

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THE WORKS OF

ORESTES A. BROWNSON

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BY

HENRY F. BROWNSON.

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CONTAINING THE THIRD PART OF THE WRITINGS IN DEFENCE OF THE CHURCH.

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BUSHNELL'S DISCOURSES.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for 1849–1851.]

I.—ORTHODOXY AND HERESY IDENTICAL.

Dr. Bushnell is the pastor of a Congregational parish in Hartford, Connecticut, professing what are called in New England "Orthodox" doctrines. He has produced considerable excitement for the last five or six years, and is just now one of our principal "lions." He is certainly not without influence, and we are assured that he carries with him a large portion of his own denomination, and is followed, it is said, by the larger part of the younger Congregational ministers. *The New Englander*, the organ of the New Haven school, accepts his views, and Andover, we are told, adopts them as explicitly as it can, without forfeiting its funds. The indications now are, that the Bushnellites will either divide the Congregational body into two sects of nearly equal strength, or that they will leaven the whole lump with their peculiar views, change essentially the character of New England theology, and virtually obliterate the last traces of New England Calvinism. Such are the indications; but what the result will actually prove to be, we by no means venture to predict,—though the latter alternative seems to us the more probable.

We have discovered little that is new in Dr. Bushnell's views,—little with which we were not in former years perfectly familiar, or which has not had for a long time a large number of adherents both at home and abroad. He is evidently dissatisfied with all the recognized forms of Protestantism, and desirous of hitting upon something which shall dissolve and recombine them all in a new and far more comprehensive form, or rather no-form, in which all men shall unite, however divided and mutually hostile they may be in their mere doctrinal statements. He thinks this end is attainable without the labor of clearing away any false doctrine,

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**God in Christ. Three discourses delivered at New Haven, Cambridge, and Andover, with a Preliminary Dissertation on Language.* By Horace Bushnell. Hartford: 1849.

or abolishing any extant creed or formula of faith. All creeds and formulas, according to him, are tentative, and never final. Yet they all serve to suggest the truth to the mind and conscience of those who adopt them, not adequately, indeed, but in the least untrue manner in which the given mind and conscience are capable of receiving it. The union already exists at bottom, and the only difficulty is, that men are not aware of it, do not know it, and suppose they differ when and where they do not. The work to be done is, not to induce men to believe otherwise than they do, but to show them what it is they really do believe,—not to persuade them to change their formulas, but to enable them to see what it is their formulas really stand for in their own minds, and to appreciate their real significance.

To understand this, we must advert to the author's theory of language, which he develops at length in his preliminary essay. This theory he promulgates as if it were original and profound, although it strikes us as an old acquaintance, and the one now very generally resorted to by unbelievers. Language, he assumes, has a divine origin only in the sense that it is the creation of man who is himself the creation of God, and is therefore strictly a human invention,—a notion which we are far from accepting; for language presupposes society, and society is impossible without language. Man cannot create language out of society; for whatever system of signs he should invent, being invented by and for himself alone, they would have no significance for any but himself, that is, no common significance. He cannot create it in society; for where there is no language, that is, no common medium of intercommunication between individuals, there is no society conceivable. Doubtless, a man can think, that is, perceive intuitively, externally and internally, without words or signs; but he cannot note his perceptions, retain them in his memory, or make them objects of reflection, without the aid of language of some sort;—or, in other words, he cannot take a reflective cognizance of his perceptions or intuitions, mark, or distinguish them even in his own mind, without the aid of signs. Language must have been a divine revelation, for it is not possible to conceive man, without language, setting about the invention of language. We do not, however, suppose that God gave to man in the outset, before giving him the ideas to be expressed, a complete language; it is sufficient to suppose it infused along with the knowledge itself, or supplied as occasion demanded. But

this amounts to little, because we cannot suppose a moment when man wanted the ideas. Adam was not created a baby, but a full-grown man, with a knowledge as extensive, as complete, as has ever been, or ever will be, possessed by any of his posterity. He did not grow into his knowledge, or acquire it by his own efforts, as we do; for he possessed it at the first moment of his existence. It must, then, have been given him, or infused into him, by his Maker. It is not possible to conceive of him as a perfect man, possessing from the moment of his creation a perfection never to be surpassed by any of his posterity, and yet destitute of the faculty of speech. Even those of our philosophers who hold language to have been a human invention are obliged to suppose him originally endowed with that faculty. But the faculty of speech cannot be understood to mean a power or faculty to invent or create speech, but the power or faculty of speaking, that is, of using language. The object or material of the faculty is language; and since no human faculty does or can either work without object or material, or create its own object or material, it follows that the faculty, where language is wanting, is as if it were not. The very assertion, which all are obliged to make, that man is endowed by his Maker with the faculty of speech, then, presupposes, prior to the faculty or independent of its exercise, the existence of signs as signs which it uses, and therefore language.

The attempt to make language a human creation or invention seems to us to proceed from a forgetfulness of the fact, that Almighty God instructed immediately the first man in what pertains to the natural order, as well as in what pertains to the supernatural, and therefore that Adam's knowledge was infused, instead of being acquired; and also from an unconscious leaning to the modern doctrine of progress, that man began, not in perfection, as reason and faith both teach, but in imperfection. Our modern philosophers have a singular tendency to remove God as far as possible from the world, and manifest great reluctance to ascribe any thing to his direct agency. They will in no instance, where they can help it, allow him to have done more than create the mere germ, and seem to fancy that they have made an important advance towards the secret nature of things, when they have supposed the germ developing itself. All that comes from the Creator, they wish to suppose, comes rude and imperfect, and is subsequently perfected by its own efforts. They will not allow us to believe that God created

the heavens and the earth glorious and perfect, but they would have us believe that he merely created their germs, or rather certain rude and formless bodies, which have, in the process of ages, by the operation of secondary causes, been developed or wrought into what we now find them. Some, not content with the application of this principle within the natural order, would extend it to the supernatural, and have us suppose that the Christian revelation itself was made originally only in germ, and has been since developed and matured by the agency of secondary causes. All these notions belong to one and the same general system, which develops all things from rude and feeble beginnings, and seeks perfection from imperfection, the actual from the potential, as teach the Saint Simonians and all other classes of modern socialists,—a doctrine alike repugnant to sound philosophy and Christian theology. A religious-minded man should think twice before assigning an origin to language which demands for its basis the blasphemous doctrine of modern socialists, or adopting notions which involve, if pushed to their logical results, the old Epicurean doctrine that the divinity, having launched the world in space, concerns himself no more with it, but retires to doze, as the excellent Dr. Evariste Gypendole would say, in his great arm-chair, leaving the world to take care of itself, or to "go ahead on its own hook." Perhaps, the less we are disposed to magnify the sphere of secondary causes, the more likely we are to arrive at truth.

But this by the way. Dr. Bushnell, having given language as the product of a human faculty or instinct, supposes it to consist primarily in symbols borrowed from the outward or material world, and absolutely incapable of *expressing* thought, or of serving as the medium of communicating, from one mind to another, truths which pertain to the intellectual or spiritual order. Its signs are all signs of merely sensible objects, and never are and never can be signs of any other class of objects. When they are used as media of spiritual or intellectual truths, they do not communicate or express those truths to the one addressed; they only suggest them, or direct his attention to them, and occasion his recognizing them in the intelligible world by his own intuitive power. Thus, the word *love* does not convey an intelligible idea to the mind, but merely suggests a fact of inward experience, and will mean one thing or another, more or less, according to the particular inward experience to which it is addressed. So, the word *God* is the

sign of no invariable idea, but stands in each mind for one or another idea, means this or that, more or less, according to each one's particular capacity, discipline, or internal experience. The truths suggested by language to each one, the moment it leaves the material world, are not presented by it, are not beheld in it or through it, as the medium of their revelation, but independently of it, in the intelligible world or idea,—in the Platonic sense,—in immediate relation with which, in varying subjective degrees, all men are placed by their Maker. The plain English of all this is, we take it, that the Creator has not endowed man with the faculty of speech, save for the sensible world, and that for the intelligible or spiritual world we have no language, and intercommunication of ideas or spiritual conceptions is impossible; and though we may converse with one another on sensibles, we can yet hold no *intelligible* conversation. This seems to us, nevertheless, very *intelligible* language against *intelligibility*.

That there is a partial truth in what Dr. Bushnell asserts we are not disposed to deny. Language can mean nothing to unintelligent beings, and *intelligible* conversation is possible only between intelligent persons. This, we suppose, is undeniable, and we have never heard it disputed. Intelligible conversation requires, certainly, that the one spoken to, as well as the one speaking, should be by his own constitution intelligent, that is, in relation with the intelligible. It cannot be perfect where there is a lack of unity in those who undertake to converse. There is no proper conversation possible between a man and a horse or a dog, nor between any irrational individuals. But this does not necessarily deny, as the author's doctrine implies, that man has "discourse of reason," is endowed with the faculty of rational or intelligible speech. The human race began in unity, and its unity was in the unity of the intelligible, that is, the reason,—the Platonic idea or Logos,—taken objectively, not subjectively. By virtue of the unity of the intelligible, that is, of the non-sensible, or super-sensible, intelligible language was possible, and men were capable of intelligible conversation. The idea, or the intelligible, being one in itself,—for all truth is one, and therefore the same for all men in relation with it,—its language was the same to all men, having the same significance for all. Intelligible language depends on the unity of the intelligible, and the fact that men are one in that unity, or live in im-

mediate relation with it. As the human race in the beginning were one in that unity, they could have, and in fact had, intelligible language. If they lose this unity, if they become divided, if they cease to be one in the intelligible, and able to behold it only obscurely, indistinctly, to apprehend it only partially, and to obtain only broken and detached glimpses of it, the diversity of meaning the author asserts will, no doubt, be a consequence; their language will then, certainly, be confounded, and they will no longer be able to converse intelligibly together, as happened, we know, at the building of the Tower of Babel. Thus far we do not dispute, but in some sense, agree with, the author.

But Dr. Bushnell pushes his theory too far, and even fails to perceive that the loss of unity in the intelligible is, *a fortiori*, a loss of unity in the sensible. The world of the senses is manifold and various, and its language has unity or common significance only in the intelligible; and consequently the denial of intelligible speech is the denial of all speech. The formative principle of language, whether it makes use solely of sensible images or not, is in the intelligible, not in the sensible, as is evident from the fact, that the advocates of sensism, or sensualism, in philosophy have never been able to conform any language to their system, and from the further fact, that every known language is more philosophical, contains a truer system of philosophy, than can be found in the speculations of any modern philosopher. Understand thoroughly any known language, ancient or modern, and you have a sound philosophy; and whoever finds it necessary to create a new language, or to distort an old one, in order to state his philosophical principles and conclusions, proves by that very fact that his philosophy is false, and worthy of no consideration. Philology is the true and only safe introduction to philosophy.

Modern philosophers greatly mistake in supposing, that, either logically or chronologically, the sensible in human life precedes the intelligible. The dictum of even the ancients, that *nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu*, cannot be received without Leibnitz's famous exception, *nisi ipse intellectus*,—nor even then, unless we take note that the intellect or understanding itself is not constituted without the idea or intelligible world, which is objective, above the human intellect, and independent of it. The sensible depends on the intelligible as its condition, and always presupposes it, as sensation presupposes intellection,

since not the organ perceives or senses, but the intelligent agent himself, and the perception of an external object by means of the organ of sight, smell, touch, taste, or hearing is as much an act of intellect as the perception of a non-sensible truth, and also the sensation of pain or pleasure; for it would not be a sensation, if not intellectually apprehended. Hence the patient, whose consciousness is suspended by ether or chloroform, receives no sensation from the knife of the surgeon. A non-intelligent agent cannot be conceived as a sensitive agent, although we may conceive agents intelligent no further than is requisite to be sentient,—that is to say, agents capable of perceiving, but not capable of noting or distinguishing beyond the sensitive perception; that is to say, again, agents that are simply percipient, and not reflective. Nevertheless, as there can be no intelligence without the intelligible, we must suppose all percipient beings to be, in their respective degrees, in relation with it as the formative principle of all intelligence.

Language, if admitted at all, then, must be admitted as primarily adapted to the intelligible, otherwise it would not be adapted to the constitution of the human mind, and could serve no purpose, even in the sphere of the sensible. It would also be a gross reflection on the divine wisdom to maintain the contrary; for God has evidently placed the intelligible above the sensible, and our great concernment in life is chiefly with truths which pertain to the supersensible order, that is, moral, political, and religious truths. It is these truths, that, in the commerce of life, it is chiefly necessary to communicate from one to another, and around which all serious conversation does and must turn. To suppose that God has given us a language for sensibles, and not for these, is to suppose that he has taken care of what is comparatively trifling, and neglected to provide for matters of grave importance, which would be to suppose him to act from folly, not from wisdom.

That the difficulty the author suggests does to some extent exist, though not to the extent he supposes, and is attended by grave consequences, we do not deny; but it does not lie precisely where he supposes, nor does it depend on the causes he assigns. The difficulty does not lie in language as such, whether the signs used are primarily symbolical of sensible objects or not,—for the signs are, in fact, as adequate for signifying spiritual or intelligible truths as

sensible facts, as we know from universal experience; but it lies in the fact, that the natural human race, the race deriving from Adam, has through transgression lost its unity, and is no longer one in the idea or the intelligible, has no longer in its full strength a common reason, on which the unity of language or its common significance depends. The same signs do not signify the same truths to all minds. Men's speech is confused, and they cease to understand, clearly, distinctly, and adequately, one another, because they are themselves no longer one in the objective reason, idea, or ideal truth, in which alone the unity of the race consists. This is an evil, a great evil, we admit; and though incurable out of the elected human race deriving from Abraham, the father of the faithful,—the chosen people of God,—yet not an evil for which there is no remedy. Reintegrate men in the ideal truth, restore them to their pristine unity in the intelligible, as they are restored through grace in that chosen or elected society, and unity of language is recovered, and spiritual conversation is once more practicable. In that society men are of one mind and heart, and therefore of one speech, and the same words have the same meaning for all its members, as they would have had for all men in the natural human race, had they not lost primitive unity by transgression.

But Dr. Bushnell—overlooking the fact that the natural human race has lost its original unity, and making no account of the stupendous intervention of divine mercy for its restoration through grace, in an elected humanity, a chosen people, into which all men may enter if they will, and be reintegrated in the unity of the intelligible, as Christianity teaches us—proceeds on the assumption, whether consciously or unconsciously we pretend not to decide, that the diversity he finds in regard to the intelligible is original and fundamental in the intellectual nature or constitution of man, and therefore concludes that unity of spiritual or intelligible language is absolutely impossible, and never to be sought.* "Words of thought or spirit," he says (p. 48),

* Dr. Bushnell rarely takes the trouble to be consistent with himself, and through his whole Dissertation there runs a double train of thought, which makes an exact statement of his views exceedingly difficult. According to our view, he certainly supposes the diversity of intellect, or the want of unity in understanding, to originate in the infirmity of language, in its unsuitableness to express spiritual truth; and his general doctrine as to the union of Christian sects seems evidently to imply that the diversity is mainly in the expression, not in the thought vainly at-

"are not only inexact in their significance, never measuring the truth or giving its precise equivalent, but they *always* affirm something which is false, or contrary to the truth intended. They impute form to that which is really out of form. They are related to the truth only as form to spirit,—earthen vessels in which the truth is borne, yet *always* offering their mere pottery as being truth itself." As falsehood is unintelligible in itself, and stands opposed to the intelligible, or, to speak more accurately, is the negation of the intelligible, it follows, since words of thought and spirit always affirm what is false, that there really is and can be no intelligible language, and no true statement, in words, of intellectual or spiritual truth can ever be made!

That the mass of men do not always clearly and distinctly apprehend the truths they seek to express, and do really express, in consequence of their confused perceptions and in-

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tempted to be symbolized. This supposes a real unity of the race in the intelligible, and affirms only diversity in the verbal statements. But, on the other hand, he makes language a human creation, and therefore the exponent of the interior state of the human race; consequently, he must ascribe its want of unity to the diversity of the human mind or constitution itself. Moreover, as he makes the significance of words of thought or spirit depend on the spiritual understanding and experience of those addressed, he seems to us obliged to make the diverse meaning of language the effect, and not the cause, of the diversity of the human understanding. We are inclined to believe that this is his real doctrine, and the unity which he evidently assumes as coexisting in the human race with intellectual diversity he supposes, no doubt, to consist, not in the intellect, by virtue of the unity of the intelligible, but in some deeper and more ultimate element than intellect, which he imagines there is in the human constitution.

We cannot help remarking here, that Gioberti (*Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia*, Cap. III.), ascribes the loss of unity in the order perpetuated by natural generation from Adam to the confusion of language. That the confusion of tongues, as recorded in Genesis, operated and operates to prevent the recovery of unity in the intelligible in the order so perpetuated, we do not doubt; but we are inclined to believe the confusion of speech is the consequence rather than the cause of the loss of unity. The unity of the idea or the intelligible is lost by pride, which is, when fully developed, pure, unmitigated egoism, which asserts the sufficiency of the subjective, and denies both the need and the reality of the objective, and is the very principle of diversity and separation. Pride, undoubtedly, led to the building of the Tower of Babel, and therefore the race must have virtually lost their unity before God confounded their language, which he did in mercy, to prevent the mischief they would do, if, following their pride, they could for a while maintain commerce with one another. In order to compel them to break off from their mad and impious undertaking, God confounded their language, and dispersed them abroad over the earth, which was after all only the external accomplishment of what pride had already commenced and virtually effected in the interior of man.

tuitions, more or less of error along with the truth, is no doubt the fact; and that many whose perceptions are clear and distinct express them in words which may retain traces of a meaning incompatible with the one they intend, nobody disputes; but that unintended meaning, though possibly implied by the word used, does not necessarily constitute an element of the affirmation itself, either in the mind of him who makes it, or in the mind of him to whom it is made. When we say of some one, he *attends* to what we say, we use a word which conceals the figure of a body bending to or towards some one; but not, therefore, do we affirm, or are we understood to affirm, that he stands bent forward towards us. The figure is eliminated both in our mind and in the mind we address, and the word stands in both minds as the sign of a purely intellectual or mental act of listening. The word has a spiritual as well as a material sense, and is as precise, as definite, as exact, in the former as in the latter; nay, the material sense, or the figure, serves to intensify the spiritual meaning, for *bending to* a thing indicates resolution and earnestness. It is no objection to a word, that it has many senses, or senses incompatible with the one intended, if the particular sense intended is sufficiently marked and determined, as it may be, and always is, by careful speakers and writers. Men who do not think, who pay no attention to what a speaker or writer intends, may, no doubt, mistake the "pottery" of words for the truth they are used to express; but that is not the fault of the words, but of the men themselves.

But assuming the incapacity of language, denying its adequacy to express truth in the intelligible or spiritual order, Dr. Bushnell concludes against all formal or dogmatic statements of doctrine:—"Dogmatical propositions, such as are commonly woven into creeds and catechisms of doctrine, have not the certainty they are commonly supposed to have. They only give us the seeing of the authors at the precise stand-point occupied by them at the time, and they are true only as seen from that point,—not even there, save in a proximate sense. Passing on, descending the current of time,—we will say two centuries,—we are brought to a different point, as when we change positions in a landscape, and then we are doomed to see things in a different light, in spite of ourselves. It is not that the truth changes, but we change. Our eye changes color, and then the color of the eye affects our seeing." Evidently the author holds that all

dogmatical statements of spiritual doctrine are more or less inadequate, and, indeed, at best, only proximately true. But, after all, they are so, not only because language never does, and never can, tell the truth, but because the formula of doctrine embodies only our partial views of truth, which are variable and varying, not truth itself, or views which in all times and places are true views. This last reason, which shows that the author makes the difficulty consist in the mind as well as in language, would be a good one if we had no divine revelation,—if we were abandoned to the order of nature, compelled to draw up our own creeds and catechisms, without divine instruction or assistance, and able to embody in them only our own variable and ever-varying views. But Dr. Bushnell's idea of a formula of doctrine is not exactly that of the Christian. The Christian supposes the formula embodies, not our views, but, so to speak, God's views, which do not vary with time, place, or position, and is drawn up, not by us to express our views of truth, but by God himself, as a statement for the human intellect of the views we ought always and everywhere to take, or of the truth, which we must in all times and places apprehend and believe, on pain of error and the divine displeasure. Dr. Bushnell's idea is the reverse of this. Having assumed that "language is rather the instrument of suggestion than of absolute conveyance for thought," he concludes that to teach, that is, to impart knowledge, or present truth to the minds of others, is impossible. We can tell no man any thing whereof he is ignorant. Hence the truth, for us human beings, is never any thing but the view we actually take of it; that is, for us human beings, there is no truth but our variable and ever-varying notions of truth. The creed or catechism can express only those notions as held at the time and from the point of view it is drawn up; and as these are constantly varying with time, and as we shift our point of sight, the creed or catechism, in order to express or embody the truth, must constantly vary with them. The principle the "Orthodox" doctor adopts is, that the formula, to be true, must conform to human belief, not that human belief, in order to be true belief, must conform to the formula!

That men out of unity, out of the reintegrated humanity, persisting in the diversity and variety of the natural human race in its fallen state, developing pride as its principle, do shift, with regard to spiritual truth, their positions, and change their views accordingly,—that for them the creed or

catechism loses, with time and change, its original significance, and fails to embody their ever-varying notions of truth,—that their eye changes color, and sheds its own hues over the objects they contemplate,—is, no doubt, very true; but is this a proof that the formula loses its truth, becomes false, or is it a proof that they lose sight of the truth, or perceive it, if at all, only through a colored or distorting medium? If, in process of time, there arises a discrepancy between the original formula of doctrine and men's views, is it the formula that needs changing, or men's views that need rectifying? Is it certain that men's notions are always the standard of truth, and that every statement of doctrine not conformable to them is therefore to be rejected, either as false or as inadequate? If the "Orthodox" doctor were pleading the cause of error instead of truth, or if he were laboring to prove that there is no real difference between truth and error, what else, or what more, could he say, than he does?

But as language is never a medium of truth, and as its sole office is to direct the mind to the truth intuitively apprehensible, already in it or before it, every statement of doctrine it is possible to make in words, in itself considered, is erroneous. Thus, the Orthodox statements of the sacred mysteries, the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement, regarded as statements for the intellect, or logical understanding, are inadequate and erroneous. Indeed, the truth, in itself formless, can never be truly stated, because the statement gives it a form, and every form falsifies it. Here is the grand fact that has been overlooked. It has been supposed that Christian truth could be drawn out in formal propositions, and stated in formulas fully expressing it, and having the same meaning for all men; but this is a mistake. Christian truth spurns all forms, defies all formal statements, and the more adequately we conceive it, the more paradoxical and contradictory shall we be in our speech, and the less shall we submit to the restraints of logic.

"There is no book in the world that contains so many repugnances, or antagonistic forms of assertion, as the Bible. Therefore, if any man choose to play off his constructive logic upon it, he can easily show it up as the absurdest book in the world." (p. 69.) "We find little, therefore, in the Scriptures, to encourage the hope of a complete and sufficient Christian dogmatism, or of a satisfactory and truly adequate system of scientific theology. Language, under the laws of logic or speculation, does not seem to be adequate to any such use or purpose."

(pp. 76, 77.) "Considering the infirmities of language, all formulas of doctrine should be held in a *certain spirit of accommodation*. They cannot be pressed to the letter, for the letter is never true. They can be regarded only as proximate representations, and should, therefore, be accepted, not *as laws of our belief*, or opinion, but more as badges of consent and good understanding." (p. 81.) "Unquestionably, the view of language here presented must produce, if received, a decided mitigation of our dogmatic tendencies in religion. It throws a heavy shade of discouragement on our efforts in that direction. It shows that language is, probably, incapable of any such definite and determinate use as we have supposed it to be in our theological speculations; that, for this reason, dogma has failed hitherto, and about as certainly will hereafter." (pp. 91, 92.)

Our readers must not suppose that Dr. Bushnell means merely to reject scholastic theology, for he objects to creeds and catechisms themselves, unless taken in a loose, accommodating sense, as each one chooses to interpret them for himself, and therefore means to assert that language is inadequate to the distinct, formal, and exact statement of Christian doctrine, or the divine *revelata*. According to him, all spiritual truth is formless, and every formula is contrary to its nature, and falsifies it. Our study should be, not to give it a form for the understanding, but to be moved and excited by it as an interior and all-pervading force or principle of life. He does not propose at once to abolish "all platforms and articles," for to that men will not as yet hear (p. 341). But it is clear that he proposes to do it ultimately, and to get rid of all *credenda*, all dogmas or articles of faith, and to have no truth for the understanding insisted upon. In other words, he holds that Christianity is a life, not a dogma; an interior principle, a living force that is felt, loved, obeyed in the conduct of life, but not a collection of articles or a system of doctrines to be intellectually apprehended and believed. Unity of language or of mind is not to be looked for or desired; the only possible unity is the unity of love, the unity of sentiment, and all who have the sentiment have the unity of the spirit, and really and truly worship God, whether they conceive of him as "Jehovah, Jove, or Lord," or manifest it outwardly in the forms approved by the Protestant, the Catholic, the Gentoo, the Chinese, the Thibetian, or by the ancient Phœnicians, Greeks, or Romans. This is clear enough from an article of his which appeared some time since in *The New Englander*, entitled *Comprehensive*

Christianity, that is, a Christianity which comprehends all forms, and is itself without form; which accepts all the mutually contradictory and repugnant doctrines extant, with all their contradictions and repugnances, and avails itself of all their partial and one-sided views and statements as so many various and useful modes of duly infusing the spirit of love into the human heart, and effecting the concord of affection and harmony of life.

But this conception of Christianity, while it makes them of little value, allows the author to retain all creeds, formulas, and statements, not as expressive of the whole truth, truth in its purity, integrity, and completeness, nor of truth for the intellect, but of truth for the affections, sentiments, feelings, conscience. The Orthodox statements of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement are, indeed, inadequate and false for the logical intellect; yet, in a large class of persons, they produce the true affections, quicken Christian sentiments, and aid in conforming the life to the spiritual reality. In another class they produce contrary effects, and these, therefore, should not be required to accept them, but suffered to modify them, or to substitute other statements for them, better adapted to their peculiar modes of thought and feeling. The statements preferred by Unitarians, in Unitarian minds and hearts, produce the same affections that Orthodox statements do in Orthodox minds and hearts. The truth for the affections, the only truth in the case to be considered, suggested by the two sets of statements, though one contradicts the other, is the same truth in each, and both sets should be suffered to stand; both are as true as statements can be for those they suit, and as false as false can be for those they do not suit; let the Orthodox have his statements, and the Unitarian have his, and both will be suited, and Christian affection promoted. Hence the "Orthodox" doctor protests against no creed. "So far," he says (p. 82), "from suffering even the least consciousness of constraint or oppression under any creed, I have been readier to accept as great a number as fell in my way; for when they are subjected to the deepest alchemy of thought, that which descends to the relation between the form of truth and its interior formless nature, they become, thereupon, so elastic, and run so freely into each other, that one seldom need have any difficulty in accepting as many as are offered him. He may regard them only as a kind of battle-dooring of words, blow answering

to blow, while the reality of the play, namely, *exercise*, is the same, whichever side of the room is taken, and whether the stroke is given by the right hand or the left." The doctor's notion of what accepting a creed means appears to be somewhat peculiar, but very liberal, withal.

Such, briefly, are the principal characteristics of Bushnellism. It must be apparent to the most careless student, that our "Orthodox" doctor cannot, without contradicting his whole theory, admit the possibility of a divine revelation, made to mankind through the medium of inspired prophets and apostles, as the Christian world has hitherto held, because such revelation can be communicated by the inspired to the uninspired only through the medium of language. But language is not a medium of thought from mind to mind, and can only by its symbols suggest to the mind addressed the truth it already possesses, or that lies intuitively perceptible or apprehensible before it. Since the revealed truths, the *revelata*, at least as *revelata*, pertain to the supernatural, lie in a sphere above the naturally intelligible, are, in regard to our natural cognitive faculty, super-intelligible, they are not intuitively apprehensible or perceptible by the uninspired, and therefore cannot be communicated to them even by the inspired. Revelation, therefore, is possible only to those whom God directly and immediately inspires; and only those whom he does so inspire have, or can be believers in, a divine revelation. To all others, in the language of Thomas Paine, "revelation is mere hearsay." This is, substantially, Quakerism, and is a conclusion the author appears not only to accept, but even to contend for. He holds to a present, immediate, personal inspiration (pp. 350, 351),—probably claims it for himself; but we shall so far adopt his doctrine as to hold ourselves excused from accepting what he says as divine revelation, till we find it either confirmed by an authority we respect, or are ourselves personally inspired to believe it.

The doctrine of the author also denies that God himself can make a revelation to the human mind, even immediately, without supernaturally enlarging, not merely its creditive, but its cognitive power, so as to enable it by its own inherent *vis intuitiva*, or intuitive energy, to behold or perceive the supernatural truth he would reveal; for it denies that truth is communicable, or that it can be *mediately* apprehended. Consequently the doctrine denies the possibility of belief in any thing which is not an object of immediate intui-

tion; for no one can believe what he does not apprehend. Hence faith is possible only in so far as it is intuition, sight, knowledge, or science; that is, it is possible only in so far as it is *not* faith; for faith is to believe what we do not see,—is, if we may believe St. Paul, "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." *Est autem fides sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium.* Whether the author is right or wrong in this, it is pretty evident that his doctrine is irreconcilable with the faith of the Christian world and the common sense of mankind.

The intelligent reader of Dr. Bushnell's work is everywhere struck with the tendency he manifests to confound faith and science, dogma and speculation. He is offended by the theological speculations of *theologers*, as he contemptuously calls them, and therefore condemns Christian dogmas, as if Christian dogmas were mere speculations! Does he need to be told that the dogma is the *revelatum*, the revealed truth, and essentially non-speculative, preceding theological speculation as its postulate? The dogma is enjoined or imposed by authority, and demands simple assent; speculation is an operation of the discursive reason, assuming the dogmas as its postulates or axioms, and its results are conclusions depending on the authority of the logical process which demonstrates them; the dogma is accepted on the veracity of God, whose word it is, immediately or mediately spoken or transmitted to us. We do not suppose that Dr. Bushnell is ignorant of this distinction; but does he act wisely to treat it with contempt, and to reason on and about dogma and speculation, as if both belonged to the same category?

The same tendency, which leads the author to confound the dogmas of faith with the speculations of theologians, leads him to confound faith with science. By confounding faith with science, or resolving it into science, denying it to be faith if not science, he denies the possibility of faith in mysteries, and holds that all that is believed in the mysteries of religion is simply what the mind of the believer not only apprehends, but comprehends. This compels him either to deny all mysteries,—that God has revealed or reveals any thing above the natural understanding,—or else to assert a direct, immediate, and personal revelation from God to each man,—what he calls mysticism,—which enables us to perceive intuitively their intrinsic truth. "Christian character itself,"

he says (p. 351), "and all its graces, are forms of inspiration. It requires inspiration . . . . . to understand or really come into the truth of Christ at all." "No man," he had said (p. 331), "really knows Christ, or *can know* or *be taught* the Christian truth, who is not in the spirit of Christ." "Words cannot bring it—the Christian plan—into his heart; dogma cannot give it in the dry light of reason." And again (p. 332), "We can know the things which are freely given us of God only *as Paul knew them*,—by the spirit that is of God."

The author first asserts rationalism as the condition of rejecting the mysteries, and then mysticism as the condition of accepting them, not as mysteries, but as things intrinsically apprehended; that is, he is alternately a rationalist and an enthusiast, as suits his purpose. It is very true that we cannot believe with *divine faith* the things which God has revealed, without the grace of faith; but the author abuses the word *inspiration*, if by inspiration he means this grace. The grace by which we believe the divine *revelata* is not inspiration, is not a grace of science, but simply a grace of faith, and elevates not necessarily the *vis cognoscitiva*, but the *vis creditiva*,—gives us, not the power of seeing the intrinsic truth of the *revelata*, but of holding them in our belief with a supernatural firmness. This grace does not reveal to us the truth, as does inspiration; it simply enables us to believe it with divine faith. The truth itself, as proposed to our belief, is, when proposed, apprehensible by the natural or unelevated human intellect. The propositions of faith, as to their intrinsic truth, for the most part transcend the reach of the human intellect, and therefore must be taken, if at all, on the authority proposing them; but as propositions to be believed on authority, that is, as simple propositions of faith, they do not transcend that intellect, and can be apprehended by it without difficulty, even in the simple and unlettered, and ordinary reason can also apprehend the competency of the authority. The error of the author is in confounding inspiration with the *donum fidei* of the theologians.

The Gospel was preached by the apostles, and is every day preached by missionaries, to men not incorporated into the mystic body of Christ, not one in him, nor living his life. But this would be absurd, if no man could learn, or be taught, while out of Christ, Christian truth, which must be believed as the condition of becoming one with him, of being in him, or having him in them. Certainly no man can *live* Chris-

tian truth out of the mystic body of Christ; but not therefore does it follow that no man out of that body can know intellectually what the Christian faith requires him to believe, the authority on which it is to be believed,—whether the church or the Scriptures,—or, even with human faith, believe them. The devils certainly have not the spirit of Christ, are not in Christ, have not him in them, are not divinely inspired, and yet St. James tells us they "believe and tremble." If the truth cannot be taught to unbelievers, to men who are not yet Christians, how are they to be converted? Moreover, will the author name to us a single proposition of Christian doctrine which, as a proposition of faith, not of science, is unintelligible to the natural human understanding, supposing that understanding really exerted to apprehend it? God is one divine being subsisting in three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; in Christ are two distinct natures subsisting in one person; in the blessed Eucharist, when the priest pronounces the words of consecration, the elements are changed into the substance of the body of our Lord; we cannot elect to concur with grace without the aid of grace, and yet grace does not aid us without our concurrence. We know nothing in Christian faith more difficult to understand than these propositions; but who dares say that the assertions contained in them are not apprehensible even by a child old enough to begin his catechism? The explanation of them, the answer to the question how they can be true, and all that, is no doubt difficult; but nothing of all that is proposed as an object of faith, or is required to be understood by the believer in order to believe what is proposed. We know that a spire of grass grows, but how it grows we know not. By faith we know that the world was framed by the word of God, yet how God framed it is no object of our knowledge, or of our faith. Shall we therefore say that we cannot believe that he framed it by his word? It will never do to say that we apprehend nothing because we do not comprehend all things, or that what is not comprehensible is not believable. If the good doctor had distinguished between apprehending and comprehending, and between the simple apprehension of Christian truth as the intellectual object of faith, and the spiritual appropriation of that truth in Christian life and character, he would have escaped the blunder of asserting that "no man can be taught Christian truth who is not in the spirit of Christ," or learn it otherwise than by immediate, personal inspiration.

That the end we are to aim at is not the intellectual apprehension of the objects or propositions of faith, the human or even the supernatural assent to them, is of course true. The end to be sought is never the intellectual apprehension of the truth, for that the devils have, but obedience to the truth, or life conformable to its teachings. There must not only be the perception of the intellect, but the consent of the will; and without the latter, the former, instead of being meritorious, only augments our guiltiness. Faith without works, the *fides informis* of the schoolmen, is dead; and to be living, meritorious, it must be conjoined with love, be *fides formata*. Everybody knows, or ought to know, this. The Christian life, Christian truth as the inward principle of life, the vivifying or formative principle of character, is the main thing, without which nothing is of any value. So far as Dr. Bushnell means simply to insist on this commonplace truth,—commonplace truth with all except those sectaries who preach justification by faith alone,—we have no quarrel with him; but when he goes further, and tells us that Christian truth is not addressed primarily to the human intellect, and seeks to exclude the intellect from all share in the formation of the Christian character, we recognize in him neither the Christian nor the philosopher. We must apprehend the truth, or we cannot obey it, or voluntarily submit to it; and the intellect is our only faculty for the apprehension of truth. It is our only cognitive faculty. It is the light or the sight of the will, which, considered in itself as a distinct faculty, is blind. The will acts only for an end, and cannot act for an end which is not apprehended. Suppress the intellect, and you suppress the will; suppress the will, and you suppress all voluntary obedience, all virtue, all *human* acts. Impossible, therefore, is it to have the Christian character, to live the Christian life, without intellectual apprehension of Christian truth. The first step is always intellectual apprehension, and it is by faith that we are incorporated into the elected human race, where only we can live in unity, and complete the Christian life. Is it not a little too bad that we should be called upon to defend intellect against a modern *enlightened* reformer, and to maintain against him that intellect is not a useless appendage to the human constitution?

But truth to the human intellect must always be presented in some form more or less distinct, more or less definite. Doubtless, it is not necessary for every mind that it should

be drawn out in detail, in all the minuteness we find in scientific theology; yet the more clearly, distinctly, and definitely its several propositions are drawn out and stated, the more perfect will be our apprehension of it, and the less likely shall we be to mistake it, or fall into errors opposed to it. Even the Apostles' Creed, with which the author closes his volume, and which he professes to believe, is a formula of faith, a formal statement of Christian truth, to the intellect. And how will you teach Christian truth, except by means of formal statements? What else is every sermon that is preached, every book that is written, with a view to induce men to believe and practise the Christian religion? No teaching, no instruction, is possible, without formal statements to the understanding. Do you propose to abolish all teaching, all science, all intercommunion of thought, and leave every man to the solitary workings of his own mind? What will you do with children? Will you abolish all primary and secondary schools, all academies, colleges, seminaries, and universities,—all preaching, all catechizing, all talking, all reading, all literature? If not, you must and will have teaching of some sort, and then formal statements, formulas of doctrine, addressed to the intellect. Or do you propose to follow the cant of the day, to declaim against all intellectual education, and say you will have only *moral* education, the education of the feelings, of the moral and religious affections and sentiments? But how will you contrive, without addressing the intellect, to impart this education? Will you do it in perfect silence, or will you now and then open your mouth? If you open your mouth, you must say something, make some formal statement, true or false. You cannot speak to the feelings, you cannot even move them, except through the intellect. Then, in what will your moral education consist? Is it to be conformable or not conformable to the truth? How, without the exercise of intellect, will you know which is truth, which is falsehood, and determine what is the education conformable to the one or the other? A *moral* act is the act of a free agent, done for the sake of the end which the law of God commands us to seek. How, without teaching your pupils this end, the means and conditions of fulfilling it, will you give them a *moral* education? Is that a moral education that leaves the pupil ignorant of the precepts of morality? Were you to reduce your system to practice, how long would you be in reducing your community below the condition of the most degraded savage tribe?

Then, again, does the doctor act wisely in sneering at logic, and making himself merry with what he calls "logicking"? Does it never happen that the truth is assailed, and needs to be defended? that falsehood is promulgated, and needs to be refuted? How is one or the other to be done without logic,—*logicking*, if the author pleases? The author requires us to live Christian truth; he, then, must hold that there is a difference between truth and falsehood, —that the former is good, and the latter is bad. Will he, then, deny that it is necessary to distinguish between them, to defend the truth if assailed, and repel the falsehood if it attempts to usurp the throne of truth? Nay, is not the author himself "logicking" against logic, from the beginning of his book to the end? Does he not bring out views of his own, and seek to give us logical reasons for accepting them? and does he not point out what he holds to be errors, and endeavour to show us why they are errors? Has he, then, the face to turn round and deny the very instrument he has used, the very authority to which he appeals? Does he persuade himself that it is a sufficient answer to say, that he admits his inconsistency, but then all deep thinkers, all profound minds, are inconsistent in their statements, and cannot, owing to the imperfection of language, state the truths they behold, without violating the logical understanding?

We do not suppose that Dr. Bushnell is naturally a weak man, nor, compared with the common run of Protestant ministers, a very bad man; but he is, undoubtedly, a very ignorant man, and unacquainted with the theology of his own denomination. He has, doubtless, read some, thought a little, felt much, and imagined more; but he lacks mental discipline and scientific culture. He appears to have lighted, in the course of his experience, upon certain speculations, to have caught up certain half or quarter ideas, which, being novelties to him, he has presumed to be novelties to all the world. These he appears to have dwelt upon till his head has become a little turned, and he fancies that he is, as it were, a seer and a prophet. To those who have passed through a state similar to that he is now in, and have late in life done what they could to supply the defect of early discipline, he is an object of tender interest, and they pity him at the same time that they laugh at the antics he plays, and the capers he cuts. He may, perhaps, some day, grow sober, lower his estimate of his own supereminent greatness,

blush at his folly, and marvel at his delusions. He seems to us, after all, a man on whom the truth will not always fall powerless. He shows the marks of his Calvinistic breeding, it is true, but he has comparatively little of that cold, dry, hard, wiry, sly, crafty disposition, so characteristic of Calvinistic ministers; and seems to retain at bottom even something of the simplicity of the child, and the frankness of the youth. He seems really to have a little earnestness, which is not precisely fanaticism; and we shall not be surprised if we hear, one of these days, that he has abandoned system-making, has given up his trade of reformer, has bowed in sorrow and humility at the foot of the cross, and been received into the society of those whose glory it is to glory only in a crucified Redeemer. He is now mentally and morally in a chaotic state; who knows but the spirit of God may yet breathe over the chaos, and cause order to spring out of confusion, and light to arise out of darkness? Our brethren should pray for his conversion.

II.—ON THE TRINITY.

In what we said of Dr. Bushnell's volume in a previous article, we confined ourselves chiefly to the author's theory of language, and to some general remarks on the character and tendency of his doctrines; we propose in the present article, and those which may follow it, to enter into a more particular and thorough examination of his views and statements as a theologian,—not, indeed, because it is of much consequence to the community what are or are not the peculiar beliefs and opinions of Dr. Bushnell as an individual, but because the questions he raises are highly interesting in themselves, and of great importance in the present state of theology among those outside of the Catholic Church.

The topics on which Dr. Bushnell discourses in this volume are the Divinity of Christ, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, and what he calls "Dogma and Spirit in general." His work is far from being methodical, or approaching the character of a systematic treatise on all or any one of the matters upon which it touches. In consequence, we shall be unable to throw our review of it into that methodical and systematic shape which we always prefer when it is possible. The most philosophical and logical method of considering the work would be to commence,

after what we have said of the Preliminary Dissertation, which contains in some measure the principles of the author's theory, with his last Discourse, entitled "Dogma and Spirit," and then proceed to the consideration of what is said on each of the particular mysteries discussed. But this would compel us to recast the author's whole work, and reduce it to its logical order,—a labor which we are unwilling to bestow upon it, and which would oblige us to begin with the discussion of some knotty metaphysical questions, not at all to the taste of the majority of our readers, and which we would spare them, after the very unreasonable amount of metaphysics inflicted upon them during the last year. We shall follow, therefore, the method of the author himself, and take up the topics on which we propose to comment, as far as practicable, in the order he presents them.

Dr. Bushnell is a Congregationalist minister, the pastor of a congregation in Hartford, Connecticut, which calls itself Orthodox, that is, orthodox in the sense of the New England Puritans, which means, that they hold Calvinistic doctrines against Arminians, and nominally Catholic doctrines against Unitarians. His Discourses have found several opponents among the ministers of his own sect, and one or two attempts have been, directly or indirectly, made to convict him officially of teaching heresy. But thus far these attempts have failed, and he appears to stand at this moment, if not acquitted, at least unconvicted, of the charge of teaching doctrines really incompatible with those generally held by the Puritan churches of New England. This is a significant fact, and indicates either a greater departure from sound doctrine, or less respectable theological attainments, on their part, than most people have supposed.

Dr. Bushnell does not avowedly reject the sacred mysteries we have named as the subjects of his Discourses; he even professes to hold them, and assumes the air of defending them against Unitarians. The reality revealed or declared in them he makes the profession of believing; but he opposes the verbal and dogmatic statements of them hitherto received by Christian theologians. These statements are not the reality itself, and tend to conceal rather than to exhibit it; and he seems to think that, if the truth or the revealed reality could be divested of these statements, and insisted on irrespective of them, all, whether Trinitarians or Unitarians, orthodox or heterodox, would be found to be of one mind, and to embrace substantially one and the

same truth, or fundamental reality. This fundamental reality, the truth that underlies the orthodox statements of the mysteries, it is his aim to set forth, and he appears to hope by so doing to bring about a true Christian union between the various Protestant sects, and even between Protestants and Catholics. His method is to show the inadequacy, and the contradictory and absurd character, of the approved dogmatic statements of the several mysteries, and then to set forth the truth which those statements were intended to express, or the reality that underlies them. We have, then, two things to do,—to consider, 1. His representations and criticisms of the approved statements; and, 2. The mysteries as set forth in his own statements. We begin with the mystery of the ever-adorable Trinity.

"I speak of the more commonly accepted doctrine. What that doctrine is, I am well aware it would be exceedingly difficult to state. Let us pause here a moment, and see if we can find our way to any proximate conception of it.

"It seems to be agreed by the orthodox, that there are three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in the divine nature. These three persons, too, are generally regarded as belonging, not to the *machina Dei*, by which God is revealed, but to the very *esse*, the substantial being of God, or the interior contents of his being. They are declared to be equal; all to be infinite; all to be the same in substance; all to be one. But, as soon as the question is raised, what are we to intend by the word *person*, the appearance of agreement, and often of self-understanding, vanishes.

"A very large portion of the Christian teachers, together with the general mass of disciples, undoubtedly hold three real living persons in the interior nature of God; that is, three consciousnesses, wills, hearts, understandings. Certain passages of Scripture, supposed to represent the three persons as covenanting, coöperating, and co-presiding, are taken, accordingly, so to affirm, in the most literal and dogmatic sense. And some very distinguished living teachers are frank enough to acknowledge, that any intermediate doctrine, between the absolute unity of God and a social unity, is impossible and incredible; therefore, that they take the latter. Accordingly, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are, in their view, socially united only, and preside in that way, as a kind of celestial tritheocracy over the world. They are one God simply in the sense that the three will always act together, with a perfect consent, or coincidence. This view has the merit that it takes consequences fairly, states them frankly, and boldly renounces orthodoxy, at the point opposite to Unitarianism, to escape the same difficulties. It denies that the three persons are 'the *same* in substance,' and asserts instead, three substances; and yet, because of its clear opposition to Unitarianism, it

is counted safe, and never treated as a heresy. However, when it is applied to Christ and his work, then it breaks down into the same confusion as the more common view, reducing the Son to a really subordinate and subject position, in which the proper attributes of deity are no longer visible or supposable.

"But our properly orthodox teachers and churches, while professing three persons, also retain the verbal profession of one person. They suppose themselves really to hold that God is one person. And yet they most certainly do not; they only confuse their understanding, and call their confusion faith. This I affirm, not as speaking reproachfully, but, as I suppose, on the ground of sufficient evidence,—partly because it cannot be otherwise, and partly because it visibly is not.

"No man can assert three persons, meaning three consciousnesses, wills, and understandings, and still have any intelligent meaning in his mind, when he asserts that they are yet one person. For, as he now uses the term, the very idea of a person is that of an essential, incommunicable monad, bounded by consciousness, and vitalized by self-active will, which being true, he might as well profess to hold that three units are yet one unit. When he does it, his words will, of necessity, be only substitutes for sense."—pp. 130–132.

How far the author here reproduces the statement of this sacred mystery approved by his own brethren, we shall not undertake to say; but we can assure him that he by no means states the doctrine as held by orthodox theologians. "No man," he says, "can assert three persons, meaning three consciousnesses, wills, and understandings, and still have any intelligent meaning in his mind, when he asserts that they are yet one person." Who, we would ask him, maintains the contrary? No Christian theologian ever asserts that there are in God three wills and three understandings, or three consciousnesses. Will and understanding are divine attributes and follow the divine nature, essence, or substance, which is indistinguishably one as opposed to plurality, and simple as opposed to complexity or composition. The distinction of persons asserted by Christian theology is not a distinction of the substance, essence, or nature of God, for that is identically one and the same in each of the three divine persons. So there are not three wills and understandings in God, but only one will and one understanding. Hence to allege, because we say there are three persons in God, that we hold there are three wills and three understandings in God, is to misrepresent us, and to reason very sophistically.

No doubt there is no will or understanding where there

is no person; but this creates no difficulty, for God is not impersonal, and nobody pretends that we hold him to be so; indeed, so far from this, the charge against us is that we make him too personal, assigning him three persons instead of only one person. No doubt, again, that, where there are no will and understanding, that is to say, no rational nature or substance, there is no person conceivable. But this is no objection, for God is rational nature or substance, terminating as its last complement in the three divine persons. The three persons do not stand disjoined from the divine substance; they do not terminate each a portion or division of the divine substance, but each has, so to speak, under it the whole undivided, indivisible, and indistinguishable substance, nature, or essence of God, so that we can say, as we are taught in the Athanasian creed, and in all the rigor of the terms too, "the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, and yet there are not three Gods, but one God." The word *person* in itself, and taken distinctively, is not equivalent to the word *God*, for the term *God* expresses the three distinct persons in the unity of the divine essence. Yet each person is God, and when we name either the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Ghost, without intending to mark the personal distinction, we name all that we do when we name explicitly the three persons, because the distinction of persons is *ad intra*, not *ad extra*, because the persons, though really distinguishable, are inseparable, and because the whole divine nature, essence, or substance, as we have just said, is indivisibly under each person. Personality is properly the terminus or last complement of rational nature, and the divine nature, which is rational nature, instead of terminating in a single personality, as is the case with us, terminates in three personalities, or persons.

The author says, again, "Our properly orthodox teachers and churches, while professing three persons, also retain the *verbal* profession of one person." With his permission, this is false; for their precise *verbal* profession is, that God is three distinct persons in one divine substance, or essence, and none of them ever say, or allow any one to say, that he is but one person. The author need not labor to prove that three are not one in the sense they are three, or that one is not three in the sense it is one, for nobody does or can believe it. Orthodox theologians are not so stupid as to contend that God is three persons, and yet but one person; for they hold that of contraries one must always be false. What

they teach is, that there is one God and one only God; but that in this one God there is the distinction *ad intra*, not *ad extra*, of three real persons, and that these three real persons subsist without prejudice to the strict and absolute unity and simplicity of the divine being, or essence. Distinctions *ad extra* undoubtedly destroy the absolute unity of the subject of which they are predicated, but distinctions *ad intra* do not, for we distinguish in the cube, for instance, length, breadth, and depth, and yet without prejudice to its unity. We bring not this to illustrate the distinction of persons in God, but to show that distinctions *ad intra* are not incompatible with unity of substance. This being so, we can assert, after having asserted the distinction of persons in God, the strict unity of the divine essence, without denying the reality of that distinction. It is false, then, to say that, while professing three persons, we retain the verbal profession, or even the virtual profession, of one person only.

We do not prove, nor undertake to prove, by natural reason, that God is three real persons in one essence, or to explain how he can be so, nor are required to do it, for we profess it, not as a revelation of the intelligible, but as a declaration of the superintelligible, and we believe it not on the authority of natural reason, but on the authority of God declaring it. We know from revelation that God is distinctively three persons in one indistinguishable nature, and we therefore know that he can be, for we may always safely reason *ab esse ad posse*. All we undertake to do by reason, and all we are required to do, is to show, not that the dogma is true, nor that it is possible even, but that reason is utterly unable to show that it is impossible, or that it involves, as our author, in common with Unitarians, contends, a contradiction. As he accuses us of stating the dogma, it is contradictory and absurd; as we ourselves really do state it, and as it is held by all Christian theologians, it is neither one nor the other. The author falsifies the orthodox statement, and his objections have force against it only as he falsifies it. If he falsifies it ignorantly, he is incompetent to speak on the subject, and should return to the seminary and recommence his theology; if he does it knowingly, and therefore wilfully, we leave it to himself to characterize his grave moral delinquency.

But let us hear our author still further.

"Methods are also resorted to, in the way of explaining God's oneness

in consistency with *his existence in three* persons, which show that his real oneness, as a spirit, is virtually lost. Thus it will sometimes be represented, that the three persons are three sets of attributes inhering in a common substance; in which method, the three intelligences come to their unity in a virtually inorganic ground; for if the substance supposed be itself of a vital quality, a life, then we have only more difficulties on hand, and not fewer; viz., to conceive a living Person having in himself, first, the attributes of a person, and secondly, three more persons who are attributes in the second degree,—that is, attributes of attributes. It can hardly be supposed that any such monster is intended, in the way of bringing the three persons into unity; therefore, taking the 'substance' as inorganic, we have three vital personal Gods, and back of them, or under them, as their ground of unity, an inorganic Deity. I make no objection here to the supposition, that the persons are mere attributes of a substance not themselves; I ask not how attributes can be real enough to make persons, and not real enough to make substances; I urge it not as an objection, that our very idea of person, as the word is here used, is that of a living substance manifested through attributes,—itself the most real and substantial thing to thought in the universe of God,—I only call attention to the fact that this theory of divine unity, making it essentially inorganic, indicates such a holding of the three persons as virtually leaves no unity at all, which is more distinct than a profession of mental confusion on the subject.

"But, while the unity is thus confused and lost in the threeness, perhaps I should also admit that the threeness sometimes appears to be clouded or obscured by the unity. Thus, it is sometimes protested that, in the word *person*, nothing is meant beyond a 'three-fold distinction'; though it will always be observed that nothing is really meant by the protestation,—that the protester goes on to speak and reason of the three, not as being only somewhats, or distinctions, but as metaphysical and real persons. Or, the three are sometimes compared, in their union, to the soul, the life principle, and the body, united in one person, called a man,—an illustration which, if it has any point or appositeness at all, shows how God may be one and not three; for the life and the body are not persons. Or, if the soul be itself the life, and the body its external development, which is possible, then, in a yet stricter sense, there is but one person in them all."—pp. 132, 133.

The several methods here enumerated are new to us, and we cannot forbear asking the author what *Tractatus de Trinitate* he has studied, and if in fact he is not somewhat accustomed, like his friend Theodore Parker, to substitute his own gloss for the text he studies,—what he fancies his author ought to say, for what he does say? It is a little remarkable that no neologist seems able to see *straight* or single, and that it is difficult, if not impossible, to find an

instance in which one faithfully reproduces the orthodox doctrine he proposes to controvert. No orthodox theologian ever confounds the distinction of persons with the distinction of attributes; for the distinction of persons is a real distinction *ad intra* in God, whereas the distinction of attributes is not a real distinction in God, but simply a distinction in our mode of conceiving the divine being,—what theologians call *distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ*, that is, a distinction which is only *eminently* or *equivalently* in God. In God himself there is no real distinction, as we have often occasion to repeat, between his essence and his attributes. He is not like creatures composed of matter and form, substance and quality, essence and attributes, for he is, as all our theologians teach, most pure and simple act. He is not wise, powerful, just, and good, in the sense of being endowed with the qualities expressed by these adjectives, but he is wisdom, power, justice, goodness, in their essence, their substance, and absoluteness. No one who maintains this, and all orthodox theologians do maintain it, can be such a simpleton as to call the divine persons attributes, and still maintain that they are real distinctions in God. Consequently, the objection of the author falls of itself, for the doctrine against which it is urged is no better than a figment of his own brain.

"Thus, it is sometimes protested that, in the word *person*, nothing is meant beyond a 'threefold distinction'; though it will always be observed that nothing is really meant by the protestation,—that the protester goes on to speak and reason of the three, not as being only somewhats, or distinctions, but as metaphysical and real persons." Whether this is the case with some of the author's own brethren, or not, he knows better than we, and we confess we have noticed in some of the statements of Professor Stuart of Andover absurdities hardly less striking; but we find nothing of the sort among our own theologians. No orthodox theologian protests that the three divine persons are merely somewhats, or distinctions, but all, without exception, maintain that the distinctions, the *somewhats*, are three really subsisting persons in the highest and most perfect sense of the word *person*. They assert, not only a distinction, but a distinction of real persons, and therefore never make the protest here alleged. The protest they make is, that by the distinction of persons they mean no distinction of the nature or essence of God, but simply a distinction in its

terminus, so that the assertion of three persons, or *subsistentiæ*, does not deny the strict unity of nature or essence. To speak of the three persons, after this, as real persons, is no inconsistency, implies no contradiction. What the author means by a metaphysical person, and a metaphysical person that is real, we are not able even to conjecture. A metaphysical person that is real would, in our vocabulary, be a contradiction in terms. The distinction of persons, not of essence, in God, is not a metaphysical distinction, but a real distinction, and the divine persons are real, not metaphysical, persons.

The illustration which the author notices and refutes, borrowed from the union of the soul, the life principle, and the body in man, the appositeness of which escapes us, we have never seen adduced, and could never ourselves adduce it. And, indeed, of all illustrations borrowed from created things to help us to a conception of the sacred mystery, our theologians are in the habit of remarking, that they are unlike in more respects than they are like, and that none of them are ever to be taken thoughout, or for more than some single point of resemblance, or analogy; for we must never hope, by our natural reason, to comprehend what is in itself this mystery of mysteries.

It is long since we have studied any of the standard works of the author's own sect, but we are inclined to believe that a serious study even of them would have given the author a more correct apprehension of the commonly received doctrine of the Trinity. His statements and objections induce us to believe that he has never even read a treatise on the Trinity written by an able theologian, and that his chief knowledge of the doctrine has been gathered from the writings of rationalists and infidels. When we had the misfortune and the shame of being, not only a Unitarian, but a Unitarian minister, we could have considered his representation of the doctrine substantially correct; but then, and we blush to say it, we knew the doctrine only from the statements of those whose very purpose it was to make it appear ridiculous and absurd. There is no resemblance between the doctrine of the Trinity we are taught by our theologians, and that we had learned from Unitarian and infidel books, reviews, and discourses; and not one of the objections we were accustomed to urge, or to hear urged, against the sacred mystery, has the least force or speciousness, when urged against the doctrine as actually

taught by orthodox divines. The doctrine against which Unitarians and unbelievers direct their attacks is, for the most part, a creature of their own imagination, and their objections evince, when not their malice, only their own ignorance of the real matter in controversy. The high conceit the anti-orthodox have of their own intellectual superiority on theological subjects, over their opponents, is founded on their ineptness. There are more things, and profounder things, in heaven and earth, than are dreamed of in their philosophy; and, generally, the *progress* which all classes of neologists so loudly boast consists precisely in their not apprehending the deeper sense of the theology from which they dissent, and their having taken up with a sense that lies altogether nearer the surface. We say this not idly, nor in a tone of sarcasm; but deliberately, with a full conviction, and ample evidence, of its truth. No neologist has ever yet gone back to the old theology, and penetrated its sense, but he has been struck with the depth, clearness, and justness of the views of the theologians at whom he had been previously accustomed to make himself merry.

But let us pass to the author's own statement and defence of the sacred mystery.

"To indicate, beforehand, the general tenor of my argument, which may assist you to apprehend the matter of it more easily, I here suggest that the trinity we seek will be a trinity that results of necessity from the *revelation* of God to man. I do not undertake to fathom the interior being of God, and tell how it is composed. That is a matter too high for me, and, I think, for us all. I only insist that, assuming the strictest unity, and even simplicity, of God's nature, he could not be efficiently or sufficiently revealed to us, without evolving a trinity of persons, such as we meet in the Scriptures. These persons or personalities are the *dramatis personæ* of revelation, and their reality is measured by what of the infinite they convey in these finite forms. As such, they bear, on the one hand, a relation to God, who is to be conveyed or imported into knowledge; on the other, they are related to our human capacities and wants, being that presentation of God which is necessary to make him a subject of thought, or bring him within the discourse of reason; that also which is necessary to produce mutuality, or terms of conversableness, between us and him, and pour his love most effectually into our feeling."—pp. 136, 137.

"I do not undertake," says the author, "to fathom the interior being of God, and tell how it is composed. That is a matter too high for me, and, I think, for us all." Mod-

esty is always commendable, but not always the affectation of modesty, as an excuse for not accepting, or even considering, a revealed dogma. The author attempts to make what the lawyers term a false issue, and to provide a means of escape, if accused of denying the Trinity, because asserting, as the Trinity of the Holy Scriptures, a trinity which lies, so to speak, below God, and is distinguishable from him. No theologian asks him to tell how the interior being of God is composed, for no one believes that it is composed at all. God is most simple and pure act, and therefore excludes from his interior being, or essence, all composition and all plurality of substance. How many times must we repeat this? Nobody questions, that to fathom the interior being of God is a matter too high for us; for every one concedes at once that it is superintelligible to every human intellect. But this is nothing to the purpose. The question relates, not to our ability or inability to fathom the essence of God, but to our ability or inability, with the aid of divine grace, to apprehend and believe what God has himself supernaturally declared to us concerning his own interior being, or superintelligible essence. If God has made us a declaration concerning his own interior being, there is no modesty, no diffidence of our own abilities, in waving it aside, under the pretence that it is too high for us. God knows better than we do what is or is not too high for us; and to assume that any thing which he has chosen to declare for our belief is too high for us to receive with filial submission, firm faith, and devout gratitude, is to assume to be wiser than God himself.

The author's subterfuge will avail as little as his affected modesty. The sacred dogma of the Trinity is admitted on all hands to involve a mystery, and if the Trinity be a mystery, it must necessarily pertain to the superintelligible, and therefore to the interior being, or essence, of God; for it is only in that interior being, or essence, that God is superintelligible. In respect to the universe, as author of the natural order, God is not superintelligible, but naturally intelligible; "for the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, *are clearly seen*, being understood by the things that are made: his eternal power also and divinity."—Rom. i. 20. We know from revelation, that God's superintelligibility is in his essence or interior being, in what he is in himself; for it is that which the blest see in the beatific vision, and which they can see only by the *ens supernaturale*, or

the supernatural light of glory ; and we know also from the same source, that what God is in himself is precisely what is declared to faith in the sacred mystery of the Trinity, on which depends the mystery of the Incarnation, and into which, as their principle and end, all the mysteries of our holy religion are resolvable at last. To exclude the Trinity, then, as pertaining to the essence or interior being of God, is to exclude the whole Christian order or new creation, in like manner as to exclude God as the intelligible would be to exclude the whole intelligible order, or natural universe.

No doubt God can in a supernatural or extraordinary way make us a revelation of facts and truths of the natural or intelligible order, and he has certainly done so in the Holy Scriptures, in which he has revealed historical events and precepts of the natural law. The more sober among American Unitarians, though admitting no other revelation, in some sense admit a revelation of this sort, and therefore claim to be Christian believers, and complain that injustice is done them when they are denied the Christian name, and placed in the ranks of those who reject the Gospel. A revelation of this sort has its value, and is indispensable to all but the very *élite* of our race; yet, in relation to the matter revealed, it is, as the Anglican Bishop Butler says, very falsely, of the Gospel, only "a republication of the law of nature." It declares nothing not within the intelligible order, and manifestly contains, and it is the boast of Unitarians that it contains, no mystery ; for mystery is not merely the unknown, differing from the known only in the simple fact of being unknown, but something which in its very nature is superintelligible to every human intelligence,—transcending not only the known, but, as to natural reason, the whole order of the knowable, and remaining, intrinsically considered, as much a mystery after it is revealed or declared as it was before. It is something which, in its very nature, cannot be intrinsically revealed, or laid open to us, in this state of existence, but only extrinsically declared. Now the question between believers and unbelievers turns, not on the supernatural or extraordinary revelation of the intelligible,—a revelation which, materially considered, Herbert of Cherbury, Bolingbroke, Voltaire, and Rousseau might as easily accept as Socinus, Priestley, Belsham, Henry Ware, or Dr. Channing,—but on the supernatural revelation or declaration of the superintelligible, of mystery, which even when revealed or declared is still mystery, and therefore apprehensible only

extrinsically, with the understanding of faith, not intrinsically, with the understanding of knowledge. Evidently, then, to exclude the superintelligible from our theology is to exclude, along with the sacred mystery of the ever-adorable Trinity, the whole Christian order itself.

To explain Christianity so as to bring it within the intelligible order is to identify it with nature, to make it and nature one and the same thing, which, though attempted by all rationalists who do not wholly disavow the Christian name, is only an indirect and cowardly way of denying it entirely. The Christian order, as a distinct and substantive order, is conceivable only as transcending or lying above the order of nature, therefore only as superintelligible; for the order of nature and the intelligible order are one and the same. In the order of nature there may be much that is unknown, but there is nothing that is superintelligible; for the unknown in nature is of the same order with the known. The Christian order, then, since it is superintelligible, must be the creation of God in the sense in which he is superintelligible. God, as we have seen, is superintelligible only in his interior being, in what he is in himself. The effect cannot be asserted without the cause, the creature without the creator, for otherwise atheism would be assertable, and men might be atheists without any impeachment of their common sense, which it would be both absurd and impious to maintain. Consequently, it is impossible to assert the Christian order at all, without asserting God's superintelligible essence or interior being—what he is in himself—as its cause, or creator. What he thus is, we of course, in this world, know only by faith, not by vision as do the blest in their beatified state; but still we must apprehend it in the same sense that we apprehend other declared mysteries, or we can assert nothing at all of the distinctive Christian order. Clearly, then, our author must exclude from his theology the whole Christian order, as distinguished from the order of nature, which is to deny it; or he must include in his theology some declaration of the interior being of God, or of what God is in himself. But he expressly excludes whatever pertains to the interior being of God, as too high for us, and places the only trinity he recognizes, not in God, but below him, and therefore really denies, whatever his intention, or the respectable name by which he may call himself, the Christian religion, and degrades himself to the category of unbelievers, if not to that of apostates.

The author complains in the outset of the orthodox statement, that it represents the Trinity as "belonging, not to the *machina Dei*, by which God is revealed, but to the very *esse*, the substantial being of God, or the interior contents of his being." The author here, as throughout, confounds the mystery of the Trinity with the mystery of the Incarnation, as we shall have frequent occasion hereafter to remark,—a blunder that would be unpardonable in the youngest catechumen. The Trinity is eternal; the Incarnation takes place in time. But let this pass for the present. The complaint is absurd. The author professes, sincerely or otherwise, to hold the substance, the reality, of the sacred dogma, as commonly received, and to object only to the form in which it is commonly stated or represented. If, then, he objects to a representation or form of expression which is essential to the statement of that substance or reality, he falls into the absurdity of objecting to a statement without which he cannot state what he himself professes to hold. The substance or reality universally intended by the dogma as commonly received, does pertain to the very *esse* or substantial being of God, for it is God eternally subsisting as three distinct persons in the unity of one divine nature, essence, or substance. To deny this is to deny, not merely the outward form, representation, or expression, but the inner form, the very substance and reality itself, of the sacred mystery. The author himself cannot deny this, for he professes to assert the proper divinity of the three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, against Unitarians, who maintain the contrary; and they cannot be properly divine, that is, God, unless in God, for nothing below God, out of God, or distinguishable from God, is God. To represent the mystery as belonging, not to the substantial being of God, but to the *machina Dei* by which God is revealed, is to deny the very substance, the very reality, declared in the dogma, the precise thing the author professes he does not deny. He should complain of his own statement, then, not of the orthodox statement.

"The trinity we seek," says the author, "will be a trinity that results of necessity from the revelation of God to man," that is, a trinity that belongs, not "to the substantial being of God," but to "the *machina Dei* by which God is revealed." The author professes to be a Trinitarian minister; he is the pastor of a professed Trinitarian congregation, and is in this very discourse addressing an assembly of Con-

gregational ministers, who profess to hold the Trinity, as commonly received by the Christian Church, to be a fundamental article of the Christian faith; and therefore the trinity he is seeking, at least the trinity he is bound by his own profession, as well as by the law of God, to seek, must be the true Christian Trinity,—the truth, substance, or reality intended by the orthodox statement of that sacred mystery. It is this he must ascertain, set forth, and defend, or fail in his avowed attempt. A trinity totally different from this, even if a truth, a reality, is nothing to the purpose. The moon in its order is as real as the sun, but not therefore is the sun the moon; nor is the moon the sun because it shines only by reflecting the light of the sun. The author may deny the Trinity, fall back on the intelligible, and be a Unitarian or an unbeliever, if he chooses, and is prepared to risk the consequences, but he must not claim to be a believer in the Trinity in the orthodox sense, because he asserts another trinity, of an entirely different order. The Trinity of Christian orthodoxy is undeniably necessary, eternal, and self-existent, and no more dependent on creation or revelation than are the being and perfections of God in the sense in which he is naturally intelligible. Consequently, a trinity that is not necessary, self-existent, and eternal, whatever else it may be, is not the Trinity of Christian theology. The distinction of persons in the God-head, understand what you will by it, is, if there is any truth at all in the orthodox dogma, an eternal distinction, and therefore it is perfectly idle to attempt to resolve it into certain imaginary or even real distinctions which originate in time, and have reference solely to God's manifestation of himself to man. A trinity, if such there be, that results of necessity from the revelation of God to man, is not eternal and self-existent, and therefore is not God, nor is God it; consequently, it is not the Trinity of Christian theology. If the author says there is no other trinity, he only denies the Trinity, and avows himself a Unitarian or an unbeliever, and vainly and falsely professes to hold the substance, the reality, of the orthodox dogma.

God "could not," says the author, "be efficiently or sufficiently revealed to us, without evolving a trinity of persons, such as we meet in the Scriptures." Understand the word *evolving* in a sense not pantheistic, and this is true, if we speak only of the Christian order; but not true if

we speak of the intelligible order, for in this order God is, in regard to it, efficiently and sufficiently revealed, without being revealed as three distinct persons in one divine substance. In the intelligible order, as author of nature, God is intelligible, his perfections, the invisible things of him, even his eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen, from the creation, or foundation, of the world, being understood by the things that are made. Yet in this order he is not clearly seen as three persons. No trace, no intimation even, of God as Holy Trinity, is to be found by natural reason alone, in the whole natural order, and no man, left to that order alone, could ever have in the remotest degree even dreamed of the Trinity of Christian theology; because, as creator of the natural universe, the distinct persons have not each a distinct office, and therefore he is revealed in it to natural reason only in the unity of his being. The simple fact, then, that men have entertained the belief that God is three distinct persons in one substance, of which the first hint is not in nature, is conclusive proof, if we consider it well, that it has been divinely revealed; for that which in no sense exists cannot be an object of thought, and *de non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio.* Error may be entertained, but error is always the misapprehension or perversion of truth, for pure falsehood, being pure negation, is absolutely unintelligible; but where there is no truth in the order of the error to be misapprehended or perverted, there can be no error. No man could have a false notion of God, if he had no notion of God at all. As there is nothing in nature that can in any sense suggest the notion of the Trinity to natural reason, uninstructed by revelation, the fact that the notion is entertained is a proof that it has been derived from God's supernatural revelation of himself, and is therefore a truth.

But if we pass from the order of nature to the Christian order, we concede that God cannot be efficiently or sufficiently revealed to us, without being *revealed* as three distinct persons in one divine substance. But why not? If he is not three persons in one substance, he can be; for it is absurd to suppose that God cannot efficiently or sufficiently reveal himself as he is, without revealing himself as he is not, or that in being revealed as he is not, he is efficiently or sufficiently revealed as he is. It will not do to say God can lie, or that he can tell the truth only by means of a falsehood. The reason, then, why God cannot "efficiently

or sufficiently reveal himself to us without evolving a trinity of persons such as we meet in the Scriptures," must be, because he is in himself such three really subsisting persons in one essence, and because the Christian order is a new creation, in which God creates distinctively as three persons, or in which each of the divine persons has a distinct office, so that it reveals him explicitly in his tri-personality, as the natural order reveals him explicitly only in the unity of his being. The natural universe is the work of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but indistinctly,—"Let us make man,"—the new creation is the work of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost distinctly. And hence the baptismal formula is, "I baptize thee in the name of the Father, *and of the* Son, *and of the* Holy Ghost," in which the three persons are distinctly marked. Here we may see the reason why the belief in the Holy Trinity is fundamental in Christian faith, and wherefore to deny the Trinity is not a secondary, but a primary or fundamental error,—the virtual denial of every truth pertaining to the Christian order; for it denies the whole new creation, by denying God in the sense in which he is its creator, its first and its final cause. It was not about a mere diphthong, as somebody has foolishly said, that the Catholics and Semiarians contended in the fourth century, for in that diphthong was involved the whole question of Christianity or no Christianity. It is not for a mere scholastic subtilty, or vain theological distinction, that we contend against the Unitarians to-day, in contending for the sacred mystery of the Trinity, but for the whole Christian order, the whole new creation, against mere rationalism, naturalism, deism, or pantheism. Not without reason, then, does the orthodox believer hold him who denies or casts doubt on the sacred mystery of the Trinity to be no Christian believer, but the bitter enemy of the Christian religion and the souls of men.

Understood in the sense we here explain it, the author's assertion, that God "cannot be efficiently or sufficiently revealed to us without evolving a trinity of persons such as we meet in the Scriptures," can be accepted. But this is not the sense in which he himself understands it. He does not mean that the three persons are evolved or manifested, because God is three eternally subsisting persons in one substance, but that the persons result from the revelation itself, or that God, in order to reveal himself efficiently or sufficiently to us, must assume three persons, or personate

a father, a son. and a holy spirit. "These persons or personalities are the *dramatis personæ* of the revelation." The author holds, that God cannot reveal to us, in language, any thing of which we have not direct and immediate intuition, and that he can reveal himself only in so far as he exhibits himself to our intuitive apprehension. In order to do this, he must make use of such methods of self-exhibition as are adapted to the nature of our understanding. These methods are the personations, as in a drama, of the characters of a father, a son, and a holy spirit, and through these impersonations, by virtue of what we already know of the characters personated, as existing in the intelligible order, he extends our knowledge of himself. These persons or personalities "bear, on the one hand, a relation to God who is to be conveyed or imported into knowledge; on the other hand, they are related to our human capacities and wants, being that presentation of God which is necessary to make him a subject of thought, or to bring him within the discourse of reason."

The trinity of persons said to be evolved in the process of revelation is not the absolute God, not God as he exists in eternity, conceived as existing in himself prior to all creation in time, or outward expression, but the revealed or manifested God. The following extracts may help our readers to seize the author's thought:—

"To bring the whole subject fully before us, let us endeavour, first of all, to form the distinctest notion possible of God, as existing in himself, and unrevealed. Then we shall understand the better what is necessary to reveal him. Of course we mean, when we speak of God as unrevealed, to speak of him anterior to his act of creation; for the worlds created are all outgoings from himself, and in that view, revealments of him. God unrevealed is God simply existing, as spirit, in himself."—p. 137.

"Observe that, when God is revealed, it cannot be as the One, as the Infinite, or Absolute, but only as through media. And as there are no infinite media, no signs that express the infinite, no minds, in fact, that can apprehend the infinite by direct inspection, the One must appear in the manifold; the Absolute in the conditional; Spirit in form; the Motionless in motion; the Infinite in the finite. He must distribute himself, he must let forth his nature in sounds, colors, forms, works, definite objects, and signs. It must be to us as if Brama were waking up; as if Jehovah, the Infinite I am, the Absolute, were dividing off himself into innumerable activities that shall dramatize his immensity, and bring him within the moulds of language and discursive thought.

And in whatever thing he appears, or is revealed, there will be something that misrepresents, as well as something that represents him. The revealing process, that which makes him appear, will envelop itself in clouds of formal contradiction,—that is, of diction which is contrary, in some way, to the truth, and which, taken simply as diction, is continually setting forms against each other.

"Thus, the God revealed, in distinction from the God Absolute, will have parts, forms, colors, utterances, motions, activities, assigned him. He will think, deliberate, reason, remember, have emotions. Then, taking up all these manifold representations, casting out the matter in which they are cross to each other, and repugnant to the very idea of the God they represent, we shall settle into the true knowledge of God, and receive, as far as the finite can receive the Infinite, the contents of the Divine nature."—pp. 139, 140.

"There is in God, taken as the Absolute Being, a capacity of self-expression, so to speak, which is peculiar,—a generative power of form, a creative imagination, in which, or by aid of which, he can produce himself outwardly, or represent himself in the finite. In this respect, God is wholly unlike to us. Our imagination is passive, stored with forms, colors, and types of words from without, borrowed from the world we live in. But all such forms God has in himself, and this is the Logos, the Word, elsewhere called the Form of God. Now, this Word, this Form of God, in which he sees himself, is with God, as John says, from the beginning. It is God mirrored before his own understanding, and to be mirrored, as in fragments of the mirror, before us. Conceive him now as creating the worlds, or creating worlds, if you please, from eternity. In so doing, he only represents, expresses, or outwardly produces himself. He bodies out his own thoughts. What we call the creation is, in another view, a revelation only of God, his first revelation."—pp. 145, 146.

"Thus, the Divine Word, or Logos, who is from eternity the Form, or in the Form of God, after having first bodied him forth in the creation and the government of the world, now makes another outgoing from the Absolute into the human, to reside in the human as being of it; thus to communicate God to the world, and thus to ingenerate in the world Goodness and Life as from him. To make his approach to man as close, to identify himself as perfectly as possible with man, he appears, or makes his advent through a human birth,—Son of man, and Son, also, of God. Regarding him now in this light as set out before the Absolute Being (who he representatively is), existing under the conditions of the finite and the relative, we see at once that, for our sakes, if not for his own, he must have set over against him, in the finite, his appropriate relative term, or impersonation. A solitary finite thing, or person, that is, one that has no relative in the finite, is even absurd,—much more if the design be that we shall ascend, through it, to the Absolute; for we can do this only under the great mental law of action

and reaction, which requires relative terms and forces, between which it may be maintained. Besides, there may have been some subjective or internal necessity in Christ himself, (for we know nothing of his interior structure and wants,) requiring that, in order to the proper support of his attitude, he should have in conception some finite relative impersonation. For one or both these reasons, when he appears in the human state, bringing the Divine into the human, there results, at one and the same time, a double impersonation, that of the Father and that of the Son,—one because of the other, and both as correspondent or relative terms. As Christ himself appears in the finite, he calls out into the finite with him, if I may so speak, another representative of the Absolute, one that is conceived to reside in the heavens, as he himself is seen to walk upon the earth. This he does to comfort his attitude, or more probably to make it intelligible; for if he were to say, 'Look unto me, and behold your God,' then his mere human person would be taken as a proof that he is only a flagrant and impious impostor; or else, being accepted as God by those who are more credulous, they would, in fact, receive a God by apotheosis, and under human boundaries. Therefore, he calls out into thought, as residing in heaven, and possessing celestial exaltation, the Father, who is, in fact, the Absolute Being brought into a lively, conversable, definite (therefore finite) form of personal conception, and sets himself on terms of relationship with him at the other pole; so that, while he signifies or reveals the light and love of God, in and through the human or subject life, he is able to exalt and deify what he reveals, by referring his mission to one that is greater and higher in state than himself, viz. the Father in heaven."—pp. 168, 169.

"But, in order to the full and complete apprehension of God, a third personality, the Holy Spirit, needs to appear. By the Logos, in the creation, and then by the Logos in the incarnation, assisted or set off by the Father as a relative personality, God's character, feeling, and truth are now expressed. He has even brought down the mercies of his heart to meet us on our human level. So far, the expression made is moral; but there is yet needed, to complete our sense of God, the Absolute, another kind of expression, which will require the introduction or appearance of yet another and distinct kind of impersonation. We not only want a conception of God in his character and feeling towards us, but we want, also, to conceive him as in *act* within us, working in us, under the conditions of time and progression, spiritual results of quickening, deliverance, and purification from evil. Now, action of any kind is representable to us only under the conditions of movement in time and space, which, as we have seen, is not predicable of the Absolute Being abstractly contemplated. God, in act, therefore, will be given us by another finite, relative impersonation."—p. 171.

This last *developed* person, or personality, is the Holy Ghost, who completes the trinity of personal representa-

tions. The author, it will be seen, distinguishes between absolute God and revealed God. God, as absolute God, is no Trinity; but the revealed or manifested God is, and God is Holy Trinity only in the sense in which the manifested God, as distinguished from absolute God, is God; that is, in a purely representative sense. The distinction between God himself and the representation of God to us is conceivable, but the representation is not itself God, and no distinction between God unrepresented and God represented is admissible or conceivable. The representation must represent him truly, as he is independent of the representation, or it is a false representation, and the God represented is not the true God, absolute God. God as absolute is God, neither more nor less than God, and all that is or can be predicable of God at all must be predicable of him conceived as necessary and eternal being, as prior to, and independent of, his representation or revealment, that is, in the language of the author, as God absolute. A revelation does not make that which it reveals, nor in any sense whatever affect or modify it. If a true revelation, it declares the object precisely as it exists *a parte rei;* if it does not so declare it, it is a false revelation, and not to be trusted. No distinction, then, can be made between God unrevealed, the God absolute, and God revealed, or represented to us. Whatever the process of revealment, or the methods of representation, they in no sense affect or modify God himself, nor are they themselves to be confounded with him, or to be taken for him, for their purpose is simply to present him to us as he is, independent of themselves. A representative trinity is then no real Trinity at all, and has nothing to do with the question before us, for the substance, the reality intended by the orthodox dogma, which the author professes to hold, belongs, not to the representation of God, but to God absolute, as he is in himself, self-existent, eternal, immutable, immovable, and independent. To deny that he is Holy Trinity in this sense is simply Unitarianism, and none the less so because God is said to be Trinity in a representative sense.

"Thus the God revealed, in distinction from the God absolute, will have parts, forms, colors, utterances, motions, activities, assigned him." As eminently existing in him, as the effect in the cause, they may be assigned, not only to the representation, or represented God, but to absolute God, for all things do so exist in him, and all that is in God is

God; but if really and literally assigned to God, as formally existing in him, they are falsely assigned, and the God thus represented is neither the revealed nor the unrevealed God, for he is no God at all. That such things may be assigned to him tropically or figuratively, to help our imaginations, and to give us a lively apprehension of him, is no doubt very true, but they are never to be taken literally. They are figures used, not to present him to our reason, to our proper intellectual apprehension, but to our imagination and senses, and therefore, though modes of sensible apprehension, never enter into our rational conception of God. Sensible apprehension is always subject to the limitations of space and time, but rational apprehension is not, and it is not necessary to prove that we have rational apprehension. The God we are to call God revealed is God as declared to our rational apprehension, not to our sensible apprehension, and the God so declared must be identically the God undeclared; for between reason and its object there intervenes no idea, species, or representation. The idea is the reality, not a mere image or representation of it, and even when there are media of apprehension, reason never mistakes these for the object apprehended.

"When God is revealed, it cannot be as the One, as the Infinite, or Absolute, but only as through *media*." Cannot be to the senses, agreed; for we have, and can have, no sensible intuition of God, that is to say, God is not revealed to our senses, is for us no sensible object; cannot be to the understanding, denied; for that would be only saying that he cannot be revealed at all. The author himself agrees that God is one, infinite, absolute; then what is not one, infinite, absolute, is not God, but something else, or nothing. God must be revealed as he is, or else he is not revealed at all. Therefore, if revealed at all, he must be revealed as one, infinite, absolute. But if he cannot be so revealed, how does the author happen to know, or to be able to affirm, that he is one, infinite, or absolute? If God cannot be revealed as he is as unrevealed, how has the author been able to tell us what he is as unrevealed, and to say wherein what he calls God revealed is distinguished from "the God Absolute"?

"As there are no infinite media, no signs that express the infinite, no minds that can apprehend the infinite by direct inspection, the one must appear in the manifold; the absolute in the conditional; spirit in form; the motionless in

motion; the infinite in the finite." Bad philosophy, as well as bad theology, dear Doctor. There are, in the author's sense, no infinite media, we grant, for whatever is infinite is God, and God is not something between God and man. But that the one can be apprehended only in the manifold, we deny; for the manifold, that is, the multiple, is itself inconceivable without the intuition of unity. The conditional is the negation of the absolute, and like all negation inconceivable without the positive denied. The finite is simply a negative conception, and for the same reason presupposes the conception of the infinite. The positive must always precede in the mind the negative, as St. Thomas teaches and proves. Consequently the conception of the one, the absolute, the spiritual, the motionless, the infinite, all of which are positive conceptions, must precede the conception of the manifold, the conditional, the material, the motional, the finite. The order of knowledge must follow the order of being, for what is not is not intelligible or knowable. No logical process can extract the one from the many, the absolute from the conditional, spirit from form, that is, in the author's sense, matter, the motionless from motion, the infinite from the finite, for the best of all reasons in the world, because they are not contained in them, and you cannot get from a thing what it has not. Logic is mere analysis, and analysis adds nothing to the conception analyzed; it only deduces or demonstrates what is already in it. The mistake into which many fall on this point is owing to the fact that they take the negative conceptions in the *sensus compositus*, in which sense is included, not only the purely negative conception, but also, obscurely it may be, the positive conception, which always precedes and accompanies it in the mind.

The author's doctrine, that God can be revealed only as finitely represented, derived from sensism, is only a denial, in other terms, that God can be revealed at all. "These three persons, or personalities," he says, "are the *dramatis personæ* of the revelation, and their reality is measured by what of the infinite they convey in these finite forms." The infinite, we need not tell the author, is indivisible, and must be conveyed entire, as a unit, or not at all. No finite form can convey the infinite, for no form can convey more than it can contain, and no finite form can contain the infinite. The infinite in or under finite forms is the finite, not the infinite. There can be no finite representations of

the infinite, for no representation can exceed itself, and as the infinite is indivisible, the infinite finitely represented, that is, represented with limitations, is precisely the finite. God in or under finite forms is not God, but creature, if any thing. Thus, in our Lord, that which is limited, finite, or conditioned is not God, but man, and Christ is God, because his person which has assumed human nature is divine, not limited, not subjected to the human form, — which would be man assuming God, not God assuming man,—but remains God in all the infinite plenitude and independence of the divine nature. The person of Christ is not in or under a human form, for if it were it would not be a divine person, but a human person, since whatever is in the form of man is man. Christ is indeed in the form of man, yet not because he has, if we may so speak, parted with the form of God, and assumed that of man, but because he is literally and truly man as well as God, perfect man and perfect God in the unity of one divine person. Either, then, God can be revealed without being represented in or under finite forms, or he cannot be revealed at all; for nothing finite is God, and nothing but the finite can enter into or be represented by finite forms. Hence the author's theory of a representative trinity, as "the *machina Dei* by which God is revealed," cannot answer the purpose for which he concocts it, and can be no medium through which God as he is can be represented, and God represented as he is not is not God, but a fiction.

But these imaginary, fictitious, or representative persons, according to the author himself, do not represent any thing to us of the interior being or essence of God. "I do not," he says, "undertake to fathom the interior being of God." "That is a matter too high for me, and I think for us all." Then his trinity of persons represents nothing to him of God in the sense in which God is superintelligible, not intelligible to us without it; and then it is quite superfluous. The author's whole theory is built on the assumption, that God is in himself unintelligible, and that he does not and cannot reveal himself as he is. This assumption is not warrantable. God, to the full extent to which the author supposes him representable by the trinity of persons he imagines, is naturally intelligible, is naturally a subject of thought, is naturally within the discourse of reason. His natural attributes and perfections, his unity, his eternity, his immensity, his wisdom, his justice, his goodness,—the

invisible things of him, even his eternal power and divinity,—are not only intelligible to us, but actually known, clearly seen from the creation or foundation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, as St. Paul expressly declares. God, save as to what he is supernaturally in himself, is naturally intelligible, and it is only in and by his intelligibility that any thing is intelligible, for his light is the light of our light. The author's machinery for revealing God could not serve his purpose if it were needed, and would not be needed if it could.

The author forgets, also, the distinction between faith and knowledge, and is all the time considering what may be intrinsically known of God, not what God has extrinsically declared of himself for us to believe. It is true nothing can be declared to us in words, so as to be *intrinsically* known, of which we have not already intellectual apprehension. Words are signs, and can signify to *knowledge* only what the mind apprehends without them. Signs do not interpret themselves, and the mind must have in itself a key to their signification, or they can signify nothing to it. The word *tree* is no sign to one who has not seen a tree. This, confined to the sphere of knowledge strictly so called, we readily concede; but in the sphere of faith, belief, whether human or divine, we do not concede it, for the very characteristic of faith is to believe what is not seen,—*fides est credere quod non vides*, as says St. Augustine. If we could from signs learn nothing, obtain no intellectual apprehension at all, all belief, all faith, human as well as divine, would be out of the question, and all revelation of the supernatural, and all history would be to us empty formulas and unmeaning words. This is a point the author has not duly considered. But as it is a point to which we must return, in our examination of his Discourse on "Dogma and Spirit," it will suffice to add here that God can reveal to us, so that we shall know it intrinsically, only what is within the naturally intelligible order, but that he can *declare* the superintelligible so that it shall be apprehended, though obscurely and extrinsically only, yet sufficiently for faith, and so that in faith something more than an empty formula or unmeaning word shall be present to the mind. Faith is not impossible, for without it it is impossible to please God, and faith, the blessed apostle tells us, is *sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium*.—Heb. xi. 1 6 Hence the notion the author

entertains, that nothing is declared to us of the Christian order beyond what is collected from God's exhibition of himself to our intuition, is unfounded, as we showed in replying to *The Mercersburg Review*.* Consequently, as God in the natural order is intelligible, and as in the super-intelligible order he is declared only to faith,—not revealed nor required for faith to be revealed to vision,—the author's supposed machinery for representing God is as unnecessary as illusory.

Finally, the author in some sort confounds the process of revelation with that which is revealed, the representation with the represented, otherwise he could not call his representative persons God. A little sound philosophy would have taught him that in knowledge there are but two things, the intellective subject, and the intelligible object, and that which is not *a parte rei* the one is the other. The old notion of species or representative ideas interposed between the intellective subject and intelligible object, and that what is immediately apprehended is not the object itself, but its *species*, *phantasm*, *idea*, or *image* in the mind, is now universally exploded, and was never in reality held, as the moderns have supposed, by the sounder scholastics. That we see all in the idea is, we believe, true, but the idea is not the representative of the object in the intelligible order, but the object itself,—is in fact, in the order of intelligibles, as St. Augustine, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventura, Malebranche, Leibnitz, and Cardinal Gerdil teach, God himself. We say *St. Thomas*, for though he has the air of holding the contrary, and usually adopts the peripatetic forms of expression, his principles, as Cardinal Gerdil has shown in his *Defence of Père Malebranche against Locke*, are not only not opposed to it, but do in reality imply it. But let this pass. It is undeniable that what is apprehended in the fact of knowledge is the object itself, not its image or representative. Hence what in the fact of knowledge is not object is subject, and therefore, in the intuition or apprehension of God, what is not God, or is distinguishable from God, is the intuitive or apprehending subject, that is, the human mind itself.

The author must concede that his trinity of persons pertains either to the subject or to the object. If he concedes the latter, he must maintain that the persons are not

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*See Vol. III. pp. 57–68.

merely representative persons, but God himself, that is three eternally subsisting persons in the unity of the divine substance, which is the orthodox doctrine; and then he must abandon his notion of a merely representative trinity, of a trinity that belongs not to the substantial being of God, but to the *machina Dei* by which God is revealed, and resulting of necessity from the revelation of God to man. In such case he must concede that his whole theory is from beginning to end false and illusory, with not the slightest foundation in reality; for whatever pertains to God is God, and nothing distinguishable from God is God, or can be said to pertain to him save as his creature. If, on the other hand, he distinguishes his trinity of persons from God, and makes it merely representative of God, as he evidently does, he makes it purely subjective, places it, not on the side of the object known, but on the side of the subject knowing, and then it is the subject itself, or a mere figment of the human mind, without any reality at all. Let him, then, do his best, and he can find no medium between the orthodox dogma of the Trinity, and bald, naked Unitarianism.

We insist on this last point as fatal to the author. His pretension is to place himself between the orthodox formula and the Unitarian formula, and to concede the objections adduced by the advocates of the latter, without surrendering the truth or reality intended by the friends of the former. The Trinitarian asserts that God is three real, distinct, and eternally subsisting persons in one divine substance; the Unitarian denies this, and asserts, as its direct contradictory, that God is not three persons, but one only person, as he is one only substance. Against the Unitarian the author asserts, in words, God is three persons, as the Trinitarian maintains; but against the Trinitarian he asserts that these three persons are not three eternally subsisting persons in the divine substance, but simply three representative persons, by which the unknown and unintelligible God is represented to us. But to assert three representative persons is not to assert any thing against Unitarians, for what they deny is, not that there are three persons, but that there are three persons eternally subsisting in the unity of the divine substance or essence. Consequently, when the author denies them to be such persons, he concedes the whole Unitarian formula. So, on the other hand, the concession of three representative persons is the

concession of nothing to the Trinitarian, for it is not for three persons the Trinitarian contends, but for three real, distinct persons eternally subsisting in the unity of the divine being. He then does not deny the Unitarian error on the one hand, and save the Unitarian truth on the other; but denies the Trinitarian truth, and asserts at best only the Unitarian error.

The fact is, the author falls below the Unitarian error, and denies not merely the tri-personality of God, but that God is himself person at all. The only personality he recognizes is a personality, not in God, but in the representation of God to us. God reveals himself as personal, not because he is so, but because it is only under a personal form that we can conceive him. He is personal only in relation to our mode of conceiving him, as he is said also to have hands and feet, to reason and deliberate, and to be subject to human passions. The error of the Trinitarian, according to the author, is precisely in affirming that what is true of the representation,—of the methods adopted, in consequence of our weakness, to bring God within our conceptions,—is true of him absolutely considered, or as he is in himself. As God has not in himself hands and feet, passions, &c., for he is pure spirit and impassible, so has he not personality in himself. Consequently, God absolute is impersonal, and the author's doctrine necessarily leads, if not to formal atheism, at least to formal pantheism.

III.—ON THE INCARNATION.

According to Dr. Bushnell, the distinction of three persons in the Trinity is not a distinction of persons in God himself, but in his process of revealing himself to us, and the relations which God assumes as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are simply media or instruments of his revelation to us of his own internal character. God is to be regarded as a great dramatist or actor, who assumes or impersonates three distinct characters, in order the better to give us a full and lively sense of his infinite power and resources. Regarded in himself, in his own internal being, or eternal nature, he is not triune, and is trinity only in his revelation. The trinity, therefore, is not eternal, and depends on the fact that God has chosen to create us, and to make himself known to us.

We need not say how contrary this is to the Christian

doctrine, but it is clear from it that the author does not and cannot hold the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, for he denies the Logos, or Word, the eternal Son of God, the second person in the ever-adorable Trinity, to be a divine hypostasis, who has assumed human nature, and become incarnate. The Logos, according to him, is not a divine hypostasis, but the capacity or faculty of God to express or produce himself outwardly, his generative power of form, his creative imagination, in which, or by aid of which, he can produce himself outwardly, or represent himself in the finite; and the Incarnation is nothing but his representation of himself by virtue of this power in the finite form of man.

"There is in God, taken as the Absolute Being, a capacity of self-expression, so to speak, which is peculiar,—a generative power of form, a creative imagination, in which, or by aid of which, he can produce himself outwardly, or represent himself in the finite. In this respect, God is wholly unlike us. Our imagination is passive, stored with forms, colors, and types of forms from without, borrowed from the world we live in. But all such forms God has in himself, and this is the Logos, the Word, elsewhere called the Form of God. Now, this Word, this Form of God, in which he sees himself, is with God, as John says, from the beginning. It is God mirrored before his own understanding, and to be mirrored, as in fragments of the mirror, before us. Conceive him now as creating the worlds, or creating worlds, if you please, from eternity. In so doing, he only represents, expresses, or outwardly produces himself. He bodies out his own thoughts. What we call the creation is, in another view, a revelation only of God, his first revelation.

"And it is in this view that the Word, or Logos, elsewhere called Christ, or the Son of God, is represented as the Creator of the worlds. Or it is said, which is only another form of the same truth, that the worlds were made by or through him, and the Apostle John adds, that without him is not any thing made that was made. Now, as John also declares, there was light, the first revelation was made, God was expressed in the forms and relations of the finite. But the light shined in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not. The Divine Word was here; he had come to his own, but his own received him not. One thing more is possible that will yield a still more effulgent light, viz. that, as God has produced himself in all the other finite forms of being, so now he should appear in the human.

"Indeed, he has appeared in the human before, in the same way as he has in all the created objects of the world. The human person, taken as a mere structure, adapted to the high uses of intelligence and moral action, is itself a noble illustration of his wisdom, and a token also of the exalted and good purposes cherished in our existence. But

there was yet more of God to be exhibited in the Human Form of our race. As the spirit of man is made in the image of God, and his bodily form is prepared to be the fit vehicle and outward representative of his spirit, it follows that his bodily form has also some inherent, *a priori* relation to God's own nature; such probably as makes it the truest, most expressive finite type of him. Continuing, therefore, in a pure, upright character, our whole race would have been a visible revelation of the truth and beauty of God. But having not thus continued, having come under the power of evil, that which was to be the expression or reflection of God became appropriated to the expression of evil. Truth has no longer any living, unblemished manifestation in the world; the beauty of goodness lives and smiles no more. Sin, prejudice, passion, —stains of every color, so deface and mar the race, that the face of God, the real glory of the Divine, is visible no longer. Now, therefore, God will reclaim this last type of himself, possess it with his own life and feeling, and through that, live himself into the acquaintance and biographic history of the world. 'And the word was made flesh and dwelt among us; and we beheld his glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.' 'The only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him.' This is Christ whose proper deity or divinity we have proved."

Whatever may be the exact meaning of the author in this passage, it is clear to the veriest tyro in theology that it is not the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. The union of the human and divine asserted in the Christian doctrine is the union of human nature to the eternal Son of God, the second person or hypostasis of the Trinity, and, of course, is impossible, if there be no such person or hypostasis. Dr. Bushnell unequivocally denies such divine person, and he avows that he is in doubt whether the Trinity results from the Incarnation or is merely implied in it. Moreover, he admits no proper divine personality at all. He does not like to apply the word *person* to God, regarded as absolute being. The word for him expresses not an individual substance of rational nature with its last complement, in its last or supreme dignity, but the limitation or circumscription of such nature, and therefore has always a finite sense or signification. Hence God, since he is infinite, must be impersonal, and the term *person* can rightly be applied to him only in some production of himself outwardly in a finite form. Holding this he cannot hold the Christian doctrine; for the Christian doctrine is not that the divine nature in the Incarnation is united to the human person, or to human nature, so as of the two natures to make but one nature, as the Eutychians falsely

held; but the assumption of human nature by the Word or divine hypostasis, or the union of human nature to the divine person, so that there remain two distinct natures in one person or divine hypostasis. Hence the union is always termed by all theologians a hypostatic union, not a union of the human and divine natures. The author, in denying the divine hypostasis, necessarily denies the hypostatic union, and also its very possibility.

The author, supposing him not to deny the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation outright, completely removes it. The Incarnation he contends for is the divine nature entering into human nature, and becoming subject to all the accidents, limitations, and evils of the human person. The divine nature lowers itself to the human, and, in fact, becomes human nature. Instead of taking human nature up to himself, and giving it the dignity of his own divine person, God descends to its level, and becomes or makes himself a human person, and incorporates himself into "the biographic history of the world." This is the author's doctrine, and, unhappily, he does not stand alone. It is the dominant heresy of Protestant Germany, especially of the school founded in opposition to Paulus and Bretschneider by Schleiermacher and De Wette; we find it distinctly avowed in the publications of the Mercersburg School in Pennsylvania, and we are greatly mistaken if we do not detect some obscure traces of it in Moehler's *Symbolik* and Mr. Newman's *Essay on Development*. In its principle that God produces himself outwardly in finite forms, it underlies the modern doctrines of progress and socialism, and may be regarded as, in fact, the grand heresy of the nineteenth century. It contains the seminal principle of the original heresy of the gentiles, which resulted in the various forms of heathen idolatry, and its prevalence must pave the way for the restoration of ancient gentilism, which it cost Christianity the blood of so many martyrs to supplant.

The belief in one God is older than polytheism, and the worship of the true God was known and observed ages before the fall of the nations into idolatry. Idolatry is of a far later birth than is commonly imagined, and it does not seem to have become general till about the call of Abraham, if indeed at so early a date. Idolatrous gentilism, like every heresy, was a corruption of the true religion handed down by tradition, and evidently grew out of the particular corruption of the true doctrine of creation, which asserts that

creation is God outwardly producing himself, that he may and does produce himself outwardly in finite forms, and subject himself to the limitations of finite persons and objects, and that so produced he is still the proper object of worship, the peculiar doctrine of Dr. Bushnell. Once admit this doctrine, and you admit the seminal principle of all polytheism and heathen idolatry. The doctrine is pure pantheism, and polytheism is always pantheism with the learned, as we may see in Xenophanes of Elea, in Plato, and in the philosophers of India, ancient and modern, and is the assertion of a real plurality of gods only with the vulgar; and pantheism can no more be asserted and maintained by the learned now, without becoming polytheism and idolatry with the vulgar, than it could in ancient times. It is a grave mistake to suppose that polytheism grew out of hero worship, or the deification of individual persons or objects. Hero worship, or the deification of individuals, is the consequence of the universal deification of nature, or of regarding universal nature as the self-production of God in finite forms, which is pantheism.

The fundamental error asserted by Dr. Bushnell assumes, in our day, two apparently opposite forms, but both lead to idolatry as their inevitable result. One form is that which he himself more especially insists upon; namely, that the Incarnation is simply God producing himself outwardly in a finite form, or in a human person. This he connects with the more general doctrine, that creation is nothing but God's production or expression of himself in finite forms. These forms, that is, what we call external things, being nothing but God outwardly produced, must be God, and the author cannot deny it, for God's supposed production of himself in the finite form of the human person he expressly calls God, and maintains, as such, to be a proper object of divine worship. Here, then, is the entire universe, taken collectively and distributively, deified, and represented as worthy to be worshipped as God. This is all that gentilism could ever ask, whether viewed from the point of view of pantheism or from that of polytheism. The other form in which the same heresy manifests itself is, that, in the Incarnation, the Son did not assume individual human nature, human nature *in individuo*, but human nature *in specie*, in the species, and thus entered into hypostatic union with all the individuals of the race, and became the person or hypostasis of all men. Something like this appears to have been in the mind of the

late editor of *The New York Churchman*, and led him to reject baptismal regeneration, and maintain that infants dying without baptism can enjoy the beatific vision, and it is maintained, directly or indirectly, by the great body of those who call themselves Christian socialists. Some, however, modify it, and hold that the assumption of human nature was actual only in the individual nature assumed by our Lord in the womb of the Blessed Virgin, and only potential *in specie*, becoming actual in each individual only as he becomes a believer. This appears to be the doctrine of Dr. Nevin of the *Mercersburg Review*, and we have met something resembling it in the writings of some recent converts. We do not assert positively that any of our recent converts, several of whom we find much commended for the new light they are supposed to have thrown on the mystery of the Incarnation and the proper mode of defending the worship of saints, and veneration of relics and images, do actually maintain this doctrine; but some of them certainly have not taken sufficient precautions against being understood to do so. If we assert the worship of saints, on the ground that human nature in the saints has been assumed by our Lord, we convert it into pure idolatry, because we then worship them, not as saints, but as gods; and if we venerate relics and images on the ground that God, in assuming human nature, assumed and deified matter, we are evidently idolaters. To undertake to defend us from the charge of idolatry on such a ground would be only to confirm the charge itself. We worship the saints for what they are, that is, sanctified men and women, not as gods, nor with the worship due to God; and we venerate relics and images, not for any divinity, sanctity, or worth they possess in themselves, but for the divinity, sanctity, or worth to which they are related, and it is only as so related that we venerate them at all. To worship or venerate them or the saints themselves as deified or really united hypostatically to God, as we worship the humanity of our Lord, would be pure idolatry; for we should then pay them divine worship. We worship, indeed, the Son as we do the Father, and in his humanity as well as in his divinity, because in worshipping him we worship his person, which includes both, and because in him the two natures are united, not only in one person, but in one divine person, who is truly and properly God as well as man. We can never worship any saint, not even the Blessed Mother of God, for the same reason or with the same worship, for human nature in all

others, however closely it may be united to the person of Christ, through his grace, is united by adoption, not hypostatically, and retains always its own proper human person.

The error we are considering in either of its forms is in our day exceedingly dangerous, because it chimes in with the spirit of the age, and seems to authorize the assertion of the favorite doctrines of progress or development, and the divinity of humanity, justifying at once Dr. Channing and Pierre Leroux. But, be this as it may, the view it takes of the Incarnation is evidently not the Christian view. The Christian doctrine is, that the human nature assumed by our Lord was individual human nature, and that, in assuming it, he did not enter into it and become a human person, but took it up to himself and gave it his own divine person as its *suppositum* or *hypostasis*. Christ was, indeed, in the form of man, for he was perfect man as well as perfect God, and the human nature he assumed had in the assumption its proper form, and must have had it, or it would have been only a possible, not a real, human nature. But he was not in the *person* of man, that is, was not a human person; for the human nature he assumed was no person, had no human personality. Otherwise there would have been no real assumption of human nature, but a simple adoption. The last complement, the supreme dignity of human nature, that which makes human nature a person, was supplied, in the individual human nature assumed, by the divine person of the Son, so that the divine *hypostasis*, or eternal Son of God, truly and properly God, became the person of the human, as he was, is, and always will be of the divine nature. This is precisely what is meant by the assumption of human nature, or the Incarnation. Christ is not a human person; nor is he the union of two persons in one nature; but he is the union of two for ever distinct natures in one person, and that one person, which is the supreme dignity of the divine nature, and which takes, in regard to the human nature assumed, the place of the last complement or supreme dignity of that nature, is God. In the Incarnation it is not the divine nature that loses its personality, but the human nature that gains, instead of its own, the divine personality. God retains in the Incarnation his own divine person as the one person of the two for ever distinct natures, and is no more under a finite form as incarnated than as not incarnated. He loses, he gains, nothing; it is the human nature assumed that gains. It is modified

and singularly elevated by receiving a divine instead of the human personality; but God, but the divine person, remains unchanged, unaffected, immutable, in all the fulness, majesty, and glory of his own eternal and incommunicable divinity.

Morever, Dr. Bushnell, notwithstanding his reasonings against Unitarians, really asserts no Incarnation at all. He places in the same line the fact he calls the Incarnation and the fact he calls creation, and makes the two facts substantially identical. He understands by the Incarnation, God's production of himself outwardly in a human form or human person, and by creation he understands God's producing himself outwardly in finite forms. In creating, he says, "he only represents, expresses, or outwardly produces himself." "One thing more is possible, that, as God has produced himself in all the other finite forms of being, so now he should appear in the human." His appearance in the human can then only mean, if the author admits creation at all, his creation of the human form of being, that is, creating or making a man, in like manner as he has made all the other finite forms of being, or created things. The Incarnation then means nothing but God's creation of the human person, which is manifestly no incarnation at all.

We do not misapprehend or misrepresent the author. He himself says, God "has appeared in the human before, in the same way as he has in all the created objects of the world." He establishes no difference in the kind or quality of his second appearance or reappearance in the human form, from that of his first appearance in, or simple creation of, the human form. It may have a different purpose, but it establishes no new relations between him and human nature, and therefore only the relations of creator and creature. The Unitarian will find no difficulty in acknowledging all the incarnation there is here, but his good sense will prevent him from calling such an appearance in the human form by the name of incarnation, and he will tell Dr. Bushnell that he would have done much better to have used plain and simple terms, and contented himself with calling things by their right names.

The passage extracted conclusively proves, however, that the author does not in reality admit even so much as creation, and that he is really, whether he knows it or not, a pantheist. This is evident from his defining the creative power of God to be simply the power of self-production,

self-expression, or self-exhibition, in finite forms, which forms are his own eternal Logos. "But all such forms God has in himself, and this is the Logos, the Word, elsewhere called the Form of God." These forms are eternally in God, therefore are God, for whatever is in God is God. Hence, in creating, God, as the author expressly states, "only represents, expresses, or outwardly produces himself. He bodies out his own thoughts. What we call creation is, in another view, a revelation only of God, his first revelation." God expressed or procured in these finite forms is God, and it is precisely on the principle that God so expressed, that is, the finite expression of God, is God, that our author asserts that Christ is God, and undertakes to prove the proper divinity of the Son against Unitarians. So creation is not God producing or creating external forms or things distinguishable from himself, but the mere exhibition of himself in the finite forms which he has in himself, that is to say, in the inherent forms of his own being. If this be not pantheism, we know not what is.

Dr. Bushnell is misled by his Platonism. That the essential forms of things, *ideas* in the language of Plato, are in God, and are God, is no doubt true; but as in him, as forms or ideas in the divine mind, they are not things, but the eternal types, exemplars, or possibilities of things, which God may create, or not, as he chooses. The created thing or existence is not the idea, or God simply expressed in a finite form, as Plato seems to have held, but a thing created from nothing, after the idea as its original type or model, and requires between itself as an actual existence and its idea in the divine mind the intervention of the divine creative act. No doubt God expresses his intelligence, wisdom, power, and goodness in creation, and no doubt all created things are an expression, manifestation, or revelation of the divine being and attributes, but only in the sense in which the cause expresses itself in the effect, or the effect manifests the cause. If the author means that what is called creation is a revelation of God only in this sense, he says what is very true, but what is little to his purpose; for then he must call our Lord a creature, and cannot maintain his proper divinity as he professes to do. If he means that it is a revelation or outward production of God in any other sense, he cannot escape pantheism.

We regret the necessity of so frequently preferring this grave charge of pantheism against those whose doctrines we

are obliged to controvert; but the fact is, that all modern philosophy is pantheistic, when not openly and avowedly atheistic. Pantheistic principles impregnate the whole atmosphere of the modern world, and are drawn in with our very breath; we adopt them as naturally as we breathe. In the great body of the people they are comparatively innocuous, for they remain without development, inoperative, and unsuspected. But in the cultivated few, in the scholars and theorizers, they are active, and produce the most fatal results. It is therefore necessary to expose and to do our best to expel them wherever and whenever we chance to meet them. We have no belief that Dr. Bushnell intends to be, or believes that he is, a pantheist; we fully believe him to be unaware of the dangerous tendency of the principles he adopts; but his writings are none the less dangerous on that account, and all his difficulties and perplexities, all his confusion and apparent contradictions of himself, his rejection of logic and appeal to feeling, his efforts to reason against reason, and to get a religion for the affections as distinguished from a religion for the intellect, grow out of the fact that he has adopted pantheistic principles and is trying to explain in accordance with them the teachings of religion and the dictates of common sense. There is no possible way, humanly speaking, of setting him right, and enabling him to return to Christian orthodoxy, but by pointing out to him this fact, and making him aware that all his peculiar doctrines have a pantheistic basis.

But we proceed to consider the author's view of "the difficulties created by the supposed relations of the divine to the human in the person of Jesus."

"Under the relations of the divine to the human, we meet the objection, first of all, that here is an incarnation asserted of the divine nature; that God, the infinite God, is represented as dwelling in a finite human person, subject to its limitations and even to its evils; and this is incredible,—an insult to reason. It may be so, and if it is, we must reject the doctrine. But we notice, while revolving this objection, that several other religions have believed or expected an incarnation of their deity, or the divine principle of their worship; and that these have been the most speculative and cultivated forms of false religion. If, then, whole nations of mankind, comprising thinkers, scholars, and philosophers, have been ready to expect, or have actually believed in, the incarnation of their god or highest divinity, it would not seem to be wholly cross to natural reason to believe in such an event. On the contrary, we are rather to suspect that some true instinct or conscious want of the race is

here divining, so to speak, that blessed visitation, by which God shall some time vouchsafe to give himself to the world."—pp. 148, 149.

The reason here assigned why the author's view is not to be regarded as unreasonable, is a bad one. That several other religions have believed or expected an incarnation of their deity, is true enough; but this no more proves that such an incarnation as the author asserts is not "cross to reason," than the fact that the whole gentile world in former times were, and that the greater part of mankind even in modern times are, idolaters, proves that idolatry is "not cross to reason." The fact that all, or nearly all, religions which have been, and are, assert the Incarnation in some sense, either as accomplished, or to be accomplished, is good evidence that the Incarnation, in some sense, is either a dictate of reason or a doctrine of primitive revelation preserved in universal tradition; but it is no evidence as to the reasonableness of the Incarnation, either in the author's sense, or in the sense of the several religions he refers to. The universal prevalence or expectation of the Incarnation, we agree with the author, is an indication of some want of our nature that demands it, or at least of some promise made in the primitive age by our God, and preserved by tradition, that he would, at some time, give himself to the world, as he had not done in creating it.

The objection to the author's view of the Incarnation is well put by himself. "Here is an incarnation asserted of the divine nature; that God, the infinite God, is represented as dwelling in a finite human person, subject to its limitations, and even to its evils; and this is incredible,—an insult to reason." We say as much, and even more; we say, such an incarnation is absolutely impossible. The divine nature is not, so to speak, incarnable, for it is divine, and not human. God can create human nature, but he cannot with all his omnipotence make his own nature human, that is, make his own divine and uncreated essence a creature. The infinite God, that is, the infinite divine nature, cannot dwell in a finite human person, that is, be assumed by the human person, and be subject to its limitations and even its evils; for this would suppose that man assumes the divine nature, and that the human person becomes person or hypostasis of God, which is absurd. Person is a term of higher dignity than nature. The nature wanting personality is below person, for it wants its last complement, its supreme dignity. The finite, then, can never be the person of the infinite; therefore the hu-

man person, confessedly finite, can never be the person of the divine nature, which is infinite. The lower cannot be above the higher, and the infinite nature of God is certainly higher than the finite human person. Then the divine nature cannot be under it, or be subject to its limitations. The infinite God in his divinity cannot be subject to any limitations, because he cannot cease to be infinite, since he is necessary being, and cannot make himself other than he is, and it is of the very essence of the infinite to be free from all limitation.

In vain does the author with his view of the Incarnation attempt to defend it against Unitarians, for as he represents it, it is absolutely indefensible. But his view is not orthodox, as we have seen. He errs in asserting that the divine *nature* is incarnated, and incarnated in a finite human person. The divine nature is not incarnated, but the divine *person*, that is, the Son, the second person of the Trinity; and the Incarnation is not in the divine person's becoming subject to the limitations and evils of the human person, but in his taking human nature up to himself and giving it the dignity of his own infinite person. The human nature is raised to the dignity of the divine person, not the divine nature lowered to the abjectness of the human person. This is the Christian doctrine, and against this doctrine, however much it may surpass all human comprehension, reason can frame no objection.

The author continues his defence against Unitarians.

"But the human person, it will be said, is limited, and God is not. Very true. But you have the same objection in reference to the first revelation, the Word in the world. This also is limited,—at least what you have known of it is limited; besides, you have a special delight in seeing God in the smallest things, the minutest specks of being. If, then, it be incredible that God should take the human to express himself, because the human is finite, can the finite in the world, or in a living atom, express him more worthily or, do it more accordantly with reason?

"But Christ, you will say, perhaps, is a living, intelligent person. Taking him, therefore, as a person, I must view him under the measures and limitations of a person. Very true, if you have a right to measure the contents of his person by his body; which, possibly, you have no more right to do than you have to measure God, as revealed in any object, by the object that reveals him. For it no more follows that a human body measures God, when revealed through it, than that a star, a tree, or an insect measures him, when he is revealed through that. As regards the interior nature of Christ, or the composition of his person,

we perhaps know nothing; and if his outward nature represents an unknown quantity, it may, for aught that appears, represent an infinite quantity. A finite outward person, too, may as well be an organ or type of the Infinite, as a finite thing or object; and God may act a human personality, without being measured by it, as well as to shine through a finite thing or a world, without being measured by that."—pp. 151, 152.

"The human person is limited, and God is not. Very true." How then can you represent the divinity as subject to the limitations of the human person, that is, as a human person, for this is your meaning, if you understand yourself? "But you have the same objection in reference to the first revelation, the Word in the world." Conceded, and therefore we do not admit the Word to be in the world in the sense you contend. Your answer will not pass, for its principle is denied. God is no more incarnated in the world than in a human person, and you are not at liberty to contend that an objection to one of your doctrines is good for nothing, because it is equally an objection to some other doctrine you may hold; for it may be a valid objection to both. "A finite outward person may as well be an organ or type of the Infinite, as a finite thing or object." Unquestionably. But how can a finite thing or object be itself an organ or type of the infinite? Dr. Bushnell is a bad theologian, but unhappily a worse philosopher. He mistakes entirely the character of God's immanence in his works. No doubt God is intimately present to all created things, and immanent in them, but not present or immanent as the subject in which they inhere, or as their substance, so that they are to be regarded as phenomena of his own divine substance or being, as Spinoza dreamed, which were pure pantheism. He is intimately present and immanent solely as their cause or creator, and is distinct from them as the cause is distinct from the effect. It is neglecting this distinction, and regarding God as the universal and only substance, and creatures simply as phenomenal, that is, simply as appearances, manifestations, exhibitions of the divine substance or being, that causes our author to fall into his numerous and fatal errors. He entirely mistakes the fact of creation, and confounds it virtually with emanation, as do nearly all our American and German neologists.

"Taking" Christ "as a person, I must view him under the measures and limitations of a person." Certainly you must, if you take him as a *human* person; but what right have you to take him as a human person? You have no

right to assume that *person* is always measured and limited; the word *person* does not express the limitation or circumscription of rational nature, as you strangely fancy, but that nature in its completeness and supreme dignity, as we never cease to remind you, and therefore may apply to God as well as to man, and, since God is infinite, unlimited, be infinite as well as finite. Dr. Bushnell seems to have no knowledge of the meaning of the word *person* as used by philosophers and theologians. He appears to understand by it outward appearance, as when it is said of some one, "He is a portly *person*," or "has an imposing *person*."

Several other difficulties the author objects to himself and attempts to dispose of which we regard as real difficulties in his way; but as they bear solely against his false representation of the doctrine in question, we need not follow him in his efforts to remove them. His difficulties are not, he is aware, with Unitarians alone. He cannot accept the orthodox doctrine of the two natures in Christ. Here we must allow him to speak for himself, at some length.

"But the history of Christ, it will be said, compels us to go further. We cannot look at the external person of Christ on the one hand, and the Absolute Jehovah on the other, and regard the former simply as a representative or expression of the other. Christ, says the Unitarian, obeys, worships, suffers, and in that manner shows most plainly that his internal nature is under a limitation; therefore he is human only. Then the common Trinitarian replies, Your argument is good; therefore we assert a human soul in the person of Jesus, which comes under these limitations, while the Divine soul escapes; and so we save the Divinity unharmed and unabridged.

"Answering the latter first, I reply that, in holding such a theory of Christ's obedience and sufferings, he does an affront to the plain language of Scripture. For the Scripture does not say that a certain human soul called Jesus, born as such of Mary, obeyed and suffered; but it says in the boldest manner, that he who was in the form of God humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. A declaration, the very point of which is, not that the man Jesus was a being under human limitations, but that he who was in the Form of God, the real Divinity, came into the finite, and was subject to human conditions. Then, again, Christ himself declared, not that a human soul, hid in his person, was placed under limitations, but more;—that the Son, that is, the Divine person,—for the word *Son* is used as relative to the Father,—the Son can do nothing of himself but what he seeth the Father do; for the Father loveth the Son and showeth him all things that himself doeth. He also prays,—'O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self, with the glory that I had with thee before the world was,'—a

prayer which cannot be referred to the human soul, even if there was a human soul hid in his person; for that soul could speak of no glory it once had with the Father. Hence the supposition of a human soul existing distinctly, and acting by itself, clears no difficulty; for the Son, the Divine part, or, I should rather say, the whole Christ, is still represented as humbled, as weak, as divested of glory, and existing under limitations or conditions that do not belong to Deity.

"Besides, this theory of two distinct subsistences, still maintaining their several kinds of action in Christ,—one growing, learning, obeying, suffering; the other infinite and impassible,—only creates difficulties a hundredfold greater than any that it solves. It virtually denies any real unity between the human and the Divine, and substitutes collocation or copartnership for unity. If the Divine part were residing in Saturn, he would be as truly united with the human race as now. Instead of a person whose nature is the real unity of the Divine and the human, we have two distinct persons, between whom our thoughts are continually alternating; referring this to one, that to the other, and imagining, all the while, not a union of the two, in which our possible union with God is signified and sealed for ever, but a practical, historical assertion rather of his incommunicableness, thrust upon our notice, in a form more oppressive and chilling than it has to abstract thought. Meantime the whole work of Christ, as a subject, suffering Redeemer, is thrown upon the human side of his nature, and the Divine side, standing thus aloof, incommunicably distant, has nothing, in fact, to do with the transaction, other than to be a spectator of it. And then, while we are moved to ask of what so great consequence to us, or to the government of God, can be the obedience and suffering of this particular man Jesus, more than of any other, it is also represented, as part of the same general scheme, that he is, after all, scarcely more than a mere nominal man,—that he is so removed from the fortunes and the proper trial of a man, by the proximity of the Divine, as not even to unfold a human character! And thus, while the redemption even of the world is hung upon his human possibilities, he is shown, as a man, to have probably less of human significance than any other; to be a man whose character is not in himself, but in the custody that keeps him from being himself!

"There is, then, I conclude, no solid foundation for the common Trinitarian theory of two distinct or distinctively active subsistences in the person of Christ. It is not Scriptural. It accounts for nothing. It only creates even greater difficulties. Indeed, it is a virtual denial, we should say, of that which is, in one view, the summit or highest glory of the Incarnation, viz. the union signified, and historically begun, between God and man."—pp. 153–156.

Dr. Bushnell is very much in error if he supposes that, in denying two subsistences in Christ, he denies any thing Christian theology asserts in asserting that the two natures,

the human and the divine, are hypostatically united in him. The assertion of two subsistences in Christ is to assert two suppositums or persons, a human and a divine hypostasis, which is not the Catholic dogma, but the Nestorian heresy. The Catholic dogma is that Christ is one person, one suppositum, hypostasis, or subsistence, and that in this one person subsist, forever distinct, but inseparable, the two natures, the human and the divine; so that he is not two persons or two subsistences, but two natures subsisting in one person. The author confounds nature with suppositum, or subsistence, and we are inclined to suspect that his Protestant Trinitarian friends generally do the same, and by the two natures really understand two subsistences, that is, two persons, for they nearly all shrink from calling the Blessed Virgin the Mother of God. If so, they have lapsed into the Nestorian heresy, and Dr. Bushnell is pardonable, so far as they are concerned, for attempting to refute the doctrine of two subsistences in Christ; but he is not pardonable for undertaking to refute it as the "common Trinitarian" doctrine, or for confounding it with the doctrine of two natures in one Christ.

As against two subsistences in Christ, in our sense of the word *subsistence*, what the author says in the passage cited is conclusive and unanswerable; but as against the doctrine of two distinct natures subsisting in one person, what we suppose he really means to deny, it has no force, no bearing at all. To suppose in Christ two subsistences or persons, and we must suppose two persons if we suppose two subsistences, is not only to disregard the whole language of the New Testament bearing on the subject, but to deny the Incarnation itself, and all real union of the human and divine; for person is incommunicable. The person of the Father is not the person of the Son, the person of the Son is not that of the Father. The divine nature is common to each of the three persons, all and entire, undivided, indivisible, indistinguished, and indistinguishable under each one of them; but the three persons in their personality are distinct from one another, and one can never be another. There is and can be no assumption of one person by another. If we suppose two persons, one human and the other divine, in Christ, we dissolve him, we deny all hypostatic union, and can at best say, not that the Word assumed flesh, but that the Son of God adopted the man Jesus, in which case the relation between the human

and the divine, between the Son of God and the son of Mary, would be only that which is between God and believers or sanctified persons in general. Such a supposition, the author says truly, virtually "denies any real unity between the human and the divine, and substitutes collocation or copartnership for unity." It, as he also very properly maintains, solves no difficulty, and in fact creates new and greater difficulties. But it is a gross error to suppose that the doctrine of two distinct natures subsisting in the one person of Christ necessarily implies that of two subsistences; for two natures may without implying any contradiction have only one subsistence.

The Scripture does not say that a certain human soul called Jesus, born as such of Mary, obeyed and suffered, but, in the boldest manner, that "he who was in the form of God humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." Certainly; and so do we. But the Scripture in saying this does not say, that the divinity, or Christ *secundum divinitatem suam*, thus obeyed and suffered. The Son of God humbled himself in assuming into union with himself so abject a thing as human nature; but in his divine nature he could not obey or suffer, because the divine nature is supreme and impassible. Certain it is that the Scriptures represent uniformly Christ as one person, subsistence, or suppositum; but they also affirm things of him which are affirmable only of God, and others which are affirmable only of man, and not at all affirmable of the divine nature. Here is the fact. But how is it possible that this should be the fact, if it be not true, that in the unity of his person subsist the two natures, the divine and the human, and that some things he does *secundum divinitatem suam*, and others he does or suffers *secundum humanitatem suam*?

The Scriptures certainly predicate of Christ as one person or suppositum indifferently divine things and human things. Christ calls himself at one time the Son of God, and at another the Son of man. He is in heaven and on the earth, in the form of God and the form of a servant; he is in the bosom of the Father,—who hath seen him hath seen the Father; is the Son of God,—whatever he seeth the Father do he doeth; is the Word that was in the beginning, that was with God, and that was God, by whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made; and yet he was born of woman, was an infant, grew in stature, eat

and drank, was exposed to cold and heat, to hunger and thirst, subject to all the infirmities of the flesh, sin excepted,—was of the seed of Abraham, tempted, a man of sorrows and stricken with grief, obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Here are two classes of things predicated alike of Christ, but which cannot be both predicated either of the divine nature or of the human. The author himself professes to maintain the proper divinity of Christ, and to defend it against Unitarians, and his proper divinity is as clearly asserted by the sacred Scriptures as any thing can be. St. John represents him as saying, "For as the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son also to have life in himself." (St. John v. 26.) None but God, the eternal and ever-living God, hath or can have life in himself; for all except God that exists is creature, and the characteristic of creature is not to have life in itself, but to depend for it on its creator. Christ, then, since he hath life in himself, as the Father hath life in himself, must be truly and properly God, and consubstantial to the Father, and in his divine essence indistinguishable from him. On the other hand, the Scriptures with equal clearness declare that this same Christ is truly and properly man. "The Word was made flesh," — *Verbum caro factum est.* (Ibid. i. 14.) "Every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God, and every spirit that dissolveth Jesus is not of God," or, as the Protestant version has it, "every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is not of God." (1 St. John iv. 2, 3.) And, again, "Many seducers are gone out into the world, who confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh; this is a seducer and an antichrist." (2 St. John 7.) There is no cavilling here on the word *flesh*; it means, as all Unitarians contend, that Jesus Christ was truly and properly *man*, as is otherwise proved by the fact that he was born of woman, lived, suffered, and died as a man.

Now how can Christ be true God and true man, unless there is in his own subsisting person the distinction of two natures? The two are predicated alike in Scripture of him as one subsisting person, but it is impossible, in the very nature of things, that Christ should be God in the respect that he is man, or man in the respect that he is God. It will not do here to allege a miracle or mystery, as our author seems inclined to do, though both miracle and mystery there are. Neither miracle nor mystery is admissible against reason,

and the miracle or mystery here, if we deny the two natures, would be *against* reason, not merely *above* it. We must either deny the divinity or humanity of Christ, or else admit the two natures, the human and divine, in him, without admitting two subsistences. The author himself seems to be aware of this, for he says further on,—"I only deny that his human soul or nature is to be spoken of or looked upon as having a *distinct* subsistence, so as to live, think, learn, worship, suffer, by itself. Disclaiming all thought of denying or affirming any thing as regards the interior composition or construction of his person, I insist that he stands before us in simple unity, one person, the divine-human, representing the qualities of his double parentage as the Son of God and the son of Mary."—(p. 163.)

If the author had or could be supposed to have any clear and well-defined system of his own to which he could be logically held, we should say that, in order to escape Nestorianism, or two subsistences in Christ, he falls into Eutychianism, that asserts the two natures after the Incarnation became fused into one nature. But he is so confused in his own views, so loose and inaccurate in his expressions, that there is no use in attempting to hold him strictly to any thing. He disdains consistency, and sneers at logic. He begins by affirming or denying, and ends by saying that he neither affirms nor denies. He confounds in the outset nature and subsistence, and concludes, because there cannot be two subsistences in Christ, there cannot be two natures. But finding that, if he denies the two natures, he must say that Christ is either God alone or man alone, and thus lose the Incarnation, he adds that he only means to deny that the human nature in Christ is a distinct subsistence. Well, this looks like something; but if he stops here he will be obliged to agree with orthodox theologians. So he starts off anew, and says, "Without a thought of denying or affirming any thing of the interior composition or construction of his person, I insist that he stands before us in simple unity, one person, the divine-human, representing the qualities of his double parentage as Son of God and as son of Mary." That is, I will not affirm or deny that two and two are four, but I insist that they are more than three and less than five! If the author really means to deny the two subsistences, and to assert Christ as at once divine and human, he must either concede the two natures

in the sense of orthodox theologians, or else fall into the monophysite heresy; for these are the only alternatives left him. Which one does he take? As he protests against the two natures under the name of two subsistences, he must be supposed to take the latter, and to hold that Christ is one divine-human nature in one divine-human person. But this latter is not maintainable, as the author would perceive if he did not confound in his own mind person and nature. It is not the orthodox doctrine, for that declares, as may be learned from the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, that the two natures, *post incarnationem*, did not become one nature, but remained and for ever remain two distinct natures subsisting in one suppositum, hypostasis, or person. Then, as we have seen, the human and divine are naturally distinct, and therefore cannot be united in one nature; because such union would demand the destruction of the form of each, and therefore the annihilation of both. The formation of a new nature out of the two which shall be neither, and yet retain the characteristic qualities of both, is metaphysically impossible, for nature, as such, is always incommunicable. Quality implies a subject. What sort of subject is that nature in which inhere both divine and human qualities? Is it created? Then it has no properly divine qualities. Is it uncreated? Then it can have no proper human qualities. Is it neither? But what is neither uncreated nor created is nothing, for nothing is or exists but uncreated Creator and creature. Is it both created and uncreated? That is impo sible, for nothing can be and not be at the same time. The author would do well to consult the categories or predicaments at which he sneers, apparently because ignorant of their importance.

It is impossible to conceive a subject which is neither created nor uncreated, which is neither God nor man, and which, nevertheless, is at once, and in one and the same sense, both. Nothing, then, remains but the assertion of two distinct natures subsisting in one suppositum or person, as does Christian theology. According to Christian theology, Christ is true God and true man, because he is the one suppositum, hypostasis, or person of both the divine nature and of the human nature subsisting in him. We may, therefore, predicate alike of him, as the Scriptures uniformly do, things which pertain properly to the divine nature and things which pertain properly to human nature, though we must predicate them in diverse respects. Divine things

are predicable of him in the respect that he is Son of God, the second person of the ever-blessed Trinity, and human things in the respect that he is the suppositum or person of the human nature he assumed. As Son of God, or divine hypostasis, he includes under him, as we have seen, the whole divine nature, which, since it is most simple, indivisible, and indistinguishable, is common to each of the three divine persons; and, as he himself undergoes no change in assuming human nature, or becoming incarnate, —for the *becoming* or change is on the part of the nature assumed, not on the part of the person assuming,—there is not and cannot be the least impropriety in predicating of him all that is predicable of God or the divine nature. Being at the same time the suppositum of the human nature assumed, and as that nature loses nothing, but gains in perfection, by being assumed, or having a divine instead of a human suppositum, there can be just as little impropriety in predicating of him all that belongs to perfect man.

Human and divine things are predicable of Christ, not in a figurative or representative sense, as the author vainly labors to persuade us, but really, truly, and in the strictest and most literal sense; because he is, in the strictest sense of the words, both God and man, not in the blending, intermixing, or confusion of the two natures, but in their distinctiveness, as the one simple suppositum of the two. We say *one simple suppositum;* it is true, that, considered as the suppositum of both natures, he is composite person, but regarded intrinsically in himself he is simple, not the union of two persons, but strictly and indistinguishably one. As the one suppositum of the two natures, whatsoever Christ does, whether by virtue of the one nature or the other, it is he himself in the unity and simplicity of his person, not *it*, that does it. Nature as abstracted from its suppositum is and can be the subject of no predicates, for so abstracted it does not and cannot exist. Nothing lives, moves, acts, or suffers in the abstract. Nature to do, or to suffer, must be concrete, have its suppositum, and the doing or suffering, though impossible without nature, is predicable solely of the nature in its suppositum. As the suppositum in Christ is the same for both natures, whatever is done or suffered by him is done or suffered by one and the same suppositum. He is God, because he is a divine person or suppositum and in God the suppositum or person is not separable from

the divine nature; he is man, because he has perfect human nature, and is in his one suppositum its suppositum. The whole mystery of the Incarnation is precisely here, in the divine person so assuming to himself human nature as to be its suppositum, its person, or its last complement, and supreme dignity. How this can be, we do not know; that it is we do know; and it being so, we can and do understand that Christ is man as well as God, and being God and man, we do and can understand that divine and human things are strictly and literally predicable of him.

We predicate divine and human things alike of Christ, but not alike of him as the suppositum of either nature. Yet here we do not dissolve Christ, lose the unity of his person, and suppose a divine Christ, who is the Creator of the worlds, who is God of God, true God of true God, begotten, not made, consubstantial to the Father, who became incarnate for our sakes, and a human Christ who was assumed, who was born of Mary, who increased in stature, who was obedient, and who suffered, was crucified under Pontius Pilate, was dead and buried, descended into hell, and the third day rose again from the dead ascended into heaven, sitteth at the right hand of the Father, and thence shall come again. Christ is one Christ, one person, and there is no divine Christ distinguishable from the human, and no human Christ distinguishable from the divine. The humanity of Christ has no suppositum, never had any suppositum, separate or distinct from the one divine suppositum of the Word made flesh. It never existed, and never could exist, save as asumed by the Word, for the Word did not assume a human person, or a previously subsisting human nature, but a human nature, so to speak, created *ad hoc*, expressly to be assumed by the Word; otherwise there would have been no assumption, but, as we have said, simply adoption. What we say is, not that the divine nature of Christ did this, the human nature of Christ suffered that, but that Christ did this in his divine nature included under his divine suppositum, and Christ suffered that in his human nature included under the same suppositum.

The pretence of the author, that this dissolves the person of Christ and implies that there were two subsistences in him, is unfounded. It no more does this, than to say that we perform some acts through our material nature and others through our rational nature dissolves our personality, and implies that we have two subsisting natures, or, in the bar-

barous language of modern philosophy, two *mes*. Certainly there is an essential distinction between purely rational nature and *concupiscentia*, or sensitive nature. And there are existences, such as angels, who have the former without the latter, because they are spirits without body; but still, as the one rational soul is in us the one suppositum or person of the two natures, the acts we perform through either are alike our acts in the unity of our rational soul, and what we suffer through concupiscence, it is we that suffer it. We do not propose this as an exact parallel throughout, but it is sufficiently analogous to show that what we affirm of Christ does not necessarily imply a dissolution of the unity of his person, or that there are in him two subsistences, the one divine, the other human, because there are two natures.

Let it be understood, then, that Christ in his divinity and in his humanity is one Christ, one person, and that whatever is affirmed of him is and should be affirmed of him as one. There is, then, no boldness in the Scripture's saying that he who was in the form of God humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross; for it does but express the plain, simple fact. He who was in the form of God was born of woman, and therefore the Council of Ephesus defines the Blessed Virgin Mary to be Θεοτόκος, or Mother of God, and therefore we say, and say truly, that he who was in the form of God, that is, God himself, suffered and died for us on the cross. Not that he was born in his divinity, not that he died in his divine nature, for in that he was before all worlds, from all eternity, immortal and impassible; but in his human nature, which was from the moment of Incarnation as truly his nature as was the divine nature, and therefore what he became, did, or suffered in that nature, it was as truly he, therefore as truly God, who became, did, or suffered it, as it would have been had he become, done, or suffered it in his divine nature.

The very prayer of our Lord, which the auther cites as a proof against the doctrine of two natures in Christ, implies it, and is inexplicable on the hypothesis of the unity of his nature as well as of his person. "O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory I had with thee before the world was." This prayer, the author says, "cannot be referred to the human soul, even if there was a human soul hid in his person; for that soul could speak of no glory it once had with the Father." Be it so; then for the same reason it could not be referred to a human person, which the

author asserts our Lord was; then not to our Lord at all, unless our Lord was other than a human person. It cannot be referred to our Lord as a divine person, if he is not also the person of human nature, because as such he was eternal, and always had had and still had the glory prayed for, and therefore, even if he could pray at all, could not pray to be glorified with it. Nor, finally, could it be referred to any created person, for no created person could have had a glory with the Father before the world was, before being created. The same person prays to be glorified that had had glory with the Father before the world was. As Son of God in his divine nature, our Lord had never lost this glory, and never could lose it, any more than he could cease to be the eternal Son of God; as son of man he had never had it, and could not pray to be glorified with it as a glory he had once had. The only explication possible is on the principle of the two natures in one person. Christ, as the divine suppositum of the divine nature, did not and could not pray; but Christ who is the one suppositum of the two natures, as the suppositum or person of the human nature assumed could pray, and did pray to be glorified in his human nature with the glory he in his divine nature had with the Father before the world was, and with which in his humanity he was not yet glorified.

As we are not writing a treatise on the Incarnation, we have said all that is necessary on this sublime mystery, for we have said enough to vindicate it from the objections which the author urges against it, and to convict him of objecting to what he does not understand, and of writing—to use a mild term—nonsense. Dr. Bushnell evidently writes in the dark, and strikes hither and thither, he knows not at what. He caricatures the orthodox doctrine, and then finds himself unable to accept it; yet unwilling to deny it outright and take refuge in open Unitarianism, the shallowest system that can be easily imagined, he tries to get something which shall be neither orthodoxy nor Unitarianism, but somewhere between the two,—which shall take what he supposes to be the truths, and avoid the errors, of both. Unhappily, he gets all the error of the Unitarian without the Unitarian's consistency, and involves himself in even greater difficulties than any he imagines in the way of orthodoxy.

After doing his best to convict orthodoxy of self-contradiction, of absurdity, after bringing against it the most subtile objections he can devise or pick up, he turns round and

condemns reasoning, and reads us a grave lecture on the temerity of attempting to inquire into such questions as he himself has raised. He may bring objections, but we must not presume to answer them. He may "logic" as much as he pleases against others, but will have no *logicking* against himself. He is at liberty to deny that Christ is true God and true man, and to assert that he merely expresses, represents, without being, the divine and human; but if we venture to insist that Christ is what he appears, what he represents, a real, not a mere tragedy king, enacted on the stage it may be by some very plebeian actor, he grows grave, and talks to us after this fashion:—

"Therefore, to insist on going beyond expression, investigating the mystery of the person of Jesus, when it is given us only to communicate God and his love, is, in fact, to puzzle ourselves with the vehicle, and rob ourselves of the grace it brings. It is killing the animal, that we may find where the life is hid in him, and detect the mode of its union with his body. It is taking the medicine that would cure us, and using it, not as a cure, but as a subject of investigation. God certainly is able to assume the human, to become incarnate in it so far as to express his union to it, and set himself as Eternal Life in historic and real connection with it. He tells us plainly that he has done it. That we may know by what law to receive and interpret his proceedings, his object is declared; viz., to express or manifest himself in the world, and thus to redeem the world.

"We see at once, if it be so, that here is a matter presented, which is not psychologically or physiologically investigable, because it does not lie within the categories of ordinary, natural humanity. And yet, instead of turning to receive simply what is expressed of the Divine, we immediately begin to try our science on the interior person of Jesus, to ascertain its contents or elements, and the mode of its composition! Nay, we must know who suffers, what worships, and all the hidden chemistries of the person must be understood! Then, as to what is expressed, why, that is a matter of so little moment that many overlook it wholly.

"It is as if Abraham, after he had entertained as a guest the Jehovah angel, or angel of the Lord, instead of receiving his message, had fallen to inquiring into the digestive process of the angel; or, since he came in human form and spoke with a human voice, whether he had a human soul or not; and, if so, how the two natures were put together! Let alone thy folly and thy shallow curiosity, O Abraham! we should say, hear the Lord speak to thee; what he commands thee, do, what he promises, believe! Suspend thy raw guesses at his nature, and take his message!

"Or, it is as if Moses, when he saw the burning bush, had fallen at once to speculating about the fire: Is this real fire? No, if it was it would burn the wood. Well, if it is not fire, then there is nothing very wonderful

in it; for it is nothing wonderful that that which is not fire should not burn! Nay, is it not a very dishonest fire? he might have said; for it is not what it pretends to be,—it is no real fire at all. And yet it was better, methinks, to take the bush as it was meant, to see God in it, and let the chemists look after the fire!

"It is very difficult, I know, for a certain class of men, whose nature it is to live in their logic, and not in simple insight, to stay content with any thing which has not been verified by some word process. Instead of putting off their shoes before the burning bush, they would put out the fire rather,—by such kind of constructive wisdom as I have just now given. A poem is ill to such, if it does not stand well in the predicaments. Receiving nothing by their imagination or by their heart, the verities they embrace are all dead verities. And as dead verities cannot impregnate, they live as being dead themselves,—a sterile class of souls, whom not even the life-giving mysteries of the Incarnation are able to fructify. See, they say, Christ obeys and suffers, how can the subject be the supreme; the suffering man, the impassible God! Probably they toss off their discovery with an air of superior sagacity, as if by some peculiar depth of argument they had reached a conclusion so profound. They cannot imagine that even the babes of true knowledge, the simple children of Christian faith, who open their hearts to the reconciling grace of God in Christ Jesus, are really wiser and deeper than they. As if it were some special wisdom to judge that the Lord Jesus came into the world, not simply to express God, and offer him to the embrace of our love, but to submit a new riddle to the speculative chemistry and constructive logic of the race! Indeed, you may figure this whole tribe of sophisters as a man standing before that most beautiful and wondrous work of art, the 'Beatified Spirit' of Guido, and there commencing a quarrel with the artist, that he should be so absurd as to think of making a beatified spirit out of mere linseed, ochres, and oxides! Would it not be more dignified to let the pigments go and take the expression of the canvas? Just so are the human personality, the obedient, subject, suffering state of Jesus, all to be taken as colors of the Divine, and we are not to fool ourselves in practising our logic on the colors, but to seize at once upon the divine import and significance thereof; ascending thus to the heart of God, there to rest, in the vision of his beatific glory."—pp. 157–160.

We make no reply to these remarks, some of which would be worthy our attention, if they were not misapplied. The mystery of the Incarnation is a mystery, and therefore not explicable by natural reason, and it is the author, not we, who undertakes so to explain it. But though it is a mystery, it is a mystery announced to us as reasonable beings, and to be believed without our renouncing the exercise of reason. If any body chooses to state it so that it contradicts reason, insults common sense, and then tell us we must believe it

because it is a mystery, we shall not consider that we are wanting reverence for the mystery if we attempt to show him that he misstates it, and to give the orthodox statement of it in return.

IV.—ON THE REDEMPTION.

We proceed now to the second of these three Discourses, the one delivered at Cambridge, before the Unitarian Divinity School. It is on the Atonement, and is designed to give us Dr. Bushnell's views of the sacred mystery of Redemption. The author discusses this subject with special reference to the points in dispute between Unitarians and the so-called orthodox Protestants, and not without the hope of disclosing a ground on which the two parties may come together, and each retain every thing really essential to its own theory. He selects for his text 1 John i. 2, "For the life was manifested: and we have seen it, and do bear witness, and declare unto you the eternal life, which was with the Father, and hath appeared to us"; or, as the author reads from the Protestant version, "For the life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and show unto you that eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us." Having recited his text, he proceeds:—

"This particular passage of Scripture has seemed to me to offer one of the most comprehensive and most deliberate announcements of the doctrine of Christ, that is anywhere given in the sacred writings, with the advantage that it is yet so far unoccupied as not to have become a technic, under the wear of any theory. In the verse previous, the writer opens by setting forth the fact, as I suppose, of a Divine incarnation in the person of Jesus. By the Word, or Word of Life, that peculiar power in the Divine nature by which God is able to represent himself outwardly in the forms of things, first in the worlds and now in the human person, which is the liveliest type of feeling possible, and closest to God,—by this Word of Life, God has now expressed himself. *He has set forth his Divine feeling even to sense and as a fellow-feeling,*—he has entered into human history, as one of its biographic elements. We have seen, looked upon, handled, what may thus be known of him. Then he adds,—throwing in a parenthesis which is to be a solution of the whole evangelic history,—'For the Life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and show unto you that Eternal Life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us.'

"Observe three points in this very peculiar language. First, there is

a manifestation of something, the mission of the Word is looked upon inclusively as a manifestation, that is, a coming into visibility of something before invisible. Secondly, it is the Life that was manifested,—not life generally speaking, but *the* Life. And, thirdly, as if to distinguish it in a yet more definite manner, it is called *that* Life, that Eternal Life that was *with* the Father, and was manifested unto us.

"Taking, now, these three terms, in connection with the assumption, elsewhere made, that our human race, under sin, are alienated from the life of God; also, with the declaration of Christ, that, as the Father hath life in himself, so he hath given to the Son, as the world's Redeemer, to have life in himself; and, again, with that deep utterance of joy sent forth by an emancipated soul,—'For the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death,'—taking the text, I say, in connection with these others, as commentaries, we have a good synoptic view, it seems to me, of the doctrine of the Messiah.

"It is not that Christ is a man, a human teacher, who is sent to reform us by his words and his beautiful human example, but it is to this effect:—All souls have their proper life only in the common vivifying life of God. Sin, being a withdrawal into self and self-hood, separates them from the life, and, as far as their own freedom is concerned, denies all influx of the Divine into their character and their religious nature. Passing thus into a state of negation, as regards the Divine all-sustaining life, they become imprisoned in darkness, unbelief, idolatry, and a general captivity to sense. And now the Life is manifested in sense; in Christ is life, and the life is the light of men. Christ enters into human feeling, by his incarnate charities and sufferings, to re-engage the world's love and reunite the world, as free, to the Eternal Life. To sum up all in one condensed and luminous utterance, every word of which is power, *God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself.* The Apostle says nothing here, it will be observed, of reconciling God to men, he only speaks of reconciling men to God. Had he said, 'The Life of God was manifested in Jesus Christ, to quicken the world in love and truth, and reunite it to himself,' he would have said the same thing under a different form.

"I am well aware that, in offering such a statement, as the true doctrine of Christ and his work, I affirm nothing that is distinctively orthodox, and shall even seem to rule out that view of Christ as a *sacrifice*, an *expiation for sin*, a *vicarious offering*, which, to the view of most orthodox Christians, contains the real moment of his work as a Saviour. It will be found, however, that I am proceeding exactly in the line of the Scriptures, and I trust also it will appear, before I have done, that the Scriptures advance two distinct views of Christ and his work, which are yet radically one and the same view.

"I. A subjective, speculative,—one that contemplates the work of Christ in its ends, and views it as a power related to its ends.

"II. An objective, ritualistic,—one that sets him forth to faith, instead of philosophy, and one, without which, as an Altar Form for the soul, he would not be the power intended, or work the ends appointed.

"Thus, when it is inquired, as in the first form specified, for what end did Christ come into the world, we have a class of terms in the Scripture which can scarcely get any proper meaning, if what is said under the second form is considered to be the whole doctrine of Christ. The converse also is equally true. The real problem is to find a place and a meaning for *all* that is said concerning him,—to effect a union of the two sides.

"As examples of the manner in which the Scriptures make answer, when the question is, for what ends did Christ come into the world, we have the following :—

"'To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, to bear witness to the truth,'—a passage that is remarkable as being the most direct, specific, and formal statement Christ ever made of the object of his Messiahship ; and here he says, that he came to bring truth into the world.

"'I am the way, the truth, and the life';—'I am the light of the world,'—are declarations of a similar import.

"'Unto you, first, God having raised up his Son Jesus, sent him to bless you, in turning away every one of you from his iniquities.' 'Who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works,'—where the end of his mission is declared to be a moral effect, wrought in the mind of the race.

"For this purpose, the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the 'works of the devil,'—a passage declaring the precise object of the incarnation as affirmed in my text ; and, as the work of the devil is not the punishment, but the corruption, of his followers, we are brought to the same conclusion as before.

"In all these citations, we have so many echoes of the one just produced, as the grand, comprehensive doctrine of Christ's work, or mission :—GOD IN CHRIST, RECONCILING THE WORLD UNTO HIMSELF. And I affirm, without hesitation, that whenever the question is about *the end* of Christ's work, that end to which he stands related as the wisdom and power of God, the answer of the Scripture will be, that he comes to renovate character; to quicken by the infusion of the Divine life; in one word, that he comes to be a Saviour, as saving his people from their sins."—pp. 187–191.

The reader will perceive here a repetition of that form of the old Apollinarian heresy which we pointed out in our last article, and which, if it does not absolutely deny the Incarnation, at least completely reverses it; namely, that the Word, in some sense, enters into human nature, or is con-

verted into flesh, or that the divine is assumed by the human, instead of human nature by the Word or second Person of the ever-blessed Trinity. The reader will also perceive that here again the author represents the Word, Logos, or Son, not as a divine person or hypostasis, but as the power or faculty of God to produce himself outwardly in the forms of things, which, if explained so as to escape pantheism, can only mean that the eternal Word is simply the creative power of God, or God's ability to create existences, and therefore the Incarnation is only the creation of a human existence, or a human person. Giving the author the benefit of the most favorable construction his language will bear, he undeniably falls into these two fatal errors, errors which necessarily imply the denial of the whole christian religion.

But passing over these two fatal errors, as already sufficiently discussed, it is obvious that the author's doctrine in regard to the purpose or purposes of our Lord's mission is, that Christ came solely to effect a moral renovation or change in the human race, to make satisfaction for sin, to fulfil the law, and effect the Atonement by reconciling us to God, that is, by leading us to repentance and newness of life. The whole significance, end, or aim of Christianity is the moral regeneration of mankind, or the production of certain subjective states or affections in us. This is evident from the extract we have made, and from the whole Discourse.

With some modification, we could accept this statement, so far as relates to the end of our Lord's mission. The end of his coming was undoubtedly the salvation of sinners. "The Son of man has come to seek and to save that which was lost." (St. Luke xix. 10.) St. Paul says, it is "a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Jesus Christ came into this world to save sinners, of whom I am the chief." (1 Tim. i. 15.) "The only cause of the coming of Christ," says St. Augustine, "was to save sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no cause for medicine. If the great Physician came from heaven great infirmity was on the earth."—*Si venit de cælo magnus medicus, magnus per totum orbem terræ jacebat ægrotus.** On this point we have no controversy with Dr. Bushnell. Mankind were sick, and Christ came to heal them; they were

*Serm. clxxv. (al. *de verbis apostoli* 9) cap. i.

alienated from God, and he came to liberate them from their sins, and to reconcile them to God,—although he reconciles by liberating, rather than liberates by reconciling them, in the author's sense.

The author contends that Christ does not reconcile us as a human teacher, by his beautiful words and beautiful examples, as Socinianism holds. Something more is necessary. The subjective view alone is insufficient, and the objective view must always be joined with it.

"Then, again, to show that a view is offered of Christ, in the writings especially of the Apostles, which is wholly different from this, one that speaks of him as a propitiation, a sacrifice, as bearing our sins, bearing the curse for us, obtaining remission by his blood, is altogether unnecessary. In the Epistles to the Romans, the Galatians, the Hebrews, those of Peter and John, this altar view or form of Christ appears even as the eminent, or super-eminent truth of the Gospel.

"Omitting, therefore, because it is unnecessary, to offer any particular citations to this effect, I will simply refer you to a passage that is remarkable, as being an instance where one view runs into the other, and the altar form becomes, in the issue, a renovating power. The eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews opens with a look toward sacrifice, describing Christ as a 'priest' 'having somewhat to offer,' but still as 'having obtained a more excellent ministry' than the priests of the law, and brought in for us a 'better covenant.' How better? Because it has a more transforming power in the life, because it fulfills a better and higher design, writing the law in the heart:—'*I will put my laws into their mind, and write them in their hearts.*' Here the objective, ritual view passes into the subjective, and reveals the fact that it has and was designed to have a renovating power in character;—thus becoming a 'new' and 'better covenant.' Accordingly, I design to show that, if the first or subjective view of Christ, that in which I state the end and aim of Christ's work, is true, that end or aim could not be effectively realized without the second, or objective view, in which his whole work is conceived in the altar form, and held forth to the objective embrace and worship and repose of faith."—pp. 191, 192.

But this objective or ritualistic view and the subjective "are yet radically one and the same." The objective view represents no objective reality, no truth independent of the subjective, and is only the subjective objectively expressed, or the machinery which the Almighty invents and employs to produce and express the subjective states or affections which it was the end of Christ's mission to produce in us.

To understand this, we must bear in mind that the end of Christ's mission, according to the author, is the produc-

tion of certain moral changes, states, or affections in us, and the whole truth and value of all the transactions brought to view in the Gospel history consist in their artistic or æsthetic fitness to produce them. They do not produce these changes, states, or affections in the way of doctrine or didactic teaching addressed to the logical understanding, not as philosophy or as theology, but as art, addressed primarily to the feelings. This ritualistic view is the artistic form of the subjective or philosophical view, and without which it would be practically inefficient.

We shall better understand this, if we glance at the author's theory of language laid down in his Preliminary Dissertation. According to the author, all language depends for its significance, not on an objective world to which it introduces us, and of which it is primarily the sensible sign, but on the mind to which it is addressed. Words are signs, indeed; but not signs of objective realities; they are signs only of subjective states or affections, and the whole value of the verbal sign is in its fitness to suggest to the mind or call up in the mind a certain thought or feeling. All words, even those which are suggestive of spiritual thoughts and affections, will be found on analysis to be primarily signs of feelings, and only mediately signs of intellectual and spiritual affections. They are not purely arbitrary or conventional signs, but are significant by virtue of a certain innate correspondence between the sign and the feeling, and between the feeling and the intellectual or spiritual affection. Our philosophical readers will readily understand this theory, which is substantially the old conceptualistic theory, advocated in the twelfth century by the too famous Abelard, completely and confessedly refuted by St. Bernard. On this theory there is no intelligible reality, that is, the intelligible is simply *in mente* and does not exist *a parte rei*, and God himself is for us only our subjective conceptions. He can reveal himself to us only by means of certain sensible signs, which are significant only by the affections they are fitted to produce in us. God is supposed, mediately or immediately, to prepare the signs and to construct them artistically as signs of our feelings, as he does the feelings as signs of spiritual affections. Hence the whole value of the signs as a medium of divine communication consists, not in what they signify of God to us, but in what they express in us that has its equivalent in God, or rather, that is identical with God.

Christianity is constructed and made expressive on the same principle. The author's radical conception of it is that of a work of art, a divine drama, or fable, intended to illustrate and impress a moral, or to produce certain moral or spiritual states or affections in the soul. The Trinity, he tells us, is the *machina Dei*, or the divine machinery by which God reveals himself to men; and he expressly calls the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost the *dramatis personæ* of the revelation. They are not three persons eternally subsisting in the Godhead, but three impersonations, or representations expressing in a dramatic or poetic form to our feelings the three characters or attitudes which God, regarded as absolute being, bears to his creatures; or, in other words, they are the machinery or fable which God employs to make us aware of the contents of his own being. Their value is solely in what they express. They are real or true, because the subjective affections they stand for in us are the affections of God; but whether, beyond what they express to our feelings, that is, beyond the subjective affections, they have any reality or not, is more than we can affirm or deny, for to do either would require a knowledge of the internal nature of God to which we cannot attain.

The Incarnation completes God's dramatic representation of himself, and adds the fifth and last act to the divine tragedy. It includes, in fact, the whole of the Christian representation; for the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are first brought to view in it, and either incidental to it or produced by it. "This threefold denomination is itself incidental to and produced by the central fact, or mystery of the Incarnation, as an impersonation of God developed in time." (pp. 167, 168.) In it God expresses himself under a human form, under human relations, as living a human life, associating with us as a friend and a brother, and pouring out upon us the human contents of his being; our feelings, the human affections, charities, and sympathies which eternally dwell in the bosom of the Divinity. Strictly speaking, the Incarnation is not God exalting human nature by taking it up to himself, nor does it import new divinity into new humanity, but is simply a new and striking manifestation of the substantial identity of the human and divine natures. Christ is not God, is not man, absolutely considered; but the expression of both in what they have in common. He is God in that what he expresses is God, and man in that what he expresses is also human, and both God and man in

that he expresses the common properties of both,—that is, the humanity of God and the divinity of man, which at bottom are one and the same. This must be the author's meaning, for he denies the doctrine of two natures in Christ, and contends that he has but one simple nature. If, then, he is the expression of both God and man, both God and man, as far as he is their expression, must be identical; which follows, also, from the author's pantheism. But apart from the expression, what is Christ? Is he man? Is he God? Is he both? Let no one be foolish to ask; for whether he is, or what he is, independent of the expression, is a matter clearly out of the range of our investigation. He is for us only in the expression, and as he expresses both God and man to us, he is both to us, and that is enough for us to know. Who asks whether the beasts and birds in Æsop's fables were or were not objectively real, and really talked or not? The errors and divisions among theologians all grow out of the attempt to get behind the expression, and to impose their idle conjectures and uncertain guesses as dogmas of faith. We should learn to stop with the expression itself.

Such, in brief, is the author's conception of Christianity. It is a divine tragedy, conceived, written, and acted by Almighty God, by which he makes known to us through our own subjective states the affections of his own bosom, the feelings of his own heart. Like every dramatic performance, nay, like every work of art, it is addressed primarily to our feelings, and affects and improves us on the same principle that any tragedy affects and improves us, though in a far higher degree, as being far more perfect as a work of art than any human tragedy ever represented or conceived. Hence the author says:—

"The value of Christ's mission is measured by what is expressed. And if so, then it follows, of course, that no dogmatic statement can adequately represent his work; for the matter of it does not lie in formulas of reason, and cannot be comprehended in them. It is more a poem than a treatise. It classes as a work of Art more than a work of Science. It addresses the understanding, in great part, through the feeling of sensibility. In these it has its receptivities, by these it is perceived, or perceivable. Moving in and through these, as a revelation of sympathy, love, life, it proposes to connect us with the Life of God. And when through these, believingly opened as inlets, it is received, then is the union it seeks consummated. Were it not for the air it might give to my representations, in the view of many, I should like, in com-

mon with Paul (Phil. i. 9, 10), to use the word *æsthetic*, and represent Christianity as a power moving upon man, through this department of his nature, both to regenerate his degraded perception of excellence, and also to communicate, in that way, the fullness and beauty of God.

"Hence, it would not be as wild a breach of philosophy itself, to undertake a dogmatic statement of the contents of a tragedy, as to attempt giving in the same manner the equivalents of the life and death of Jesus Christ. The only real equivalent we can give is the representation of the life itself. It is not absurd, however, to say something about the subject, if only we do not assume the adequacy of what we say; we could offer some theoretical views of a tragedy, but our theoretic matter would not be the tragedy. No more can we set forth, as a real and proper equivalent, any theoretic matter of ours concerning the life and death of Jesus Christ, which is the highest and most moving tragedy ever acted in this mortal sphere; a tragedy distinguished in the fact that God is the Chief Character, and the divine feeling, moved in tragic earnest—Goodness Infinite manifested through Sorrow—the passion represented." pp. 203–205.

We can now easily understand what this objective or ritualistic view is, and what is its relation to the subjective view. The subjective view is Christianity philosophically stated, the objective is the same philosophical truth artistically represented. The former is plain prose, the latter is the former done into poetry, or the form in which it must be expressed in order to be practically efficient.

Turning now to the subjective view, we find that it represents Christ as accomplishing his mission, the salvation of sinners,—1. By placing in the world "the example of a sinlessly perfect being," which of itself is sufficient, by the new feelings and ideas it awakens, "to change the destinies of the race, and even their capabilities of good." (p. 205.) 2. By the fact that it manifests the Life, the eternal Life of God, which penetrates men's souls, moves their feelings, enlarges their views, "elevates their ideas and purposes, and even their capacity of good itself." (p. 207.) 3. By giving assurance, through the charity manifested in the Life, of God's willingness to forgive and justify the sinner on condition of repentance and reformation of life; and thus dispelling the imaginary fear of the wrath and vindictiveness of God, and that dread of future punishment which sin generates in the breast of every transgressor, and exciting the sinner's love to God, inspiring him with confidence, and giving him courage to begin a new life. (p. 213–216.) And 4. By bringing the law closer to men's souls, and giving it

a more sacred rigor and verity than it had before his advent. (p. 219.)

Christ brings the law closer to men's minds and gives it a more sacred rigor in four methods:—

1. By his instructions concerning it. The advent of Jesus was a new and more fearful revelation of God. Christ holds up the law in tones of greater rigor and exactness than any which had been used before. (pp. 219, 220.)

2. By his obedience. This and the two following methods the author considers in relation to the institution of sacrifices, and to do him justice we must extract at length his own words.

"The institution of sacrifice is most reasonably regarded as a positive institution, originally appointed by God. We find the rite in use at a time when marriage, a far less artificial institution, is represented as being received by God's appointment, and when he himself was introducing, by his lessons, the culture of the ground and even the dress of the body. It was most natural, too, that, when he was teaching the guilty, fallen pair their severance from him, by removing them from their paradise, he should also teach them by what rites of penitence and worship they might be purified and restored to union with him. We also find a positive statute enacted, at a very early period, forbidding the eating of blood, the object of which is to make it a sacred thing for the uses of the altar. Afterwards, undeniably, the system of sacrifice was carefully elaborated by the minutest and most specific positive statutes. Besides, which to me is most convincing of all, there is a certain forelooking in this ritual, and then, when Christ appears, a certain retrospection, one answering to the other, one preparing words and symbols to express the other, and a beautiful and even artistic correspondence kept up, such as argues invention, plan, appointment, and indicates a Divine counsel present, connecting the remote ages of time, and weaving them together into a compact and well-adjusted whole. And if the redemption of man, is the great work of the world, that in which all existences here find their highest moment, as most assuredly it is, then what may better occupy the wisdom and the greatness of God, than the preparation of so great a work?

"The matter and manner of the sacrifice are familiar to us all,—the going up to Jerusalem, driving thither, or purchasing there, a choice, unblemished animal; the confession of sin upon his head before the altar; the solemn formalities of the slaughter and preparation of the sacrifice: the sacred blood sprinkled before the vail that is closed against unholy feet, the horns of the altar touched with blood, and the remainder poured out before it on the ground; then the fire kindled and the smoke of the victim, made a total loss for sin rolling up before the eyes of the worshipper to heaven. And then he returns again to his tribe, thinking

on the way, of the journey he has undertaken for his sins,—as he went up thinking of the sins that required him to go.

"What, now, is the real meaning or value of this transaction? The ceremony is proposed to be connected with the remission of sins. How thus connected?

"It is not that God has been appeased by the smell of the sacrifice. It is called an atonement, or propitiation, but it cannot be supposed that God is pacified in any way by the sacrifice.

"It is not that the worshipper has embraced the atonement of Christ, typified in his sacrifice, as we sometimes hear. He had no such conception. Even the sacred prophets themselves, we are told, were guessing *what*, as well as what manner of time, the Spirit that was in them did signify when they spoke of Christ and his day. Nay, his own disciples, explicitly taught by himself, could not understand the import of his death till they were specially illuminated. Doubtless the worshipper did sometimes, and ought always to have exercised faith in God, as a forgiver of sin; and, as God is Christ and Christ is God, there was exercised, of course, a virtual, but not formal, faith in the Christ of the future.

"It is not true or supposable, as needs to be specially noted, that the animal offered is punished for the sins of the worshipper. No hint or trace of any such impression can be found. Nor can it be argued from the confession of sins upon the head of the victim; for, when the scapegoat is employed, the confession upon his head is even more formal, and yet the animal is only driven away into the wilderness to signify the clearing of sin, its forgiveness and removal for ever. Besides, if there were any idea of punishment connected with the sacrifice, if the death of the animal had a penal character, because of the sins supposed to rest on it, then something would be made of the suffering inflicted; which we know was never thought of, and made no part of the transaction. The animal was simply despatched, as when slaughtered for the table, and it nowhere appears, in the whole range of Hebrew literature, that any one ever thought of the sufferings of the animal as entering at all into the real moment of the transaction.

"We come now to that in which the real value of the sacrifice did consist. The institution had, of course, a historic value as connected with the future life and work of the incarnate Redeemer; for in it are prepared correspondences and, so, types or bases of language, in which that more spiritual grace may be represented. It had also a value, considered as part of a great national religion, in which public remembrance of sin is made every year. It was also as a rite, to have a renovating power over the character, somewhat as the manifested Life in Christ Jesus is designed to have; only in a vastly feebler and inferior degree. And therefore, in cases where it had no such effect, it was openly declared, on the part of God, to be an abomination to him, and as such to be rejected. The value of the sacrifice lay chiefly, however, in the power it had over the religious character,—the impressions, exercises, aids, and

principles, which, as a liturgy, it wrought in the soul of the worshipper. And among these, as connected especially with the remission of sins, was the impression it cherished of the sanctity of violated law; for, as I have said already, it is on the ground of that impression secured, both that forgiveness will be wanted, and may be safely offered."—pp. 222–225.

The design of the ritual sacrifices was to strengthen and sanctify the law in the minds of the worshippers, and especially to impress them with a sense of the sanctity of the violated law, however freely through God's mercy sins may be forgiven. "The same impression is made, and far more deeply, by the obedience of Christ; for, considering who he is, there is more of meaning in his obedience than there is in the obedience of many nations." "God is really under the same law of obligation that we were under and cast off, and it is the glory and greatness of his nature that he delights eternally to acknowledge this law. Christ is the manifested Life revealing this everlasting obedience of the divine nature. All that he does and suffers is but an expression of the homage, rendered by God himself, to that which we reject." If God himself renders homage to the law which we have violated, how sacred must that law be!—(pp. 226, 227.)

3. "Christ, coincidently with the sin-offering, sanctifies the law through expense and painstaking. The sacrificer must come bringing the best and choicest of his flock,—a lamb or a bullock without blemish. He must be absent from home, and leave his business behind for whole days,—all in the way of expense and painstaking." Save in its subjective effect on himself, all this is "a dead loss." The victim must be wholly destroyed,—must all "go to smoke," and then it will move his conscience, and make him feel the sacredness of violated law. "Christ, by the sorrow and suffering of his painstaking life, accomplished a like result." "Every thing he does and suffers, every labor, weariness, self-denial, and sorrow, becomes an expression of his sense of the value of the law,—every pang he endures declares its sacredness."—(pp. 227, 229.)

4. "The law of God is yet more impressively sanctified by Christ, if possible, in the article of his death, considered as counterpart to the uses of blood in the ritual." The whole ritual turns on the essential sacredness of blood. The blood was considered as the life, and its use in the ritual signified to the worshipper that "only the most sacred thing he knows, even life, can suffice to resanctify the law violated by his sins. Nay, more, a sacred thing is something that belongs especial-

ly to the occupancy and right of God, and the impression was that blood, being the mysterious principle of life, is somehow especially near to the divine nature,—thus and therefore sacred." The meaning of sacrifice is, therefore, that "only something derivable from God, some sacred element yielded by him, can suffice to cover man's sin and hallow again the violated majesty of broken law." Hence the maxim, "Without the shedding of blood there is no remission of sins." "Christ appears and closes his sanctified and sublime life by submission to a violent death. He is not a sacrifice in any literal sense, as we know. There is no altar in his death; no fire is kindled; by no act of religion or priestly rite is he offered up; he is simply murdered by the malice of his enemies." But his life, considering who he was, in comparison with which the most sacred things the apostles had ever known were profane,—it was the life of God, and, being yielded up in devotion to the law, and in its honor, was admirably fitted to show us that nothing conceivable is too sacred for us to yield up to cover the breaches made by our sins.

Here the author apparently breaks down in the attempt to sustain the analogy which he asserts, and really gets no more in the death of Christ than he had previously got in the sacrifices under the law. The signification of the sacrifice, he says, was that "only some sacred thing, yielded by God, is sufficient to cover the breaches made by sin," and therefore blood, as the most sacred thing known under the law, and yielded us by him, was offered in sacrifice. To carry out this view, he should be able to say that we have something infinitely more sacred than the blood of goats and calves yielded us in Christ, and which we can offer to God, or which by his death in our place he offered for us. Christ was sinless, and shedding his blood on the cross, not for us, not in the place of sinners, but simply as murdered by the malice of his enemies, could in no sense signify that only some sacred thing yielded by God is sufficient to cover the breaches made by sin, for in his case there were no breaches made by sin to be covered. The only view the author can take, in accordance with his theory, is, that Christ was engaged in a work of charity to mankind, and he chose rather to suffer himself to be murdered by his enemies than to desert it, and thereby showed that the law of God exacts that in a charitable work we persevere unto death, even the death of the cross; which, we apprehend, is not true, since the law

of God only commands us to love our neighbor *as* ourselves. However, let the author speak for himself.

"Looking, now, at the death of Christ in this manner, we are made, first of all, to feel, whether we can explain it or not, that it has a marvellous power over our impressions, concerning ourselves and our sins, the law of God and his character. It brings an element of divinity into every thing, sheds an air of solemnity and grandeur over every thing. It is even more awful to the guilty conscience itself than the thunders of Sinai. And, then, secondly, we shall be able also, I think, to see that the whole effect, contemplated under the laws of art, is produced by the fact that the Life, thrice sacred, so dimly shadowed before in the victims of the altar, is here yielded, as a contribution from God, to the pacification and reconsecration of his realm. The effect depends, not on any real altar ceremony in his death, but it depends, artistically speaking, on the expressive power of the fact, that the Incarnate Word, appearing in humanity, and having a ministry for the reconciliation of men to God, even goes to such a pitch of devotion, as to yield up his life to it, and allow the blood of his Mysterious Person to redden our polluted earth!"—p. 236.

Here is the whole significance of the Gospel considered philosophically in its relation of a means to an end. Setting aside the author's attempt to explain the Hebrew ritual, his blunder as to the significance of sacrifice, and his assertion that God is under the same law of obligation that we are, we recognize, not, indeed, the whole truth, nor the central truth of Christianity, but a truth, and an important truth, in what he appears to be driving at. Christianity, no doubt, is, in some sense, addressed to our feelings, and operates æsthetically. The life and passion of our Saviour are admirably adapted to affect us, and they move us far more powerfully than do the simple truths they express, when logically drawn out and stated in a dry and didactic form. Remembering who our Lord is, we cannot follow him step by step from his lowly birth in the stable to his agony in the garden and death on the cross,—we cannot see him, who was rich, for our sakes become poor, who was in the form of God and without robbery could judge himself equal to God, take upon himself the form of a servant, humble, and as it were annihilate, himself, live a life of poverty and want, go about doing good when he had not whereon to lay his head,—despised and rejected of men, derided and scorned by the world, betrayed by a follower, deserted by his friends, arraigned as a criminal, mocked, buffeted, spit upon, scourged, and finally crucified between

two thieves,—bearing all in meekness and patience, in sweetness and without a murmur, forgiving his enemies, and in the agony of his passion, with his latest breath, praying for his murderers,—without being touched in our hearts, filled with abhorrence for sin, and furnished with the most powerful incentives to contrition and virtue. Certainly one of the most efficient means of Christian growth is daily meditation on the life and passion of our Lord, and no one can hope to attain to Christian perfection who neglects it. All this is true, and well known to all masters of spiritual life.

But this is not by any means the whole truth, and would not be a truth at all on Dr. Bushnell's theory. The power of the life and passion to produce the effect indicated depends on their being believed to be the life and passion of a real being, a real individual, who in the highest and most absolute sense is both God and man. Dismiss this belief, let it be understood that the whole life and passion are only a grand dramatic representation, or theatrical exhibition, gotten up and displayed merely for artistic or æsthetic effect, and their power to move us would be destroyed, because they would want reality. In denying or rendering doubtful the objective reality or ontological truth of the Christian mysteries, the author should bear in mind that he takes away their very power to affect us. If Christianity is only a dramatic fable, designed simply to illustrate and impress a moral, and has no reality but in the feelings it excites, the thoughts it suggests, and the resolutions it leads us to form, he has done a very unhandsome thing in telling us of it. He has destroyed the illusion by admitting us behind the scenes.

There is no doubt that the ceremonies, sacrifices, sacred things, and observances enjoined by the Jewish ritual, reacted upon the worshippers in the way the author supposes, and that the worshippers, when sincere, were really instructed, edified, and made better by them, as simple spiritual exercises. But if the worshippers had approached them with the understanding that their sole value was in the spiritual exercises they demanded or were fitted to produce, they would have failed to receive from them even that advantage. Prayer is certainly the most holy and profitable spiritual exercise conceivable,—indeed, it includes every spiritual exercise; but if undertaken solely for the sake of the exercise, it would not be, for it would then cease

to be prayer. Prayer is the elevation of the soul to God; but a man praying for the sake of spiritual exercise does not elevate his soul to God, and therefore loses the benefit of prayer even as an exercise. The poor man would be merely endeavoring to lift himself by pulling away with all his might at his own waistbands. The Gospel, no doubt, operates to some extent on the principle *ex opere recipientis*, but to make it operate solely on that principle is pushing the matter further, we should suppose, than even Protestants generally are prepared to go.

But waiving these obvious objections to the author's doctrine, we confess we do not see wherein he gets any thing more from Christ than beautiful words and beautiful examples. All the methods by which he represents the Gospel as regenerating men are reducible to the moral force of the truths Christ taught, and the examples he set. It is true, he calls Christ the Life of God manifested in the world, but this life, according to his own principles, operates only æsthetically, as a poem, a picture, or a statue, and connects itself with the life of mankind only in the thoughts it generates and the feelings it excites in them,—that is to say, only in and through the effects which naturally result from the contemplation of a holy life,—a life of truth and goodness, love and mercy, meekness and patience, disinterested affection and heroic suffering. That such a life has power to move and excite us to virtuous effort we have conceded; but it imparts no new power to the soul, no new strength to any of its faculties. It only stimulates the powers and calls forth the strength the soul already has, and always has had; for the author must remember that there is, on his doctrine, no infused grace, and that Christ does not exalt humanity, or import any divinity into human nature. He only declares the union of the human and divine natures which has always existed, and all the additional power he imparts to us to keep his commandments it what naturally flows from a clear and full conviction, that, up to a certain point at least, the human and divine are one and the same, —a conviction produced by a dramatic representation, instead of a dry, didactic statement of the fact. We confess, therefore, we do not see wherein the author rises above simple Unitarianism as to the substance of his doctrine, and he even falls far below it, for Unitarians in general do at least admit our Lord was a real man, not the mere hero of an epic poem, a drama, or a novel.

But the author himself concedes that this subjective view of Christianity is insufficient,—is not the complete Gospel of our Lord.

"Here I close the subjective view of Christ's mission. Considered as a power moving the spiritual regeneration and redemption of man, this is the conception we form of it. Is it a true conception? I have a degree of confidence that it is. But there is yet another question: is it satisfactory,—is it the Gospel of Christ? However it may seem to others, for it certainly appears to be a plan not wanting in magnificence, I am still obliged to confess, that, taken by itself, it is not satisfactory to me, and I could not offer it as the full and complete Gospel of Christ.

"I observe, in the Scriptures, a large class of representations, such as speak of the *atonement* received by Christ, his *sacrifice*, his *offering*, his *bearing the sins* of many, the holiest opened by his *blood*, the *curse* he became, the *wrath* he suffered, the *righteousness* he provided, which do not seem to have their proper, natural place and significance in the view here presented. I recollect, also, that around these terms of grace the whole Church of God, with but a few limited exceptions, have hung their tenderest emotions, and shed their freest tears of repentance; that by these the righteous good, the saints and martyrs of the past ages, have supported the trial of their faith: that before these they have stood, as their altar of peace, and sung their hymns of praise to the Lamb that was slain; and remembering this, I cannot conceive myself that they were wholly mistaken, or that they were not receiving here, in the living earnest of their spirit, something that belongs to the profoundest verity and value of the cross. Men do not live in this manner, from age to age and by whole nations, upon pure error. Spiritual life is not fed, thus interminably, upon a Gospel that mocks all reality. If their supposed Gospel does not stand with reason or theory, it must somehow stand with faith, feeling, and all that is inmost in eternal life. This brings me to the second department of my subject, that in which I proposed to unfold an objective ritual view, answering to the mere speculative and subjective now presented, and necessary, as such, to the full effect and power of Christ's mission."—pp. 244–246.

This would seem to be something; but, as we have seen, it is only the subjective view we have already stated, objectively expressed. In itself considered, this objective view contains no truth not contained in the subjective view, and is only a sacred language, a divinely constructed system of signs, for producing in us certain states or affections. It is true because it expresses the truth to us, but the truth it expresses is subjective, not objective truth. It is only the form under which Christianity is to be represented in order to have an artistic effect.

"But it will be imagined, I suppose, by some, that the objective religion, the view of vicarious atonement which, as we have seen, may be generated by a transfer of the speculative doctrine, is only a rhetorical accident,—that the apostles and evangelists only took up certain Jewish figures, made ready at their hands, using them to convey the Christian truths. Contrary to this, it is my conviction, and I shall now undertake to show, that God prepared such a result, by a deliberate, previous arrangement. It is the DIVINE FORM of Christianity, in distinction from all others, and is, in that view, substantial to it, or consubstantial with it. It is, in fact, a Divine Ritual for the working of the world's mind. It was not more necessary, indeed, that the Life should find a body, than it is that the power Christ deposits in the world should have an operative vehicle. The Christ must become a religion *for* the soul and *before* it, therefore a Rite or Liturgy for the world's feeling,—otherwise Christianity were incomplete, or imperfect."—p. 258.

This ritualistic view, if not a rhetorical accident, is not so only because its author is God, and not man. It is clearly an accident in relation to the substantive truth of Christianity, for it is only the artistic form of that truth, and is no more essential to it than the fable is essential to the moral it is intended to illustrate and impress. With this objective view the author's system is at best only Socinianism clothed in Christian garments, or Unitarianism expressed in orthodox phraseology; and the only reason why, in so expressing it, we are not guilty of fraud and deception is, that God himself has prepared that phraseology as the fitting vehicle of Unitarian doctrine. How the author has learned all this, and many other things he asserts, is more than we know, or are able to divine.

The objective or ritualistic view of the author comprises the whole of the great mystery of redemption objectively considered, or the representation of Christ as our sponsor, our redeemer, the propitiation for our sins; as dying in our place, bearing our sins, redeeming us by his blood, making satisfaction for us to divine Justice, and by his own merits obtaining for us the grace of pardon, and sanctification, and heaven. This view must be taken, not because Christ really did die in our place, satisfy for us, and merit our pardon and salvation, but because this is the necessary form of Christian expression, the only form in which the Gospel can be expressed so as to produce its intended effects. It is a divine form, because the old ritual from which it is borrowed was itself the work of God, designed, aside from the æsthetic effect it was to have on those who observe it,

to supply a fit and appropriate language for worshippers under the new law.

That the mystery of Redemption expressed in orthodox language is admirably fitted to produce the subjective affections the author supposes, is not denied, and we have already conceded it more than once; but only on condition of its being believed to be objectively true. Reduced, as the author reduces it, to mere fable, to mere poetical machinery for the production of those affections, it would not be so fitted. Moreover, we are not prepared to look upon God as dealing in fable, using fiction, and requiring us to believe it literally and strictly true. To say that he cannot without fiction or fable reveal himself to us, or move us to contrition and virtue, is to derogate from both his wisdom and power; and to say that he uses fiction, and requires us to believe it as truth, is to derogate from both his truthfulness and his justice. God does not employ fiction as truth, and Christianity is not a fable. Either the objective form of Christianity is objectively true, true to the letter, or God has deceived us, and the Gospel is an imposition.

Dr. Bushnell is, no doubt, an able man, and many parts of his theory indicate no little ingenuity and speculative talent; but he fails to see his doctrine in all its bearings. If his theory, that Christianity effects its end only æsthetically, be true, the whole benefit of the life, passion, and cross of our Lord must be restricted to those who have lived and died since his coming. The old patriarchs, and the saints under the old law, were not then saved by Christ *crucified*, and they cannot hail him as the Captain of their salvation. He did nothing for them; he did not by his cross and passion consummate their faith, and perfect what was wanting to them; for, as all the transactions brought to view in the Gospel were subsequent to their death, they could not affect them as divine art. The divine drama, not being represented before them, could not touch their hearts, and operate their reconciliation to God. Either, then, they are not saved, and are suffering now in hell, or there is another than Christ crucified in whom there is salvation, contrary to St. Peter, who says, "Neither is there salvation in another. For there is no other name under heaven given to men whereby we must be saved." (Acts iv. 12.) It would not be true, then, as St. Paul teaches us, that "there is one God, and one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a redemption for all, a testimony

in due times." (1 Tim. ii. 5, 6.) Nothing is more evident from the Scriptures, than that all who are saved at all are saved by Christ crucified, and that the effects of the cross of Christ extend backwards to the first sinner of our race, as well as forward to the last, and were as essential to the salvation of those who lived and died before his coming as to those who live and die since. There never has been but one true religion, but one medium of salvation, and that medium is the cross of Christ. Hence, St. Paul, enumerating the saints who lived and died before the Incarnation, and commending their faith, adds "And all these being approved by the testimony of faith, received not the promise, God providing something better for us, that they should not be perfected without us." (Heb. xi. 39, 40.) This plainly intimates that we have received something necessary to salvation, which they had not received; that we have received the promise, that is, the fulfilment of the promise, in which they confided, but which they did not receive; and that our having received it, or that which was promised to them having now come, not only perfects us, but them also. The author is therefore precluded from giving to the life and passion of our Lord any interpretation which restricts their effects to those living only after his advent.

The author denies the vicarious atonement, or that Christ suffered as a sacrifice for the sins of mankind, and made satisfaction for them to the justice of God. Such satisfaction, he contends, was not necessary, was impossible, could serve no purpose, and God would have been unjust and cruel either to have exacted or to have accepted it from an innocent person. That it was not absolutely necessary is conceded. God could have pardoned the sinner gratuitously on the simple condition of penitence and amendment of life, if he had so willed. "If God had willed," says St. Thomas, "to liberate men from sin, without satisfaction, he would have done nothing contrary to justice. The judge who is charged to punish crime committed against another, as another man, the commonwealth, or a superior prince, cannot, indeed, save justice, and dismiss the guilty without punishment. But God has no superior, and is himself the supreme and common good of the whole universe. Therefore, if he forgives sin, which derives its guilt from the fact that it is committed against himself, he does no one any injury; thus a man who forgives an offense against himself acts mercifully, not unjustly. Hence David, seeking mercy

of God, says, *Tibi soli peccavi*, as if he would say he can be forgiven without injustice." * On this point we have no controversy with the author, or with his Unitarian friends.

But because God could have willed to liberate us from sin without satisfaction, we cannot say he has so willed. *Argumentum a posse ad esse, non valet.* God was free to will not to pardon without satisfaction, as he was free, if he had willed, not to accept satisfaction, but to leave the sinner to suffer in his own person the full penalty of the law he had broken. He was not obliged to pardon either with or without satisfaction. Man had sinned willfully, and had voluntarily incurred the penalty of everlasting death, and would have had no cause of complaint against the divine justice if left to suffer it. To have pardoned the sinner on the simple condition of penitence and reformation would have been a great mercy, an act of grace on the part of God; but to refuse to pardon on that condition, for the sake of making a higher display of his infinite love and wisdom, and of raising us to a greater dignity and to a higher blessedness than we lost by sin, would have been a still greater mercy, a higher act of grace. Now this may have been the reason why God refuses to pardon gratuitously. He may have willed something better for us, something more to his own glory; and all orthodox Christians believe that such is the case, that he willed, not only to repair the damage done by sin, but to make even sin itself contribute to the exaltation of the sinner and the divine glory by the means taken to repair it. Hence the church in her exultation breaks out, *O felix culpa, quæ talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!* Hence, whether we reason either from the justice or the mercy of God, we cannot conclude, that, because God could have remitted our sins without satisfaction, he actually does so remit them.

To all human wisdom and power the satisfaction asserted is unquestionably impossible, and no created intellect could ever have discovered its possibility. But not therefore was it impossible to God. The author's arguments against its possibility are irrelevant, because founded on a misapprehension of the orthodox doctrine. He states the doctrine as he may have learned it in the bosom of his own sect, but not as it is taught by our theologians. He gives what he calls "the Protestant views" of the mystery of Redemp-

* *Summa Theol.*, P. 3, Q. 46, A. 2, ad 3.

tion, and states them to be,—1. That Christ satisfied the divine justice by suffering in his own body all the pain to which mankind were doomed for their sins; and 2. That he suffered simply to express the divine abhorrence of sin. The cross certainly does express this abhorrence, and the suffering of Christ during his life, which was one continued passion, was beyond our conception, for never were there sorrow and pain like his, and his humanity was miraculously strengthened, by its union with the divinity, to suffer; but neither view stated by the author is the essential condition of the satisfaction. The satisfaction contended for is what theologians call condign satisfaction, that is, a satisfaction which is equivalent in value and dignity to the penalty incurred by transgression, or that renders to the majesty of God offended by sin an honor equal in dignity to the offence. Christ does not make it by suffering in his own body the actual amount of the debt, for the satisfaction concerns personal, not material things; but by offering that which in the estimation of divine justice is, to say the least, fully equivalent in value to the offence. A debt can be discharged, without paying its actual amount in money, by offering its equivalent in some other form, if the creditor consents to accept the commutation.

That Christ could make condign satisfaction, offer to divine justice a full equivalent, and far more than a full equivalent, for our debt, or our dishonor to it by sin, is most certain; for he was both God and man, the union of the divine and human natures in one divine person, and we can therefore, as we showed in the last Article, predicate of him on the one hand all that is predicable of God, and on the other, all that is predicable of man, sin excepted. He could not, indeed, suffer in his divine nature, but he could suffer in his human nature, and his suffering in his human nature would be as really his suffering as God as if he suffered in his divine nature, since what we suffer in our body is as really our suffering as if we suffered it in our soul. Christ could suffer, and, as the value or dignity of whatever is done or suffered is always determined by the value or dignity of the person doing or suffering, his suffering, since his person is God, would have an infinite dignity or value. We say not that it would be an infinite suffering, for human nature, however exalted, is still finite, and cannot be the medium of infinite suffering, but by virtue of Christ's infinite person it would be infinite in dignity and value. A single drop of blood, a single tear,

a single sigh of the incarnate God, therefore, was amply sufficient to satisfy for the sins of the whole world, whether we say with some that sin is finite, or with others, that, since committed against the infinite majesty of God, sin is itself in some sense infinite. But as his whole life on earth was one continued passion, simply consummated on the cross, and as he shed every drop of his blood for us, his suffering was not only a full satisfaction of the law even to its utmost rigor, but even a superabundant satisfaction. The value of this suffering of our Lord he did not need for himself, either as God or as man. Not as God, for as God he possessed the infinite fulness of the divine nature, and could neither need nor receive any thing; not as man, because he was without sin, and had no sin to atone for. The title to this value was not in the Trinity, because it was acquired by suffering, and the Trinity did not and could not suffer, but was in Christ, the Son, who had acquired it in his human nature, the only sense in which God did or could suffer and die. It is, then, in the Son as the Son of Man. Possessing it as Son of Man, Christ could make it over to us, or, what is the same thing, offer it to the Trinity in satisfaction for our sins, and in doing so he would offer it to another than himself as Son of Man, in which sense he acquired and holds it, and offer what is even more than equivalent to all the demands of divine justice against us. The satisfaction is, then, possible on the part of the Redeemer, and herein is seen the wonderful wisdom of God, as well as his unbounded goodness, that he should have provided a Redeemer who could make full and complete satisfaction to the law for all the sins of all mankind.

That it would be unjust on the part of God to accept this satisfaction in commutation of the penalty annexed to transgression cannot be maintained. It is certainly not unjust to the sinner To the sinner it is an act of pure mercy, because God might have justly refused to accept any commutation, and actually inflicted on him the whole penalty of sin. It is a great favor to the sinner, and not merely a favor of the Son distinctively considered, for, though only one person of the Trinity was incarnated, the Incarnation, without which no satisfaction or commutation could have been made, was the work of the whole Trinity, in which the whole Trinity concurred. The Trinity provided the Redeemer, and therefore the redemption is a display of the mercy of the Trinity, not, as the author supposes, of one

person only. There is no violation of eternal justice in accepting the satisfaction in so far as it releases the sinner, because we have seen God could have willed to release the sinner without any satisfaction, and if he could justly release him without satisfaction, he certainly could with satisfaction.

But the author contends that it would have been unjust to Christ on the part of God to have required him to make the satisfaction, against his will, and still more to have accepted it in case the Son freely consented to make it. That it would have been unjust to have compelled the Son of Man to make the satisfaction against his will, we do not deny, but not unjust to exact or accept it, the Son voluntarily consenting to make it. The Son of Man freely consented to redeem mankind, and as he had the right to consent, since he had free will, and violated no law in consenting, no injustice is done in accepting it. Otherwise, we must say that every exaction from the surety of the payment of a debt is an act of injustice. If you voluntarily become surety for another, there is no injustice on the part of the creditor in accepting you as surety or even in exacting payment of you, in case the one for whom you become surety fails to discharge the debt. If not unjust, it is not cruel, for there can be no cruelty where there is no injustice. Moreover, the injustice and cruelty, if any in the case, are not avoided by the author's own theory. There is just as much suffering of the innocent for the guilty, of the just for the unjust, according to his doctrine, as there is according to ours; for he holds that Christ was innocent and just, and that God permitted him to lead a life of humility, to be persecuted and finally crucified by his enemies, for the purpose of manifesting to sinners the divine love and mercy, and of reconciling them to God by taking away their sins. It is as unjust and cruel to permit him so to suffer for the sake of reconciling sinners æsthetically, or by way of dramatic representation, as for the sake of reconciling them by way of satisfaction. But there is no injustice or cruelty in the case, unless it is unjust and cruel on the part of God to permit any act of heroic charity, or any heroic suffering for the sake of others. All through the world the good suffer for the bad, the innocent for the guilty, the just for the unjust, and if this were forbidden, not a flower of charity would ever bloom to gladden us with its beauty and fragrance, and not a shower of mercy would ever descend to refresh the earth, and clothe its dusty face with verdure.

Dr. Bushnell contends, that, even if Christ makes satisfaction for our sins, nothing is gained by the transaction but the simple transfer of the evil from the guilty to the innocent. This objection is founded on a misconception of the orthodox doctrine of Redemption. Christ does not satisfy for our sins by bearing in his own body an amount of pain equal to that which mankind have incurred by transgression, but by offering to God in its stead its equivalent in value, or that which does more to repair the honor of the law dishonored by sin than would be done by the actual infliction of the penalty. God is more pleased with the submission and obedience of his Son, than he is displeased with sin, and his justice is better satisfied by his offering than it could have been by the suffering of all mankind in hell eternally for their sins; for their suffering could never fully satisfy it, otherwise it would not be endless. There is, then, by the transaction the gain of perfectly satisfying the divine law by the offering of Christ, and on such conditions that its honor may be fully repaired and the sinner be saved, enter heaven, which he could not have done if he had had to endure the penalty.

The author, moreover, does not seem to understand that to the innocent and just there is and can be no evil. Strictly speaking, there is no evil but moral evil, that is, sin and its penalty, because nothing else excludes us from our supreme good. The evil of what Christ suffered was not evil in him or to him, but solely in the malice of those who persecuted and crucified him, that is, in the malice of mankind for whose sins he suffered, and to them alone. Christ merited in his sufferings. He merited for himself, as Son of Man, the resurrection from the dead, the glorification of his body, his exaltation to the right hand of God the Father, and all power in heaven and in earth. "He humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. *Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him*, and given him a name which is above every name: that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow of those that are in heaven, on earth, and in hell, and that every tongue should confess that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father." (Philip. ii. 8–11.) He was rewarded for what he did with the glory as Son of Man which as Son of God he had had with the Father before the world was. He bore our evil, but none of his own, for he knew no sin, and his humility and obedience, his cross and passion, became,

through God's wisdom and love, the medium of his exaltation to the glory of the Father, to be honored as we honor the Father, and obeyed as universal Lord.

We, also, gain by the transaction, if we are sanctified, more than tongue of men or angels can tell over and above what we should have received by gratuitous pardon. In being redeemed by the passion of Christ, we receive many things pertaining to salvation besides the simple remission of our sins. We learn from his passion the great love wherewith God loves us, which excites our love to him, and in which consists the perfection of salvation. "God commendeth his charity towards us: because when as yet we were sinners, according to the time, Christ died for us." (Rom. v. 8.) In being thus redeemed, we have given us an example of obedience, humility, constancy, justice, and the other virtues exhibited by our Lord in his passion, and which are necessary to salvation. "Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example that you should follow his steps." (1 Pet. ii. 21.) Again, Christ by his passion, besides liberating us from the penalty due to transgression, a penalty that God could have remitted gratuitously, merited for us the grace of sanctification and of final beatitude. The simple, gratuitous remission of our sins would have imparted to us no additional grace, would have given us no new interior strength, no supernatural elevation of our nature, and would have left us as blind and as weak as we were before, and equally incapable of that supernatural virtue to which alone is promised the reward of heaven. We know little of what would have been the final destiny of Adam had he persevered in the original justice and sanctity in which he was constituted, but a higher destiny, a more supernatural blessedness is promised to us who are redeemed and sanctified in Christ. The redemption we have in him is not merely the remission of the penalty of transgression, is not merely our restoration to the state in which Adam stood before he fell, but our supernatural elevation to a higher spiritual state here, and to a higher glory and blessedness hereafter. Christ does more than repair the damage done by sin; he makes the very fact of sin turn to the advantage of the sanctified. "Where sin abounded, grace hath abounded more." Christ was constituted our head, and Christians are members of his mystic body, and as such partake of his fulness. "And of his fulness we have all received, grace for grace." (St. John

i. 16.) The grace by which he is constituted our head, and by which Christians are made members of his mystic body, and therefore the beatitude of being united to him, and participating not only of his human, but also of his divine nature in heaven, the reward of the sanctified, we receive through his incarnation and passion, over and above the remission of sin, and over and above what we should have received even if restored to the state in which Adam was before he fell; and therefore it is the church, anticipating as it were, on Holy Saturday, the resurrection of our Lord from the tomb, and his triumph over the grave, over sin, and the powers of darkness, breaks out, *O felix culpa, quæ talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!* Herein, we repeat, is displayed the wonderful wisdom and love of God. It were comparatively a small thing for God to defeat the devil, and to repair the damage done by the fall of Adam, but to turn sin, which is the abasement of man, the death of his soul as well as his body, and his exclusion from all good, to his advantage, and to make it the occasion of exalting his nature, and raising him to a higher dignity and blessedness than he would have attained to had he not fallen, is what passes all created understanding, what we can never sufficiently admire, and what will excite the admiration and gratitude of the blest through all eternity. God's love and mercy are manifested to us not merely in not leaving us to suffer the penalty incurred by transgression, not merely in restoring us to the state in which Adam stood before he fell, but in making man's sin, through the mode of reparation adopted, the occasion of ennobling our nature, and of raising us, who had offended, grossly insulted, his infinite majesty, to be in some sense companions of God himself, and coheirs with his Son. "Behold, what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be named and should be the sons of God." "We are now the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." (1 John iii. 1, 2.)

Moreover, the reflection that we are purchased with a price, that we are redeemed by the precious blood of God, presents us a far stronger motive to preserve our bodies pure, undefiled by sin, than any that could have been furnished by mere gratuitous pardon. "Ye are bought with a price. Glorify and honor God in your body." (1 Cor.

vi. 20.) And, finally, it turns to the greater dignity of man, that, as man had been overcome and deceived by the devil, so there should be a man who should also overcome the devil, and as man had merited death, so man might by dying vanquish death. Therefore, "thanks to God who giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ." (1 Cor. xv. 57.)* Here are considerations, and we have adduced only a few of the many we might adduce, to show that there is great economy in the transaction, and that it is not a simple transfer of the evil from the guilty to the innocent.

The author adduces other objections which it may be well to glance at.

"Then, again, according to the same view, Christ is also God and ruler of the world, in his own person. Would any king, then, be in a fair way to maintain justice in his kingdom, if he took all the penalties of transgression on himself? Or if it be said that the human nature only of Jesus suffered, then we have the brief pangs of one human person accepted, in strict justice, as the equivalent of all the penalties of all human transgression, since the world began!

"Again, there can be no such thing as future punishment or retribution, in this view, without involving a charge of injustice. For if justice be exactly vindicated, and the terms of the law exactly satisfied, to punish after that is plainly to exact double justice,—which is injustice.

"Again, it is a fatal objection to this view, that it sets every transgressor right before the law, when, as yet, there is nothing right in his character; producing, if we view it constructively, and not histo cally (for historic and speculative results do not always agree), the worst conceivable form of licentiousness. For, if the terms of the law are satisfied, the transgressor has it for his right to go free, whether he forsake his transgressions or not. As far as any mere claims of law or justice are concerned, he may challenge impunity for all the wrongs he has committed, shall commit, or can commit, while his breath remains!" —(pp. 197, 198.)

1. Christ makes the satisfaction as Son of Man, in which sense he was not the king against whom the offence was committed, for as Son of Man he was exalted to dominion only as a reward for having made the satisfaction, for having humbled himself and become obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. It is not true, because our Lord suffered only in his human nature, that "we have the brief

*St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, P. 3, Q. 8; Q. 46, A. 3; and Q. 48.

pangs of one human *person* accepted, in strict justice, as the equivalent of all the penalties of all human trangression, since the world began," because his pangs are not accepted as satisfaction on the ground that they are equivalent as suffering to the penalty, but equivalent in value; and because there was no human person in the case. The person of our Lord as Son of Man is his person as Son of God, and therefore the pangs were the pangs of a divine person, the pangs of God, not of a human person; and being such, although suffered by God in his human nature, not in his divine nature, which is impassible, they are of infinite value, and therefore amply and superabundantly satisfactory in strict justice for all the sins of all mankind. The author must remember that Christ is the union of the human nature and the divine nature in one divine person, or hypostasis, and that, though some things he can do only as the suppositum of the divine nature, and others only as the suppositum of the human nature, yet in both he is the one divine suppositum, and the dignity and value of either class follow the dignity and value of his person.

2. Christ in the Incarnation received not only grace as an individual, but also the grace of headship, as the head of every man, and it is as our head that he makes satisfaction for us; that is, he satisfies for us as his members, on the principle that the members satisfy in their head. His satisfaction, though amply sufficient, and even superabundant, considered in relation to the offended majesty of God, for the sins of the whole world, can yet be as to us an actual satisfaction, an actual, or personal, remission of our sins, only on condition that we are joined to Christ the Head as members of his mystic body. We do not satisfy the divine justice out of Christ; we satisfy only in him; and it is only in him that we have redemption from sin. Consequently, if we are not in him, if we are disjoined or sundered from him, we cannot reap the fruits of the redemption. If, then, we refuse to become members of his mystic body, through baptism, the medium he has appointed for the reception of the grace which incorporates us into his body, and unites us to him as our Head,—as we may refuse, since we are endowed with free will, and he forces no one to become his member,—we remain practically under sin, have no practical application of the Atonement, are not practically washed from our sins in the laver of his blood, and therefore remain as obnoxious to all the penalties of sin as if he had not died,

besides being guilty of rejecting the grace proffered us, and despising the Lord who has died to redeem us. The Son of Man was free to establish the conditions on which he would apply the pardon he purchased, or bestow the grace he obtained for us, and if we refuse to comply with those conditions, we may be justly punished for our sins. So the author is mistaken in saying that the sinner cannot, since Christ has made satisfaction superabundantly sufficient for all men, be punished without injustice. If he remains a sinner after so much has been done for him, he only shows the deeper malice, and that he deserves the greater damnation.

3. The answer to the third objection follows from the answer just given to the second. Redemption does not set the transgressor, save in Christ the Head, right before the law while as yet there is nothing right in his character. The sinner, regarded in himself, is not justified before the law till he is intrinsically just. The law is satisfied in Christ, in whom is our redemption and our justification, or rather redemption and justification for us; but it is practically *ours* only as we are practically united to him as our Head, or as members of his body. The justification is in him, not out of him, and we must be in him in order to have it practically ours; and whoever is in Christ is a new creature, is regenerated, and therefore right in character. Till thus right in character, he is not individually right before the law. The doctrine of forensic justification, or our justification in the eye of the law, while we are practically unjust, though held by some sectaries, is not orthodox doctrine, any more than is the author's doctrine that Christ has made no satisfaction at all. The practical application of his satisfaction to us is essential to our individual justification in the eyes of the law, so that there is no personal justification without sanctification. The justice of Christ is imputed to us, justifies us, only in that we are living members of him, and united to him as our living Head by the efficient operations of his grace in us.

We pass over without comment what the author says in refutation of what he calls "the mitigated orthodox view," namely, that Christ by his cross satisfied the divine justice in that he showed the divine abhorrence of sin, because, as he states it, we do not hold that view, and regard it as no less heterodox than his own. The cross expresses that abhorrence, no doubt, but the formal expression of that abhorrence is not the satisfaction which Christ offered.

The author objects to the doctrine of satisfaction, that it implies, as he alleges, that God transferred his displeasure against the sinner to his Son, which cannot be supposed, for the Son had never done any thing to displease him. The objection grows out of the author's misapprehension of the mystery of Redemption. The Father transferred no displeasure to the Son. The voice from heaven was, "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." And the Son himself declares that he always does those things which are pleasing to the Father, and never was the Father better pleased with the Son, than in his agony in the garden and in his passion on the cross. Christ did not incur the divine displeasure against sin. Through love he bore the effect of sin, that he might deliver us from it, as the author must, even on his own hypothesis, concede; but as he was himself without sin, the divine displeasure against the sinner was not manifested against him. He was made a curse for us, it is true, because it is written, "Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree" (Gal. iii. 13), but only in the sense that the Scriptures frequently call sin the effect of sin. The curse of sin is death, for death came by sin, and whoever is made subject to death, or is in a mortal body, does so far share the effect of sin, and is cursed. Yet if sharing it without sin, he is not the object of the divine displeasure. Thus, "God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful [that is, mortal] flesh, even of sin, condemned sin in the flesh." (Rom. viii. 3.) That is, removed the curse, or death, the effect of sin, through his resurrection, which he could not have done had he not been made in the likeness of sinful flesh, or subject to death. He did not suffer death as a punishment, but that he might destroy death by rising again, and becoming the first fruits of them that slept, the first-born of the dead, and obtaining our resurrection and triumph over death and the grave. Here was no divine displeasure against the Son, but an excessive love of the Son for us, and of the Father, who so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son to die, that whosoever should believe in him might not perish, but have everlasting life. Nor less did the Father love the Son, for he hath highly exalted him, given him a name above every name for his humility and obedience in effecting our redemption, and hath received him into his own glory, and placed all things under his feet. The whole mystery of Redemption is nothing but the manifestation of the surprising love of God to sinners and to his Son who died for them.

The objections to the orthodox doctrine urged by the author, being thus shown to be unfounded, he is bound to admit it; for he concedes that it is clearly taught in the literal sense of the Scriptures, and the rule is always to take the literal sense, unless something obliges us to take another.

The author concedes the fact and the necessity of sacrifice, and not merely such sacrifice as possibly Adam might have offered in paradise, or men may offer in a state of innocence, but such sacrifice as is demanded in the present order of things, offered on account of transgression, and designed to resanctify violated law, and to cover the breaches made by sin; that is, sacrifice designed in some way to repair the honor of the law dishonored by sin, as well as the damage done by sin in us. But sacrifice of this sort is impossible without the propitiatory sacrifice of our Lord, and cannot be asserted without recognizing in his obedience, in his cross and passion, a satisfaction made for sin.

The author very properly concedes that the sacrifices under the old law were made on account of sin, and had reference to the honor of violated law; but he fails in his attempt to explain the true nature of sacrifice, and the mode in which it effects the purpose for which it is made. He makes sacrifice consist in offering some sacred thing to God, and tells us that its significance is, that only some sacred thing yielded by God, and by occupancy and right especially his, can serve to resanctify violated law, and cover the breaches made by sin. The sacrifices of the old law all turned, he says, on the sacredness of blood. Blood was held to be the most sacred thing yielded by God, because it was held to be the mysterious principle of life. Hence it was the most proper thing to be offered in sacrifice, and because it was so offered came the maxim, "Without the shedding of blood there is no remission of sin." This clearly proves that the author holds that the sacrifice was offered for the remission of sin, which is so far all very well. But blood, even considered as the principle of life, is not necessarily more sacred in the sacrificial sense of *sacred*, and no more God's by occupancy and right, than is every thing else he has created, for the earth is his and the fulness thereof. Life belongs to God as its author and sustainer, and so does every thing else in creation by the same title. The author puts the effect for the cause. The thing is not offered because it is sacred, but is sacred because it is

offered, or rather becomes sacred in being offered. Sacrifice is making a thing sacred (from *sacrum* and *facere*), and consists not in offering a sacred thing to God, but in making a thing sacred by offering it to God; that is, in separating it entirely from its ordinary uses and devoting it especially and exclusively to God, to testify his supreme dominion, by way of satisfying his majesty dishonored by sin, rendering him supreme homage, giving him thanks, and impetrating his favors or his gracious assistance. The reason why blood was offered, was not because blood was the most sacred thing known, but because, in all the sacrifices under the law, there was a remembrance of sin, and the offering of blood signified that the life of the sinner was forfeited to God, and he had in strict justice no longer the right to appropriate it to the ordinary uses for which life is bestowed; that is, life itself was in justice sequestered from the purposes for which it was originally given, separated, made sacred, or accursed, as the penalty of transgression. This is wherefore the destruction of the victim, as to all its ordinary or human uses, was essential to the consummation of the sacrifice. Hence the bloody sacrifices, not only of the Jews, but also of the heathen, bear witness to the tradition of the fall of man, and the terrible penalty incurred by sin,—"In what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death." They bear witness, also, to a promise and a hope of redemption through vicarious satisfaction; for the life of the sinner is sacrificed only vicariously,—not his own life is offered for his sins, but the life of another, and of one not a sinner.

Now it is certain that we have nothing in our own right as God's creatures that we can offer in sacrifice that will be a sacrifice of reparation, or that will tend in any way to resanctify the law violated by our sins. for the sacrifice of our own life would be simply an infliction of the penalty of death. The animals offered in sacrifice were not in themselves real sacrifices, and the shedding of their blood could in no sense vindicate the majesty of the law, could in no sense make it honorable, for they were wholly disjoined from the sinner, had no communion of nature with him, and in dying yielded no obedience to the law. They could be only symbolical or figurative sacrifices, needing a substantial sacrifice, which they were not, in order to have any sacrificial value. And hence St. Paul denominates them figures, types, or shadows of the one sacrifice of our Lord.

Sacrifices in a state of innocence are, perhaps, conceivable, but sacrifices in such a state cannot be sacrifices in the Christian sense, nor in any sense applicable in the present order of things; for we are not born in a state of innocence. Through the prevarication of Adam, we are all born under sin, and sacrifices must in some way be reparatory of the honor of the law, and remove the disability of sin, before they can be acceptable to God as latric, eucharistic, or impetrative sacrifices. We do not mean to say that we can perform in our fallen state no actions not sinful, till the divine justice is actually satisfied in us for the sin under which we are born, for that is not true. Not all the works of unbelievers are sin. Men are not born with a totally depraved nature. They have not lost by the fall reason and free will, nor any of the essential faculties of human nature. By the fall man lost original justice, in which Adam was supernaturally constituted, with the integrity of his nature, and was turned away in his nature from God, passed under the dominion of Satan, and became darkened in his understanding and attenuated in his will; but his nature, as pure nature, *seclusa ratione culpæ*, is still substantially what it was before the prevarication of Adam, and he may still by actual grace perform acts which are not sinful, which are in some sense good and even meritorious in the natural order, though not meritorious in regard to everlasting life, or in the supernatural order, in which lies our real and only true destiny, since, strictly speaking, we have *in hac providentia* no natural destiny. What we mean, then, is, that we must be liberated from the curse of sin, before we can render unto God in the present order an acceptable worship, and therefore must be able to offer a sacrifice of propitiation before we can offer an acceptable sacrifice of homage, thanksgiving, or impetration. "The victims of the wicked are abominable to the Lord; the vows of the just are acceptable." (Prov. xv. 8.)

Sacrifices, of course, are not alone for propitiation, but sacrifices in the present order must always have a propitiatory character, and in some way liberate from sin. And hence they are always assumed to have this character, whether among the Jews or among the heathen. They are undeniably presented under this character in the Holy Scriptures, and the author implies it, by expressly connecting sacrifice with the remission of sins. Now sacrifices under this character, no mere creature, whether man or angel, can

offer, for all the creature has or can offer is only sufficient to fulfil the law, and to save him from being guilty before it. Yet sacrifices in this sense are plainly possible. The sacrifices under the old law were sacrifices, and were expressly enjoined by God himself, as the author clearly allows. But whence became they sacrifices? Whence did they derive their sacrificial virtue? Whence do we derive our ability to offer real sacrifices to God?

Undeniably, we derive this ability only from the one sacrifice of Christ, for none but he ever could offer a sacrifice the value of which could be applied to repairing the honor of broken law, or to covering the breaches made by sin. He could offer such sacrifice, on the principle and for the reasons we have assigned in proving that he could make satisfaction for sin. The sacrifices under the old law not being in themselves sacrifices, they could be sacrifices only by virtue of a real and absolute sacrifice; and we not being able to offer any thing of our own, unless something made ours by supernatural gift, can offer them only in so far as they participate of the merit of a sacrifice offered by one who is competent to offer a sacrifice that is intrinsically and absolutely a sacrifice. No one but he who is at once God and man in the unity of one divine person can offer such a sacrifice, and consequently our Lord, who is and who alone is at once God and man in one divine person, alone could offer a real sacrifice of the character we are considering, and therefore all other sacrifices of the same sort can be sacrifices only by virtue of his one sacrifice, by which he has for ever perfected them that are sanctified.

But how could the sacrifices of the old law, and how can our sacrifices, derive their sacrificial virtue from the sacrifice of Christ? Nothing is more evident from the Scriptures than that sacrifices in the present order, in so far as they enter into the worship of God, whether propitiatory, latric, eucharistic, or impetrative, do derive all their virtue from his sacrifice, for we are not sufficient to think any thing of ourselves as of ourselves; our sufficiency is from God, through Christ (2 Cor. iii. 5), who expressly declares that without him we can do nothing (St. John xv. 5.) How, we repeat, can our own sacrifices, or those of the old law, become sacrifices by virtue of his? Certainly, only on condition that his was offered for us; that is, that he, not needing the infinite value of his sacrifice for himself, since he was without sin, offers it to God for us, or, what is the

same thing, makes it over to us to be offered by us in sacrifice for our sins. To offer it to God for us, or to make it over to us to be offered by us, is only offering it in satisfaction for us. Consequently, it follows that sacrifices in the present order, even of the sort the author concedes, if he understands himself, are and were possible only on condition that Christ offered himself a propitiation for the sins of mankind, and by the merits of his sacrifice made satisfaction for them. Supposing him to have done so, then, as referred to him and as signifying his sacrifice, the sacrifices of the old law were truly sacrifices, acceptable to God; and every act of self-denial, mortification, or alms-deeds of ours becomes a true sacrifice by virtue of his one sacrifice of himself offered on the cross and perpetuated in the holy sacrifice of the Mass. Hence, in Christ we can do what the apostle beseeches us to do, "present our bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God," (Rom. xii. 1,) and it becomes literally true that "a sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit." (Ps. l. 19.)

No one who carefully studies the Scriptures, especially the Epistle of St. Paul to the Hebrews, can fail to perceive that they fully warrant this view, and can be reconciled with no other. It is necessarily implied in the priesthood of Christ. Christ is a priest, our high-priest, and he abideth a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedech. But the especial function of a priest is to offer sacrifice, and there is no more a priest without a sacrifice, than there is a sacrifice without a victim. "Every high-priest is appointed to offer gifts and sacrifices; wherefore it was necessary that he [Christ] also should have something to offer." (Heb. viii. 3.) Christ was both priest and victim, and what he had to offer, and what he offered, was himself. "Christ hath loved us, and hath delivered himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God, for an odor of sweetness." (Eph. v. 2.) A priest is a mediator between God and men, and though men who are priests are obliged to offer for their own sins, as well as for the sins of the people, yet he who is the true high-priest, the source of all sacerdotal virtue, needs not to offer for himself, for he is without sin, and offers for the people only. "For it was fitting that we should have such an high-priest, holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners, and made higher than the heavens; who needeth not daily, as other priests, first to offer sacrifices for his own sins, and then for the people's; for this he did once

by offering up himself." (Heb. vii. 26, 27.) The sacrifice is plainly propitiatory, and is offered in satisfaction for sin. "For if the blood of goats and of oxen, and the ashes of an heifer, being sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled to the cleansing of the flesh, how much more shall the blood of Christ, who, through the Holy Ghost, offered himself without a spot to God, cleanse our conscience from dead works, to serve the living God." (Heb. ix. 13, 14.)

It is only on the principle, that all sacrificial merit in the Christian order flows from the one sacrifice of Christ, that the reasoning of the apostle concerning the sacrifices of the old law becomes either intelligible or pertinent. These sacrifices were appointed by God himself, but in themselves they had no virtue to cleanse the conscience; "For it is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sins should be taken away." (Heb. x. 4.) Yet they had a shadow of good things to come, and as a shadow implies a substance, they implied the sacrifice of Christ as their substance, as the substantial or real sacrifice which they foreshadowed, and without which they could be no real sacrifice. The apostle plainly teaches that what was wanting in them was supplied by the one offering of Christ. "And every priest, indeed, standeth daily ministering, and often offering the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins; but he, offering one sacrifice for sins, for ever sitteth at the right hand of God, ... for by one oblation he hath for ever perfected them that are sanctified." (Heb. x. 11–14.) That this has reference to saints before as well as since his coming, is evident from what the apostle says further on, in a passage which we have already cited: "And all these [the patriarchs, and the saints under the old law] being approved by the testimony of faith, [that is, by the testimony they bore to the faith, or to the coming, of Christ, and salvation through him,] received not the promise, [the real sacrifice not having as yet been actually offered save in the prescience and decree of God,] God having provided something better for us, that they should not be perfected without us," (Heb. xi. 39, 40,) plainly implying that with us, or by the sacrifice of Christ which is now offered, and which we have, and which they had only in promise, they should be made perfect, for it gives reality to their sacrifices, and completes or fulfils them.

It is idle, after this reasoning, if we admit the authority of the apostle, to deny that Christ offered a real propitia-

tory sacrifice, made by his obedience, his cross and passion, a real satisfaction for sin, and to assert that he removes our sins only on æsthetic principles, by the mere tragic display of his passion and death. The author in so doing loses the whole force of the apostle's reasoning. The sacrifices under the old law did cleanse by way of satisfaction from defilements of the flesh contracted under the law; if they could do that, "how much more," asks the apostle, "shall the blood of Christ, who, through the Holy Ghost, offered himself without spot to God, cleanse our *conscience* from dead works, [that is, from sin,] to serve the living God?" There would be no analogy in the case, and no place for the *a fortiori* of the apostle, if the sacrifice of Christ did not cleanse from sin by way of satisfaction. On the author's theory, the sacrifices under the law could take away sins, in the same sense, though not in the same degree, perhaps, that the sacrifice of Christ takes them away; but this the apostle denies, and declares that, in the sense in which he represents Christ's sacrifice of himself as taking away sin, "it is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sins should be taken away." If the apostle was right, Dr. Bushnell is undeniably wrong, and ought to give up his æsthetic theory, and return to the orthodox doctrine of redemption.

Taking the view we have presented, it is easy to understand that the sacrifice of Christ was infinitely meritorious, in satisfying for our sins, and in procuring us grace to rise from sin and to walk in newness of life. We see, also, that all merit, in the Christian order, comes from Christ, that we have no merit of our own, that we merit only in his merit, and are saved by his justice and sanctity, not by our own,—the great truth which the author's Calvinistic friends and their Jansenistic allies so strenuously assert, and which they so seldom fail to abuse. Christ is the great fountain of merit, and is "made unto us from God wisdom, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption." (1 Cor. i. 30.)

But this can be true only in the orthodox sense. Christ satisfied and merits for us by his obedience, not simply by his suffering and dying on the cross. The cross stands for redemption, not because it was the mere death of Christ that redeems us, but because on it was consummated his obedience. "He humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." What satisfies is not the death, but the infinite merits of the obedience of which

submission to death was the last crowning act. "For as by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so also by the obedience of one shall many be made just." (Rom. v. 19.) But merit is of a personal nature, and not transferable; how, then, can the merits of Christ's obedience become ours, or we merit in his merit? Christ was constituted, as we have seen, and as the Scriptures plainly declare, our spiritual Head, and he was obedient, offered himself for us, as our Head, and only as our Head, not merely as an individual man, and his merits, which, considered in their intrinsic value are amply sufficient and even superabundant for all men, can avail us only as they become ours; and they can become ours only on condition of our being mystically united to him as his living members. We are redeemed, sanctified, only in him, that is, only as we are in him, and merit in his merits, as the members are in, and merit in the merit of, their head. If we are out of him, sundered from him, and are not made, through the efficient operations of his grace in us, one with him, there is no connection between his merits and ours but, as it were, a chasm between him and us, across which his merits cannot flow to us, and become ours. Hence the dogma of faith, *Extra ecclesiam, nulla salus*,—Out of the church, no salvation,—a dogma which many hold to be unreasonable, but which could not be denied without denying the whole doctrine of redemption, and of salvation through the merits of Christ. God operates by his grace, indeed, in all men to bring them to Christ, to be mystically united to him, and no one can come to him without grace; since he says, "No man cometh to me except the Father who hath sent me draw him." (St. John vi. 44.) But it is only as so united to him in his mystical body that the merits of his obedience are, as it is termed, practically applied to us, that is, become ours; for it is only as so united that we obey in his obedience, or are crucified with him on the cross, and can offer his merits, as merits acquired by us, not individually indeed, but in our Head, in satisfaction for our sins, and plead them as the ground of our title to pardon and everlasting life; since "Christ is the head of the church," and "the Saviour of his body;" "he loved the church and delivered himself up for it, that he might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life; that he might present it to himself a glorious church without spot or wrinkle, nor any such thing; but that it should be holy

and without blemish." (Eph. v. 23–27.) Hence Christ tells us, "I am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman." "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine; so neither can you, unless you abide in me." (St. John xv. 1–4.) But when we are thus united to him as living branches to the true vine, or as living members of a living body to its living head, his merits, acquired as our Head, are, through his free gift, infused into us individually, as the sap flows from the root through the vine to its living branches, and become the principle of our sacrifice and our charity,—of our new life and all its acts,—and we are personally justified because personally just, and we are personally just by the justice of Christ, because as real members of him we participate of the justice of our Head; and being thus just, God can justify us and still retain his justice in all its rigor. Thus are we "justified gratis by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to the showing of his justice, for the remission of past sins, through the forbearance of God, for the showing of his justice in this time; that he himself may be just and the justifier of him who is of the faith of Jesus Christ." (Rom. iii. 24–26.)

The difficulty the author feels in admitting the doctrine of satisfaction, we apprehend, grows out of his having contemplated the mystery of Redemption only in the form presented by his own and kindred sects, which regard the relation of Christ to us as our Head and of ours to him as his members, as merely extrinsic, as a matter of mere outward covenant or agreement. So regarded, Christ does not and cannot make any real satisfaction for us; his merits could only be imputed to us, or reckoned to be ours, without being so in fact, and our justification through him could be only an imputed justification, without implying any inward or intrinsic justice or sanctity on our part. God does not and cannot deal in fictions of law, and does and can pronounce no man justified who is not intrinsically just in the eyes of the law. The doctrine of imputed justice, the common doctrine of the reformers, invented to save the glory of Christ, entirely mistakes the great mystery of Redemption, and reduces the new law to the level of the old, and Christ to the level of Moses, instead of making him the mediator of a better testament. Moses was the mediator of an extrinsic testament, and his sacrifices did not and

could not of themselves take away sin as pertaining to the conscience, and were only types, figures, or signs of the real and intrinsic sacrifice, which was needed and was to be made. But Christ, we are told, is the mediator of a better testament than that of Moses; and better because intrinsic, not extrinsic merely, so that justification and sanctification may in fact be one and the same thing. "For this is the testament I will make to the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord; I will give my laws into their minds, and I will write them on their heart; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people." (Heb. viii. 10.) Hence a testament that effects the justice of the sinner while it justifies him before the law, which the sacrifices of the old law could not do.

Here is the truth the Mercersburg reviewer so strenuously contends for, and which, singularly enough, he accuses the church of denying, although it is well known that she has always asserted it, and condemns the reformers, in condemning their doctrine of imputed justice, its contradictory, for denying it. The original pretence of the reformers for separating from the church was that she held it, and our Mercersburg friend, having discovered its importance, does not do well to charge us with denying it, and to claim it as the great and essential doctrine of the reformation. This is at once to bear false witness and to be guilty of the attempt to commit robbery. The doctrine is a truth essential in Catholic faith and theology, and after we have been abused by the whole Protestant world, during three hundred years and over, for holding it, we cannot now consent to be robbed of the honor of having held it, and declared to have rejected the gospel on the grounds of our not having held it. The reviewer has well seen that Christ's obedience can satisfy for us, and his merits become ours, only by virtue of our real, living union with Christ as our Head, what the church has always told him, but, having no infallible guide in matters of faith, he exaggerates the union, makes it hypostatic, asserts that every believer bears to the divine Word the same relation which subsists between the Word and the human nature he assumed in the womb of the Blessed Virgin, which is to fall into a sort of Christian pantheism, the grand error of our author, and of a large class of German neologists. The union is mystical, not hypostatic, and is effected, not by way of the emanation of Christ, but by the efficient operations of his grace in us,

by which he *creates* us anew in him, or by which he begets us unto himself, generates his own life in us, and through it transmits to us his merits.

The author may here see that the two views of Christianity he insists upon can coalesce more really than on his hypothesis, without denying, but by asserting, the objective reality of what he calls the objective form of Christianity. What he wants to maintain is, that Christ actually redeems only in sanctifying us, that the redemption becomes effectual in us only inasmuch as it removes our sins and renders us intrinsically just; and this on the orthodox doctrine is actually the case, and hence, though his merits are always declared to be sufficient and even superabundant for all mankind, none are represented as ever really participating of them but those who are living members of Christ, because it is only *in* him as our Head that we merit, satisfy, or are saved. No man has ever any occasion to be heterodox in order to assert truth, for there is no truth not amply provided for in orthodox theology.

In the orthodox view we have presented, we may see the wonderful wisdom and goodness of God, who not only redeems us from sin through Christ, but gives us the power to render every one of our acts a sacrifice well pleasing in his sight, by enabling us, through a mystic union with Christ, to participate of the infinite merits of Christ's one sacrifice, which was offered in a bloody manner on Calvary, and is perpetuated in an unbloody manner upon our altars,—whether regarded as a propitiatory or a latric, a eucharistic or an impetrative sacrifice,—and of the infinite merits of his most perfect obedience, freely given us through grace operating efficiently in us. On the score of mere magnificence, this somewhat surpasses the author's æsthetic scheme; and to even untutored reason must appear far more worthy of the divine interposition for the salvation of men. If joined to Christ, through his mystic body, by faith, hope, and charity, we share his infinite merits, and the gift of even a cup of cold water in the name of Christ is sufficient to entitle us to the infinite reward of heaven. What dignity to be bestowed on man, who in himself is but a worm! What grandeur does it give to the humblest act of the humblest Christian!

JARVIS'S REPLY TO MILNER.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1848.]

Milner's *End of Religious Controversy*, first published about thirty years since, is a well-known and highly esteemed work; and on points of our faith and practice controverted by Protestants, for the generality of readers, appropriate, instructive, and convincing. It is admirable for its lucid arrangement, the easy and natural manner in which the precise questions to be treated are placed before the readers, and for its condensation of matter. We are at a loss which most to admire, its solid learning, its rigid logic, or the candor and modesty of its temper and language. It is all it professes to be,—the end of religious controversy. It has never been answered, and never will be; and no fair-minded person, willing to embrace the truth, though it conduct to that church which he has hitherto despised, can read and understand it, and have any doubt remaining as to the fact that Catholicity is the religion, and the only religion, of God.

To this work Dr. Jarvis, a Protestant Episcopal minister of Connecticut, very well known in this section of the country, has, in the publication before us, attempted a reply. Dr. Jarvis, we are told, has an excellent library, and he enjoys, among people of his own persuasion, the reputation of a learned theologian, and of being profoundly versed in patristic lore. It is, we learn from his work, now twenty-five years since he first read Milner's work, and we are led to infer, though it is not expressly so stated, that his reply has the benefit of his reading and studies for that length of time. Certain it is, his work bears the marks of careful preparation, and appears to have received all the elaborate finish the author could give it. It evidently is the best he could do; and we have no reason to suppose that it is not equal to any thing a minister of his own denomination could do. It may, then, not be uninteresting or

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**A Reply to Dr. Milner's "End of Religious Controversy," so far as the Churches of the English Communion are concerned.* By S. F. Jarvis, D. D., LL. D. New York: 1847.

unprofitable to our readers to learn what he has succeeded in doing.

They who have read Dr. Milner know that the excellent and learned bishop wrote his work for candid and honest inquirers after the truth, for readers who were willing to seek, and who had actually begun to seek; and that it is to such that it is specially adapted. His purpose is not controversy, but the end of controversy; and he aims not simply to silence the logic of Protestants, but to meet their actual wants, and, by the grace of God, to convince their understandings and convert their hearts. He writes as the pastor of souls, and not as the mere controversialist; consequently, he consults not merely what can be legally demanded of him by the logical conditions of the argument, but also what is demanded by the peculiar intellectual state of his readers. He therefore goes over much ground which the Catholic controversialist is not bound to go over, and meets and removes objections which he was under no obligations, save by the law of Christian charity, even to entertain.

The only thing a Catholic, in his argument with Protestants, can be required to do, is, to prove that Almighty God has instituted and commissioned his church to teach all nations, unto the consummation of the world, all things whatsoever our Lord commanded his apostles. That once proved, there is, and can be, no further controversy. All there is, then, to do, is to hear and obey the church. Particular objections to this or that doctrine or practice of the church are of no moment, because overruled by her authority to teach, established, if established at all, on a higher principle of certainty than is, or can be, the principle of any objections which reason can urge or suggest against it. Nevertheless, Protestant ministers imagine various objections to the several doctrines taught by the church, which they urge with great vehemence, and which create real difficulties in the minds of the Protestant people, and render it often desirable that special solutions of them should be given. Protestants, *in religious matters*, are poor reasoners, and in general require, for their practical conviction, not only to have a doctrine proved in its principle, but also in all its details, and not only that the truth be proved by one process, but its contradictory falsehood disproved by another. Hence our authors, aiming never at a barren victory, but always at practical instruction and conviction, often go beyond what can be legally demanded of them, and attempt by special replies to remove

the particular difficulties Protestants suggest in the case of this or that particular doctrine. Dr. Milner has done this to a very considerable extent, and has thereby greatly enhanced the practical value of his work for the class of persons for whom he designed it.

But this labor of love, on the part of our controversialists, is not without a certain practical evil. In performing it, we in some degree descend from our high Catholic vantage-ground, and act on the principle of private judgment and private interpretation, and thus place our adversaries more nearly on a footing of equality with us than they have any right to pretend to. We thus give them a chance to talk, and sometimes with the appearance of saying something. We enable them to continue the debate; and there are many people in the world who will take it for granted, that, so long as they continue to talk, they are not refuted; for there are many people who seem to hold that to refute a man is to shut his mouth as well as his reason; as if a man never speaks without saying something or saying only nonsense! Nevertheless so it is; and hence Protestant controversialists always seize upon this supererogatory part of our work, where they can apparently meet us on equal ground, and attempt to show that their objections to particular doctrines and practices are solid, and that our special answers to them are not conclusive. This, in general terms, is precisely what Dr. Jarvis attempts in his *Reply;* and under this point of view, he may be thought by those who already believe, or rather disbelieve, with him, to have said some few things not wholly irrelevant,—though, in fact, even under this point of view, he says nothing that amounts to any thing.

But with whatever success Dr. Jarvis should reply to Bishop Milner's special answers to objections to this or that doctrine, it would not affect one way or other the real question at issue. If it were conceded, that, independently of the authority of the church, on the principle of private authority, or private interpretation of the divine traditions and of the fathers, we cannot triumphantly prove that every Catholic doctrine taught by the church to-day has been always and everywhere taught by her, it would amount to nothing. No Catholic believes any doctrine because, independently of the authority of the church, he can prove it to be an apostolic doctrine; and one of our strong arguments for the church is precisely this, that, without her authority, there is no sufficient authority to determine what is apostolic doctrine. Surely

it is not to refute us, to prove successfully what we ourselves assert and urge against our adversaries! The Catholic rule is, to take the doctrine from the church, not the Protestant rule, to take the church from the doctrine. We prove the church; we show that she is divinely commissioned to teach; and when we have done that, we have authorized belief in all she teaches. There our argument stops; henceforth we listen and believe. If, in our ardent charity for souls, we sometimes show or attempt to show that there is a *corroborative historical testimony* to the fact that the church has in all ages taught as she now teaches, it is not because we are under any obligation to do so, nor do we thereby abandon or weaken the ground of authority. If, furthermore, in this we should not always succeed, it would be nothing against us, and not in the least impair the authority on which we believe, and on which all must believe, or not be Catholic believers. Even if Protestants could convict us of total failure, in regard to this historical evidence of particular doctrines, and it should turn out that not a trace of the teaching of the church is to be found in external history, they would prove nothing against us, or for themselves; the real question at issue would be unaffected. This fact Protestant controversialists in general, and Dr. Jarvis in particular, do not appear to understand, and hence all their reasoning tends only to mislead themselves. If all they adduce were conceded, nothing would really be conceded against us or for them; and the very utmost that could be said would be, that a certain line of argument, which our controversialists, out of *pure charity*, condescend to adopt against Protestants, must be abandoned. We should still have enough left for all our wants, and to satisfy all the demands of *justice*, but should not have so much to give away in charity as we now have or persuade ourselves we have.

The fault of Protestants has always been to argue either on false principles, or some other question than the real one. We recollect no argument of theirs which does not conceal either a *petitio principii*, the *ignorantia elenchi*, or some other sophism. It must needs be so. No man can reason against the truth without falling into sophism of some sort. Protestants are not sophists because they want education or natural ability. We wish for no abler or more acute and rigid reasoners, sounder or more skilful dialecticians, than some Protestant lawyers we have known, when engaged in their own profession. It is a necessity of their false position, and

grows out of the fact that nothing really logical ever is or can be urged against the truth. Protestants should try to get a clear and precise view of the real questions to be discussed, and of the principles on which they are to be settled. If they would do this, and adhere rigidly to both, the debate between them and us would soon be concluded.

Undoubtedly, the questions to be debated between us and Protestants are questions which must be decided by reason, speculative or practical, or both; therefore the only questions which can properly be debated between them and us are questions which come within the province of reason. These are, Has Almighty God instituted a church commissioned to teach? If so, which is it? Here is all that is really in issue between the parties. The commission is the divine warrant of infallibility in teaching, because Almighty God cannot authorize the teaching of a lie; and the church commissioned is divine authority for believing whatever she teaches or commands in the name of God. Then to know what she so teaches and commands now, and always has so taught and commanded, we have only to ask her authorized teachers, and listen to what they say. The Catholic, then, has simply two points to make out, namely, that God has instituted such a church as supposed, and that his church is the one; Protestants, in general, have one of two points to make out, either that God has instituted no such church, or, if he has, that it is not the Roman Catholic, but theirs, or some one of theirs.

But there is in the outset a presumption in favor of the Catholic, and against Protestants. Protestants originally were subjects of the Roman Catholic Church, which claimed and was acknowledged to be the church commissioned by Almighty God to teach. She was in possession, and to be presumed to be lawfully in possession, as such church. Protestants were therefore bound to show good and valid reasons for protesting against her, or for throwing off her authority; and till they did so, she was under no obligation to produce her titles, or to adduce evidence to sustain them. The burden of proof was on them. The two points she has in the argument to make out were already made out, at least so far as Protestants were concerned, if they failed to adduce good and valid reasons for contesting her claims, or for the points necessary for them to make out in their own justification. Thus, though the refutation of Catholicity would not be necessarily the defence of Protestantism,—if

Protestantism is any thing more than a protest against the church,—the failure of Protestants to establish their claims would be their condemnation as rebels. Protestants, then, must set forth what, if sustained, will completely vindicate them, clear them of the charge of rebellion against their legitimate sovereign, before the church is under any obligation to say one single word in her own defence. This is the exact state of the question between us and Protestants, and the precise view to be taken of the logical obligations of the two parties.

Dr. Milner, yielding to his desire to meet as far as possible the actual state of Protestant minds, has waived the presumption on which he had the right to insist, and which we ourselves will never consent to waive, and has attempted to do more than he was logically or legally bound to do. He attempts to establish the two points which Protestants are bound to presume to be in favor of the church; to refute the pretensions of Protestants; and to repel their objections to particular Catholic doctrines and practices. The second was all that was logically necessary; and the proof of the first carries with it *all* that it is necessary to say in regard to the other two. Consequently, Dr. Jarvis, in order to refute Dr. Milner, or to reply to him successfully, must show, either negatively, that what Dr. Milner advances in support of the two points which the Catholic has to make out is false or inconclusive; or, positively, that the pretensions of Protestants, or, since he does not undertake to sustain Protestants in general, "the churches of the English Communion," are well founded. Whatever is proved or disproved with regard to this or that doctrine, is said or not said about such matters, is of no manner of consequence. The authority of the church, if established, suffices for *all* her doctrines, and its successful denial is their successful refutation.

We can now understand what the Protestant Episcopalian had to do; let us see if he has done it. The point for us to consider is not whether Dr. Milner has successfully maintained his cause or not, but whether Dr. Jarvis has successfully replied to him or not. This it will be well to bear in mind. We must also premise that there is a great deal said by Dr. Jarvis on which we have neither space nor disposition to remark, and it must not be supposed we concede because we do not contradict it. We take notice of only such portions of what he says as may be supposed to have some direct or indirect bearing on the main argument; the rest we pass in silence.

Dr. Milner divides his work into three parts. In the first part he concludes the church from its necessity as the rule of faith, and the insufficiency of all other methods. Faith is assumed to be necessary, commanded by Almighty God, and is conceded to be so by those against whom he is reasoning. Then there must be some infallible rule or method of finding out what is the faith we are to believe; for, without some such rule or method, faith is not possible, and God does not and cannot command what he does not render possible. But without the church there is no such rule or method. Hence the *necessity* and the *fact* of the church. To refute this argument, Dr. Jarvis, since he concedes the necessity of faith, must prove either that faith is possible without the rule or method asserted, or that there is some such rule independent of the church. Has he done either? We answer, that he can hardly be said to have even seriously attempted to do the one or the other.

In illustrating and maintaining his argument, which is conducted in a logical, though popular form, Dr. Milner discusses and refutes the several rules of faith contended for by Protestants, and arrives at the Catholic rule, which he states to be "The word of God at large, whether written in the Bible or handed down from the apostles in continued succession by the Catholic Church, and as understood and explained *by that church*." This definition of the Catholic rule is intended to include the *whole* word of God as taught or delivered by the apostles, on the one hand, and to exclude all revelations, if such there are, which have been made to individuals subsequently to the apostles, on the other; and, furthermore, to include that word *as understood and explained by the Catholic Church*. The rule, as defined, does not assert whether the word is written or unwritten, but simply covers the whole word, whether written or unwritten, or whether in part one and in part the other. This is a question it does not determine, and which is not to be determined before determining the church; for it is obviously a question to be determined by the rule, and not before the rule itself is determined. Unquestionably the whole word of God delivered by the apostles is to be received, whether written or unwritten, and Dr. Jarvis concedes it more than once. Furthermore, if the whole word of God, as defined, is to be believed *as understood and explained by the church*, all she understands and explains to be the word of God whether written or unwritten, must be received and

believed as his word. Consequently, the only point in this rule to which Dr. Jarvis can legitimately object is the definition of the rule of faith to be "the word of God as *understood and explained by the Catholic Church.*"

But, strange to say, this is precisely the point to which he does not formally object. He raises a question not raised in the definition of the rule, namely, Whether the church can understand and explain any thing to be of faith not recorded in the written word; or, if she should do so, whether we should be obliged to receive it;—plainly a question for the church herself to decide, if her authority is conceded; for we seek the church to tell us what is the word of God, not the word of God to tell us what is the church. Antecedently to the church, we are undoubtedly able to say, that any church that denies that to be the word of God which is his word, or affirms that to be his word which is not his word, is not the church of God. But if we concede the church to be necessary to teach us the word of God, we cannot determine, independently of her, what is the word of God, and erect it into a standard by which to try her. Dr. Jarvis, therefore, has no right to raise the question he does. He must deny and disprove the church; for if she is conceded, her authority is sufficient to settle the question without his reasoning, and overrides whatever he may say on one side or the other.

Moreover, the answer to the question decides nothing as to the point in debate; Dr. Milner in his definition does not affirm or deny that the word is written or unwritten, and therefore to assert that the word is all written is not to deny any thing that the definition asserts. Dr. Jarvis says, "The question at issue is, whether the Bible, the written word of God, or what Dr. Milner calls the word of God at large, written or unwritten, as received and understood and explained by the Roman Catholic Church, is the proper rule of faith."—p. 25. But this is a mistake. Whether the written word alone, or the written and unwritten, whether the whole is written, or only a part is written, &c., is a question solely for authority itself to decide, after we have ascertained it, whether the authority be the church, private judgment, or something else, and therefore not debatable. Whether the rule is "the word as understood and explained by the *Roman* Catholic Church," is the second question in order, not the first, nor a part of the first. If we agree that the rule is the word as held and taught by the Catholic

Church, then, unless Dr. Jarvis and his Protestant friends concede the Catholic Church to be the *Roman* Catholic,—the point he tries to dispute,—we must proceed to the question, Which is the Catholic Church? Dr. Jarvis's simple question, therefore, is a *duplex* question, to say the least, and therefore cannot be the *simple* question at issue. The real question at issue is, Whether the rule of faith is the whole word of God—written or unwritten—delivered by the apostles, as understood and explained by the Catholic Church, or the Bible as understood by each particular reader or hearer of it.

Dr. Jarvis undertakes to prove, and under the head of *the rule of faith* the main thing he attempts to prove is, that nothing can enter into the rule of faith not contained in the written word; but this is nothing to the purpose; for even if it be so, it does not follow that the Protestant rule is true, or the Catholic false. To assert that the rule of faith is the word of God contained in the written word only is one thing; to assert that it is solely the word of God as contained in the Bible, and as interpreted by each particular reader or hearer of it,—the proposition Bishop Milner denies,—is another and a very different thing; for should it be conceded that the whole word was written, and nothing can be received as of faith not recorded in the Bible, it might still be true that the rule of faith is what Dr. Milner asserts, namely, the word of God at large,—that is, the whole word delivered by the apostles,—*as understood and explained by the Catholic Church;* which is the proposition of the bishop that Dr. Jarvis is to disprove.

Before determining the authority which is to determine what is the word of God, the question of written or unwritten tradition can be raised only as an historical question, or for the purposes of an *argumentum ad hominem*. If it be historically true that unwritten tradition has in all ages been contended for by the generality of Christians; if it be true that it is contended for by fathers and doctors held to be authoritative by Protestants; or if Protestants themselves profess to hold as revealed truth doctrines which are not contained in the Scriptures, or not to be obtained from them without the aid of unwritten tradition, and yet assert that the Bible alone is the rule, then we may urge the fact as a conclusive argument against their rule; for if there be unwritten tradition, they are certainly wrong; or if it is shown that they must admit it or abandon their doctrine,

they are refuted on their own principles. It is only in this sense that we understand Dr. Milner to urge unwritten tradition. If he urges it successfully, he overthrows Protestantism; if unsuccessfully, he does not thereby render Catholicity false or Protestantism true; and all that can be said is, that he has used an unsound argument against Protestants; which would, indeed, affect his character as a polemic, but not at all the real points in issue. The whole discussion into which Dr. Jarvis enters was therefore aside from his purpose, and he would not have advanced a single step in his argument, even if he had succeeded in his denial of unwritten tradition. But he has not succeeded; nay, after going into a long and elaborate argument against unwritten tradition, he very frankly concedes it. Thus he says, p. 29,—"Now the Church of England, and the churches in communion with her, do not deny, certainly, what an apostle has asserted, *that the written gospels do not contain all that Jesus did or said.* Nor do they deny that the apostles, in proclaiming the Gospel and establishing the church, *did and said many things which could not properly enter into the apostolic writings* which have been transmitted to us. Let it be proved, then, that any doctrine or practice proceeded from Christ or his apostles, and we receive and embrace it. 'The question is not,' as Bellarmine well observes, 'how great is the force of divine and [or] apostolical traditions, but whether any tradition [*aliqua traditio*] be truly divine or apostolic!'" p. 29. This, if it mean any thing, means that "the churches of the English communion" acknowledge both the fact of unwritten traditions and the obligation to receive and embrace them, if *proved* to be really from Christ or his apostles, which is all that the Catholic says; for no Catholic holds that he is bound to believe any thing as from our Lord and his apostles not proved by *infallible* authority to be from them.

Dr. Jarvis, after this, is precluded from restricting the rule to the written word alone, and must say with the Catholic bishop, "the word of God at large, written or unwritten." Thus far, instead of refuting the Catholic rule, he concedes it, and asserts its soundness. The only point, as we have already said, for him to deny, if he means to controvert the Catholic rule, is, that the rule of faith is the word "as understood and explained by the Catholic Church." Does he deny this? Not at all. He concedes it, and denies, though he also asserts, the Protestant rule of private

judgment; for he maintains expressly that the church is the judge of controversies of faith, according to Art. XX. of the Thirty-nine Articles of his society, and that the Scriptures are to be interpreted according to tradition, or "the consistent testimony" of antiquity, or rather, of all ages. The last, if it mean any thing, denies private judgment; the first necessarily implies that the word is to be received as understood and explained by the church. After all his flourish, to borrow his own phraseology, he denies the Protestant rule, and concedes the Catholic, and of course gives up the whole argument to the Catholic as to the necessity and fact of the church,—the first point the Catholic had to make out.

It being now proved, or at least conceded, that there is a Catholic Church, and that the rule of faith is the word as understood and explained by this church, the next question in order is, Which is it,—the church in communion with the see of Rome, or "the churches of the English communion"? But Dr. Jarvis is not yet prepared to broach that question. He has other work to perform first. He is placed in a delicate position, which may be expressed by *Protestant*-Catholic, and *Catholic*-Protestant. He must be Catholic enough to condemn Puritanism and dissent from Anglicanism; and Protestant enough to condemn *Romanism*. In other words, he is an *Anglo-Catholic*, which means a man who asserts one set of principles against us, and the contradictory set against Puritans, Socinians, Presbyterians, Baptists, Methodists, &c. So, though he has conceded the Catholic rule in principle, and given up the Protestant rule of private judgment, we must not be surprised to find him going into a long, elaborate, and learned defence of the Protestant rule, and also indulging in very liberal abuse of us for asserting ours.

After having given up the Protestant doctrine as to the unwritten word, he must, in order not to be too Catholic, reassert it, deny all unwritten tradition of doctrine, and insist on the sufficiency of the Scriptures. But the Scriptures speak of "traditions." Very true; but *tradition* means "handed over," and may apply to the written word itself, which the apostles handed over to their successors. But St. Paul speaks of traditions, "by *word* or our Epistle." True, very true; but that which was unwritten at the time St. Paul afterwards wrote. The proof? "*We say*, and that very plainly and openly, that it is an arrogant assumption

of the very point at issue, to assert that he meant unwritten tradition of his *doctrine*. *We say*, that, in the fourteen epistles which bear his name, he did record the doctrine which he as a divinely inspired apostle thought it necessary to *deliver* in addition to the already written doctrine of the Holy Scriptures, as received by him. St. Paul's traditions of *doctrines* were *written* traditions."—p. 32. Brave assertions, no doubt; but the proof? "His epistles to the Thessalonians were among the earliest, and are comparatively short. Who will undertake to prove that doctrines, not recorded in them, were not afterwards recorded in his other Epistles?"—*Ib.* But, with your permission, this is not to the purpose. You assert that "St. Paul's traditions of doctrines were *written* traditions"; and yet when the apostle exhorted the Thessalonians to stand firm, and to hold them (2 Thess. ii. 14), they were undeniably, in part, *unwritten;* it is, therefore, for you, who assert that they were *all* subsequently written, to prove it. The fact that they might have been is no proof that they were. Besides, you have conceded "that the apostles, in proclaiming the Gospel, and establishing the church, did and *said* many things which *could not properly enter* into the apostolic writings which have been transmitted to us."

But Dr. Jarvis attempts to save himself by a *distinction*. He distinguishes between *doctrines* and *precepts*, and contends that the unwritten traditions are traditions not of doctrines, but of *precepts*, though, as we understand him, of *divine* precepts,—precepts which the apostles received from our Lord himself, or from the dictation of the Holy Ghost. That is, they are traditions of things to be done, not of doctrines to be believed. The distinction shows, no doubt, the master. But is not faith itself a precept, in so much as it is commanded, and as in believing we are active, that is, *do* something? Again, is not a precept something *taught* as well as commanded, and therefore a *doctrine?* And must we not *believe* it from God, in order that, in obeying it, we may be obeying God? Moreover, are the divine precepts less a part of the word of God than the divine mysteries? And is not a rule of faith which excludes a portion of the divine precepts, or even *ordinances*,—to adopt another term insisted upon by Dr. Jarvis,—just as much a false rule as one which excludes a portion of the dogmas? The distinction, therefore, between doctrines and precepts, on which the author lays so much stress, though

valid enough for some purposes, can avail him nothing for the purpose for which he makes it. The precepts are the law of God, what the law practically ordains; and could anybody regard a tradition of the word of God, as complete, which only partially handed down the *law* of God?

Nevertheless, we must expect Dr. Jarvis to hold on to his Protestantism, at least for some few pages further. Notwithstanding his concessions, he asserts (p. 37), that "the Bible, the written word of God, *in its true intent and meaning*, is the only rule of that faith which is necessary to salvation." But how does he prove this? He has already admitted that there is a portion of the word not recorded in the Bible, and whether he call it doctrine, or precept, or ordinance, how does he know that it is not necessary to salvation? He cites, indeed, the English synods; but till he has proved that they were commissioned by Almighty God, to teach, they are authority neither for him nor for us. And yet we can find no other proof of his assertion of the sufficiency of the Scriptures. But this is a serious question. What is the faith necessary to salvation must be determined by divine authority, and therefore, if what is contained in the Scriptures is sufficient, we must have divine authority for believing it. But, unhappily for the Protestant minister, he has no such authority; for the Holy Scriptures, as is well known, nowhere assert their own sufficiency. This, of itself, is decisive against Protestantism.

In arguing against the Protestant rule, Dr. Milner presses home the inability of the Protestant to settle the canon, and to be certain that he has an authentic copy of the original Hebrew and Greek autographs,—that this translation is faithful,—and that he seizes the true sense. Dr. Jarvis, still in his Protestant vein, undertakes at considerable length to dispose of this formidable objection. Let us see how he succeeds.

1. The Protestant cannot proceed a step, even if the sufficiency of the Scriptures be conceded, till he has settled the canon, that is, determined what books are authoritative. Dr. Milner tells his Protestant opponents that they are unable to do this. Dr. Jarvis *says* Protestants can do this as well as we can; but he fails to show how. He, however, proceeds himself to settle the canon by a very short and simple process. The Catholic canon and the Protestant agree, except that the former includes seven books and certain parts of Esther and Daniel excluded by the latter. "The ques-

tion, then, as to the canonical Scriptures, or Scriptures to be adduced as a rule of faith, is clearly reduced to this: Whether the seven books named, and the parts of Esther and Daniel as contained in the Septuagint and the Old Latin Vulgate, are, or are not, canonical."—pp. 44, 45. These books were not in the Jewish canon, were not received by some early Christians, were thought lightly of by St. Jerome, and therefore are not canonical. Therefore the Protestant canon is the true canon, and the Catholic, so far as it differs from the Protestant, false. But, waiving the argument against the books in our canon not in the Protestant, which, it were easy to show, is of no weight, on what authority does Dr. Jarvis assert the canonicity of those books with regard to which there is no dispute between Catholics and Protestants, that is, of the books which Protestants hold to be canonical? On our authority? Nay, because he does not admit that authority, and because, if admitted, it is as good for those rejected as for those retained. On what authority, then? On the authority of the primitive church? By what authority do you determine what was the canon of the primitive church? Your own? That is, no doubt, very respectable, but hardly sufficient for an act of faith; at best, it cannot be more than human, and therefore not above the authority of the holy Council of Trent, at worst.

2. But Dr. Milner continues: Supposing you have settled the canon of the Scriptures, how do you know that the copies of them translated and printed in your Bibles are authentic? Here is a further difficulty; for even if you have the true canon, but a corrupt text, it avails you nothing. What does Dr. Jarvis answer to this? 1. That Dr. Milner should have used the word *genuine* instead of *authentic*. [Doubtful.] 2. That various learned men, though they have detected thousands of various readings, are of opinion that the received Hebrew and Greek text is substantially correct. 3. Conceding that the text of the Psalter in the Book of Common Prayer is not pure; and 4. Entering into a long and learned dissertation to prove that the text of the New Testament, in one instance at least, is grossly corrupt, and contains what was originally only a marginal gloss!—pp. 52–65. This looks to us more like assigning reasons for doubting than for crediting the accuracy of the text.

3. But, Dr. Milner goes on, admitting the canon, and the

genuineness of the text, how can you be sure that yours is a faithful translation? The generality of those who read the Bible must read it in a translation, the faithfulness of which they have themselves no means of ascertaining; and yet, if they are to take their faith from the Bible alone, they can not be certain of their faith, unless they are certain of the translation in which they read or hear it read. What has Dr. Jarvis to say to this? So far as we can understand him, he answers Dr. Milner's question, 1. By abusing and misrepresenting the holy Council of Trent; 2. Berating the Latin Vulgate; 3. Excusing one error in the Protestant English translation, on the ground of a various reading; 4. Trying in vain to defend another; 5. Asserting that the Protestant version, take it all in all, is a very excellent translation; 6. Placing in parallel columns an extract from our English version and one from the Protestant, and calling on "plain, unlettered" men to decide between them; 7. Abusing ours for coming through a *Latinized* medium, and for retaining the word *Cephas*, instead of translating it *Peter*, in a passage in which it is not certain that Peter was the person meant; and 8. By leaving a strong impression on the reader that translations can never be worthy of full confidence.—pp. 65–70.

4. But, Dr. Milner asks again,—"Admitting that your Bible is canonical, authentic, faithful, what security have you that you understand it rightly?" Dr. Jarvis is bound to answer this question, for he says, as we have seen, that "the Bible, the written word of God, *in its true intent and meaning*, is the *only* rule of that faith which is necessary to salvation." Besides, what we are to believe is unquestionably the word of God, and the Bible is, and can be, the word of God only in the exact sense intended by its divine Author. If we have no infallible certainty that we have that sense, we cannot have faith; for faith must exclude doubt, and where there is not infallible certainty, where there is a liability to error, doubt is not excluded. Now what certainty has the Protestant, or can he have, that he understands the words of the Bible in the very sense intended by the Holy Ghost? Here we are at some loss to make out what the author really answers. His vituperation of Dr. Milner and the Catholic Church is intelligible enough; but when he comes to the direct answer to the question, he grows dark and profound. He seems himself to feel that there is a difficulty in the case. If, he says, the noble design once entertained by

the English reformers had been carried out,—our Lord himself not having made any provision for the right understanding of his word, we must suppose,—there *would* have been a way, he is sure. The child would have been baptized, early taught the creeds, [what vouches for the creeds?] catechised, in due time confirmed, and then would every day of his life have heard four chapters in the Bible read by a learned priest, and "with that just emphasis and intonation, that the very reading would have conveyed to him the true sense of God's holy word."—p. 74. This *would have been*; but, alas! Catholics and Puritans marred the "noble design," and so it *is not*, and *has not been*. Very unkind on the part of Catholics and Puritans, and very unfortunate for the "churches of the English communion," certainly. If the "noble design" had been carried out, the Protestants would have an authoritative interpreter of the word in the "just emphasis and intonation" of the reader! But who would have gone guaranty for the "emphasis and intonation"? The fact that the priest knew Hebrew and Greek? Alas! we have known men who knew both Hebrew and Greek who had a shocking bad emphasis and intonation, and we presume Dr. Jarvis has known some eminent Hebrew and Greek scholars who were, in his estimation, very bad Biblical interpreters, whether by reading or otherwise.

Dr. Jarvis frankly concedes, that, as matters now stand, the method of arriving at the true sense of the word of God in his communion is not perfect. He says, "*Even in the present weak and imperfect state* of our communion, longing as we do for a more devout and general fulfilment of the church's purposes, I will be bold to say, that no one who clearly understands our system, and *follows it in his daily practice*, can be carried about by *every* wind of doctrine and the cunning craftiness of men, whereby they lie in wait to deceive."—p. 75. Here the *weak* and *imperfect* state of the author's communion is taken as a settled fact, and also, that the perfection of the church is a thing *in futuro*, perhaps, but certainly not in the present. True, after this admission, the author takes courage, grows bold, and asserts—what? That no one who understands our system,"—but who understands it?—"No one who understands our system."—very well,—"and follows it in his daily practice,"—that is, understands and *adheres* to it,—"will be carried about by every wind of doctrine." Certainly not; a man who understands and sticks to Episco-

palianism is not an Anabaptist, a Quaker, or a Mormon; but is it certain that he understands and adheres to the word of God? How know you that? How be certain of that?

"Thanks be to God, we have a prayer-book, which the most ignorant of our laity can understand, and which embodies in a devotional form the Catholic interpretation of the Scriptures."—p. 74. That the most ignorant of your laity, or even the most learned, can understand your prayer-book, may be questioned; but be it so; how are they to know, that, by understanding it, they rightly understand the Scriptures? Because you understand an Episcopal prayer-book, is it certain that you rightly understand the word of God?

But it "embodies the Catholic interpretation of the Scriptures." If you say that, you abandon the Protestant rule, and imply the Catholic. But let that pass. How are your most ignorant laity, or even your most learned laity, to know that your prayer-book embodies in a devotional form the Catholic interpretation of the Scriptures? Rely on their ministers? But that were "blind submission," to which (p. 75) you object, and which you regard as the condemnation of Dr. Milner's system. How, indeed, are even your ministers to know the fact themselves? What is the guaranty, even to your ministers, that they do not themselves mistake the Catholic interpretation? Moreover, what authority have they for saying that the interpretation, even if the Catholic interpretation, is the true sense of God's word, since you deny the infallibility of even the Catholic Church, adduce Catholic testimony only as *human* testimony (p. 37), and say that "all attempts to enforce the decision of a present *infallible* interpreter end only in spiritual despotism"? (p. 75.) If there is no *present* infallible interpreter, there can be no present infallible interpretation, and no infallible assurance than any ancient interpretation is infallible; and then no assurance, sufficient for faith, even if we understand your prayer-book, that we rightly understand the Scriptures.

Dr. Jarvis appeals to what he calls *traditive interpretation*, to the traditions, the "consentient testimony of all ages"; but appeals to them as helps only to private judgment. They are to be collected and ascertained by private judgment, not defined and declared, as the Catholic holds, by authority; and when collected and ascertained, private judgment is at liberty to accept, modify, or reject, as seems

to it good. But private judgment may err in determining what is the tradition of all ages, what is the consentient testimony of the fathers; it may gravely mistake as to the traditive interpretation itself; it may also err gravely in the use it makes of it; and therefore, with all the helps it gets from it, be still liable to err in the interpretation of the Scriptures. How, then, is the Protestant to be certain that he rightly understands the word of God, has seized "its true intent and meaning,"—and not merely the plain, unlettered Protestant, but even the most gifted and learned? Our author is silent,—nay, not quite! "The *well-taught Christian* [who has taught him, and taught him well?] will apply to him who is set over him in the Lord to resolve his doubts."—(p. 75.) That is, he must apply to his pastor,—a plain surrender of the Protestant rule, and, in principle, an equally plain assertion of the Catholic. But who is guaranty for the pastor, if there be no infallible church who teaches him, sends him, and teaches through him? "There is no more uncertainty in our communion than there has ever been in the Catholic Church."—*Ib.* That is assumption; but at any rate, then, there *is* uncertainty in your communion; how, then, in your communion, be sure that you rightly understand the word of God? "All attempts to enforce the decision of a present *infallible* interpreter end only in spiritual despotism."—*Ib.* We distinguish; the decision of a pretended infallible interpreter, or of an interpreter who is not infallible, we concede it; of an interpreter who is really infallible, we deny it; for submission to truth is spiritual freedom, and the decisions of an infallible interpreter *are* truth. But in saying this, Dr. Jarvis evidently concedes that his communion is not, *at present*, infallible, and then not authorized by Almighty God to teach. "The fires of the Inquisition have made *hypocrites*, not *converts*."—*Ib.* The author's mind must be running on the English Court of High Commission, and we are happy to think his Anglicanism a little modified from what it was under Elizabeth and James.

It is clear, from Dr. Jarvis's own statements and concessions, that he is aware of no method by which, on Protestant principles, either ministers or people can be sure that they rightly understand the word of God, that they seize its true intent and meaning, and hold it in the sense intended by the Holy Ghost. But with any uncertainty on this point, they cannot have faith; for faith and uncertainty

cannot coexist in the same mind, on the same subject, as is evident from the force of the terms themselves. But faith is possible, and, if not possible without the church, then the church must be, and is. The *Reply* is constantly recurring to the church. The author speaks of the *well-taught* Christian; but there cannot be well-taught Christians, unless there be some one competent to teach them. He fails, therefore, to defend his Protestantism, and, as we have seen, concedes in principle the Catholic rule, namely: The word of God at large, written or unwritten, *as understood and explained by the Catholic Church.* He then concedes that there is a Catholic Church, whose function it is to teach, understand, and explain the word. Then the first point in the Catholic argument, and which Dr. Milner undertakes to establish, is conceded. Thus far the *Reply* makes out nothing against Dr. Milner, but, as far as it goes, either concedes or defends all he contends for.

We may pass now to the second question in order, namely, Which is the Catholic Church,—the church in communion with the see of Rome, or "the churches of the English communion"? There is a Catholic Church essential to the rule of faith. This is now certain, so far as regards the argument between Dr. Milner and Dr. Jarvis. This church is none of the minor Protestant sects, by the concession of Dr. Jarvis, and therefore, in an argument with him, they may be thrown out of the question. The controversy, so far as he is concerned, turns, and he wishes it to turn, between the *Roman* Catholic Church and "the churches of the English communion"; for it is, as he tells us in his title-page, only so far as "the churches of the English communion are concerned" that he undertakes to reply to Dr. Milner. Dr. Milner, under this head, maintains that those churches are not the Catholic Church, and that the Roman is; Dr. Jarvis, to refute him, must refute these two propositions. Dr. Milner, if he refutes the pretensions of the Anglican communion, can, against Anglicans, at once, without further argument, conclude his second proposition, that the church in communion with Rome is the Catholic Church; or, if he establishes by direct proofs that this church is the Catholic Church, he can conclude at once against *all* others. Dr. Jarvis, however, does not prove his own church, even if he uncatholicizes the Roman, and must either disprove the pretensions of all pretended ecclesiastical bodies but his own, or prove his own by direct

affirmative proofs. Let us see, not whether Dr. Milner has succeeded, for that is not the question, but whether Dr. Jarvis has succeeded in maintaining against him the catholicity of "the churches of the English communion."

Dr. Jarvis begins by accusing Dr. Milner of having in the outset assumed the point in dispute, by speaking of his church as the *Catholic* Church. In this Dr. Jarvis is wrong, and all he says about Bishop Milner's "chicanery," and "quibbling," and using words in "a double sense," is irrelevant and unjust. Dr. Milner calls his church *Catholic* from the outset, it is true; but he builds no argument on the name, and in his second part he undertakes to prove that it is what he calls it. The church in communion with the see of Rome, whether in fact the Catholic Church or not, is legitimately so called. Catholic is its official name; the name by which it has always designated itself, and been designated by others. It is its historical name, its proper name, by which it is distinguished in history, and in the common speech of mankind. It is a name exclusively appropriated to it. No church or ecclesiastical body not in communion with the see of Rome has ever been known and distinguished among men by the name of Catholic. All other churches, or bodies, are known and distinguished in common speech, by the common sense of mankind, and we believe, even by themselves, by some other appellation. She alone bears it, and she has as good a right, when speaking of herself, to call herself by the name Catholic, as Dr. Jarvis has to call himself *Samuel Farmer* Jarvis. If the name is an argument in her favor, that is not her fault. She is not obliged to change her name, because others change their faith and communion.

Dr. Jarvis wishes, we are aware, that "the churches of the English communion" should be called *Catholic*; but those churches have never officially called themselves so. The Anglican Church is officially "the Church of England," and the Queen of England, who is its supreme governor, or governess, in her coronation oath, did not swear to protect and defend "the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church," but the "Protestant religion," as established in her realms. The official name of Dr. Jarvis's own society is, "The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America"; and when he himself, in its general convention, at Philadelphia, in 1844, introduced a resolution changing its name to "Catholic," or "*reformed* Catholic,"

the convention voted it down, and by doing so, voted that his church is not *Catholic;* for it is notorious that they hold it to be *reformed.* This of itself is decisive against the catholicity of the *Protestant* Episcopal Church. Dr. Jarvis, in asking us to call ourselves *Romanists*, and him and his friends Catholics, or *Anglo-Catholics*, is not modest. He asks that we should give up the name by which the whole world knows us, and call him and his friends by a name which they have solemnly voted they will not have. We cannot be so discourteous as to call them by what in their case would be a nickname. The "churches of the English communion" call themselves Protestant; they fraternize with Protestants; they regard themselves as the bulwarks of the Protestant religion; and Protestants we shall call them, whenever we wish to distinguish them from those whom all ages have designated by the name of Catholic.

Unquestionably the name we bear is a strong presumption in our favor. The body which has always maintained the name and style of a given corporation is *prima facie* it; and anybody claiming to be it, which does not use, and which has never been known to use, its name and style, is, *prima facie*, not it. If this is in our favor, and against Protestant Episcopalians, whose fault is it? Is Dr. Jarvis so very modest as to ask us to give up the name and style we have always borne and used, so as to place ourselves on an equal footing with himself? If so, we may, indeed, admire his modesty, but cannot consent to gratify him. He must oust us from our possession, which we have held from time immemorial, before we yield one iota to oblige even him. Whatever advantage the name *Catholic* gives us is rightfully ours; and we cannot surrender it, without being false to God and unjust to our neighbour. Whatever disadvantage "the churches of the English communion" may labor under in consequence of not having and never having had, the name and style of the *Church of God*, they must submit to; we forewarn them that we will not do so much as the lifting of a single hair to relieve them. So it is useless to talk about the name. They are named; and, do their best, they will never be able to make the name *Catholic* stick to them. There is often common sense in names.

"We will not, and cannot," says Dr. Jarvis (p. 117), "be drawn from our vantage-ground by the wily manœuvres of Dr. Milner. He knew, and his brethren now cannot but know, that there is no debate between us on the terms of

the ancient creeds. The Seventh Article of the Synod of London, in 1552—the same with the Eighth Article of 1662 says, 'The three creeds—Nicene Creed, Athanasius's Creed, and the Apostles' Creed—ought thorowly to be received and believed; for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Scripture.' Thus far, therefore, our faith is that of the Catholic Church at the end of the first four general councils. From this vantage-ground, I repeat, we cannot and will not be driven; and it is an unfair use of terms, to deny us the name of *Catholic*, or to represent the debate between the English and Roman Communions as if *we* were the *heretics*, and they the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church."

Here we see that Dr. Jarvis claims to stand on a vantage-ground. He asserts that his faith is that of the Catholic Church at the end of the Fourth General Council. But what is the proof? "We believe the ancient creeds." But that is a point to be proved, not taken for granted. If you believe the creeds in the sense and for the reason the Catholic Church did at the end of the Fourth General Council, you do, so far as her faith at the time was embodied in them; but that you do so believe them is not evident from the fact that you *profess* to receive and believe them; because you may believe them in some other sense, or for some other reason, than hers. You must prove that you hold them in a Catholic sense, and for a Catholic reason, before you can pretend to stand on the vantage-ground you boast.

To believe the ancient creeds, it is necessary, as is evident from their face, to believe the Holy Catholic Church, as we have also proved, by proving that the rule of faith is the word of God *as understood and explained by the Catholic Church*. In the act of faith, then, there must always be belief of the church. Now, if we turn to the article of the Synod of London cited above, we find that the reason assigned for believing the ancient creeds is, not that they are the creeds of the Catholic Church,—the word of God as understood and explained by her,—but that "they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture." In believing them for this reason, there is no belief of the Catholic Church, expressed or implied, but a virtual denial of the church. If the reason for believing is the most certain warrant of Scripture, the want of such warrant, even if we had the Catholic Church teaching, would be good

reason for *not* believing, and therefore the church teaching counts for nothing. The doctor's vantage-ground, therefore, evidently slides from under him.

Moreover, the ancient creeds, at the time mentioned, were held as *creeds*, and no debate whether they were or were not provable by "most certain warrants of Holy Scripture" was allowed, *because the church had spoken, and concluded debate.* Her authority was held to be final, and no one was at liberty to reject it, on Scriptural or any other grounds; and every one was bound to believe it under pain of anathema. Is Dr. Jarvis free to open the debate? If he is, he denies the authority of the Catholic Church at the end of the Fourth General Council, and his faith is not hers. Is he not free? What binds him? The ancient church? No; for it is not on her authority he takes the creeds, but on the alleged fact that "they may be proved by most certain warrant of Holy Scripture." What, then, binds him? The authority of the Synod of London, which asserts that fact? If so, he makes the synod authoritative, and, therefore, must prove it is the Catholic Church that speaks in it, before he can allege it, or allege, that, in believing on its authority the ancient creed, his faith is that of the Catholic Church at the end of the Fourth General Council. He must, then, prove his church to be the Catholic Church, before he can claim the vantage-ground of which he speaks.

Finally, no man believes the ancient creeds who does not believe the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church. But no man who rejects the authority of that church, separates himself from her communion, and believes a communion which is not hers to be the Catholic communion, does believe her. Consequently, before Dr. Jarvis can be at liberty to affirm that his faith is that of the Catholic Church at the epoch designated, he must prove the Catholicity of his own communion, and that, in believing it, he believes the Catholic Church of the ancient creeds. These considerations may not, indeed, drive the doctor from his boasted vantage-ground, but they show, at least, that he does not occupy it.

Dr. Jarvis is not at liberty to pursue the line of argument which he sees would be very convenient for him. He wishes to be allowed to assume, since he professes to believe the creeds, that his faith is that of the Catholic Church in the early ages, from that to conclude his orthodoxy, and then from his orthodoxy to conclude his church. But this

will not do. The church cannot be concluded from the faith; for, without the church, we have no authority by which to determine what is the faith, whether the ancient or modern faith,—to distinguish, where there is and can be no difference. The doctor misconceives the question at issue. He labors under the hallucination, that Catholics yield him the early ages of the church, and that the controversy begins only at the end of the Fourth General Council, —that his faith is admitted to be that of the Catholic Church at that epoch, and that it is contended that he is wanting only in regard to certain matters not expressed in the creeds, and which he alleges are subsequent *additions*, but which Mr. Newman calls *developments*, and he cites Mr. Newman's *Essay* in proof of it. But the work he cites was written, not by a Catholic, but by a member of the communion to which he himself professes to belong, and the doctrine is not Catholic doctrine. Dr. Jarvis may be assured that Catholics yield him not one iota of antiquity, and no more grant that his faith is that of the church in primitive than in modern times. His vantage-ground is purely imaginary. We hold ourselves bound by the primitive creed, without alteration, addition, or diminution, save its further explication for the condemnation of new errors which from time to time arise. We recognize no *ancient*, no *modern* creed; for the creed of the church is always, and everywhere, the same and invariable,—never young, never old. The question is simply, What *was* the creed, or doctrine, of the church in primitive times? Settle that question, and you unchurch every pretended church which has deviated, or which deviates, from it. But that is not a question for private judgment, to settle by private interpretation of the three creeds enumerated and the early fathers; but a question for authority, the authority which proposes and defines the faith,—that is, the Catholic Church herself. Evidently, then, the question, Which is the Catholic Church? must precede the question, Which is, or who has, the Catholic faith? If Dr. Jarvis had just simply considered that the doctrine is to be taken from the teacher, not the teacher from the doctrine, he could hardly have fallen into the gross blunder of attempting to establish his orthodoxy without the church, and then the church by his orthodoxy. In homely language, he puts the cart before the horse.

The question now returns, Which is the Catholic Church? And this question must be answered without any appeal to

the faith, which we can know only by the church. The controversy into which Dr. Jarvis seeks to lead us is wholly irrelevant, and could settle nothing for him or for us. Which is the Catholic Church? There is a Catholic Church, —that is settled; and, between Dr. Jarvis and Dr. Milner, it must be either the church in communion with Rome, or the churches of the English communion. Which of these is it?

Were we arguing the question, we should plant ourselves on the fact of prior possession, on the presumptions in favor of the Roman Catholic Church, and there stand, till the Protestant Episcopal doctor had set forth good and valid reasons for ousting us. But we are not arguing the question; we are only examining Dr. Jarvis's *Reply* to Dr. Milner. Dr. Milner undertakes both to prove his own church, and to disprove the pretensions of his opponents. There are certain marks of the true church in the Nicene Creed, and which, at least, all who admit the authority of that creed must accept. Dr. Jarvis finds no fault with them, but, so far as we can understand him, acknowledges them to be the true marks of the true Catholic Church. These marks are, Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity; —"*Credo Unam Sanctam Catholicam et Apostolicam Ecclesiam.*" The church which possesses all these marks is the true Catholic Church; any body, or association, calling itself *the church*, that wants *any one* of these, is a false church, and to be rejected. Dr. Milner shows that the Roman Catholic Church possesses all these marks, and that no other so-called church does; at least, he attempts to show this. Dr. Jarvis, to refute him, must show that they are all possessed by the churches of the English communion; and, if he fail to do so, he must concede that Dr. Milner is right, and that the *Roman* is the *Catholic* Church. Does he succeed or fail? Let us hear him.

"Since the Fourth General Council, the state of the church has been very materially altered. They who equally maintain the great principles of the ancient creeds are now *riven* into *separate* communions. The question is, not whether there *ought to be unity*, but who has *violated* unity. The question is, not whether *holiness* should be the badge *of our* Christian profession, but which of the contending parties is the *least unholy*. . . . . Our object is *to gather* together in one the *scattered* and *divided* members of Christ's fold; to *perfect* holiness on earth, that we may

enjoy it in heaven; *to render* the church truly Catholic, *as it once was;* and, for that purpose, to *restore* the blessed communion of the apostolic fellowship."—p. 117. This evidently implies that Dr. Jarvis considers the church now existing to be destitute of these four marks, and supposes the question to be, not who possesses or does not possess them, but through whose fault have they been lost.

But the question he would raise cannot be entertained, because it presupposes the church to have ceased to exist. The Catholic Church, without the four marks enumerated, is not conceivable. The doctor, therefore, cannot go into any inquiry by whose fault the true church has lost them, for she cannot lose them. If the view he takes were admitted, we should be obliged to say, the church, the true church, we are in pursuit of, does not exist. This is implied in the doctor's carefully chosen language. *Unity*, he tells us, has been violated,—the members of Christ's fold *scattered* and *divided*; we are to inquire, not what church is *holy*, but which "is the *least unholy*"; and the purpose of the churches of his communion is, to *recover* unity, to "*perfect* holiness," to *render* the church truly Catholic, and to *restore* the apostolic communion;—all expressions which necessarily imply that he holds that there is at present no church existing which is One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic; for otherwise, he would not be seeking to revive, restore, or to manufacture such a church.

But there *is* a Catholic Church to-day, as we have seen. Therefore Dr. Jarvis cannot affirm any thing which denies it. What he affirms, then, cannot be predicated of the *Catholic* Church. But it may apply, and he must hold that it does apply, to "the churches of the English communion"; for, if he held otherwise, he could not assert what he does. Therefore it is a full admission on his part that the churches of that communion want the marks of unity, sanctity, catholicity, and apostolicity. Then, by his own admission, they are not the Catholic Church; and therefore the Roman Catholic Church is the Catholic Church. Thus both points Dr. Milner undertook to make out are conceded, and the argument, so far as Dr. Jarvis is concerned, is closed. Will not Dr. Jarvis write another *Reply*?

We could easily obtain the same conclusion by a dozen different processes, each of which Dr. Jarvis would be obliged to admit to be legitimate; but we refer our readers to Milner's *End of Religious Controversy* itself, in which

they will find all that needs to be said, and far better said than we could say it. Having established, so far as required for our present purpose, the two points which, in the argument, the Catholic has to make out,—or having shown that Dr. Jarvis has not invalidated them, but is really obliged to concede them, and virtually does concede them,—our work is done. We will not follow him into his long discussion concerning particular doctrines, for we never will consent to be drawn by Protestants into any discussion of the sort. If the Catholic Church is the church of God, all she teaches is true, all she does as the church is right and holy; and if it is not acceptable to you, that is your fault, not hers. The question, whether she be the church of God,—the question as it relates to the motives of credibility, to the grounds for believing her to be the church of God, commissioned by God himself to teach all nations, all things whatsoever our Lord hath commanded,—we are ready and willing to discuss with Protestants; for this is a question which is to be settled by the authority of reason, speculative and practical, common to them and to us; but all beyond is the province of authority, and not debatable.

Dr. Jarvis has taken up nearly forty pages of his work with an attempt to convict Bishop Milner of quoting unfairly and mistranslating his authorities. We have examined that part of his work, and setting aside his comments,—which are not to be relied on,—we think the authorities, as he cites them, are much stronger in favor of the Catholic, than as cited by Dr. Milner himself. He has not, so far as we can see, convicted the bishop of unfairness in a single particular, unless it be unfair to cite an author on one subject, without also citing what he says on some other subject not connected with it. As for mistranslation, if by mistranslation is meant a translation which perverts the sense of the author, he has not, even on his own showing, succeeded in convicting the bishop of a single instance. We have no space to enter into the discussion, which could, moreover, answer no purpose but that of giving us a chance to display our own patristic learning. But we keep our learning for use, not display, and therefore pass over what Dr. Jarvis says on this point. We have no apprehensions for the reputation of Dr. Milner. A charge of unfairness or of ignorance against him, from Dr. Jarvis, does not move us, nor does it tempt us to a retort. Dr. Milner is beyond the reach of praise or blame, and it is a matter of exceedingly small

moment to him or to his brethren, what Dr. Jarvis may think of his scholarship. He cared, when living, little for human approbation or censure. He devoted his eminent abilities, solid learning, and enlightened zeal, to the service of God, who is able to protect him and his reputation. Few men who have written in our language have more effectually served the cause of truth and virtue. He was a man without pretension, without show or parade, free from all arrogance and from all pedantry. It was glory enough for any one man to be the author of the *End of Religious Controversy*,— a work to which thousands owe, and tens of thousands will owe, under God, their happy conversion from Protestant error to Catholic truth. Happy was he in being permitted to write it, and honored is he in falling under the displeasure, and being the object of the vituperation, of Samuel Farmer Jarvis, D. D., LL. D., &c.

But enough. We are not disposed to complain of Dr. Jarvis's want of candor, fairness, and justice; for he is a Protestant minister, and men do not gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles. He has probably done as well, being what he was, as he was able; and not without the grace of God can he be other than he is. We close by a single suggestion, which we beg him to weigh well. His embarrassments evidently arise, not from any objections he has to the church, but from the fact that he cannot become a Catholic without ceasing to be an Anglican. He sees clearly enough that Anglicanism is not the church of God,—that it wants every mark of the true church. But what shall he do? Shall he say it is no church at all, nothing but a human establishment, and no part of the church of God? So he must say, if he admits that the Catholic Church still subsists in her normal state. But then all who adhere to his communion are schismatics, heretics, fighting against God, and blaspheming his spouse. Can he say this? In reply, we ask him, Which is the more difficult to believe, that a little handful of Anglicans, in a corner of the world, during three hundred years have been heretics, or to believe that the whole Christian world for one thousand years, and by far the larger part of all who bear the Christian name for thirteen hundred years, have been involved in frightful errors, sunk in gross superstition and idolatry,—that the church no longer has a normal existence, that she has failed, and that Almighty God has broken his word?

HAWKSTONE, OR OXFORDISM.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January 1849.]

This is an Anglican novel, which was published in England early in 1845, and has passed through five editions in this country since 1847. We are told that it produced no slight sensation among the English, and we presume it has been well received among ourselves by that class of our community who are fond of saying, "We are Catholics, but not *Roman* Catholics." The author's name we do not know, or, if we ever knew, have forgotten. He is said to be a distinguished member of the Oxford school, and he is evidently a man of some cultivation and fair natural ability. He has a satirical vein, and a heartiness in his hatred, which, in the absence of nobler qualities, impart occasionally an interest to his pages; but as a writer he wants simplicity, ease, sprightliness, and grace. In a few instances he produces a tolerable melodramatic effect, but his power over the human heart does not appear to be great. He seldom touches the springs of deep and genuine feeling. His characters strike us as drawn from preceding works of fiction, and they want originality, life, and naturalness,—are, in general, monsters, blocks, or mere shadows. He might, perhaps, write a passable essay or article for a magazine in favor of Oxfordism, and against Romanism, or Evangelicalism, but he is ill fitted to write a novel pleasing to such as do not happen to be chiefly interested in the controversies he carries on.

Hawkstone belongs to the class of novels termed religious, and was principally designed to arrest the tendency to Catholicity so apparent in the Oxford movement for several years prior to the happy conversion of Mr. Newman and a large number of his distinguished friends. We suppose everybody has heard of the Oxford movement, of Tractarianism, or Puseyism, but it is possible that everybody has not perfectly comprehended it. Many Protestants were frightened out of their propriety by it, and many Catholics thought they saw in it the indication that the day of England's re

**Hawkstone: a Tale of and for England in 184—.* Fifth American Edition. New York: 1848.

turn to the faith and unity of the church drew near; but both Catholics and Protestants seem to have beheld it through a magnifying medium. It was in no sense the result of a Catholic tendency among Anglicans; its motive was not, as some have thought, to Catholicize the Establishment, and prepare the way for its return to our communion; and England's conversion, we fear, is still a far distant event. England will never return to the church till she is humbled, till her English pride is broken, and she feels and is willing to acknowledge her own insufficiency for herself. She must be severely chastised, and suffer terrible reverses and calamities, before she will seek the God on whom in her pride and wantonness she turned her back. Nevertheless, the Oxford movement was more important than we ourselves considered it, and Almighty God in his mercy has brought a good out of it which we did not anticipate.

The motive of the Oxford movement was, not to revive Catholicity in England, but to resist its revival, to guard against the consequences of its revival, and to save the Anglican Establishment, whose very existence was threatened by the well known Act of Catholic Emancipation. That act, passed in 1829, went further than to relieve Catholics of their political and civil disabilities; it involved a change, not merely in the policy of the English government, but in the constitution of the English state. The constitution of England, as modified by Protestantism, made the English state and the English church commensurate one with the other. The sovereign people was restricted to the members of the church established by law. Catholics and Dissenters might or might not be tolerated, but, as such, they were excluded from the state, and could have no representation in the government. The state was Protestant Episcopal, and existed only for Protestant Episcopalians. But when Dissenters, and especially Catholics, were freed from their disabilities, and admitted into the state, as constituent elements of the political body, all this was changed; the state ceased to have a profession of faith, to be Protestant Episcopal, and, as the state, had no longer any religion at all, except Christianity in that vague sense in which it includes alike all professedly Christian denominations. Its subjects were free to adopt any religion they pleased, and the several religions they might adopt, if nominally Christian, were all equal before it.

From that moment the Anglican Establishment became an anomaly in the British constitution, and one which the or-

dinary course of events must inevitably sweep away. It ceased to be the *national* religion, the religion of the sovereign people, and there was a manifest inconsistency, to say the least, in requiring the sovereign people to support it. As long as it was the religion of the state, the state might sustain it; but when it was no longer such religion, the state could not support it as a state religion, without being guilty of a practical lie. Moreover, where would be found in the state the disposition or the power to support it? Dissenters hated it, and were doing their best to destroy it. Could men be expected, as members of the state to sustain an establishment to which as individuals they were conscientiously opposed, and on which they were continually making war? Would Catholics legislate for the preservation of an establishment which they believed schismatical and heretical, which had persecuted their ancestors, slaughtered their priests, and which was plethoric with the wealth robbed from their church? If, combined with dissenters, they had already become strong enough to compel the state, in spite of the Established Church, to admit them into the bosom of the sovereign or ruling people, how long would it be before they would be able to compel it to abolish the Establishment itself?*

Nor was this all. The state had the legal right to abolish the Establishment. It could refuse to support it, on the ground that it was no longer the church of England, that is, of the new political England, created by the Act of Catholic Emancipation. But it could also do it on the ground that it was its own creation, and therefore subject to its authority. The

*In this we see the far-reaching foresight of the illustrious O'Connell, and the claims he has to the lasting gratitude of his countrymen. The Catholic Emancipation Act, which was more due to him than to any other man, is the great political event of modern times. It must prove in its operation the destruction of the Anglican Establishment, and the liberation of Ireland. Irish patriots have gained by it the means of working out the freedom of their country. Let them now follow the recommendation of the Holy Father, establish an Irish Catholic university worthy the name, raise up an army of thoroughly disciplined scholars and statesmen, and throw into Parliament a hundred members every way a match for any other hundred members of Parliament, and they will not long have to seek in vain justice to Ireland. We cannot but admire the political sagacity of O'Connell, and whatever may be our views of his Repeal Movement, we cannot believe it easy to overrate his services to his countrymen. There is great lack of wisdom, as well as base ingratitude, in speaking of him in the disparaging terms adopted of late, by some young patriots, who are no more in comparison to him than a farthing candle is to the luminary of the heavens.

civil power had created it, and given it its commission, and was therefore competent to revoke its commission, and to unmake as it had made it. For the civil government to destroy it, to blot it out entirely, required the assumption of no principle not necessarily admitted by the Establishment itself,—the violation of no principle either of the old or the new constitution, whether political or ecclesiastical. Of this the government seemed to be perfectly well aware. When, therefore, a reforming government, on the heels of Catholic emancipation, proposed the suppression of certain Irish sees, the friends of the Establishment felt that their worst fears were about to be realized. The suppression of certain Irish sees might be only the prelude to the suppression of the entire Establishment in Ireland, and its entire suppression in Ireland only a prelude to its entire suppression in England and the Colonies. All this became tolerably clear to Oxford men. It was a moment of peril. What was to be done? The aim of the Oxford movement was to meet the danger here implied.

Two facts were certain:—1. The English church was bound hand and foot by the state; and, 2. No inconsiderable number of her nominal members had little regard for her as an establishment, and no belief in her necessity as the medium of salvation. To arrest the policy threatened by the government, and to save the English church, two things, then, were clearly necessary:—1. To emancipate her from her thraldom to the temporal power; and, 2. To stir up the zeal and augment the fervor of her members. But the former was possible only by asserting the apostolical origin and commission of the church, and the latter only by reviving the forgotten doctrine of the sacraments, which makes them indispensable to salvation;—two undeniably Catholic doctrines, always held and insisted upon by the Catholic Church. The Oxford men, therefore, accepted these two doctrines, and labored to bring out and establish them as genuine Anglican doctrines. But they soon saw that these doctrines could not be asserted without condemning the principles of the Protestant reformation, and that the principles of the reformation could not be condemned without exonerating the Roman Catholic Church from the charges the reformers had brought against her. But if that church was exonerated from those charges, and the reformation was condemned in its principles, it was clear that the English church was in schism, perhaps in heresy, and no Christian Church at all. Here was an unlooked

for conclusion,—a discovery which disconcerted them, and threatened to defeat them altogether. What was to be done with it? Here was a new and more serious difficulty.

The Oxford men, on making this discovery, divided into three classes:—1. Those who were and would be Protestants, let come what might; 2. Those who would save the Establishment at all hazards; and, 3. Those who would save the Establishment, if possible, but yet not at the expense of truth and consistency. The first of these, seeing very clearly where the movement was tending, and regarding dissent as a less evil than Catholicity, abandoned the movement altogether, and lapsed into low-churchism, Evangelicalism, or rationalism; the second, caring little for logical consistency, and having great confidence in the ignorance, the prejudice, and the unreason of the people, boldly asserted, in spite of the obvious fact, that a distinction between Catholicity and Romanism is tenable, and stoutly maintained that they might stand where they were; but the third class, having a deeper sense of religion, and more logical sequence of thought than usual with Oxford men, unable to accept this distinction, believing what was called Romanism was better than Evangelicalism or rationalism, and seeing no other alternative, preferred marching towards Rome, and giving up entirely the glorious Protestant reformation, with the whole catalogue of Protestant saints. But they still wished and hoped to save the Establishment. They saw that they must go to Rome, but they would carry the Establishment with them. Hence they devoted themselves with great zeal and energy to bringing out and popularizing in the Establishment "all Roman doctrine," according to the expression of the time, or so much of it as they understood, with the ulterior view, though not distinctly avowed, of uniting their communion with the Roman. Hence the decided Catholic tendency which the Oxford movement appeared for a time to be following, and which so alarmed Protestants and so encouraged Catholics.

The work before us was written in 1844, just as the third class of Oxford men we have described were rapidly coming to the conclusion, that they must abandon the Establishment, and go to Rome, not as a corporate body, but as simple individuals, yet before many of them had actually become reconciled to the church. The author is an Oxford man of the second class enumerated. His precise object is

to induce the other two classes of Oxford men to continue on in the course they at first marked out for themselves, and to arrest the tendency to abandon it in favor either of Evangelicalism or of Catholicity. He wishes and is determined to save the Church of England; and in order to do so, he sees that he must defend it against three classes of enemies,—the state, the Evangelicals, and the Catholics. To defend it from the state, or to assert its independence of the state, he must assert it to be the church of Christ, and the church of England only because the church of Christ, and thus abandon the old ground, that it is the church of Christ because it is the church of England; to defend it against the Evangelicals, he must assert its catholicity, its apostolical origin and commission, and revive the Catholic doctrine of the Sacraments; and to defend it against the Catholics, he must make it a national church, the church of England, and the church of Christ because the church of England, and conclude the Catholic Church a false church because it differs from it, and does not recognize its mission. He is an Englishman, at least writes in the character of an Englishman. He must, then, have an English god, an English church, an English faith, an English worship, in a word, an English religion, suitable to an English gentleman. He must in order to meet this demand, make his church catholic yet national, universal yet insular;—catholic, that he may assert its independence of the state and condemn Evangelicals; national, that he may confine it to England, and keep it under the control of Englishmen, or rather, of Oxford men;—universal, that he may emancipate it from the state and save its revenues; insular, that he may save it from the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff. If national merely, it is subject to the national will, and at the mercy of the state; if insular merely, it has no authority as a church, is not essential as a medium of salvation, and nothing can be said in its favor against Evangelicalism or rationalism; if catholic, it is subject to the pope, and Oxford men are not the supreme ecclesiastical authority, and can have no commission but as they receive it from Rome. To emancipate the church from the state in favor of Rome is to come under another authority equally fatal to them; to emancipate it from the state in favor of Evangelicalism or rationalism is to lose its revenues; and what would it be worth without its revenues? Therefore, it must be asserted as catholic and not catholic, insular and

not insular, and the author must boldly maintain that of contraries both may be true.

The author is an Oxford man, and we are, therefore, not to expect any clear and distinct statement of his problems, or any scientific solutions of them. The Oxford man does not usually deal in science, and there is a sort of haze about his understanding that prevents him from seeing things clearly or distinctly. Indeed, were it otherwise, the Oxford man would not be an Oxford man; he would be a Catholic, or develop into a downright rationalist. The author leaves his problems to be divined by his readers, and undertakes to solve them by way of examples,—yet not by examples taken from real life, but imagined by him or his predecessors for the occasion. The discussions are carried on by way of dialogue between certain imaginary Anglicans and Catholics, who have no prototypes either in the church or the Establishment, and for the most part behind the scene, —the author only occasionally coming forward and reporting, not the arguments, but the result. We are told Mr. Beattie convinced Mr. Villiers of this or of that, that this same Mr. Beattie satisfied Lady Eleanor as to this or that difficulty; but of the process we are left to judge mainly from the imaginary conduct of the imaginary *dramatis personæ*. There is, no doubt, great convenience in this method of managing a controversy; for the author has only to assert that the party intended to be defeated is defeated, then to make him act as if defeated, and his cause is won. There is some ingenuity in an Oxford man, after all.

The most serious difficulty the author encounters is, how to dispose of the Catholic Church. He can get along tolerably well with Evangelicals and that sort of rabble, for he can assert Catholic doctrine and use Catholic arguments against them, but how to dispose of the Catholic Church, how to silence Rome, is the real difficulty. This he must do before he can proceed a single step in defence of his Oxford movement, for an impression has gone abroad that the Oxford movement has a Romanizing tendency; and he must do it, too, without offending those members of the Establishment who really begin to crave something approaching Catholicity. The Catholic Church is in possession. There she stands, to confound every sect and schism Men out of her communion may talk as they please, but they have a strange, uncomfortable feeling every time they look at her, and would feel altogether more confidence in

their own schemes, parties, or associations, and repose much more quietly in their own inventions, if she was not there always before them, and giving in her calm and majestic tones the lie to their assertions. The Oxford man seems to be really troubled at her presence, and feels that he should breathe much freer, if she were only out of the way. His first care, as his first necessity, is to remove her. He has half gained his cause, if he has dispossessed her. He must invalidate her titles. But how is he to do this? Scientifically he of course is well aware that he cannot do it. But he has discovered a most ingenious and facile method of doing it. He has only to suppose the principal Catholic doctrines, and call them Anglican, then imagine the most absurd and wicked thing he can, and call it Romanism. Having done this, he has only to imagine the two in operation, and by their imaginary effects judge which must be and which cannot be the church of God. An ingenious device.

Now this is precisely the author's method of disposing of the church. The Anglicanism of his book he himself confesses, and his American editor confesses for him, has no actual existence, is not the Anglican Church which is or ever has been, but simply what he imagines, perhaps believes, the present Church of England is capable of becoming. It is only an imaginary or ideal Anglicanism. This, in the very outset, concedes that the Church of England is not catholic. To be catholic, it must be catholic in time as well as in space, and must be equally complete and entire at all times. The most the author can say for his church is, that he believes it is capable of being developed into the Catholic Church. But this can avail him nothing; for he goes expressly against the doctrine of development, and devotes several pages of his book to its formal refutation. Indeed, one of his most formidable objections to what he calls Romanism is, that it seeks to defend itself by appealing to the principle of development. If he denies development, he must take his church as it is; and if he confesses, as he virtually does, that, considered in its actual state, it is not catholic, he gives up his cause before entering upon his defence. This, we suppose, must be the Oxford way of defending Anglicanism.

On the other hand, his Romanism, if intended to be taken as the doctrine and practice of the church in communion with the see of Rome, is as imaginary as his Anglo-

Catholicism. It may have some reality in Protestantism, but it is a pure fiction when affirmed of Catholics, or, to please the author, of Papists or Jesuits. To prove that *this* Romanism is not Catholicity is not a difficult matter; but to do so is nothing to his purpose. Both he and his American editor virtually confess that they do not find it actually existing, and that it is only their ideal of Romanism,—that is, what Romanism might become, if logically carried out. But the Roman Catholic Church, her principles and practice, are facts, and must be taken as they actually are, and refuted as such, or not at all. She is no ideal church. She has existed for centuries; she has been actualized in the world's history, and it is as so actualized that she must be judged, approved, acquitted, or condemned. We have nothing to do with an ideal Catholic Church, with effects which *might* follow, with characters in which her system *might* issue. The question is, What does she actually teach? What have actually been her effects? In what characters has her system actually issued? A church which has subsisted eighteen hundred, or even three hundred years, cannot be judged by what may be imagined to be her legitimate consequences. She has made her experiment, and must be tried by the results actually obtained, not by results which it is believed or imagined, hoped or apprehended, may be obtained. If the church, as you concede, never has produced the effects you allege, if she never has given birth to such characters as you imagine, then you are estopped. Fact overrides speculation, and even imagination. Your only rational conclusion is, that you have either reasoned illogically, or misapprehended the system itself,—have either assigned it principles which it repudiates, or failed to recognize in it certain principles which it contains, and which limit and modify the action of those you do recognize.

The author's method of testing what he calls Romanism is by exhibiting its effects on character; and, imagining its effects to be bad, he concludes, at once, against the Catholic Church. He is in this guilty of what logicians term *transitio a genere ad genus*, for his Romanism differs generically from the Roman Catholic Church; and, moreover, he adopts a principle of reasoning which is rarely safe, and which must at all times be applied with great caution. The church is not responsible for the abuses of her system. It is always necessary to prove in the outset that the character

to be judged has been formed by her system, not in spite of it, and is its legitimate consequence. Doubtless, there are bad men in the church, as black-hearted villians as you need look for; but that is nothing to the purpose. Are they the fruits of Catholicity? Are they obedient sons of the church? Do they believe and obey her teaching? Do they conform to her spirit, and strictly and conscientiously perform their Catholic duties? If not, she is not responsible for their character. When the author produces a real personage who lives as the church directs, who really follows out her system in his daily life, and is, nevertheless, a bad man, or not, in an elevated sense, a good man, we will listen to him and agree that he has adduced an argument against our church which needs a reply. But this he has not done, —has not even attempted to do. The characters by which he attempts to determine the effects of Catholicity, or, as he calls it, the papal system, are not real, but imaginary, not drawn from history, but from the author's imagination, and are avowedly formed to express merely his views of its logical consequences. What proves that his views are correct? The facts and presumptions are against him; for, if correct, he could have found in real life characters already formed to his hand. It is certainly a singular way to refute a system, this of imagining something which is not it, then imagining characters to express that which is imagined, and finally, from the unseemliness of these imaginary characters, to conclude the wickedness and falsity of the system itself. Such a refutation can, at best, be only *imaginary*.

That the author draws on his imagination for his Romanism, or that of his predecessors, we need not undertake to prove. A bare statement of it will suffice to prove it, for all who are qualified to form an opinion on the subject. According to him, the Catholic system held by us is throughout a system of fraud and chicanery. The pope, the cardinals, the bishops, theclergy, especially the Jesuits, are leagued together in upholding and extending a gigantic imposition for the sake of attaining to universal temporal dominion. They are constantly engaged in contriving and hatching plots and conspiracies against the liberties of nations and the common rights of mankind. Just now, the whole energy of Rome and her minions is directed to the recovery of England, wrested from her tyrannical grasp by those comely saints, Henry VIII. and his daughter Elizabeth. For this, Catholics pour out exhaustless wealth like water. Innumerable

emissaries from the papal court—men of all grades, and of all characters, fit for deeds of lofty virtue and of the most damning villainy—swarm over the nation, penetrate into every society, into every nook and corner of the land, worm their way into the confidence of the unsuspecting, cajole the great, terrify the little, and, through the confessional, master the secrets of all, and use them in furtherance of their hellish purpose. No Englishman is safe. There is a universal conspiracy against him. His steps are dogged, his motions are watched and noted; his most secret thoughts are ascertained, and transmitted to the pope or to the general of the Jesuits. Artful spies surround him; he is besieged with arguments and blandishments; appeals to his senses, his passions, his intellect, his tastes, his imagination; smooth-faced and liberal priests cajole or threaten him; high-toned and crafty Jesuits, whose nights are spent in vigils, prayers, and studies, whose minds are stored with the literature and science of all ages and nations, make themselves his companions, win his heart, and seek to entrap him into Romanism. Worse than all this; if he remains obstinate, the agents employed are punished for their failure, even assassinated before his very eyes, by order of their master or masters; he becomes the object of papal vengeance; invisible agents swarm around him; his plans are defeated, his hopes are deceived, his affections severed, his children stolen from him, and brought up in profanity and vice, prepared, at the first opportunity, to cut his throat. Poor man! there is no safety for him. Let him not dream that he can escape the vengeance of Rome. Artful, designing, learned, accomplished Jesuits, with no principle but obedience to their superiors, ready to pray or to murder, according to the order given, are ever on his track, and, in one disguise or another, lurking near him. Does he go to Italy to display his magnificence, or to enjoy the sunny clime and the treasures of Italian art? A Jesuit disguised becomes his body-servant, and soon his factotum;—by his artfulness, his address, his faculty of making himself agreeable and useful, gets the command over him, finds out his secrets, and then refuses to spare him, unless he turns Papist, and bequeathes his estates to the Jesuits.

Not individuals only, but the state, is beleaguered. Emissaries from Rome are in every department. Every Jesuit, every priest, every Irish laborer, is in the conspiracy. Is there a riot or an outbreak in some mining or manufacturing

district,—it is the work of the disguised Jesuit, done in obedience to orders from Rome, for the purpose of bringing about a change of ministry. Is some provincial bank, which has been insolvent for years, obliged to stop business, to the ruin of hundreds of honest people,—the same ubiquitous Jesuit is at the bottom, and has done it in order to secure the return of a liberal and infidel member of Parliament. Is there a change of ministry, a rise or a fall in the stocks, —it is the work of Rome, through her agents, for the embarrassment of the British government.

With a few rare exceptions, these emissaries and agents are all in the secret, understand the purposes of their masters, and are themselves without faith, without conscience, without principle, and utterly reckless. Nevertheless, they keep their oath, are faithful to their trusts, practise the most exact obedience, submit to the severest mortifications, and make the most painful self-sacrifices; and all to uphold a system of sheer fraud, a mere imposition, which they know to be a mere imposition, and which among themselves they ridicule and despise. What binds them to their superiors? What insures their fidelity? What compels them to make these sacrifices? They are caught and cannot escape. They find themselves leagued with a band of robbers, and cannot break away without running the most fearful risks. There would be no living for them in Catholic countries, and Protestants, alas! have no houses of refuge to receive them. Let them falter in their duty, let them in their secret chambers, in the solitude of their own private thoughts, but dream of swerving from their fidelity, and the muffled assassin's dagger shall speedily find its way to their heart. By a system of universal fraud, intrigue, and espionage, the church establishes her power, and by a system of universal terror she contrives to preserve and even to extend it.

We say nothing which is not warranted by the book before us, and had we space, we could justify by citations every statement we make. This is Romanism, or the papal system, according to the author of *Hawkstone*; and this horrible system, he would have his readers understand, is the system which we Catholics embrace and exert ourselves to uphold and extend! Does he believe this? Why should he not? It is, with slight variation, as far as it goes, the old story which Protestants in general, and English Protestants in particular, have been repeating for these three hundred years, and substantially what we may read in any antipopery

book, tract, or newspaper we can take up. It may seem incredible to those who have been always Catholics from their infancy, that any Protestant can believe any thing so absurd; but Protestants have a liberal share of credulity, and can believe any thing—but the truth.

The whole of this theory of what they call Romanism, the papal system, or the Jesuitical system, Protestants rest on two assumptions:—1. The church holds that the end justifies the means; and, 2. That by means of the confessional she obtains possession of the secrets of all hearts, and can use them for her own purposes. The church exists in spite of all opposition; that is a fact there is no denying. She persists through all the mutations which go on around her, and retains, and from day to day even extends, her influence. As a matter of course, she is a gigantic imposition. Otherwise, Protestantism would be false and criminal. But if an imposition, if a mere human institution, she can extend or even preserve her influence only by human means,—by craft, artifice, and consummate human skill and address. She must be wise, crafty, subtle, and unscrupulous in the selection and employment of her means and agents. This view of the church the Protestant must take, or concede that she is the church of God, and thus condemn himself.

The church certainly subsists, and it is a fact that the counsels of her enemies are often frustrated, and that nations which have disowned her often feel her influence, and unintentionally promote her interests, in a way which to them is strange and incomprehensible. But this theory of her consummate human policy, her craft and address, is far from being borne out by the facts of history. Humanly speaking, her ministers have not always been good ecclesiastical politicians, and have not seldom committed what in the eyes of men are gross blunders. We have been struck, in reading history, with this fact. If ignorance, weakness, false policy, and blunders on the part of churchmen could have ruined the church, she would have been ruined and ceased to exist long ages ago. Her whole history proves that she subsists in spite of human policy, and therefore that she is upheld, not by the arm of man, but by the arm of God. But let this pass. We cannot expect Protestants to recognize the facts of history, or to make in view of them the proper induction. Let it be that she is a mere human institution, and therefore a gigantic imposition; still, the

means on which she is supposed to depend are altogether inadequate to the acknowledged effect.

The assumption, that the church holds that the end justifies the means, is unwarranted, a pure, unmitigated falsehood; but let that pass; even if it were not so, it would not meet the exigencies of the case. The principle itself presupposes that the end is good, at least believed to be good, and it is only on that condition that it can have place, or operate. But if our author is to be believed, the church does not even propose a good end. He, indeed, represents his imaginary Catholics as justifying their conduct on the ground that it is for the good of the *cause*; but, at the same time, he represents them as perfectly aware that the cause itself is bad. They must, then, act, not on the principle that a good end sanctifies the *means*,—the principle supposed,—but on the principle that a *bad* end sanctifies bad means,—that, however detestable the means, if the end is bad, they are justifiable!

Not only is this the representation given of the inferior agents, but of the superiors, of the pope, and of his supposed master, the general of the Jesuits. If the system be what it is alleged, it has and can have no good end. What good end, indeed, can you suppose? The salvation of men? No, for the church believes in no salvation, and its ministers are nothing but a set of baptized infidels, without faith and without conscience. They know their system to be an imposition, and ridicule its pretensions. Of course, then, they cannot believe its maintenance essential or at all necessary for any religious purpose,—certainly not as the medium of salvation; for, in order to believe that, they must really believe their church to be the church of God, which they cannot do, if they know it to be a mere human institution, a mere imposition. What, then, is the good end proposed? The monopolizing of power? But this is not an end; it is only a means to an end. For what end monopolize power? For mere selfish gratification? But that is not a good end. Supposing the church, then, to be what is alleged, supposing her to adopt the principle, that the end justifies the means, that principle cannot avail her; for, false as that principle is, it can operate only with men who have some faith and some conscience, and where there is an end proposed which is really or apparently good, neither of which is the fact in the case supposed. The church has, according to the author, only a vicious end, which she seeks by un-

scrupulous agents who know it to be vicious. Will he explain to us how the larger part of the civilized world can be made to submit to a system vicious both in its ends and in its means,—a system which they do not believe, and which deprives them of all their rights as men? or how a system so utterly rotten in all its parts can be sustained, by agents still more rotten, in the face of day, and in spite of all the opposition it undeniably encounters? Is the Oxford man deeply read in philosophy? Is he remarkably well versed in the secrets of human nature? False systems may, undoubtedly, be sustained, but only when they propose an end which commends itself to the human heart, and in whose favor conscience can be enlisted; and only while the adherents retain some persuasion that the systems, though they may be imperfect, are nevertheless, in the main, true and necessary. Satan must disguise himself as an angel of light, nay, must seat himself on the throne of God as God, must deceive, must delude, in order to induce any considerable number of persons to hearken to him or to worship him as God.

The second assumption is no better. It is false to suppose that the secrets of the confessional are or can be disclosed or used as pretended. The confessor, even if permitted to reveal the secrets of the confessional, or to make use of them out of the confessional, which is strictly forbidden, could do it only to a feeble extent, and on rare occasions. How in the world can a confessor who hears ninety or a hundred different confessions in a single afternoon, and of persons the majority of whom he does not know even by sight or by name, remember each one's confession, and set it down to the proper penitent? When could he find time to record these confessions? And supposing he could do this, and should transmit the records to Rome, who is there in that city to read them all, to make a digest of them,—reduce them to such a compass, that it would be possible, in any practicable length of time, for the pope or the general of the Jesuits to form even a general idea of their contents? Neither the pope nor the general can devote more than a certain number of hours a day to mastering the secrets of these confessions from all parts of the globe; and by what conceivable process will you contrive to enable either, in these few hours, to master the daily secrets of the whole world? Yet the hypothesis requires, not only that the priests collect all these secrets, not

only that they write them out, and transmit them to Rome, but that the pope or the general of the Jesuits—the author does not tell us explicitly which—is actually to become acquainted with them, and to shape his policy according to the information he thus acquires. Who but a Protestant could believe this possible, without one of the most stupendous miracles ever recorded?

But pass over this. The confessional does not afford the means of collecting all the secrets of all the world. Protestants and persons not Catholics do not confess to Catholic priests, and therefore nothing more can be known of their secrets with than without the confessional. If Catholics should happen to become acquainted with their secrets, they could not reveal them in the confessional; for they are forbidden to confess any one's secrets, even if they know them, but their own. If they are conscientious, they will not do it; if they are not conscientious, they will not go to confession. The agents and emissaries supposed have neither faith nor conscience, and therefore will not seek the confessional, or, if they should, they would take care to confess nothing seriously to their own disadvantage. Consequently, supposing the worst, it is not possible through the confessional to get at that knowledge of the secrets of mankind, or of the emissaries and agents employed, which is essential to the maintenance of the system of universal terror by which it is pretended Rome is able to keep up her power, and secure the fidelity of her servants.

The author of *Hawkstone* reasons as if everybody confessed to Catholic priests,—whereas none but Catholics do it; also, as if all who pass for Catholics, although they have neither faith nor conscience, go to confession, and that each one not only goes to confession, but even makes a good confession,—whereas none but good Catholics go to confession, for nothing but faith and conscience can carry them there; or if something else should induce them to go, nothing else could induce them to make a clean breast, that is, what Catholics term a good confession. Evidently, then, supposing the church to be as bad as our author pretends, the means he alleges are altogether inadequate to give and preserve her power. The causes assumed are inadequate to the effects which are seen and cannot be denied. The Protestant has, no doubt, all the malice requisite to imagine bad causes for these effects, but he suffers his malice to get the better of his discernment. When he takes it upon him to

invent a Romanism for us, he should take care to invent causes adequate to its explanation. If Romanism were what he supposes, and dependent for its support on the means he imagines, it could not subsist twenty-four hours. It would instantly be exposed; nay, *Hawkstone* alone would suffice to annihilate it for ever. Yet *our* Romanism survives, and, we doubt not, will survive for some time to come.

But having in his imaginary way disposed of his imaginary Romanism, or papal system, the author imagines that he has cleared the field for his Oxfordism, or imaginary Anglicanism. This is the first step. If now he can establish his Oxfordism with as much success as he has had in dispossessing Romanism, he imagines he shall be able to shout his imaginary triumph. His work is now to prove the English church catholic. In order to do this, he begins by conceding, nay, proving to our full conviction, that, in its actual state, at least going back ten years from the date of his story, it wants nearly every element of the church of Christ. It is enslaved to the secular power, and has no faculties of its own; it has been robbed of its rights and has refused to reclaim them; it has lost sight of its glorious privileges, its high prerogatives as the church of God, and suffered them to be denied without a protest; it has failed to assert the Catholic system, and left by the way large portions of Catholic doctrine; it has failed to discharge its most obvious and imperious duties as a Christian Church, and suffered to grow up under its ministration the most ignorant, vicious, criminal, degraded, and squalidly wretched population to be found in any nation, festering in the very heart of the empire and threatening its total destruction, without making even an effort to arrest the terrible evil; its bishops and priests, though meaning well, perhaps, with rare exceptions, neither understand nor perform their duties as Christian pastors, and as doctors fall into mischievous errors and damnable heresies. We do not doubt it.

But this is nothing against the Church of England. It is rather a proof of her being the true Catholic Church, as distinguished from the papal church.

"'And yet,' said Villiers, 'the Church of England ten years since was at the point of death.'

"'So,' replied Beattie, 'it seemed to us. Threatened by the people, treacherously protected and corrupted by the state, robbed of her revenues, mutilated in her bishoprics, disorganized and enfeebled in those collegiate bodies which ought to form her greatest strength, her authority

neither asserted by herself nor recognized by others, her testimony set aside and supplanted by an empty rationalism, her education emptied of every thing which could give it life and power, her churches deserted, her children running off without a warning voice into every kind of dissent, and the population swelling like a running tide around her, and menacing to swallow her up, like those fabled springs destined to overflow and drown the mortals who forgot to keep them under cover and confined within their proper bounds,—such was the condition of the Church. Who would have dared at that time to prophesy that it should, within ten years, simply by the assertion of its own principles, be more deeply rooted than ever in the affections of its children, more feared than ever by its enemies, more able than ever to take its stand as the guardian of its empire, and to spread out its arm to the most distant continents as the converter of the heathen? Yet surely this is now true.'

"'And yet,' said Villiers, 'there must have been some malformation, some secret mischief, which had reduced her to her previous state. Without some radical defect, no church could so have fallen.'

"'My dear Villiers,' said Beattie, after a pause, and placing his hands on his friend's shoulders, 'will you endeavour to remain for five minutes in this position, standing upright without moving a single muscle?'

"Villiers stopped (for they were now walking on the terrace in the college gardens), and endeavoured to do so, but found it impossible.

"'Or,' continued Beattie, 'will you try and walk up to that plane-tree yonder in one straight line without a single divergence?'

"Villiers shook his head.

"'No," said Beattie, 'it would be impossible; for *the law of progression, as in human minds, and in individuals as in societies, is a law of continual oscillation.* We bend from side to side, wavering at every step; if weak, falling wholly, not to rise again; if strong, recovering ourselves by some great effort, and advancing at each fresh struggle with more directness, but never upon this earth without a tendency to vary from the central line. Do not, therefore, measure the weakness of societies by their oscillations, or even by their falls (*for they are human and cannot escape them*), but by their recoveries,—recoveries through their own internal strength, when to common eyes they seemed wholly lost. Look round on all the churches in the world, on all civil societies which history presents, and search if you can find an instance of any human polity recovering itself from oscillations so fearful as those by which the English Church has been shaken at times from her centre. Think what a tremendous shock to all opinions and all institutions was given by the stroke which severed her from the tyranny of Rome. And yet, though she bent for a time beyond her equilibrium, she righted and recovered in her doctrine both the principle of authority and the talisman of an hereditary Catholicism, without which she would long since have been fractured to atoms, like the Protestant communions in Germany. *She was saved by the arm of the civil power*, which

grasped her (roughly, indeed, and tyrannically) when she had shaken off her hold upon Papacy; but yet rescued her from falling wholly into that worst anarchy, the government of self-will. That arm itself was then fractured, and the Church fell to the ground, and to human eyes was utterly destroyed. And yet suffering, and persecution, and martyrdom, only purified and strengthened it; and it came out of the convulsions of the rebellion stronger than before,—the monarchy supported by the Church, and the Church supported by the monarchy. The Revolution came; and the monarchy was split from top to bottom. It stood, indeed, and a superficial view might not detect the flaw. But the principle of popular election, how much disguised and disclaimed, was admitted into the constitution. And since then the Church has been placed to contend against it, breaking out as it has done in a thousand different forms. She has contended with it under the most difficult circumstances; her hands tied, her movements restricted, her principles corrupted, her resources curtailed, her operations betrayed by the necessity of recognizing a nominal monarchy, which, in reality, was a democracy. If the monarchy had wholly disappeared, her course would have been plain and her opposition unfettered. But she has fought like a woman defending her house and her husband against robbers; her husband himself being all the time one of their accomplices, and endeavouring to silence and corrupt her. We measure strength,' continued Beattie, 'not by mere exertion, but by exertion against resistance, and under disadvantages. Think, in this point of view, on the very existence of the Church of England at this day as all but a miracle.'"—Vol. I. pp. 288–291.

Our readers will do well to reperuse this extract, and to take notice that the defence of the Church of England is here expressly based on the assumption,—not concession merely,—that it is a *human* institution, and subject to the law of human progression. Her oscillations are only those of the human mind itself, and it is not possible for her to walk without a tendency to vary from the central line of truth. This we have no doubt is true. But if a human and variable institution, how can she be the church of God, the reflex on earth of his own eternal truth and immutability? To assume the Church of England to be human is to deny its divinity, and therefore that it is the Catholic Church. Who but an Oxford man, after this, would attempt to prove her the church of Christ?

Nevertheless, the author, after having thus conceded away and disproved, in the most satisfactory manner, the Catholicity of his church, and reduced her to a purely human society, proceeds to prove that she is truly Catholic, and

that Anglicans, though not Romanists, are genuine Catholics. But how? What is the Catholic Church? How is it identified with the English Church? Why, the modern Church of Rome is the Catholic Church *plus* the papacy; consequently the modern Church of Rome *minus* the papacy is the true Catholic Church. Abstract from the modern Church of Rome the papacy, the remainder will be the answer to the question, what is the Catholic Church. Now it is certain that the Church of England during one thousand years prior to the reformation was this same Catholic Church *plus* the papacy. But the reformation intended only to throw off the papacy. Consequently the church it left, as the present Church of England, was this same church, *minus* the papacy, which is the true Catholic Church, and therefore the present Church of England is the true Catholic Church. Q. E. D. It is true, however, that the reformation in point of fact exceeded its intention, that the reformers tore away a part of the Catholic system itself; but as the Church of England *intended* to throw off only the papacy, she is not responsible for what went beyond that intention, and has therefore the right to claim, *minus* the papacy, the whole Catholic system as her own. She is then, undeniably, the Catholic Church *de jure*, and the moment she revives the whole Catholic system and conforms to it in her practical teaching, discipline, and worship, she will be it *de facto*. Who, then, dare deny the Catholicity of the Church of England?

This, if we understand it, is the Oxford theory. It is ingenious, profound, and beautiful, and highly creditable to its authors. It settles with great ease the questions which might arise as to what is the true Catholic Church. Rome answers those questions for them, and her authority is good, except so far as she asserts the papacy. After all, then, Rome serves an important purpose. She keeps the Catholic Church in its integrity, though unhappily obscured by her own additions. Still, as under her additions remains intact the entire Catholic Church, we can learn from her what it is, which we could not do from the Church of England, for she, unhappily, has mutilated it, and lost the greater part of it. The author, therefore, takes frequent occasion to rap his Evangelical brethren over the knuckles, for their vulgar prejudices against Rome, and also, notwithstanding all he says against her, to show her immense superiority over the Anglican Church. It is clear, in his view, that, *minus* the

papacy, Anglicanism wants all that Romanism has, and that Romanism has all that Anglicanism wants. Let England borrow from Rome all that Rome has, *minus* the papacy, and England will once more be Catholic. Rome, then, unless she undertakes by her own authority to plant her system in England, in derogation of the mission of Anglicanism, is to be respected, and held to be a living branch of the Catholic Church. Really, Oxford men are liberal as well as ingenious, and not at all squeamish, if not themselves interfered with! They have no difficulty in recognizing the Catholicity, out of England, of the very church which they denounce as a gigantic imposition upon mankind, and which, according to them, is sustained only by a system of universal fraud and terror!

This theory, too, enables the Oxford men to dispose of certain troublesome matters connected with the interference of Henry and Elizabeth in ecclesiastical matters at the time of the separation of their church from the rest of Christendom. The Church of England does not derive from either Henry or Elizabeth; it is the old Catholic Church of England, the primitive church, *minus* the papacy, which had been the church of England from the time of St. Austin, perhaps from the time of St. Paul. Henry and his daughter Elizabeth were only instruments,—rude instruments, it is true, but such as the times afforded,—in the hands of God, for freeing her from foreign domination and Roman corruption. The reformers may not have been saintly men; they may have had bad motives, and erroneous principles and doctrines. But what then? Bad churchmen do not make the church false or wicked. They had nothing to do with founding the Church of England, or settling her constitution, doctrines, or liturgy. They only disencumbered her of the papacy, cut away the excrescences or accretions which threatened her existence, in order to enable her to stand forth in her native freedom, purity, simplicity, and majesty, as the church of God, which she was, and had always been. This was their work. They gave nothing to her; they simply removed what was not hers, and which was only a let and a hindrance to her. They may, indeed, in their ignorance, their zeal, their error, their rashness, have laid a rude hand on the church herself, taken away more than they should have done, mutilated, wounded, and left her half dead; but is she to blame for that? Is she to be censured because she was so cruelly treated? Is she to be denied her own be-

cause she was unjustly deprived of it? The reformers in their rude grasp exceeded their powers, and she cannot be bound by their lawless acts. She has, therefore, the right to disavow them, and to reclaim her own.

All this is no doubt very clever, but we do not precisely understand how the Church of England can be Catholic at all, if not Catholic in fact,—Catholic in her actual character. A church Catholic *de jure*, and not Catholic *de facto*, passes our understanding. We should suppose a church ceasing to be Catholic in fact had forfeited whatever rights it once had, and become a schismatical or an heretical body. A man once Catholic, but lapsed into schism or heresy, retains, no doubt, with the blessing of God, the power of becoming a Catholic again, but he can hardly for that be called a Catholic, unless he actually becomes so. As long as the power remains a mere virtuality, unreduced to act, he is no more of a Catholic than if he had it not. Grant that the Church of England was once Catholic, that is nothing, if she is not Catholic now; grant, also, that she has the power of becoming Catholic once more, and—what we deny—that by reducing to practice principles which she actually holds; that does not make her Catholic, and she cannot be Catholic, unless she so reduces them, and actualizes that power. As long as she remains as she is, she is only what she is *in actu*, and not being *in actu* Catholic, we should suppose that she cannot be regarded as Catholic at all.

That the church of England before the reformation was Catholic, by virtue of her communion with the centre of unity, we concede, and if she is now identically that same church, she is Catholic now, we also concede; but if the identity asserted does not exist, the fact that the old church in England was Catholic does not make the present Anglican Church Catholic, but the reverse. That identity does not exist, if there is an essential difference between the church that is and the one that was. That such difference does exist is proved by the admitted fact, that the Anglican Church was mutilated by the reformers, that she has been subjected to the civil power, has practically rejected large portions of the Catholic system, has neglected essential Catholic doctrines, has embraced doctrinal errors, and sanctioned, tacitly at least, mischievous practices; nothing of which, in the same sense, can be affirmed of the church before the reformation. Under any view of the nature and office of the church which even Oxford men will take, this must imply an essential difference,

and therefore destroy the identity asserted; and then, confessedly, the Catholicity both *de jure* and *de facto* of the present Anglican Church.

That the Anglican Church, since the change effected by the reformers, and in spite of it, retains certain principles which imply and demand the Catholic Church for their logical development and practical operation, we do not deny. There is no heresy of which we cannot say as much. Even the Unitarian has principles, which, if logically carried out and reduced to practice, would compel him to seek admission into the Catholic communion; but he is not, therefore, a Catholic: for he does not so carry out and reduce them, and because he has other principles which he obeys and which are opposed to them and utterly inconsistent with Catholicity. The Church of England may retain in her Book of Common Prayer and other formularies principles which logically imply the church; but they give her no title to Catholicity, if they are not logically developed, and made the principles of her actual life, or if along with them she holds and practises another set of principles inconsistent with or diverse from them. To be Catholic she must not only retain all Catholic principles, but she must have no other principles, and she must not only possess the Catholic principles and them only, but she must live them, that is, realize them in her actual life. But it is conceded by the Oxford men themselves, that she does not realize the Catholic principles in her actual life, for they are laboring with all their might to induce her to do it. Either, then, she realizes no principles, and therefore is only a dead church, living no life at all, or she realizes other than Catholic principles, and is therefore a false church. In either case she is not Catholic.

But giving the Church of England the benefit of development, which our author repudiates, and granting that she retains, as far as they can be retained in formularies, all Catholic principles and Catholic principles only, she is not Catholic, unless she is united in the one Catholic communion, for Catholicity is inconceivable without unity. It is conceded by Oxford men, that valid and legitimate sacraments are essential to the Catholic communion, and their purpose requires them to maintain that their church is indispensable to salvation, at least in England, because she has valid and legitimate sacraments, and no one else has them. In order to maintain this, they must maintain her apostolic origin and commission,

that is, *orders* and *jurisdiction*. If, in the change which took place in the convulsions of the sixteenth century, the Church of England lost these, or either of them, she is not, and, without going out of herself, cannot become, Catholic. If she lost orders, that is, valid ordination, she is no church at all, but a mere human society, as our author in fact assumes her to be; if she has lost jurisdiction, she is at best only a schismatical church.

That the Anglican Church, so called, has no valid orders is morally certain, and under the circumstances of the case the negative is to be concluded if the affirmative is not proved, because the perpetual *visibility* of the church must be asserted. She certainly has none, unless she has received them through Matthew Parker, Queen Elizabeth's Archbishop of Canterbury; and she has not received them through him, unless he himself had been validly consecrated. That he had been was denied by the Catholics at the time, who must have known of his consecration, if he had been consecrated, and who had no interest, as Catholics, in denying it, but rather an interest in affirming it. It was virtually conceded even by members of the Establishment, who certainly would not have failed to assert and prove it, had they been able. The uneasiness of many Anglicans became so great, that the civil authority was obliged to interpose, and attempt to establish it, not by adducing proofs of the fact, but by the royal prerogative, and making it a penal offence to deny it. This was very extraordinary. The queen was a lay person, and had no authority to consecrate or to supply defects; and the fact, that her supposed authority to supply defects was invoked in the case, is itself a proof of the invalidity of the consecration. If Parker had been consecrated at all, it must have been by her order, and the evidences of the fact must have been within her reach. Why, then, did she not silence the gainsayers, and calm the uneasiness of her subjects, by producing them, instead of attempting to do it by royal proclamation or act of Parliament? Who will believe, that, if the consecration had taken place, and by her order, she had no means of proving it?

There is no evidence that any valid act of consecration took place, but the Lambeth Register, unknown, at least never produced, till some fifty or sixty years after the pretended event it professes to record, and which, though Lingard thinks it is genuine, is in all probability, to say the least, a forged document. It is too minute, enters too much into

detail, and, as one may say, is too perfect to be genuine. Its not being produced, when needed to repel Bonner's plea that Horn was no bishop, is unexplained. If it existed, its existence must have been known, or could have been ascertained, by those who had an interest in producing it. The fact that they did not produce it is conclusive evidence, either that it did not exist at the time, or was known to be worthless.

But given the genuineness of the Lambeth Register, still there was no valid consecration, unless Barlow, who is said to have been the consecrating bishop, had himself been validly consecrated. That he had been, there is not a particle of evidence, and there is as strong evidence as the nature of the case admits that he had not been. That he had been a bishop elect is conceded, that he had been consecrated is not proved, cannot be proved, and is disproved to a moral certainty.

But passing over this, even conceding Barlow had been validly consecrated, there still was no valid consecration of Parker; for, if consecrated at all, it is conceded that it was according to the ordinal of Edward VI., which was defective, and obviously did not consecrate to the office of bishop at all, as Anglicans themselves virtually admitted, a hundred years after, by amending it. These facts prove conclusively that Anglicans have no valid orders; therefore that their Establishment has no sacraments; therefore that it is no church at all, and that its pretension to apostolic succession is imaginary. The Oxford man is, therefore, fully justified in placing it in the category of *human societies*, and assuming it to be subject to the law of human progression.

But granting Anglicans *valid* orders, they have no *legal* orders. They have no mission, no jurisdiction. That their church has no jurisdiction but what it receives from the civil authority is a well-known and undeniable historical fact, which has been legally established in the recent case of Dr. Hampden, raised to the see of Hereford. But the civil authority cannot give spiritual jurisdiction, for the church derives her mission from God, not from the state, as the Oxford men themselves assert and must assert, for they seek to emancipate the church from the state. Consequently, supposing the Church of England to have valid orders, even orthodox doctrine and usages, she is only a schismatical body, and as such diverse from the Catholic Church, and under its anathema.

To us these are serious difficulties in the way of the Oxford theory. The Oxford men are obliged to concede, nay, they assume, that in her actuality their church is not Catholic, and they assert her Catholicity only on the strength of certain latent principles which they say she retains, in spite of the changes effected by the reformers, and which they hold can be developed into actual Catholicity. But suppose the principles, suppose them developed,—if she wants valid orders, she is no Catholic church; she is, if you will, a body moulded after the Catholic fashion, but a dead body, a mere carcass, without vitality or reproductive energy. And even if she have valid orders, and all Catholic principles and usages, since it is undeniable that she has no jurisdiction, she is only a schismatical church, differing *per genus* from the Catholic, and no more capable of being developed into it than a monkey is of being developed into a man.

But this is not all. The Oxford men tell us that their church is the identical old church of England which existed prior to the rise of Protestantism. On this ground and this only do they assert her Catholicity; and they agree that if she is not that identical church, that if she was instituted by the reformers, or contemporaneously with them, she is not Catholic. This identity, we have seen, does not exist; but suppose it. The essential attributes of the church of England must, then, be identical, both before and since the rise of Protestantism. The Oxford men tell us, that, among other things, it is an essential attribute or function of the Catholic Church to teach, and that, in teaching, her authority, under God, is ultimate, supreme. Hence, they repeat, "Hear the church," and assert the absolute obligation to believe what she teaches. But it is a well-known fact, historically provable, denied by no one, and conceded by the Anglican Church herself, in her present official teaching, that prior to the Reformation, for a long series of ages at least, the church of England held and taught that the papacy is an integral, an essential element of the Catholic system. On what authority, then, do Oxford men exclude the papacy from that system, and how can they exclude it and still believe the teachings of what they call the church of England?

Do they reply, that their church now denies the papacy, and that they must believe her present instead of her past teaching? Be it so. But if they say this, they must say it on the ground that the authoritative teaching of the church is always her present teaching, and then they deny to them-

selves their pretended right of appeal from the modern church to the primitive,—their only method of even appearing to justify their rejection of the Church of Rome. Moreover, if they give this reply, they concede that their church teaches at one time one doctrine, and its contradictory doctrine at another. Both doctrines cannot be true. Either, then, their church taught a false doctrine on the papacy before the rise of Protestantism, or she teaches a false doctrine now. If she teaches a false doctrine now, the papacy is included in the Catholic system, and the Oxford men are heretical in rejecting it. If she taught a false doctrine then, as they must hold, she was then a false church, and therefore not Catholic. If not Catholic then, she, by their own confession, is not now, unless a church identically not Catholic is Catholic. If the present is identically the church of England before the rise of Protestantism, she has undeniably erred, for she has taught contradictory doctrines, and therefore is not Catholic. The Catholic Church cannot err, for she is God's church, and what she teaches he commands us to believe,—as Oxford men themselves assert, in asserting her authority to teach,—and he cannot command us to believe a false doctrine, since that would be to lie himself, which, if we may credit St. Paul, or even the natural light of reason, is impossible. No church that errs or can err is, then, the Catholic Church; as Anglicans maintain, for they attempt to disprove the Catholicity of our church by proving that she has erred. The Oxford men, by their own confession, cannot assert the present Catholicity of their church, unless they assert her identity with the church in England before the reformers; and they cannot assert it, if they contend for that identity, for then they must concede that she has erred, either in teaching the papacy or in denying it. In no case, then, can they assert that their church is Catholic, without making God a liar. If not Catholic, she has no authority, and cannot authorize the rejection of the papacy.

The Anglican Church, assuming the only ground on which Oxford men attempt to defend her Catholicity, has both affirmed and denied the papacy. Her authority, then, neutralizes itself, is placed in the centre of indifference, and, at best, stands at zero. It can, then, count for nothing. On what authority, then, do the Oxford men assert that the papacy is no part of the Catholic system? They must, according to their own principles, do it on the authority of the Catholic Church, because they acknowledge that she has

authority to teach, and we are to learn from her what we are to believe. Thus, our author expressly maintains, in his attempt to pervert the poor simpleton, Lady Eleanor, to Anglicanism, that we are to hear the church, and to take our faith from her, and on her authority. The church is the teacher, and teaches us, instead of our teaching her. Then we must learn what is or is not the Catholic system from her. We cannot assume the Catholic system, and from that conclude the Catholic Church, but must first ascertain the Catholic Church, and then from her conclude the Catholic system. That is, we must take the doctrine from the church, not the church from the doctrine. Now, as the Anglican Church, not being Catholic, or having nullified herself by her contradictions, has, as we have seen, no authority, what is, we repeat, the Catholic authority on which the Oxford men exclude the papacy? The primitive church, or the church in primitive ages? No; because they are obliged, as we have seen, in order not to be bound by the teaching of the church in England before the rise of Protestantism, to maintain that the present teaching of the Catholic Church is always her authoritative teaching, and must be taken as the authoritative declaration of her teaching in all past ages. If they appeal to the church in primitive times, they condemn themselves, in crediting their church in what she teaches now, rather than in what they concede she taught before the reformers.

Again; the primitive church to which Oxford men appeal either was the Catholic Church or it was not. If it was not, it had no authority to teach, and they gain nothing by the appeal. If it was, it either subsists still, or it does not. If it does not, the Catholic Church has failed, is dead, and its authority has died with it. The authority of a dead church is only a dead authority, and a dead authority is as no authority at all, and therefore cannot authorize. Consequently, if the Catholic Church is dead, the Oxford men have not and cannot have her authority for saying what is or is not the Catholic system. But if the Catholic Church still subsists, she subsists the identical church she was in the primitive ages, with the same identical authority, and the same identical doctrine she then had. We say *the same identical doctrine*; for Oxford men deny, as we do, development, and maintain that identity of doctrine is essential to the identity of the church. Is it not on this ground that they attempt to unchurch the Roman communion? Do

they not deny her Catholicity because, as they allege, she has varied her doctrines and corrupted the faith? If, then, the identical church of the primitive ages, the Catholic Church must teach to-day the identical doctrine she taught then. Then, to appeal from the Catholic Church in the present, supposing her to exist, to the Catholic Church in the past is,—1. *useless*, for there can be no difference between her present and her past teaching, and he who has her present doctrine has already her primitive doctrine, on the same authority on which the primitive believers had it; 2. *inadmissible*, because the present teaching of the church is the only possible *Catholic* authority on which we can take her primitive teaching, and to appeal to her past teaching is to appeal from the church to history, the only authority aside from her own to tell us what was her primitive teaching, which cannot be admitted, for it is agreed that the Catholic system must be taken on the authority of the church, not on the authority of history; 3. *absurd*, for it denies the authority of the church and asserts it in the same breath; since the church appealed from is identically the church appealed to, and to appeal from the church is to deny her authority, while to appeal to the church is to assert it.

Oxford men must either assert the Catholic Church as a fact, or deny it. If they assert it as a fact, if they acknowledge that there ever was a Catholic Church at all, they must concede her continuous existence in time, and therefore her present existence. Catholicity is inconceivable without unity, and Catholic unity is inconceivable without uninterrupted chronic continuance, or unity in time. The church must be one and identical in time and space, or it is not and cannot be Catholic. It is agreed that an essential attribute of the church is to teach, and to teach with supreme authority. Then at every moment of time, from the first down to us, she must have *in actu* the supreme authority to teach. Then at every moment the paramount obligation to hear her and to believe what she teaches at that moment does and must subsist. On no other condition can a Catholic Church with supreme authority to teach be conceived. Appeals from her present to her past teaching, then, can never be allowed, because her present authority is supreme, and the obligation to believe her present teaching paramount. We may appeal to history, to the records of her past teaching, *against* those who allege that she has changed her doctrines, or does not maintain identity of doctrine, but never

from her present teaching, in order to remind her of what she ought to teach, or to ascertain for ourselves what we are to believe; for this would deny her present authority, and therefore her past authority and existence. The Oxford men must, then, abandon their appeal to the primitive church, and take the Catholic system from the present Catholic Church, or deny that there is or ever was a Catholic Church. But if they do the latter, they then give up all their pretensions to be Catholics. If there is no Catholic Church, there is no Catholic system to be received or rejected, to be revived or retained. Here, then they are. If they deny the Catholic Church, all their talk about Catholicity is nonsense; if they assert her existence, they must take the Catholic system from her as she now teaches it, and hold, that, as she now teaches it, she has always taught it, and will teach it, till the consummation of the world.

But not being allowed to appeal from the Catholic Church in the present to the Catholic Church in the past, on what authority, we ask once more, do the Oxford men exclude the papacy, and declare it repugnant to the Catholic system? On the authority of the Greek Church? No; because the Greek Church is in the predicament of their own, she having in the course of her history both received the papacy and rejected it. On the authority of the Church of Rome? No; for she asserts the papacy as an essential element of the Catholic system, and it is for this reason that they condemn her. On the authority of the Holy Scriptures? No; for they reject private interpretation, and maintain that the Holy Scriptures are to be understood as interpreted by the Catholic Church. On the authority of self-will? No; for that they hold is the principle of dissent, and they have no mercy for dissenters. On the authority of the state? No; for they seek to free the church from her dependence on the state, which they could not consistently do, if they held that the state has authority to define her doctrines. On what authority, then? On none? How know they, then, that in rejecting the papacy they are not rejecting Catholicity,—the Catholic system itself? Poor men! they must be Catholics, and they will not be Romanists. To be Catholics, they must have the Catholic system, and on Catholic authority, and if they reject Rome, there is no Catholic authority to tell them what it is or is not. They cannot know what it is, unless taught by the Catholic Church, and till they know what it is, they cannot by their method tell what church is Catholic.

Yet, serious as these difficulties are, the Oxford man is not disturbed by them. He is an Oxford man and has extraordinary privileges. He has the privilege of asserting both the affirmative and the negative of the same proposition, and of substituting his own simple assertion wherever evidence or authority fails him. When he wishes to excuse the oscillations from the truth and the manifest errors of his church, he calls her a human society, and alleges that to err is human; when he would defend her against the state, save her revenues from the attacks of politicians, and silence dissenters, he asserts her Catholicity, and demands obedience to her as the church of God; and when he would justify her rejections of the papacy, and her isolation as the church of England, he can deny again her Catholicity, and assert the independence of national churches, and the right of the temporal authority to interpose to free the national church from foreign domination and to purge her of her corruptions. And why not? May not a man blow hot breath from his mouth when he would warm his fingers, and cold when he would cool his broth? Do you allege that the several doctrines he is obliged to oppose to the several classes of objectors do not stand well together, and that they are absolutely inconsistent one with another? Be it so. If they are mutually inconsistent and contradictory, that is their affair, not his. He is not, therefore, inconsistent with himself, unless in urging them he acts inconsistently with the nature of an Oxford man, which we are sure very few are so ignorant or so uncandid as to pretend.

That the church of England has no claim to Catholicity, that she cannot aspire to the honor of being even a schismatical or an heretical church, is evident enough from what we have said, and is clearly evinced from the general tone and spirit of the work before us. The things which the author contends for, and which, if practised by her, would in his opinion, make her Catholic, all exist in our church in their perfection, and have always existed there, but have been unknown in the church of England since the Protestant reformation. His Anglo-Catholicism, as far below genuine Catholicity as it actually is, is an innovation in his Establishment; it is a novelty to its members, and his imaginary Anglo-Catholics feel that it is something entirely foreign to their habitual mode of thinking and acting. They appear like a rustic who has for the first time put on a court dress. He does not know how to wear it, how to dispose of

himself in it, is tickled half to death with its finery, and struts about with a mighty high opinion of himself, feeling that he must be a great man since he has such a fine suit of clothes to his back.

We have been greatly amused with the portions of the author's work in which he describes the pious practices of his Anglo-Catholics. Things which no Catholic would think of mentioning, because it would never occur to him that any Christian could be ignorant of them, are dwelt upon at great length, and described with painful minuteness,—not because essential to the action of the piece, but because the author feels that it is necessary to instruct his church in regard to them. Nothing falls in incidentally, nothing is given by way of simple allusion, or left to be inferred from the turn of a sentence, as in Catholic writers. The hero Villiers appears before a burning house to rescue a boy who is within. He makes his way through the crowd, kneels down, crosses himself, says a short prayer, ascends a ladder, rushes through the flames, seizes the boy, descends with him, nearly suffocated, and drops on his knees, crosses himself again, returns thanks, and vanishes, to the great wonder of Anglicans at the novelty, who are sure that he must be a Papist. If the writer had been a Catholic, he would have said nothing about the crossing, praying, or thanksgiving, for he would have supposed his readers would have taken such things for granted; and if he had been describing a Catholic hero in such a case, very likely he would have said nothing about dropping on the knees, presuming that his hero would be saying his prayer while ascending the ladder, and returning thanks while descending it. The Catholic, too, though he would have prayed, would have been less attentive to the attitude in which he prayed. You would never find him laying such stress upon mere forms. Writers lay great stress upon forms only where they are neglected, or are generally unknown, or where they have nothing but forms. It is evident to the Catholic reader that the author's Anglo-Catholics have made what is to them a recent discovery. They dwell upon the simplest things with an intense interest which alternates from the tragic to the comic, and from the comic to the tragic. They are all the time praying or talking about prayer, and wondering if they really are or are not excessively happy in their new way of life. All this shows that the things which in the author's view are essential to the Catholic system are novelties in Anglicanism, and are imitated from abroad; whence we may readily conclude

that the Anglicanism of the Oxford men is only an imaginary Anglicanism, drawn not from life, displaying not the Anglican Church as she is and must be, but as they wish her to be, and are trying to make her. But, dear Oxford friends, can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots?

The hopes of the author for Anglo-Catholicism depended on its state four or five years ago. During the previous ten years he thinks much had been done to raise poor Anglicanism from her dying state. Alas! things have changed since. The hue which he took to be the hue of returning health was only the hectic flush which indicates to the skilful approaching dissolution, which raises the hopes of sympathizing friends for a moment only to dash them with deeper despair. Anglo-Catholicism is now a byword, is seldom referred to, save "to point a moral or adorn a tale." The sincere and earnest part of the Oxford men, the men who gave their movement its character, and almost sanctified it, have abandoned it, and found repose in a church already made to their hands, and which needs nothing of human tinkering to keep it from falling to ruin, or to restore it to a forgotten Catholicity. They live and labor in no imaginary *béguinage*. But they who have remained behind are forced to weep over abortive reforms. They mistook the nature of Anglicanism. She is Protestant to the core, and will follow her nature. Their efforts to change her direction have only made her Protestant soul, or rather gizzard, for soul she has none, the more apparent. The day of bright hopes for them has gone by, and a day of gloom and sullen discontent succeeds. We see it in our old friend of the *New York Churchman*. The conversion of Newman, Faber, Oakley, Ward, and others has discouraged him, and he grows pettish and ill-natured. Things have not gone to his mind in England, nor even here at home; and his hopes of bringing Rome to terms, and of being able, through some concessions on her part,—such as the permission of the clergy to marry,—to unite his communion with hers, without being obliged to confess to heresy and schism, are blasted; and he stands before the world a disappointed man, craving Catholicity, and yet too proud to embrace it, unless with the appearance of retaining his Anglicanism.

After all, the perusal of *Hawkstone* has made us sad, very sad. We cannot without sadness see men wasting so much thought, and energy, and even right feeling, in vain endeav-

ours to fill their souls with emptiness. Half the labor they expend in fruitless efforts to grasp the shadow would give them the substance. Their complete success in their attempts would give them only the empty forms of Catholicity, without the most distant approach to the reality. Let them succeed in all they undertake, and their Anglicanism would be only the ghastly and grinning skeleton decked out, as at Egyptian feasts, in festive robes, and crowned with wreaths of flowers. The author takes us, in the course of his work, frequently to his Oxford chapel. Alas! how cold and desolate we found it! The semblance of an altar was there, but no sacrifice,—the victim was wanting. The appearance of the tabernacle was there, but our Lord in his humanity as well as in his divinity was not there to speak to us and to bless us. His Glory did not fill the temple; it was no temple, it was but a Jewish synagogue since the Dispersion. We listened to the reading of the Communion Service, and saw bread and wine distributed, and we thought of the poor prodigal who had wasted his substance, sent by his master to feed swine, and craving a share of the husks with which he fed them; and we thought, too, of our Father's house, where there is bread enough and to spare, the bread of angels, whereof if a man eat, he shall never die, never hunger, never thirst. O, would they could but see themselves as we see them, and see in the blessed old church of God what we have found there! In her exists all they have not and all they need, and in a profusion, in a perfection, which exceeds their power of conception. Why seek they in this empty chapel what they can find only with us, and receive only from the hands of our pastors? Why stay they here kneeling before this painted wood and polished marble, endeavouring in vain to live by the food that perisheth? Their fathers have made this chapel desolate; they feel and bewail it. Why, then, not go to the house that was never desolate, that can never be desolate? for behold our God (*Ego sum vobiscum*) has declared that it shall be his habitation unto the consummation of the world. They are ill at ease, anxious, doubting, hoping, despairing, trying to make something out of nothing, and perpetually failing; why not seek repose in the pavilion of the Almighty, and in the arms of a loving Father? So we thought within ourselves as we stood in that Oxford chapel; but the poor worshippers continued to make their genuflections to painted wood and polished marble, and we turned away, saying to ourselves, "Ephraim is joined to his idols; let him alone."

THE CHURCH, AS IT WAS, IS, AND OUGHT TO BE.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1848.]

The Church of the Disciples is a *reformed* Unitarian church, founded in this city, in 1841, under the auspices of the late William Ellery Channing, by James Freeman Clarke, to meet the wants of the disaffected among Unitarians, or persons who thought or felt that it was time to attempt something better than the Unitarianism of such men as Worcester, Bancroft, Ware, Norton, and Dewey. It is confined to a single congregation, and not unlikely will expire with its founder. It is a sort of syncretic church, founded, as it would seem, on the principle, that the true church must meet the wants and command the assent and the love of all men, and that to do so it must receive into its bosom the peculiar views of all who *profess* to be followers of Christ, from the Catholic to the Parkerite. The aim of the church is, not to exclude error, but to include truth; and if it take in all doctrines, whether true or false, it will have all truth, if also all error! The founder, it will be seen at a glance, is a prudent man, and a profound philosopher.

The Discourse before us was delivered at the dedication of a very neat and pretty chapel, which the Church of the Disciples has recently erected, by its founder and pastor. The text is St. Matt. xvi. 18,—"On this rock will I build my church,"—and the design is to set forth the necessity there was of founding a new church, and also the principles on which it was proper to found it. The author considers the church—what he means by the church it is not easy to say—as it was, as it is, as it ought to be, historically, critically, and prospectively,—thus assuming, by turns, the character of the historian, the critic, and the prophet. His subject, he tells us, "becomes more and more interesting every year."

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* *The Church,—as it was, as it is, as it ought to be. A Discourse delivered at the Dedication of the Chapel built by the Church of the Disciples, March 15, 1848.* By James F. Clarke, Pastor of the Church. Boston: 1848.

"The tendency of the age draws our minds toward it; for in all things the present century tends toward union, harmony, synthesis, as plainly as the last century tended to division, individualism, analysis. We see this in the material world, in those inventions which make the inhabitants of the Atlantic coast a neighbour to the dweller on the Andes. We notice it in science, in the universal disposition to look at the analogies and harmonies of the universe, and to trace one plan running through the thousandfold varieties of nature. In industrial life we seek for Combined Labor, where formerly Division of Labor was the watchword. So in religion, the Church Question, that is, the question of *Christian Union and Co-operation*, is beginning to have an especial interest. Men are growing weary of an excessive Individualism. They feel the loneliness of a merely independent thought and action. They say with the poet,—

'Me this unchartered freedom tires.'

"They feel also the need of sympathy and support under the responsibilities of life. So some would turn back to a Mother Church, and sit at her feet, and rest their overstrained conscience by accepting duties from her hands, instead of seeking them for themselves. They find a pleasure in limits instead of liberty. Others, again, taking up this *Church Question*, on the other side, seeking a larger union than that of any existing denomination, would make a new church out of the whole human race. All Christian churches which exist are so inadequate, that they will not allow that they are even *steps*, by which to reach a better, but regard them rather as impediments and stumbling-blocks, to be removed as soon as possible."—pp. 4, 5.

The fact, that "the church question" is every year attracting more and more the attention of thoughtful men, is undeniable; but that this question is simply the question of "Christian union and co-operation" is not quite so certain. Prior to the question of union and co-operation among Christians is the question, how, on what conditions, by what agencies, men are to become Christians. No one is a Christian by natural birth, or can be one, unless born again, spiritually regenerated. Men must be Christians before they can unite and co-operate, and the church question, we had supposed, is the question as to the necessity and office, or, in a word, the mission, of the church in making them Christians, —in imparting to them the Christian life, and furnishing them with the requisite means to live it. This is the important question. Union and co-operation can never be wanting among Christians, if truly Christians, and plans and measures for their union and co-operation are superfluous. All we want is good Christians, and if we have them, there

is no further question. Is the church indispensable to the birth, growth, and training of Christians, or is she not? This is "the church question."

The following is Mr. Clarke's exposition of his text, which, if not ingenious, is at least original.

"Jesus is reported to have referred to a church, *by name*, only on two occasions,—once when speaking of difficulties between brethren, when he says, 'Tell it to the church'; and again in our text. Here he places the confession of Peter,—the deep conviction which Peter had and uttered, that his Master was God's Christ; he places this as the solid foundation on which *his church* should rest. He therefore believed that his disciples were about to constitute an association,—a united body, whose principle of union would be faith in him; and his prophetic mind looked down the far distances of the future, and saw this association deepening its roots and spreading abroad its branches until the birds of the air—the wandering and homeless spirits—should find a home in it." —p. 5.

The rock is not Peter, nor the truth which Peter professed, but Peter's subjective conviction that "his Master was God's Christ." This original interpretation is necessary to be maintained. If Peter is the rock, the Catholic Church is the only church to be admitted; if the truth Peter professed is the rock, the church must be built, whoever the builder, on the *truth*,—on the proper divinity of our Lord,—and then it must exclude all error, and all who deny that divinity, and, consequently, the Church of the Disciples and its founder. It was necessary to make the rock subjective conviction, that is, not the truth itself, but men's views of it, or it would be absurd to include within the church doctrines and opinions which contradict one another, and are incapable of being harmonized.

The ordinary reading of the text makes our Lord the builder. "Thou art Peter, and on this rock will *I* build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." But Mr. Clarke corrects this reading, and tells us that it should read, "Thou art Peter, and on this rock I *believe* my disciples are about to constitute an association, and I foresee that in this association wandering and homeless spirits will find a home." Mr. Clarke could not give any other interpretation to the text, without condemning himself and his associates; for if he should acknowledge that our Lord builds the church, he would be bound, in order to be his disciple, to join that church, instead of building one for himself on his own convictions or fancies. Consistency re-

quires him to maintain, that not the Master, but the disciple, is the builder. The Scriptures may teach the reverse, but what of that? What is the value of private interpretation, if we may not interpret the Scriptures to suit ourselves? What is the use of liberty, if we are not free to explain the authorities on which we rely in harmony with our doctrines? If our authorities are against us, is it not a proof that they are wrong? Would you have us convict the Scriptures of error? Then you must permit us to explain them in accordance with our own convictions. Do you hint that these convictions may be wrong? What! the founder of the Church of the Disciples be wrong? If his convictions are erroneous, he has no moral right to entertain them. Would you deny him the right to his own convictions, that is, a man's right to his own, and thus trample on the inalienable rights of the mind? Perish the thought! Therefore,—

"Instead of asking whether Jesus founded a church, ask whether he did not evidently foresee that his disciples would unite together in an association, the object of which should be to spread his gospel from land to land. This question is easily answered,—answered by his sending them out two and two, by his parables of the mustard-seed, and of the net, and by a multitude of his discourses. Jesus foresaw that this would be the case, he intended that it should be the case,—for such an association was a necessary means to his end, and such an association lay as a necessity in the very nature of the gospel."—pp. 5, 6.

Mr. Clarke, as making the church the work of the disciples, who found it on their own convictions, makes the church subsequent to its members.

"And when it came, it came as a necessity. The apostles and disciples did not found a church, but they found themselves in a church. They were driven together by outward persecution,—they were drawn together by an inward impulse. Read the first chapters of the Book of Acts and see how the church of Christ was formed. Those disciples and women who had attended Jesus in his journeys, and constituted his family, *kept together* after his resurrection. One great thought filled all their minds, one commanding truth ruled their lives. They had known Jesus, and the memory of his life and truth filled to overflowing their intellect; the influence of his wonderful character was stamped upon theirs for ever. Another and more mysterious influence had changed them inwardly,—had given them courage for cowardice,—heroism for weakness,—a commanding eloquence in place of a stammering timidity, '*We cannot but speak of the things that we have seen and heard.*' Herein

lay the necessity of the church. The church at first was an *Ecclesia docens* very literally, a missionary church altogether, a church devoted in every member and person to preaching Christ, the Saviour, the Redeemer of men.

"Men under the law of such a necessity as this must keep together, must work in union,—how could it be otherwise? Gathered out of a social life composed of the hard bigotry of the Pharisee, the cold skepticism of the Sadducee, or the desperate sensuality of heathenism,—and finding within their souls such a faith in an entire salvation from sin,—a new life of love,—free, earnest, ennobling,—having such a sympathy, and such a common aim,—here was laid the basis of the most noble friendship. Well might each repeat to the rest what Christ had said to them all: 'Behold my mother and my brethren. For whosoever will do the will of God, the same is my mother and sister and brother.'"—pp. 6, 7.

Our readers must not be startled at the assertion here that "the apostles and disciples did not found a church." They must not expect the author to be consistent with himself, or careful to make it appear that our Lord did not err when he believed his "disciples were about to constitute an association." His meaning probably is, that, although in point of fact they did constitute an association, it was not voluntarily, intentionally, but from the pressure of outward and inward necessity. The point, however, to be noted is, that the disciples living the Christian life precede the church, and the church, instead of being necessary to the generation and support of that life, is merely its effect. The church, then, derives its life from the union of its members; not its members theirs from union with it!

But the founder of the Church of the Disciples proceeds on the principle, that no view is to be excluded. Hence he says:—

"The favorite idea with the first Christians of the work of the church was this: that it was to replace Christ's body,—it was to be the earthly body by which his ascended spirit should still speak, teach, and act in the world, still heal the sick, raise the dead, cast out devils, and bless mankind. Every Christian was a living member of this body while in communion with the rest, and his life was received from Christ,—'he lived by faith in the Son of God.' The Lord's Supper was the bond of union and brotherhood. 'The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ? For we, being many, are one bread and one body, for we all are partakers of that *one* bread.' Hence the argument for mutual toleration. As the foot and hand and eye and tongue have each a different office, yet all are necessary to the integrity of the

body so may the various tendencies of character and opinion among Christians be controlled toward a common aim by that living faith in Christ which is the principle of life in all."—pp. 7, 8.

This, if it means any thing, means the reverse of what preceded it. "Every Christian was a living member of this body while in communion with the rest, and his life was received from Christ"; that is, the Christian receives his life from Christ through communion with his body. This makes the body anterior to the members, and supposes the members live by virtue of their union with the body; which is according to analogy. The human body does not receive its life from its members, but they receive theirs from their union with it; and instead of their union with each other constituting the body, they are *members* only by virtue of their union with the body. If Mr. Clarke regards the church as the *body* of Christ, through which Christ is received, he must conceive it as preceding its members, and them as of it, not it as of them,—a totally different doctrine from the one he began by laying down. But if the members are of the body and it not of them, how can it be maintained that the disciples form, found, or constitute it? By what right do the disciples undertake to form a church of their own, instead of uniting themselves to the body of Christ? Again, if we live by communion with the body of Christ, which is that body? Is it any body calling itself the body of Christ? If not, what are the marks by which it is to be discerned? Does it still exist? If so, why found a new church? If not, if it has failed, what do you make of the promise that the gates of hell should not prevail against it? We forget, —the promises of Christ are of no authority with our friend, unless for him; and he proceeds on the principle, that of contraries both may be true,—a new logical discovery!

Thus much for the origin and foundation of the church. The author now proceeds to the criticism of the church as it was and as it is.

"Such was the church of Christ at first,—simple in its organization, noble in its aim, full of a profound life and an immense energy. Its only creed was faith in Christ. Its organization was flexible, enlarging as its wants were multiplied. It was a living, loving, and working church.

"Now let us pass on. Many centuries go by, and instead of that simple body of earnest believers, we now find an immense and consolidated organization—a powerful hierarchy—spread through many lands, but bound together by the cohesive attraction belonging to a sacred order

of persons. It had noble cathedrals, every stone of which was carved with reverence, and laid with religious awe.

> 'The hand that rounded Peter's dome,
> And groined the aisles of Christian Rome,
> Wrought in a sad sincerity.
> Himself from God he could not free.
> He builded better than he knew;
> The conscious stone to beauty grew.'

So that we repeat to-day, in these our edifices, the ideas of those Mediæval Christians; and until we can build something to express the Christian ideas of our own age, we cannot do better than repeat theirs. This church had a solemn ritual, adapted to every part of human life. It met the new-born babe at its entrance into the world, washed from its brow the taint of hereditary evil, and placed those tender feet in the way of salvation. It blessed the marriage vow of love, and invested the earthly tie with the sanctity of a diviner meaning. It opened its solemn Cathedrals, as sanctuaries for the sinner,—it opened a listening ear for the confessions of the penitent, and gave him pardon,—it gave in the Eucharist a present God as food for the soul,—it brought to the sick-bed a sacred comfort, touched the forehead of the dying with the sign of safety,—it laid the dead in a consecrated grave. Did youth grow sick of youthful folly, did the maiden long for more than a virgin sanctity,—it opened its religious houses, where in the calm pursuits of piety life might move upward as it moved onward,—upward toward an eternal joy. Thus beneficent and tender toward its children, the church was awful in its rebuke of the tyrant and the oppressor. It planted its foot on the neck of the despot, and restrained him whom no other force could check. It collected libraries, and opened schools, and taught sciences to a barbarous people, and stood a beacon light of knowledge in a benighted age. Such was the aspect of the Christian Church in its second principal epoch."—pp. 9–11.

One would naturally think that a church of which all this is to be said might escape condemnation. "It met the new-born babe at its entrance into the world, washed from its brow the taint of hereditary evil, and placed those tender feet in the way of salvation." It, then, had all things necessary to salvation. What, then, did it lack?

"For many centuries this great organization was the efficient instrument of spreading Christian truth through the world. Never realizing its Idea, it often approached it; and its essential defects long lay concealed. But at last it appeared that the Catholic Church, in working out the formula, 'Many members, but one body,' had caused the unity of the body to oppress and destroy the individuality of the members. The Catholic Church in attaining union had lost freedom. And with the

loss of individual freedom also went sincerity and depth of intellectual and moral life. Force and fraud usurped the office of reason. The *teaching church*, instead of convincing men of the truth of its doctrines, cheated them into an outward conformity, or burnt them at the stake for a sincere utterance of their unbelief. Outward pomp and power took more and more the place of inward piety and love. All felt that something was wrong,—none knew how the wrong was to be righted. Then God sent the reformation, as he sends a storm to purify a stagnant and corrupting atmosphere."—p. 11.

Did not the church realize her ideal in her saints? If she did not realize it in all men, was it her fault, or the fault of those who refused to yield her obedience and to use the means she supplied? But "the unity of the body oppressed and destroyed the individuality of the members." We would ask the proof of this assertion, but the founder of the Church of the Disciples is not much accustomed to deal in proofs, and he would most likely treat our demand with silent contempt. As some persons have asserted it, he of course must accept it, or there would be one view excluded by his church, which is bound to include *all* views. But is it not a little remarkable, that, if the church was as good as he represents her, she should have behaved so improperly, and done such naughty things? Only think of a church that meets the infant on his entrance into the world, cleanses him from hereditary guilt, and places him in the way of salvation,—a church "beneficent and tender towards its children," "awful in its rebuke of the tyrant and the oppressor," "planting its foot on the neck of the despot, and restraining him whom no other force could check," "blessing the marriage vow, and investing the earthly tie with a diviner meaning," listening to "the confessions of the penitent, and giving him pardon," "giving in the Eucharist *a present God as food for the soul*," "bringing to the sick-bed a sacred comfort," "touching the forehead of the dying with the sign of *safety*," and opening religious houses where "life might move upward toward an eternal joy,"—only think of such a church oppressing and destroying the individuality of its members, wanting sincerity and depth of intellectual and moral life, suffering "force and fraud to usurp the office of reason," cheating men into mere "outward conformity," and substituting "outward pomp and power" for "inward piety and love"! Does a good tree bring forth corrupt fruit? Or has the founder of the Church of the Disciples interpreted history as he does the Scriptures,—to suit the exigencies of his theory?

"But at last it appeared that the Catholic Church, in working out the formula, 'Many members, but one body,' had caused the unity of the body to oppress and destroy the individuality of the members." *Appeared.* When? Where? To whom? *Appeared.* But was it so in reality? *Appeared.* Is it certain that it did so appear, and not rather that men have said it so appeared, because they wanted some pretext for their hostility to the church, and could not devise a better?

"The teaching church, instead of convincing men of the truth of its doctrines, cheated them into an outward conformity, or burnt them at the stake for a sincere utterance of their unbelief." This, if asserted of Protestants, is true enough,—but if of the Catholic Church, it is false; for she has never done any such thing. If she is the church of God, as she must be, if what Mr. Clarke says in her favor be true, her teaching is the highest conceivable reason for believing, and if men are not convinced by the highest reason, the supreme reason itself, the fault is their own. Sincerity in unbelief, where the truth is taught, or the unbeliever has, if he chooses to use them, ample means of ascertaining it, is impossible, and the unbelief marks only a cracked head or a rotten heart. The church, as Mr. Clarke concedes, believed and taught the truth, all the truth necessary to salvation. Which, then, was in the wrong, she in insisting on it, or the unbeliever in obstinately denying it, in reviling it, trampling it under his feet, and doing all in his power to establish the dominion of falsehood, and therefore of slavery and death?

Mr. Clarke and his friends, aware of the absurdity of the old charges against the church, dwell much on her unfavorable influence on individual freedom. But the church, if what she professed to be, that is, the church of God, taught and commanded by divine authority, and therefore could not oppress or destroy any freedom, individual or social. Who dares accuse Almighty God of tyranny and oppression? Her authority was legitimate, and obedience to legitimate authority is not incompatible with freedom, but, in fact, is its essential characteristic. The objection brought is, then, a mere begging of the question. You must dispossess the church of her legitimacy, of her divine commission, and prove her to be but a human institution, like your own Church of the Disciples, before you can allege that her acts were tyrannical and oppressive.

But the fault of the church, in the eyes of the founder of the Church of the Diciples, is, we presume, that she insists on consistency, and does not acknowledge the moral right of mortals to give the lie to their Creator, that she does not accept the logic which teaches that of contraries both may be true, and refuses to assert the right of her children to disobey her commands, to break away from her communion, and set up new churches according to their own fancies, to revile the church of Christ, and found the church of the Disciples. As a Catholic, Mr. Clarke could not have founded a church of his own, built on his own creed, speculations, wild fancies, or even deep convictions, but would have been bound to demean himself as an humble member of the church founded by Almighty God on eternal and immutable truth. But not to have the liberty to found a church for one's self, to draw up its creed, and establish its liturgy, is to be deprived of individual freedom; and as Catholicity undeniably does not allow this, it is undeniable that she oppresses and destroys individual freedom! Here is her offence. But will the founder of the Church of the Disciples be so good as to inform us how and where he finds his right to found a church of his own, and call it *Christian?* Will he show us where, in revelation or in reason, he finds his patent as a churchmonger?

So much for the church which was; now for the church that is, or Protestantism.

"In the Protestant Church the principal of individual conscience, personal freedom, and independent religious life again found its utterance. The idea of individual responsibility was revived, and with it came a new moral life,—pure and healthy as the breezes which sweep over the hills on an October morning. This idea was salt, to save the world from corruption. The Protestant reformation was as necessary to renew the moral life of mankind, as Christianity was at first. Without Christianity, the world was going to ruin. Without the reformation, the church was going to ruin.

"I know the defects of Protestantism. They are apparent. In working out the formula, 'Many members, but one body,' Protestantism saves the variety of the members, but loses the unity of the body. *In attaining Freedom, it loses Union.* Hence narrowness, ultraism, bigotry, sectarianism. Hence weakness and inefficiency in every part, according to the law, that 'if one member suffers, all suffer,'—if one member is isolated, and rejected from the communion of the rest, the life of all is weakened and impaired; for each need all, and all need each.

"These evils are now seen and felt by all Protestants. All feel that

our disunion will be sooner or later our destruction. Various remedies are proposed, most of them sufficiently superficial. The most common is the sectarian prescription,—'Let all other sects join mine,—all other denominations be merged in mine.' This we need not dwell upon. It is not only impossible for all Protestant denominations to be merged in one, but if it could be, it would bring only a swifter destruction. If the whole body were the eye, where were the hearing? Nor need we dwell on such shallow devices as the Evangelical Alliance. Two main tendencies have resulted from the divisions of Protestantism; one, a backward tendency toward Romanism,—the other, a forward tendency toward a yet greater individualism."—pp. 11–13,

Protestantism "in attaining freedom loses union." Catholicity failed by excess of union, Protestantism by excess of liberty; neither knew how to hit the exact medium, and to harmonize union with liberty, or liberty with union. This delicate point is left for the founder of the Church of the Disciples, who combines in himself all the science and wisdom of the Catholic and Protestant worlds, and more too. It is amusing to see a right-down hearty egotist, who does not hesitate to set himself up against the whole world, and to tell them that he knows more than they all put together. Indeed, such a man falls only "one step" short of the sublime.

That Protestantism loses union is no doubt true, but that it ever attains to freedom may be denied. Every man who has been a Protestant, and has had sense enough to understand his position, knows full well that Protestantism is subversive of all freedom, individual, social, religious, and moral. Nothing can be more galling than the slavery to which Protestantism everywhere subjects both the mind and the heart of its votaries. The day the Protestant becomes a Catholic is the day of his emancipation. It is then, and then only, that his fetters are knocked off, the collar removed from his neck, and he is permitted to feel himself a free man. All this, no doubt, is unintelligible to our author; yet it is none the less true on that account. But Protestantism has failed; its friends feel that their present position is untenable. What shall they do? Some of them are for going back to Rome, others forward to greater individualism. Of the tendency of the former the author says:—

"In individual instances, where our friends and acquaintances join the Romish Church, there may be reason either to be glad of it or to grieve. If they join the church of Rome because they need its peculiar influence for their own good, if, never having found peace in Christ else-

where, they do find it there, ought we not to rejoice in such a result? Why should we doubt that some minds are better fitted to find a personal union with God by the methods of the Catholic Church than by any other? But there are other cases, for which we may well grieve, in which these methods are accepted as substitutes for an interior faith, and a partisan rancor and proselytizing zeal are the bitter evidences of their wilfulness. In such cases the proselyte is made tenfold more a child of hell than before. The sense of truth is blunted, the conscience is seared, and the inward eye closed against the sight of God and the Saviour."—p. 13.

The latter class described here, we presume, is intended to take in such converts as devote themselves in earnest to the propagation of Catholicity, and have no toleration for false and heretical systems of doctrine or belief. These must needs appear to the author to be animated by "a partisan rancor and proselytizing zeal" quite objectionable. But how can the church, if obnoxious to the charges he brings against her, supply for any class of persons the most appropriate and successful methods of finding "personal union with God"? Has not the author solemnly assured us that the church "oppresses and destroys the individuality of her members," that she "loses freedom," that she wants "sincerity and depth of moral life," that in her "force and fraud usurp the office of reason," that she cheats men "into an outward conformity," and substitutes "outward pomp and power" for "inward piety and love"? How, then, can he say, that some minds "need its peculiar influence for their own good," find in it a "peace in Christ" which they do not find elsewhere, and "are better fitted to find a personal union with God by [its] methods than by any other"? If his charges are true, the Catholic Church is the church of the devil; and are we to hold that a portion of mankind need the church of the devil, "the synagogue of Satan," as the means of attaining to personal union with God? It strikes us as absurd, after having brought such serious charges against the church, to admit that she is or can be necessary or useful unto salvation for anybody. To our old-fashioned way of reasoning, the admission surrenders the charges.

But "the main tendency toward Romanism [Catholicity] must be regarded as only an eddy in the stream of the church's progress. Rome has tried its experiment—and failed." (p. 13.) The Protestant churches cannot go back to her. The tendency to greater individualism is natural,

has much to excuse it, but upon the whole is not to be encouraged. "The churches have not been without their useful action." "The need of church union, church action, is rooted in man's nature." (p. 18.) What, then, shall our Protestants do? They cannot go back; they must not go forward; and to stand still where they are is death. What shall they do?

"This brings us to the third and last division of our Discourse, which is Prospective. *The Church as it is to be.* What will be the elements of the *Church of the Future?*

"We have asserted that our Protestant Churches cannot go back to Romanism, nor forward into Individualism and No-Churchism. Nor can they remain where they are, in their present state of division and opposition. Sooner or later they must come together. The *Church of the Future* must therefore be a *comprehensive church,* taking into itself as independent but harmonizing elements all the tendencies which now appear embodied in separate sects. But they cannot unite on any narrow ground, nor upon any compromise or concession of their particular ideas. They must become large enough to admit, each its own limitations, each to confess its own narrowness, each to own a peculiar excellence in the others which may meet and supply its own deficiency. They must understand the deep meaning of the apostolic idea—'Many members, one body.' They must believe in Providence, and if a movement comes, bending the minds of men in one direction, as the ripe wheat bends before the breeze, they must accept in this movement a Providential meaning, instead of rejecting it as a new outbreak of heresy. They must be able to distinguish such a movement, coming spontaneously and universally, from the effects of human wilfulness, brought about by artificial combinations and manœuvres."—pp. 19, 20.

This answer puzzles us. Protestants must, it seems, come together; but in what direction are they to move in order to come together? They must not go backward or forward, for the one would bring them to Rome, and the other would carry them into greater individualism, already too great. Shall they move sideways, to the right hand or to the left? But what save a yawning gulf is on either side? Nothing remains, but to sink lower or to rise higher. But surely they are low enough already, and it is difficult to imagine for them, at present, a "lower deep." But if they are to rise higher, how are they to overcome the natural gravitation which keeps them on their present level, or must, if not overcome, however high they may spring up by a sudden jump, always bring them down to it? It would gratify us much to be enlightened on these points.

Our readers must bear in mind, that the problem the author seeks to solve is not, as they might naturally suppose, the problem of salvation. When he tells us Rome has failed and Protestantism has also failed, he has no thought of telling us that either has proved insufficient as a means of eternal salvation. Any religion, or none, suffices for the world to come. The failure is solely in relation to this life, in reference to our proper social organization and comfortable subsistence here. The nineteenth century is too enlightened to entertain the old doctrines of judgment and hell, or to trouble itself with any apprehensions about the future. The atheist Shelley and the saintly Fénelon will as a matter of course fare alike. This century will never believe that God will reward the saint and damn the man of genius or talent, however the latter may abuse his gifts. The problem is simply, How to organize mankind so as to secure on the one hand unity, and on the other liberty, or, more practically, How to govern men without ever restraining them.

Catholicity, it is said, secured the unity, but lost the freedom; Protestantism secures the liberty, but loses the unity. How to secure the one without losing the other is now the question, and a question which, it is assumed, has never yet been answered. The author of the Discourse, who appears to take it for granted that he contains in himself all the wisdom of Catholicity and Protestantism, besides a wisdom surpassing both, undertakes to answer this question, and answers it in what he calls the church of the future, that is, a church which is not yet, but is to be, and is to have a flexibility, a power of contraction and expansion, which will adapt it to all the future exigencies of the race. But what is to be the principle of this church of the future? It is, as far as we can collect, that all errors are to be tolerated for the sake of the truths they contain. The world has hitherto gone wrong, made a capital mistake; it has not only sought truth, but it has been intolerant of error. It has supposed it desirable to have truth without mixture of falsehood, and has therefore sought to exclude error from its systems, which has necessarily led to the exclusion of those wedded to the error. Hence these were not left free to follow their own convictions. This capital mistake must be corrected. All systems, however erroneous, contain each an element of truth, and it is for the sake of that element that each is embraced and defended. The true way is to

accept all systems, whether true or false, each with all its peculiarities, and it is only in this way that we can expect all men to come together; for "they cannot unite on any narrow ground, nor upon any compromise or concession of their particular ideas." The sects "must become large enough to admit each its own limitations, each to confess its own narrowness, each to own a peculiar excellence in the others, which may meet and supply its own deficiency." It is clear from this that the church of the future is to accept and retain all systems, true or false, which mankind have adopted, and each with all its peculiarities.

But this is possible only on condition that the several systems or religions of mankind are only so many particulars under one and the same universal, and therefore, without giving up any thing essential to them, resolvable into a higher unity, as all men may be resolved into one man in humanity. But this is not the fact. These religions are mutually contradictory, and it is an essential property of each to exclude all but itself. The Protestant denies what the Catholic asserts; the Unitarian asserts the contrary of what is asserted by the Trinitarian. Where is the general doctrine in which the views of both parties can be harmonized? Every religious system is a general system, on the plane of the highest conceivable unity, and if it is not permitted to exist as a general system, it is not permitted to exist at all. How, then, can all exist together, each in its essential character, without excluding the others?

The sect, it seems, is to recognize its own limitations, confess its own narrowness, and to become large enough to find an excellence in the others to supply its own deficiency. When this occurs, will it retain its peculiarities, its "particular ideas," its limitations, narrowness, and deficiency? Of course not. Then it loses itself in the union of the whole, and you have union without variety,—the very objection you bring against Catholicity. Moreover, by what agency or process are your sects to become large enough to change their nature, and no longer exclude one another, but each embrace the others as its complement, and this, too, without any compromise or concession? Even suppose the resolution of all into a higher unity to be conceivable in itself, how is it to be practically effected, with only what each now is and has? Equals from equals, if we have not forgotten our arithmetic, give zero for remainder.

Let it be, again, that each sect has an element of truth,

yet, inasmuch as it is a sect, it holds this element in a false light, in false relations, and therefore combined with falsehood. Truth combined with falsehood is truth corrupted, that is, error. The characteristic of each sect is, therefore, its peculiar error. To gather all, with their distinctive characters, with their peculiar or particular ideas, into the church of the future, is not to found that church on universal truth, but on the agglomerated errors of all the world. It would then be founded, not on the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, but on error, all error, and nothing but error. Was it the fault of the church "as it was" that it professed to build on truth,—pure, unmixed, universal truth?—and is it the merit of the church "as it ought to be" that it is to build avowedly on error?

But enough. Nobody disputes that mankind never embrace systems which are purely and absolutely false, or that every system, however erroneous it may be, contains or turns on some element of truth, which the true church must acknowledge and integrate in her teaching. That Protestantism, for instance, is an attempt to realize a truth, a great truth, if you will, nobody is silly enough to deny; but it does not follow from this that Protestantism has a truth that Catholicity has not. Protestantism may attempt to realize a truth already realized in the church, and the reason why it attempts to realize it out of the church may be that it has corrupted it, and turned it, by the false relations in which it holds it, into an error. Strip the doctrine of its false clothing, it may be true, and in the only relations in which it can be true, it may be held by the church. We know, you assume that the reformers broke away from the church because they had attained to a truth which she would not suffer them to maintain in her communion; but it may be that what they called a truth was a truth corrupted, and that she forbade them to maintain it in her communion, not because she rejected the truth, but because she could not tolerate the corruption. If so, Protestantism, instead of proving the defects of Catholicity, proves only the ignorance, the error, or the malice of Protestants. The church, notwithstanding the element you find in Protestantism, may still have all truth, in its unity and integrity.

Mr. Clarke assumes that each sect has a special element of truth, which it is its mission to realize, and concludes, therefore, that all sects are necessary for the realization of the whole truth. Would it not be more correct to say that each

sect has a special element of truth, which it is its mission to corrupt? Every sect holds what truth it has out of its unity and integrity, otherwise it would not be a sect; but truth so held is error, truth corrupted. All the sects, then, are necessary, not to realize the whole truth, but to corrupt it, and the history of the several Christian sects, from the early Ebionites and Gnostics down to those of Mr. Clarke and Mr. Parker, shows that they have successively attacked and corrupted every article in the symbol from the *In Patrem Omnipotentem* to the *Vitam æternam*, and developed every possible form of error.

Taking his view of the mission of the sects, Mr. Clarke supposes, that, in order to get the whole truth, it is necessary to collect from each its special element of truth; for he denies the existence of any church which embraces the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. But the idea of making up the true religion from the aggregate of false or erroneous religions strikes us as worthy only of the enlightened men and women of the nineteenth century. The true religion must have existed in its unity and integrity before it could have existed in a divided state; for truth is older than error, unless the universe originated in falsehood. But supposing it were true that it exists now only in fragments, scattered hither and thither through all the various sects and parties which divide mankind, where is the diligent Isis to go forth on her painful search, to collect these disjected members of the torn body of Osiris, and to mould them anew into a complete, harmonious, living, and *prolific* whole? What mortal man who has not already the whole truth is able to do it? And who, if he could succeed in collecting all the fragments, has the plastic power to reunite them, and endow the restored body with life and fecundity?

The error is not in supposing that the various sects revolve each around a special view of truth, but in supposing that truth is divided out among them, and that it nowhere exists in its unity and integrity, as a living whole. The search, if necessary, would be unsuccessful,—for poor Isis did not succeed, and the moral of the fable should not be unheeded. Truth, once torn and dissevered, can never be recovered or restored, save by the God of truth himself. But the truth has never been so torn and dispersed. We challenge Mr. Clarke or any one else to name, himself being judge, a single truth or excellence in a sect, which we can-

not show him integrated in the doctrine and discipline of the Catholic Church, and harmonized with all else that he will concede to be true or excellent. The problem which tortures him, and which no man, nor all men together, can solve, namely, How to reconcile association with individuality, the unity of the body with the freedom of the members, faith with reason, authority with freedom, is solved in our church, and is no problem for us. If we, as Catholics, do not trouble our heads with such problems, if we do not appear to set any very high value on the truth or excellence supposed to be possessed by the world without, it is not because we are so stupid as not to be aware of them, nor because we are too narrow-minded and bigoted to acknowledge truth and excellence, wherever we find them; but because Almighty God has himself solved the problems for us, and because we know that whatever truth or excellence there may be without, it can be at best but a pale reflection of that within,—a feeble copy of the rich and glowing originals in our possession.

These poor Protestants, who think themselves so mighty wise, these founders of new churches, who fancy that they have surpassed in knowledge all the world, because they have learned a few things they did not know in their own infancy, would find, if they were able to understand, that we commence, in the catechism, the instruction of our children at a point far in advance of the most advanced post they, with all their progress, have yet attained to. Our very children would compassionate their ignorance, could they but comprehend it. Even the old pagan philosophers would look down upon them with pity or contempt. Poor men! they have fallen so far below the ordinary Christian understanding, that they cannot comprehend the simplest Christian instructions; and are raving, and tearing, and foaming, and sweating, and exhausting themselves in vain to find out what they may read in the first two questions and answers in the child's catechism, and to found what God himself founded ages ago, which still exists, and will exist till time is no more. Simple souls! do they suppose we are such fools as not to know all they tell us,—that we need to be taught what lies on the mere surface of things? Ah! if they could but for one moment conceive how ridiculous they appear in their pretensions, to men who have been taught by a MASTER, they would not know where to hide themselves.

THE CHRISTIAN EXAMINER'S DEFENCE.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1850.]

THE number of *The Christian Examiner*—the literary and theological organ of the American Unitarians—for March last contains an attempted defence of no-churchism, in reply to our article on *The Church against No-Church.*† The author of the defence is James Freeman Clarke, founder of the Church of the Disciples, formerly one of the conductors of a monthly magazine called *The Western Messenger*, and is known to our readers as the author of the remarkable discourse on *The Church, as it was, as it is, and as it ought to be.*

The defence is not very remarkable for its solidity, and, though here and there a little clever, does not appear to us worthy of the high intellectual character aimed at by *The Christian Examiner.* If it were not for the esteem in which we have been accustomed to hold that periodical, as the organ of our old associates, and the possibility that some weak-minded persons might mistake the motive of our silence, we should pass it by unnoticed. Its author is not a man we should choose for our opponent, for we always wish for an opponent one who has some powers of discrimination, and some capacity to feel the force of an argument. But we have no choice in the case, and if the Unitarians are willing to make him their champion, and to risk their cause in his hands, we must accept him, and dispose of him as best we may.

The defence consists of two parts. The first is an enumeration and philosophical explanation of the various and extraordinary changes we are said to have undergone; the second repeats, without our answers, some of the objections we have from time to time raised against ourselves and refuted. The first part is the more racy, and appears to have been written *con amore.* It has one or two clever hits, but, unhappily, the more *piquant* portion is untrue, and the rest

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†Vol. V., p. 331.

has been repeated so often in conversation and the public press, that it has an ancient smell, more likely to disgust than delight its readers. The story of our changes is an old story, not worth reproducing, even with variations. Who has not been told, that we were formerly in the habit of changing our views, and refuting ourselves, once a quarter? The explanation of our changes suggested by Mr. Clarke is, no doubt, ingenious, but it reminds us of the joke which Charles II. of England played off upon the learned members of the Royal Society, and it might be classed with D'Israeli's chapter on *The History of Events that never happened*. However, the author must be permitted to speak for himself.

"We intend to speak in this present article of Mr. Brownson, and of his argument for the Roman Church. Mr. Brownson is an active thinker, an energetic writer, and a man who has assumed an important position in American literature by years of steady labor. He has devoted himself during that time to the highest questions of philosophy, ethics, and theology, and has treated none of these subjects in a superficial or common place way. He has also belonged for a time, after a fashion of his own, to our communion. He has repeatedly created sensations by his ultraism on several subjects, and he finally astonished our community by going over from extreme neology and transcendentalism to Romanism of the most ultramontane kind. Since then, he has occasionally addressed some arguments to his old friends, in behalf of his new church. He has sometimes referred to our own periodical; and in April, 1845, addressed us, in a somewhat elaborate argument, inviting us to become members of the church of Rome, or to show cause why we reject the invitation.

"For all these reasons, it would seem proper that we should take some notice of his writings. When a man of no mean abilities assumes such a position, it seems proper for a journal like ours to consider it. And, indeed, we should probably have weighed his arguments long before this time, had we not been expecting a reply from an abler hand, —namely, from Mr. Brownson himself. We thought it hardly worth while to exert our ingenuity in exposing the fallacy of arguments, which, judging by experience, Mr. Brownson would himself be ready to confute in the course of a year or two. No man has ever equalled Mr. Brownson in the ability with which he has refuted his own arguments. He has made the most elaborate and plausible plea for eclecticism, and the most elaborate and plausible plea against it. He has said the best things in favor of transcendentalism, and the best things against it. He has shown that no man can possibly be a Christian, except he is a transcendentalist; and he has also proved that every transcendentalist, whether he knows it or not, is necessarily an infidel. He has satis-

factorily shown the truth of socialism, and its necessity in order to bring about a golden age; and he has, by the most convincing arguments, demonstrated that the whole system of socialism is from the pit, and can lead to nothing but anarchy and ruin. *He has defended the course of Mr. Dorr in Rhode Island, and argued before a crowd in State Street, in this city, that the people of Massachusetts should aid him in taking possession of the government by force.* Afterwards, he confuted the whole argument of Mr. Dorr, showing it to be hostile to all true democracy, and fatal, if it should succeed, to republican institutions. In 1841 he defended Theodore Parker, and declared him to be a Christian, in an article on Mr. Parker's Discourse at South Boston; asserting that he was guilty of no heresy, but only of defects, in his view of Jesus. But in 1845, Parkerism is infidelity, and Mr. Parker stands in the ranks of the disobedient and rebellious, among proud, conceited, and superficial infidels, and is, to all intents and purposes, a rejecter of the Gospel. But especially in relation to the church question has Mr. Brownson's change of opinion been the most radical and extreme. He labors now with great ingenuity and extraordinary subtilty to show that there must be an infallible church with its infallible ministry, and that out of this church there can be no salvation. But formerly he labored with equal earnestness to show that there could be no such thing as a church at all, no outward priesthood or ministry. His former arguments, then, for aught that we can see, were just as acute, plausible, and effective as his present ones. In the year 1840, he wrote a long article, proving, by a subtile chain of reasoning, the exact reverse of his present propositions. He then declared that it was necessary to destroy the church and abolish the priesthood. He said, 'We oppose the church as an antichristian institution'; 'because we find no divine authority for it; because we cannot discover that Jesus ever contemplated such an institution; and because we regard it as the grave of freedom and independence, and the hot-bed of servility and hypocrisy.' 'We object to every thing like an outward, visible church; to every thing that in the remotest degree partakes of the priest.' 'Christianity is the sublimest protest against the priesthood ever uttered.' 'Jesus instituted no priesthood, and no form of religious worship. He recognized no priest but a holy life. He preached no formal religion, *enjoined no creed.*' 'The priest is universally a tyrant, universally the enslaver of his brethren. Priests are, in their capacity of priests, necessarily enemies to freedom and equality. The word of God never drops from the priest's lips,' &c., &c."—pp. 227–229.

If this were true, we ought to be looked upon as an extraordinary man, the marvel of our age and country. But we cannot claim the merit it awards us. The author cannot afford to grant us so much, for his purpose is not, by magnifying our ability, to enhance the merit of his courage in attempting to defend himself against us, but to show, from

our frequent changes and alleged ability to reason on one side of a question as well as on another, that nothing we say can deserve a moment's consideration. But if what he asserts be true, since it must be conceded that, however frequently we may have changed our views, we have never been known to return to a doctrine which we have once held and rejected, it is certain that we did not embrace Catholicity blindly, nor renounce Protestantism without knowing the best that can be said in its favor. This, instead of being a reason for not weighing, would be a good reason for weighing, any argument we might offer for the church, not only because it would be likely to be a good argument in itself, but because urged by one who knows and has said the best that can be urged against it.

We cannot understand why Protestants should dwell with so much fondness on our alleged changeability and changes, for whatever discredit may attach to them attaches to Protestantism, not to Catholicity,—to the Protestant minister, not to the Catholic believer. All the changeableness and changes alleged against us were exhibited, if at all, prior to our conversion, and nobody pretends to allege any thing of the sort against us since. We have resided in this community in all about sixteen years,—the whole of our life that can be considered of any public interest. During nearly six of these years, we have been a member of the Catholic Church, and have shown no changeableness or symptom of change. If during the previous ten years, while a Protestant, a Unitarian minister even, we were, as you say, in the habit of changing our views and refuting ourselves about once in every three months, how do you account for the fact, that we have as a Catholic remained firm and steadfast for nearly six years? Here is, if you are right, the most remarkable change of all. How do you explain it? You cannot say that it is owing to our ignorance, either of Protestantism or of Catholicity, for you concede that we have said the best things that can be said in favor of, as well as against, each; it cannot be an obstinate attachment to opinions once avowed, for your very accusation implies the total absence of such attachment; it cannot be any fear as to the sort of reception Protestants would give us were we to return to them, for nobody can doubt that they would hail our return as a godsend. Whence, then, comes this remarkable change in personal character? *The Christian Examiner* suggests the answer (p. 232), in declaring it impossible for a

man to disavow what he had once seen to be true, and in asserting that, "When a man tells us that he has changed all his convictions, he tells us that he never had any convictions to change." That, when a Protestant, we had not seen, and did not see, the truth, and therefore had no real faith, or what *The Christian Examiner* calls convictions, is undoubtedly true, and this fact explains the change. As a Protestant we lacked the truth. We were seeking it without finding it, and therefore were restless, and continually changing; but as a Catholic we have found the truth, have it, are no longer seeking it, and therefore are satisfied, at rest, and change no more. But who, except the founder of the Church of the Disciples, would ever dream of adducing this as a reason why an argument constructed by us for the church is not worth considering?

But suppose that our past conduct as a Protestant was altogether unworthy, that we were fickle and vain, as unstable as water, changing once a quarter, or even every month,—what then? The argument of *The Christian Examiner* is a bad one. Let it be that we have changed too often to be depended upon. It amounts to nothing; for we have never proclaimed ourselves as one who could be depended upon, and we have never asked any one to believe the church on our personal authority. If we professed to be the founder of our church, to be ourselves "the ground and pillar of truth," and asked people to believe the church for the simple reason that we believe her, it would not be amiss to ask who and what we are, and to make a rigid inquiry into our personal character, and our qualifications for arrogating to ourselves the divine prerogative. But we have ceased to be a Protestant, and therefore do nothing of the sort. The church was not founded by us, is not ours, and does in no sense rest on our wisdom and virtue. The arguments we have urged are addressed to the common reason of mankind; they speak for themselves, and depend not at all for their conclusiveness or want of conclusiveness on our personal character or personal authority. It is less conclusive than convenient to say, Mr. Brownson has changed his opinions often; therefore the argument he adduces for the church against no-church is worthless.

We have, however, something to say to these alleged changes themselves. Some of them are fabrications, and others are perversions or exaggerations of very harmless facts. It is not true that we ever defended the course of

Mr. Dorr of Rhode Island, or that we ever argued before a crowd in State Street, in this city, that Massachusetts ought to aid him in taking possession of the government by force. We never addressed a crowd in State Street on the subject, either for or against his course. It is not true that we have shown, or ever attempted to show, that no man can be a Christian except he is a transcendentalist. We never had the honor of being a transcendentalist, and there never was a time when the fact, that any principle we held involved transcendentalist consequences, would not have been of itself a sufficient reason for us to reject it as false. The chiefs of Boston transcendentalism were from the outset Ralph Waldo Emerson and S. Margaret Fuller, and the pages of *The Christian Examiner*, as well as those of our own *Boston Quarterly Review*, prove that we always opposed their peculiar views. It is well known by the writer against us, that *The Dial*, which we ridiculed in public and in private, not our *Review*, was their organ; that we always contended that transcendentalism was pantheism, and that we held pantheism to be unchristian and false. That we held, as does every Protestant, principles which lead to transcendentalism, we do not deny; but whenever we discovered such to be the fact, we rejected them as false, and for that reason alone. If we ever defended the transcendentalists against their enemies, it was not in their peculiar views, but in what they held in common with all of us who at the time were engaged in the war against Cambridge conservatism, and the sensism of Locke. *The Christian Examiner* knows perfectly well that its statement is not true.

With regard to Mr. Parker, we own, that, when a Unitarian minister, we defended him, and maintained that his South Boston sermon might bear a Christian sense, and on Unitarian principles we should maintain the same thing to-day. In 1845, after our conversion, we wrote an article, in which we proved that no Unitarian had a right to pronounce his doctrine, all infidel as it is, unchristian. We understand no right in any Unitarian, nay, in any Protestant, to deny Mr. Parker, or any one else, to be a Christian, so long as he professes to be one. Our views of Mr. Parker have undergone no change, but in passing from Unitarianism to Catholicity our views of what is Christianity have of course changed.

That in 1840, while still a Protestant, we maintained nochurchism, as *The Christian Examiner* alleges, is true, and

we should maintain the same to-day, if we assumed, as we did then, that the Protestant movement was a *Christian* movement. We did it avowedly on Protestant principles, and we have written article after article, since our conversion, to prove that Protestants have, and can have, on their principles, no church, no priesthood, in the proper sense of the terms. Assume those principles to be Christian, and you must be a pitiable reasoner indeed, if you cannot draw the conclusion, that every thing like a priest or a visible church is unchristian. We did but express, in clear and energetic language, what *The Christian Examiner* itself and all Unitarians do and must maintain. We were never so dull as not to see that the Protestant movement was directly opposed to every thing like a visible church or priesthood, in the sense in which we then denied them, or now hold them, or that, if there is a visible church or priesthood to be asserted as Christian, it is the Roman Catholic. At any time during the last twenty-five years, if it had been proved to us that our Lord did found a church and institute a priesthood, we should at once have said, as we say now, they are the Roman Catholic; for they obviously can be no other; and prove to us now that the Protestant movement, or reformation, as it is called, was from God, and is to be held as a Christian movement, and we will repeat the essay on *The Laboring Classes*, which *The Christian Examiner* cites, and say again, that "the truth never drops from the priest's lips,"—that "the priest is universally a tyrant, and the enslaver of his brethren." Doubtless we have changed on the church question since 1840, but we have undergone on that question no change not necessarily involved in the conversion from Protestantism to Catholicity, and to object the change to us is only objecting, either that when a Protestant we were not a Catholic, or that now we are a Catholic we are not still a Protestant. How in the world were we to become a Catholic without changing?

The Christian Examiner thinks to overwhelm us, by applying to us prior to our conversion the language we have since employed in describing Protestantism.

"In fact, he has given the best possible description of his own creed before that time in the following passage:—'It is in perpetual motion, and exemplifies, so far as itself is concerned, the old heathen doctrine that all things are in a perpetual flux. You can never count on its remaining stationary long enough for you to bring your piece to a rest and take deliberate aim. You must shoot it on the wing; and if you are not

marksman enough to hit it flying, you will have, however well charged and well aimed your shot, only your labor for your pains. It is never enough to take note either of its past or its present position ; but we must always regard the direction in which it is moving, and the celerity with which it moves ; and if we wish our shot to tell, we must aim, not at the point where it was, or where it now is, but at the point where it will be when the ball now fired may reach it. Mr. Brownson thinks that he is here describing Protestantism. But he must allow us to say that he has merely given us a very happy description of the working of his own individual intellect. It is an old trick of proselytes to ascribe to the party they have left all the blunders and errors which were peculiar to themselves."—pp. 229, 230.

This retort would be happy, if it were not a retort upon one of the author's own brethren. He applies it to us as a Protestant, and not to us as a Catholic, and the more ridiculous he makes us appear as a Protestant, the more does he weaken his own cause. Let it be that we sat for the picture, and drew from our own experience, it was the Protestant that sat, and a Protestant's experience that was depicted. Suppose we did draw from our own Protestant experience, it does not follow that we concluded the description must be applicable to the Protestant world, because we found it applicable to ourselves; for it is warranted by the history of the Protestant controversies, Protestant developments and variations, any time for the last three hundred years.

"When, therefore, we find that Mr. Brownson's mind is in the habit of experiencing such extraordinary revolutions, we may perhaps be excused for not paying much attention to his position at any particular time. In a land of earthquakes, men do not build four-story houses; neither do we spend much time in refuting the arguments of a man whom we know to be in the habit of refuting himself about once in every three months. We are inclined to say with Mr. Emerson, 'If we could have any security against moods! If the profoundest prophet could be holden to his words, and the hearer who is ready to sell all, and join the crusade, could have any certificate that to-morrow his prophet shall not unsay his testimony! But the Truth sits veiled there on the bench, and never interposes an adamantine syllable; and the most sincere and revolutionary doctrine, put as if the ark of God was to be carried forward some furlongs and planted there for the succour of the world, shall in a few weeks be coldly set aside by the same speaker as morbid,—'*I thought I was right, but I was not*,"—and the same immeasurable credulity demanded for new audacities.'"—pp. 230, 231.

This would have been more appropriate five years ago.

The author has kept his argument too long; it has grown musty, and unfit for use. He appears to have lost the current of events, and fallen behind the times. Has he been taking a nap, after the example of the celebrated Rip Van Winkle? The citation from Mr. Emerson would be to the author's purpose, if we asked people to believe Catholic doctrine on our personal authority, or on any authority liable to change or to be moody; but as it is, it is very much to our purpose, and faithfully and vividly depicts the sad condition of poor Protestants, who have only a human authority for their faith, and only an arm of flesh on which to lean.

"But it may be said, 'Will you not allow a man to make progress? May he not discover and correct his errors? Shall he not honestly say, "I was wrong, but I am wiser now"? Will *you,* who profess to believe in progress, think less of a man because he changes his opinions and cares less for consistency than he does for *truth?*'"—p. 231.

There was no need either of suggesting or of refuting the plea of progress, for we do not make it. We have never pretended that our conversion to Catholicity was a progress or the result of a progress in our Protestant life. It was a change, and consisted not in being clothed upon, as Mr. Newman would say, with Catholic truth, but in throwing off Protestant heresy, and accepting Catholic truth in its place. The only progress we lay claim to is a progress, by the grace of God, not *in* Protestantism, but *out of* it. Our conversion was a change, a real change, and the only real change we have ever undergone. It did not take place instantaneously, but was a gradual process, which continued for some three years. During those years we were in a transition state, our mind was unsettled, and our old Protestant notions were continually giving way, as snow and ice before the increasing warmth of the sun as the spring advances. Doubtless this manifested itself in our writings at the time, but all the changes we successively underwent were only the changes which every genuine Protestant must undergo in being converted to the church. They consisted simply in throwing off what we had received from Protestantism, in which we were born and bred, and in no instance was there any other change than that of throwing off the first view we had embraced on the subject. We never betrayed any of that kind of change which consists in holding a doctrine to-day, renouncing it to-morrow, and taking it up again the day after. The doctrines

we have once rejected we have seldom afterwards defended.

"The misfortune of Mr. Brownson, as it seems to us, and the explanation of his whole past course, is simply this: that he has had no such central truths, no primal convictions. Acute as a logician, able to see the sequences and dependencies by which one proposition is connected with another, his mind appears to have no power of intuition. He cannot see a truth, a principle; and he has therefore no insights, but only thoughts."—pp. 231, 232.

The Christian Examiner is nearer the truth here than usual. We have very little insight; we are mentally weak and ignorant; we feel it and deplore it. We cannot come into comparison with those great men to whom nothing is hidden, dark, or difficult, and who have mastered all the secrets of nature and all the mysteries of revelation. All we dare aspire to is to learn some little of the wisdom of others, and to repeat it in our own stammering speech for the benefit of those who know less than we, because they have had less time and opportunity for study. There can be no question of our grievous lack of insight. If we had not lacked it, we should have escaped innumerable errors, and at a much earlier day discovered the unchristian character of the Protestant movement, and begged admission into the holy Catholic Church.

No doubt, when a Protestant, so far forth as a Protestant, we had no great "central truths"; but this was hardly our fault. How could we "gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles"? We could not be expected to have what Protestantism has not to give; we had all it has, and more we could not have had, without ceasing to be a Protestant, for we always lacked the ability of our worthy opponent to maintain, that of contraries both may be true. Yet it is not true to say that we had no "primal convictions." The "primal convictions" which belong to every rational soul we certainly had, and it was those that gave us our trouble; for we never could make Protestantism harmonize with them. Had it not been for them, Protestantism, in some of its forms, might have satisfied us, and we might have settled down quietly in the sect in which we found ourselves, —perhaps have been a fellow-laborer with the founder of the Church of the Disciples. But having them, we could never persuade ourselves that all opinions are alike good, that there is no difference between truth and falsehood, between right and wrong, or that one can be safe, unless he

loves and serves God in the way God himself wills; consequently we could not rest till we had found something better than Protestantism.

But after all, *The Christian Examiner* is a little inconsistent with itself, in attributing our various changes to lack of insight,—to the total want of intuition or apprehension of principles. It awards us a high intellectual character, says that we have devoted years of steady labor to "the highest questions of philosophy, ethics, and theology," and that we have treated none of them "in a superficial or commonplace manner." It places us in the front rank of all who have labored in defense, or in refutation, of eclecticism, transcendentalism, radicalism, and socialism, and it plainly implies that we have been surpassed by none of our contemporaries in the defense of no-churchism on the one hand, and of the church on the other. It allows us great mental acuteness and extraordinary logical powers. We cannot understand how a man of whom this is to be said can be wholly destitute of insight, or have no intuition or apprehension of principles. How can a man who has no insight have great mental acuteness? or how can one who has no apprehension of principles reason logically? What sort of logic is that which can operate without principles?

"If our account of the working of Mr. Brownson's mind be correct, he has always, even when most a Protestant, been a Roman Catholic in principle. The main distinction between the church of Rome and its opponents regards the final ground of our belief. The Protestant relies, in the last result, upon personal conviction; the Romanist, on outward authority. Individual faith is the principle of Protestantism; submission to an outward teacher, the principle of the church of Rome. But Mr. Brownson, even when most a Protestant, took his first principles from some one else; and he does no more than that now. And certainly it is more satisfactory to rest on the authority of a Church claiming to teach in the name of God, than to rest on the authority of Victor Cousin or Claude Henri St. Simon. We think, indeed, that Mr. Brownson, loving fight as well as he does, must enjoy himself not a little in his present position. He there has an opportunity of fighting as much as he pleases, with all his old friends. He has not been slow in availing himself of this opportunity; and he has in turn attacked high-churchmen and low-churchmen, transcendentalists and rationalists, Unitarians and socialists, holding also an occasional argument with other Roman Catholics, not quite as orthodox as himself."—pp. 233, 234.

If we were always a Roman Catholic in principle, what becomes of the infinite number of changes we are said to have undergone? We can in that case have undergone no change in our principles, and a man who has never changed his principles cannot have been remarkably changeable. He can have undergone no changes except such as relate to simple matters of fact,—changes to which every man who acquires information is liable, and which are never regarded as at all discreditable to one's constancy of character or solidity of judgment. We were, we concede, always a Roman Catholic, in the respect that we held that faith is necessary, and regarded the man who has no faith as in an abnormal condition; that truth is something real, and not at all dependent upon or affected by our apprehension of it; that in order to reason one must have principles, and therefore that first principles are neither obtained nor obtainable by reasoning; that every one is bound by the legitimate consequences of his own principles; and that one truth can never be in contradiction with another. These principles we always held, even when most a Protestant, and thus far were, no doubt, when most a Protestant, a Roman Catholic in principle.

Moreover, we were never enough of a Protestant to believe that we were ourselves the exact measure of truth and goodness, that we were personally infallible, that we had no need of being taught, or that we could spin all truth, spider-like, out from our own bowels. We were no genuine *arachnean*, and we always felt our need of masters. We had masters,—the best masters to be found out of the Catholic Church; but, unhappily, they were very incompetent masters, who taught us more error than truth,—more ignorance than science. We made a mistake, not in having masters, but in the masters we chose. Had we known enough to seek out some humble Catholic priest, and submit ourselves to his tutelage, we should have had nothing to regret; for he would have taught us more in five minutes than all our Protestant masters taught us in forty years.

But after all, we did not, in this matter of masters, practically differ so widely from the great body of Protestants as some may suppose. Protestant profession is one thing; Protestant practice is another, and in general a contrary thing. All Protestants, except the founders of new sects, are the slaves of some master or masters, and the only liberty they have—and they by no means always have even that

—is the liberty of choosing their masters, or of exchanging one for another. You may talk of Protestant freedom to the marines. A more servile set of mortals than the mass of Protestants it is impossible to conceive; and what makes the matter worse is, that the poor slaves hug their chains, and fancy it freedom. The Catholic is the only freeman, for he has no master but God. Even the self-sufficient founder of the Church of the Disciples had his masters as well as we, and has them still. The only difference between him and us in this respect was, that we could follow the teachings of our several masters only so far as we could, or thought we could, reconcile the teachings of one with those of another, while he made no reserve of the sort. He always appeared to be able to accept the grossest syncretism, and to swallow down in their crudest state the entire systems of all the masters he could light upon, however mutually contradictory they might be. As far as we could discover, he went on the principle of accepting all systems, all schools, all sects, all doctrines, and all opinions; of being an infidel with infidels, a pantheist with pantheists, a Quaker with Quakers, a Swedenborgian with Swedenborgians, a Unitarian with Unitarians, a Trinitarian with Trinitarians, an Evangelical with Evangelicals, a pagan with pagans, a conservative with conservatives, a socialist with socialists, and a Catholic with Catholics. We have found him fraternizing alike with those who believe Jesus of Nazareth to be the only Messiah, and with those who maintain that Wolfgang Goethe was a second Messiah, and who patronize S. Margaret Fuller and Bettine Brentano. He is a man of large sympathies,—sympathies wide as the world. Do not all these various systems, opinions, sects, and classes subsist in the world side by side? Why not, then, in the church, especially in the Church of the Disciples? Would you have the church narrower and less tolerant than the world?

But enough of this. If *The Christian Examiner* had succeeded in this part of its defence, it would have availed it nothing; for the real question at issue is not our personal character, or our mental or moral constitution, but church or no-church. We frankly admit that we are altogether unworthy to be a member of the Catholic Church, much more to write in defence of Catholic doctrine. But if the argument we have addressed to it proves her claims, *The Christian Examiner* will in vain attempt to excuse itself for not having examined and yielded to its force, on the ground of

our past instability or present unworthiness. The argument is before its conductors, and they owe it to themselves to forget who has laid it before them, and to give it all the consideration to which it is entitled by its intrinsic merits. Nothing is gained in the long run by seeking to substitute personal detraction or vulgar prejudice for solid argument. In our article against *The Christian Examiner* we made no personal attack; we appealed to no popular prejudice against either it or its doctrine; we reasoned fairly and conscientiously; and it owed it to its own character, and to us, as one of its former contributors, to have met us in the same tone and manner. It has not done so; and for its sake, for the sake of its readers, and for the sake of honorable and profitable controversy, we regret it; but as far as we are concerned, we are prepared for all tones and all tempers, and have been too much accustomed to be publicly traduced to be disturbed. It is a little thing to speak slightingly of us, after having calumniated the church of God.

The second part of *The Christian Examiner's* defence need not detain us long. The author has urged several objections against us, but not one which we have not heretofore ourselves raised in substance and refuted. It is, no doubt, a convenient way to refute an opponent, to take from him the objections he raises against himself, and omit his answers; but it is not a very honorable nor a very satisfactory way; and having once replied to the objections, we cannot be held bound to reply to them again, till the answers we have already given are shown to be insufficient. The author's objections, moreover, do not require any answer from us, because he virtually concedes, or rather contends, that they amount to nothing. He attempts to refute us by argument, and of course refutes us only on condition that the arguments he objects to us are conclusive against us, that is, make it certain that we are wrong. But this, according to him, they do not do, for he maintains (pp. 235, 236) that "the strongest argument ever made never produced any thing but a strong probability," and that "*certainty is never produced by any amount of argument.*" Then, we may add, *a fortiori*, not by such arguments as his. If no amount of argument ever produces certainty, it remains certain that his arguments have not invalidated ours, and therefore amount to nothing; and if they amount to nothing, they require no answer.

The Christian Examiner should remember that scepticism

is a weapon as fatal to him who wields it as to him against whom it is wielded. If our arguments fail to prove the church, on its ground that no argument is or can be conclusive, then its arguments, on the same ground, conclude nothing against ours, and therefore it has been very silly in urging them. But, remembering the controversies formerly carried on in its pages against the so-called orthodox, we are a little surprised to find *The Christian Examiner* taking ground against all argument, and seeking refuge in scepticism. We remember the time when it maintained a different doctrine; when it did not decry reason; when the Unitarians, whom it represents, boasted themselves the champions of reason against enthusiasm, and of rational piety against fanaticism; when they were in the habit of saying, No man is against argument till argument is against him, and no one objects to reason so long as he has a good reason to give. Have they changed, turned a somerset, and undertaken to do what they accused their old Calvinistic enemies of doing, that is, to "reason against reason, use reason against the use of reason, and to give a pretty good reason why reason ought not to be used"? Alas! how have the mighty fallen! Unitarians abandoning reason, rejecting argument, and seeking refuge in scepticism, or illuminism! He who rejects reason abdicates his manhood, withdraws himself from the class of rational beings, and places himself in the category of irrational animals, as the dog, the horse, or the ass, which are manageable sometimes by our industry, but with which it is impossible to hold rational intercourse. If argument never establishes certainty, why do you attempt to argue?

The Christian Examiner's first objection to our argument for the church is, that it is too subtile. "Is it possible," he asks (p. 235), "that we are left to find the true church of Christ by means of such a subtile chain of reasoning?" Yes, we answer, if heretics have so obscured the truth by their errors and sophistry, learned ignorance and conceited folly, that they are incapable of being convinced by plainer or simpler arguments. But what sort of right have Protestants, or any other class of heretics,—after having turned their backs upon the truth, after having exerted all their wit, ingenuity, skill, and malice in devising objections to it, and thus compelling us to resort to close, rigid, and even subtile reasoning to meet and refute their sophistry and subtilty,—to turn upon us, and tell us that our church can-

not be the church of God, for if she was, no such reasoning would be necessary? If a man resolutely shuts his eyes so as not to see the sun, shall he tell us, after we have induced him by great labor and effort to open them, that the sun is not the sun, nay, that there is and can be no sun, for if there was, so much labor could not be required to enable him to see it? Poor man! we did not labor to enable him to see the sun, or to make the sun more obvious, but to remove the obstacles to his seeing it, which his own folly and obstinacy had interposed. But whence do Protestants obtain the right to urge charges against the church which refute one another? They accuse us of ignorance, and then object to our church, that she is the result of the most consummate human wisdom, and all but miraculous knowledge of human nature. They tell us, that we are utterly unable to reason, and as soon as we expose the falseness of their accusation, and show that we can and do reason, they turn upon us and say, they are sure our church cannot be the true church, because we support her by argument, and argument cannot give certainty, or because we reason, and reason altogether too well, in her defense! A wonderful deal of consistency is to be found in Protestants, most assuredly! They have a double set of objections, one the contrary of the other, so that, as the one set is refuted, they can bring up the other set. Very convenient!

The Christian Examiner thinks it is not likely that our salvation is made to depend on the logical faculty and the understanding of such a piece of pure reasoning as our argument.

"Now, according to Mr. Brownson, our *salvation* depends on our belonging to the true church; therefore, our *salvation* depends on our being able to investigate and understand the whole of the great question at issue between the Roman Church and its opponents. He thinks that he has reduced this question to its simplest form in the argument before us; and he thinks that this argument is perfectly simple and intelligible. Nevertheless, it occupies some sixty pages of pure argument, making a chain of propositions and deductions, *any one of which failing, the whole must go to the ground.* Now we say, that it is not very likely, at the outset, that God has made the salvation of his creatures to depend on the logical faculty and clearness of insight necessary in order to do justice to such a piece of pure reasoning as this."—p. 235.

There is a mistake here as to the number of pages the argument occupies. The whole essay is less than sixty pages long. One-eighth of it is exhausted with other mat-

ters, before the argument begins, and at least six-eighths are taken up with explanations rendered necessary by the errors of Unitarians and others, and in refuting the false theories of heretics. The argument proper occupies less than half a dozen pages, and *The Christian Examiner* professes to have reproduced it in less than one. Then the argument is the furthest removed possible from subtilty. It consists solely in drawing from the premises known and professed by every man who calls himself a Christian their obvious and necessary consequences. To call such an argument subtile is an abuse of terms. Moreover, the argument is not presented as the only, nor as the briefest and simplest argument possible, but professedly in reply to an essay on *The Church*, in *The Christian Examiner* for January, 1845, as the argument best adapted to the apprehensions of Unitarians, and to the removal of their peculiar prejudices.

The writer says the argument consists "of a chain of propositions, any one of which failing, the whole must go to the ground." Be it so. But the same may be said of any extended chain of reasoning, even of mathematical reasoning. It is no objection, that if one link fails the chain is broken, so long as no link can fail. That it is not likely that the understanding of this chain of reasoning is universally necessary to salvation is possible, but we do not recollect of ever having maintained that it is, and the argument itself is designed to prove, that, to be saved, it is necessary to believe, not it, but what God reveals and the church proposes. It assumes, that, in order to be saved, it is necessary to be a Christian. Does *The* Christian *Examiner* deny this assumption? If it does, let it say so, and avow itself an infidel periodical. If it does not, we beg it to have the kindness to prove in fewer words, and in a less subtile manner than we have employed in our argument for the church, any doctrine or precept it chooses to name was really taught or enjoined by our Lord; or, in a briefer, plainer, or simpler argument, in opposition to the mythic theory of Strauss, that there actually was such a person as Jesus of Nazareth. Leslie's *Short Method with the Deists*, which falls far short of refuting them, is longer than our essay; Paley's *Evidences of Christianity* make up a respectable octavo volume; Lardner requires nine or ten large octavo volumes to prove the credibility of the Gospel history; Norton requires three to establish the genuineness of the four Gospels; and the writer in *The Christian Exam-*

iner would, we doubt not, require at least forty huge folio volumes to prove that Unitarianism is identical with Christianity, or that the Church of the Disciples is identical with the church of Christ. Suppose it does require a labored argument of sixty pages to prove the church against the no-churchism of Protestants. What then? No one distinctively Christian fact can be proved with a shorter or less labored argument, and, what is more to the purpose, when we have once proved the church, we have proved all, and our labor is done; but the Protestant, when he has proved one fact, even if one fact he can prove, has proved only that fact, and has the same labor to perform in the case of every single fact, doctrine, or precept of the Christian religion, a labor to which no man's life is adequate, and which the experiments of the Protestant world for three hundred years fully prove can never be brought to a successful termination; for there is not at this moment a single fact, doctrine, or precept which all Protestants agree in regarding as Christian. Even the writer in *The Christian Examiner* confesses that Protestants generally, and some even of his own brotherhood, do not accept the view of faith essential to his theory, and consoles himself with believing that they are tending to it, and may some centuries hence reach it. Then, after all, it is ridiculous to object to our argument that it is subtile, for if it really does establish the claims of the church, you must believe and obey her, or lie under the sin of rebellion against God. If the argument is really inconclusive, that fact should be shown; but if really conclusive, it is conclusive, however subtile or elaborate it may be, and convicts, if it does not convince, you of warring in your no-churchism against the truth.

But the writer in *The Christian Examiner*, for obvious reasons objects to all arguments addressed to the understanding. He does not appear to object to our argument, that it is inconclusive for the reason, the intellect; he even seems to concede that it is strictly logical, and as conclusive as any logical argument can be; but he has a thorough dislike to all logic, properly so called, and demands arguments addressed, not to the intellect, but to the heart. Arguments to the understanding do not appear to be his *forte*, but he is great on heart arguments.

"It may be said that such a kind of proof is the only kind possible. We admit that it is the only logical proof possible. But the true church of Christ might commend itself to us by evidence which would produce

certainty in any pure mind; by arguments addressed, not to the intellect, but to the heart. If there were in the world a church so pure that not a flaw could be found in it; a church whose only weapons were the power of truth and love; which had never encouraged crusades to root out heretics with fire and sword; which had never struck medals and sung Te Deums to commemorate a Bartholomew massacre; which had never established an Inquisition, to produce an outward conformity by tortures and the stake, and so to make men hypocrites when it could not make converts; a church which never had a murderer for its head, and licentious priests for its ministers; a church like this, filled throughout with truth, love, and holiness, might do what the first disciples did, cause men 'to take knowledge of it, that it had been with Jesus.'"—p. 236.

Our Saviour when on earth exhibited, besides other evidence, the precise kind of evidence here contended for, and yet, if we have not been misinformed, he was despised and rejected, called a "seditious fellow," a "glutton and a wine-bibber," a "devil" and "the prince of devils,"—was reviled, mocked, buffeted, spit upon, scourged, and finally crucified between two thieves. The church has always exhibited the evidence, and all the evidence, here demanded, and yet the very man who says such evidence is sufficient to "produce certainty in any pure mind," rejects her with scorn and contumely, calumniates her, and insinuates charges against her, which, if he had a tithe of the intelligence he claims, he would know are as false as the pit. It is idle, also, to talk about what would produce certainty in "pure minds"; for, unhappily, the men who need to be convinced have not pure minds, and are not fitted to judge by their hearts instead of their heads. Their heads are wrong only because their hearts are foul, and it is necessary to address their heads to convince their understandings that the church is God's church, so that they may come to her and have their hearts cleansed.

The writer reasons on a false assumption,—namely, that men out of the church have pure minds, are pure in heart, —and supposes that it is because a man is pure and holy that he comes to the church of God. But they who are out of the church have not pure minds or hearts, are not and cannot be pure and holy, and those who come to the church come because they know they are sinners, and must be sinners as long as they remain outside of her communion, and they come to her that they may be cleansed from sin, purified, and made holy. By the very act of seeking admission into the

church, we confess before heaven, earth, and hell that we are sinners, and deserve eternal damnation. Men who come to the church, feeling that they are pure and holy, that they do not need her as God's medium for saving them from sin, may indeed enter her communion, but will not be *of* it. Christ came to call sinners, not the just; and it was for the ungodly, while they were yet enemies, that he died on the cross. We cannot address those out of the church as pure and holy, as already living the Christian life; for if we could we should never address them at all,—never call upon them to become Catholics. We do and can look upon them only as sinners, all foul with sin, and festering in their iniquity; and what we must address to them are, not arguments which can be appreciated only by the pure-minded, but such as can be appreciated by those who are not pure-minded, that is, such as convict them of sin, and instruct them as to the means of salvation.

The Christian Examiner continues:—

"If it were essential to our salvation to be in outward connection with the true church, and if the true church could not be known by its fruits, by its evident holiness, its manifest superior usefulness,—if it were so that our salvation depended on our getting into the church which stood in the right line of descent, and not that which regenerates our soul,—if this proposition, incredible as it seems, be true, *we shall at least be told of it* by Jesus and his apostles. Jesus will, at any rate, say, 'It is necessary to your salvation to belong to the true church; and the true church is the one which will stand in the right line of succession, and have an infallible priesthood.' Jesus came to teach the way of salvation; he clearly taught with his own lips what was necessary to salvation. *But he has not taught this.* How are we to explain the omission?"—pp. 236, 237.

It will be time enough to explain the alleged omission when it is proved to be a fact. *The Christian Examiner* is not yet recognized as the depositary of the words of our Lord, nor has it established the fact of its divine commission to define what our Lord did or did not say. It must produce its credentials as a divinely commissioned teacher, before we can entertain any of its assertions as to what are or are not the contents of the Christian revelation. We will simply remind it, however, that the church does not "regenerate the soul";—the Holy Ghost is the efficient, and she is only the instrumental, cause of regeneration. We hope *The Christian Examiner* will find this distinction intelligible. But does the Church of the Disciples regener-

ate the soul? We thought the doctrine of its founder to be, that the church is a voluntary association of believers, formed by the regenerated, and therefore subsequent in the order of its birth to their regeneration. That is, we are regenerated without the church, and then come together and form the church. If this be so, what right has he to object to the church, that it does not regenerate the soul?

But let this pass. *The Christian Examiner* proceeds :—

"If an infallible church be necessary in order to teach us certainly what are the truths of Christianity, it is even more necessary that we have an infallible guide to show us which is the infallible church. For whether is it easier to understand the words of Christ, or to understand the merits of the argument in support of the claims of the church of Rome?"—p. 237.

This objection we raised, in substance, against ourselves, in the article to which *The Examiner* professes to reply,* and the writer had our answer to it under his eyes when he urged it. It was brought by *The Episcopal Observer*, and replied to by us,† and it was repeated in a private letter to us by a clever young Unitarian minister, and answered at full length in an article entitled *Liberalism and Catholicity*.‡ These three several answers are ignored by *The Christian Examiner*, doubtless because it feels confident that its readers have not read and will not be likely to read them, and because it finds it easier to ignore than to refute them. It knows very well that its readers, as a general rule, examine only one side of a question, and that it can with perfect impunity omit all notice of our replies to the objections it copies from our pages. This is only a common Protestant trick, as we pointed out in *The Two Brothers*.†† There is no occasion for us to reply to this objection again, for we have in these replies, as the writer must be presumed to know, amply refuted it. If he could have shown that the answers we have already given are inconclusive, it is fair to presume that he would not have failed to do so. He cannot plead his ignorance of what we have said, for he professes to have before him our entire *Review* from January, 1844, to January, 1850.

We have never professed to be able to establish the claims of our church to one who is destitute of reason ; and we do not suppose it is easy for one who is intellectually

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* Vol. V., pp. 368–373 and 381–385.
† *Ib.*, pp. 409–414.
‡ *Ib.*, p. 476.
†† Vol. VI., pp. 282–291.

blind to distinguish the true church from the false. We always presuppose reason and common sense, and it is only by reason and common sense, and to reason and common sense that we undertake to prove our church. We hold to faith with reason, not to faith without reason, nor to reason without faith. If it is conceded that our Lord founded a church, there is no difficulty in finding out which is the true church. It is and must be the Roman Catholic, for it obviously can be no other, as Unitarians themselves very generally concede, and as we proved in the essay to which *The Christian Examiner* is replying, pp. 381–386, but in regard to which it maintains a discreet silence.

Grant that it is easier to understand the words of the Sermon on the Mount than the arguments which establish the infallibility of the church. What then? It is possible that the Sermon is not the whole Gospel, that it does not contain all that God has revealed or enjoined, that something more is necessary to salvation, and that even what is revealed and enjoined in that Sermon cannot be believed and done in the sense required, without the infallible church. What is there said is addressed to believers,—presupposes the church, and them to be already members of it; from what is practicable for such we cannot conclude what is practicable in the case of persons out of the church, without the aid of the instruction which she alone can give, and the sacraments which she alone can lawfully administer. Moreover, the ingenious writer is not at liberty to prescind from divine revelation all that he is not sure of by his own instincts, and then maintain that no infallible teacher is necessary, because none is necessary to teach what he retains. God is the judge, not man, of what it is or is not necessary to believe and to do in order to be saved, and we must be pardoned if we refuse to surrender his authority in matters of his own revelation for that of the founder of the Church of the Disciples. The writer reasons,—we beg his pardon,—*talks*, as if it was the easiest thing in the world to find out, on Protestant principles, what is or is not Christian truth. How happens it, then, that we find Protestants agreeing in no one thing except hostility to the church, and, instead of uniting as one body in the profession of a common doctrine, maintaining as many different doctrines as they have doctors? Unitarians regard themselves as Protestants, claim to be Protestants of Protestants, the only genuine Protes-

tants in the world, and we have yet to find two of their ministers holding the same doctrine. They agree in a few denials, but no two of them agree in the same affirmations. The writer himself concedes, in the article before us, as we have seen, that many Protestants, and perhaps some of his own brotherhood, do not accept his notion of faith, although he thinks it is that to which they are generally tending,— that is to say, the Protestant world, after three hundred years, are only tending to the true view of what faith is! Yet no infallible church is necessary, and nothing in the world is easier than to find out, by consulting one's own heart, what is and what is not Christian truth! The present state of the Protestant world, its doubt, uncertainty, divisions, sects, and mutually contradictory doctrines, are an admirable commentary on the assertion that our church cannot be the true church, because we have occupied some sixty pages in proving that she is!

"So far we agree with Mr. Brownson, that there is but one way of salvation, and that is through faith. But we differ from him as to the nature of faith, and as to the nature of the object of faith. We are aware that we differ also in this respect from many Protestants; perhaps from the majority, and probably from some who are included in the same brotherhood. We therefore speak only for ourselves in this part of our argument; though we believe our view of faith to be that to which the Protestant Church is tending, and the only one which can be satisfactorily maintained.

"Faith, according to Mr. Brownson, is equivalent to belief. Its object is a formal proposition. It is, he says, 'eminently, though not exclusively, an act of the understanding.'

"Now we maintain, on the other hand, that the saving faith demanded by Christ in the New Testament *is not belief, but reliance. It is an act of trust. It is trust in the love of God, or, rather, in the God of love.* Its object is not a doctrine or proposition concerning God, but its object is God himself, as seen in Christ as a pardoning and saving God. It is not, therefore, eminently an act of the understanding, but it is eminently a moral act. It includes, no doubt, something intellectual, and something affectionate. It carries within it something of the intellect, and something of the heart; but it is itself an act of the will. It is reliance on God, seen in Christ to be Love."—p. 238.

This confirms what we have just said. As to the view of faith here given, it will be time enough to consider it when the author has succeeded in getting Protestants generally to accept it. We cannot spend time in refuting every idle notion of an individual Protestant, which is rejected by the

mass of Protestants, and not received even by his own brotherhood. Moreover, we have discussed the subject *in extenso* in our article on *The Mercersburg Theology*,* and had also sufficiently discussed it in the article on *Liberalism and Catholicity*, already referred to. We replied expressly to the view the author takes in the very article to which he is professedly answering, and we cite what we then replied, in order to save our readers the trouble of recurring to it.

"Not a few Unitarian clergymen of our acquaintance understand by faith *trust* or *confidence* (*fiducia*), and contend, that, when we are commanded to *believe* in Christ, in God, &c., the meaning is that we should *trust* or *confide* in him. To believe in the Son is to confide in him as the Son of God. But we cannot confide in him as the Son of God, unless we believe that he is the Son of God; we cannot confide in God, unless we believe that he is, and that he is the protector of them that trust him. Where there is no belief, there is and can be no confidence. Confidence always presupposes faith; for where there is no belief that the trust reposed will be responded to, there is no trust; and the fact, that the one trusted will preserve and not betray the trust, is necessarily a matter of faith, belief, not of knowledge. Faith begets confidence, but is not it; confidence is the effect or concomitant of faith, but can never exist without it. So, however these may seem to deny the necessity of belief, they all in reality imply it, presuppose it.

"Moreover, all Unitarians hold, that, to be a Christian, one must be a follower of Christ. Their radical conception of Christ is that of a teacher, of a person specially raised up and commissioned by Almighty God to teach, and to teach the truth. But one cannot be said to be the follower of a teacher, unless he believes what the teacher teaches. Therefore, to be a Christian, one must be a believer.

"This, again, is evident from the Holy Scriptures. 'For without faith,' says the blessed Apostle Paul, 'it is impossible to please God.' Heb. xi. 6. So our blessed Saviour: 'He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned.' St. Mark xvi. 16. 'He that believeth in the Son hath eternal life; but he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him.' St. John iii. 36. This is sufficient to establish our first position, namely, that, in order to be a Christian, it is necessary to be a believer, that is, to believe *somewhat*."†

This is not refuted by being ignored, and we leave *The Christian Examiner* to excuse itself as best it can for not having attempted to answer it before insisting on the doctrine it refutes.

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*Vol. III., p. 51.

†Vol. V., pp. 338-9.

The author says he disagrees with us as to the nature of faith. Very possibly he does; but that may not be to our discredit. We do not recognize him as sent from God with authority to teach, and at the very lowest, the fact that he differs from us is as good evidence that he is not right as it is that we are wrong. He evidently does not know whether he does or does not differ from us in the respect he supposes, for it is clear that, unless he intentionally writes what is false and absurd, he does not understand our doctrine. We have never maintained, as he would have his readers believe, that the object of faith is a formal proposition, abstracted from the truth it proposes. The material object of faith is the Christian revelation, and this revelation consists in intelligible, enuntiable propositions, that is to say, is made in a form which can be proposed to the understanding for its assent. This is what we maintain in the article in question. Perhaps the author would not find it amiss on this matter of the object of faith to read what we say of Toby's dog in *The Two Brothers.**

We have no occasion to follow the writer through his proofs of his view of faith, because nobody doubts or denies that the word *faith* is sometimes used in the sense of *fiducia*, trust, or confidence. There are passages of Scripture in which it undoubtedly has this sense, but there are others in which it just as obviously means *belief*, *assent*, and even *trust* itself is only a particular form of *belief*. It is nothing to the author's purpose, then, to cite texts in which the word is taken simply as *trust*. Then, again, it is idle to say that he differs from us in our definition of "saving faith," for we were giving no definition of "saving faith." The faith we defined is necessary to salvation, but, as we stated, not of itself sufficient. We were discussing what the schoolmen call *fides informis*, not the *fides formata*, that is, faith perfected by charity or love,—the "saving faith" *The Christian Examiner* speaks of. We suppose faith to be distinguishable from charity, and St. Paul seems to suppose the same, for he says (1 Cor. xiii. 13.), "Now abideth faith, hope, charity, these THREE"; and St. James speaks also of a faith distinguishable from charity, for he says, "Faith without works is dead, being alone." Because faith without works, or faith unformed or not perfected by charity, is not sufficient for salvation, it does not follow, either that it is not faith, or that it is not indispensable to our salvation.

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*Vol. VI., pp. 253–257.

But *The Christian Examiner* proceeds:—

"Suppose that we have an infallible church, and are able to know certainly that this is the Church of Rome. We accordingly submit ourselves to her guidance; we put ourselves under her instruction, and she teaches us certain truths, by the belief of which we are to be saved. These truths are expressed in her creeds. They are expressed, of course, in words. But the meaning of words is uncertain. How do we know that we understand them in the sense she intends? We go to our priest, and receive his explanation. How do we know that we do not misunderstand him? What we hear always takes a coloring from our own mind. Our teacher's word always means something different to us from what it means to him. We have, then, our infallible church, but we have not yet attained to certainty. That eludes us still.

"But let us suppose, (what is impossible,) that we *can* be certain of the meaning of the proposition we are called to believe. Have we the *power* to believe it? Suppose that it seems to us incredible, ridiculous, absurd? Can we believe it while it seems so? To *believe* a thing is to have it seem *true*. Can it seem true, while it seems false? We must try to believe it; we may think that we ought to believe it; we may think we do believe it; but we *cannot* believe it, until it commends itself to our intellect as true. It is one thing to believe that a proposition is true, and quite another to believe the truth contained in the proposition. As a confiding child of the Church of Rome, I may believe that what she tells me is true. But I do not believe what she tells me, till I can see it to be true.

"For example. The Church of Rome teaches me the doctrine of Transubstantiation. Now, there are two things here to be believed. First, we are to believe that the doctrine of Transubstantiation is true. This we believe on the authority of our teacher. Secondly, we are to believe the doctrine of Transubstantiation itself, and this we cannot believe, until it appears reasonable and credible.

"All this is so evident, that the Church of Rome does not pretend to require its children to believe its doctrines; though, according to Mr. Brownson, we are only saved by the belief of these very doctrines. She merely requires them to believe that the doctrines are true; that is to say, in other words, she requires of them, not belief, but obedience. She requires of them merely to submit to her authority, and not to express any outward dissent from her doctrines. In this she is very reasonable, for she knows that belief is not in our own power. All she demands, therefore, is comformity.

"We were lately conversing with a very intelligent lady, one of the recent converts to the Church of Rome. She said that she had long been interested in its ritual, had enjoyed its services, and earnestly wished to become a member and receive its sacraments. But a serious difficulty lay in her way, which, to her guileless mind, bred up in the

honesty of Protestantism, seemed insuperable. The difficulty was merely this: that she did not believe the doctrines of the Romish Church, and could not believe them. But the Romish bishop, in conversation with her, at once removed this difficulty. 'My dear lady,' said he, 'we do not wish you to believe our doctrines. That is not necessary. You are simply to *submit* to the church. You are not to have any belief about it. You are to be a little child, and receive passively, as true, what the church teaches.' This, she said, quite satisfied her. It was so very simple, she was ashamed not to have seen it before. She was quite willing to believe, so soon as she found that she might believe with her *will*, instead of believing with her intellect."—pp. 240–242.

The first difficulty suggested here is, that language is an uncertain medium of thought, and therefore, since the infallible church must make her definitions in words, we can never be certain that we understand them in the sense she intends. This objection we have answered in our replies to *The Episcopal Observer*.* We had occasion to touch upon it in our review of Mr. Newman's *Essay on Development*, and we treated it at length in our criticism on Dr. Bushnell.† What we have said on these several occasions, as our opponent had it under his eyes when he wrote, is sufficient till it is answered. Furthermore, we have in examining Mr. Morell's *Philosophy of Religion*,‡ stated the objection in a stronger form than it is here stated, and given the principle of its solution; namely, the intelligibility, therefore the evidence, is in the object, not in the subject. It has no applicability to the definitions of the church, because they are always made in intelligible language. *The Christian Examiner's* argument, moreover, proves too much. If it proves any thing, it proves that language can in no case, and under no circumstances whatever, be a vehicle of truth from mind to mind, either from God to man, or from one man to another, which denies to us the faculty of speech, and to God the ability to make a revelation of truth to man;—which even *The Christian Examiner* dares not assert, since it holds that it can understand the Sermon on the Mount, and takes upon itself to decide authoritatively what the Scriptures do and do not mean.

The second objection is ridiculous,—we were about to say, even too ridiculous to be put forth by the literary and theo-

*Vol. V., pp. 401–405 and 427–431. †Ante, pp. 1–22.
‡Vol. III., p. 18.

logical organ of the American Unitarians. The difficulty imagined cannot exist. An infallible church is infallible, and can teach only infallible truth. It is impossible that infallible truth, proposed by infallible authority, can appear to one who accepts the authority as incredible, ridiculous, or absurd. No proposition can so appear that is seen to be made on an adequate authority, and an infallible authority is an adequate authority for any proposition it can make. The credibility is in the authority, and to suppose that one can regard as incredible what he holds he has infallible authority for believing is a plain contradiction in terms,—sheer nonsense.

The Christian Examiner, notwithstanding it charges us with being too subtile, is itself too subtile for our own understanding. It says, "It is one thing to believe that a proposition is true, and quite another to believe the truth contained in the proposition." This is news to us, and, we must say, it needs confirmation. To believe a proposition is to believe the truth it proposes; for, aside from the truth it proposes, from its contents, the proposition is an empty form, a mere nullity, that is to say, no proposition at all, for it proposes nothing. He who believes what the church proposes is true, believes what she proposes. To "believe that the doctrine of Transubstantiation is true," is to "believe the doctrine of Transubstantiation itself."

"All this is so evident, that the Church of Rome does not pretend to require its children to *believe* its doctrines." Indeed! "She merely requires them to believe that the doctrines are true; that is to say, in other words, she requires of them, not belief, but obedience." That is, the church does not require her children to believe her doctrines, but she requires them to believe her doctrines true; that is to say, she requires not belief at all, but simply obedience! Alas! we have no heart to triumph over mental imbecility. The writer may have fancied he meant something, but he cannot have known what, and he has only talked sheer nonsense and palpable absurdity. To believe doctrines are true is certainly belief, and if the church requires this, as the writer asserts she does, she must certainly require belief. If she commands, as she undeniably does, her children to believe what she teaches is true, she in exacting obedience also exacts belief, for the obedience cannot be rendered without believing.

The anecdote of the lady, introduced to confirm what the

author asserts of our church, is as untrue as his assertion itself. The Bishop of Boston never said what he is alleged to have said, for he is at least a man of common sense, and it is absolutely impossible that he could utter the absurdity ascribed to him. What the lady may have said, we know not, but she certainly never did say what Mr. James Freeman Clarke asserts. It is infinitely more probable that he should have invented it, than it is that an intelligent convert, instructed in the Catholic faith, should have talked so little like a Catholic, and so completely in accordance with his false and absurd theory. We, however, suppose she did say something, which he, not exactly understanding, interpreted to favor a theory he had previously excogitated. Doubtless we could conjecture what she said, but we are under no obligation to do it, and have no space for correcting every ridiculous blunder of the writer.

Yet the author should not have blamed the doctrine he ascribes to the Bishop of Boston, for it is precisely his own. He labors throughout to make it appear that faith is not belief, belongs not to the understanding at all, but is a pure affection of the heart, that is, of the will. Wherefore, then, find fault with the lady for being quite willing to "believe with her will instead of her intellect"? We protest against his right to urge one set of objections one moment, and an opposite set the next. If a man attempts to reason at all, he must hold himself bound by the laws of logic.

One extract more, and we close this already too protracted article.

"But the church which to-day claims most loudly to be apostolic, and whose head claims to be in the place of Christ,—which professes to be infallible, as the apostles did not profess,—hides its infallibility in a napkin, and, instead of showing us God's truth, requires of us even to receive its doctrines with closed eyes. Never did such magnificent pretension end in so small a result. An infallible church is demanded on this ground, that we can be saved only by the belief of certain supernatural truths; and, after all, the infallible church does not pretend to show us those truths, but merely requires submission to herself.

"Finally, we say to Mr. Brownson, that our Saviour himself has given us the test by which to distinguish his prophets, and to know his church. 'By their fruits, ye shall know them.' 'Men do not gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles.' We are not to know the fruit by the tree, but the tree by the fruit. We are not to say, 'This church is orthodox, therefore its disciples are Christians'; or 'This church is in the line of apostolic succession, therefore those who belong to it are in

the way of salvation.' This method is the reverse of that of Christ. Christ teaches us to know the tree by the fruit. Mr. Brownson would have us know the fruit by the tree. Mr. Brownson virtually says, 'These dissipated cardinals, these domineering popes, these crusading bishops, belonged to the true church, and therefore are in the way of salvation.' Christ says, 'These little ones are pure, are humble, are loving, and therefore they belong to my kingdom. This man, though he follows not my apostles, yet, because he is doing good in my name, belongs to me. We prefer, we confess, the method of Christ to that of Mr. Brownson. Tried by this test, we see little reason for admitting the claims of the Church of Rome to be the only channel of the Holy Ghost. We find holy men, men of God, in all churches. Wesley and Baxter, Doddridge and Jeremy Taylor, Channing and Ware, and tens of thousands of others, whose lowly piety and large philanthropy have sweetened life, were certainly holy men. And if so, the Church of Rome is not the only true church of Christ. And if we take a wider range of observation, and compare the condition of Roman Catholic and Protestant countries, we shall find that the tone of morals in Italy, Portugal, Spain, and South America is not so much superior to that in Prussia, England, Scotland, and New England, as to convince us that these Catholic countries alone are blessed with the presence of Christ. But if the claims of Rome are valid, and she be the only channel of the Holy Ghost, then the difference between the moral condition of Catholic and Protestant nations should be so marked that no one could mistake it. Each Catholic nation and people should be an oasis of purity, truthfulness, honesty, industry, and of every Christian virtue. Family ties should be all sacred, the sacrament of marriage never violated, female chastity touched by no stain. All should be order and peace, undisturbed by intestine dissensions, civil struggles, or domestic strife. All Protestant influences have been rooted out of Portugal, Spain, and Italy by the Inquisition, and kept out by the strong hand of law. Here, then, ought to be found the earthly paradise of purity, peace, and moral virtue. Does any one pretend that it is so?"—pp. 243, 244.

The flourish in the first paragraph must go for what it is worth. If a man obstinately shuts his eyes to the light, it is not our fault that he finds himself in darkness. The complaint, as far as it is intelligible, is, that our church requires her doctrines to be received as matters of faith, and not as matters of science, on the veracity of God, because he has revealed them and commissioned her to propose them, and therefore on her proposition of them, not because they are intrinsically evident. This is, undoubtedly, the fact, and if any one is silly enough to urge this as an objection, he is not able to receive an answer. We do not believe the human mind is adequate to the comprehension

of all things, and our church does not pretend to make her children omniscient. The truths she teaches are mysteries, and will be mysteries to us as long as we are in the flesh.

As to the talk about the fruits, we reply that we are willing to test the church by her fruits, and should be glad so to test her. But we must have an indorser for *The Christian Examiner's* taste, if it is to be the judge. We are not sure that its taste is not perverted, that it is a judge of fruits, or that it will not call bitter sweet, and sweet bitter. "We are not to believe every spirit, but to try the spirits, for many false prophets have gone out into the world. "We," says the beloved apostle St. John, "are of God. He that knoweth God heareth us, and he that knoweth not God heareth not us. By this we know the spirit of truth, and the spirit of error." (1 St. John iv. 1, 6.) "This church is in the line of apostolic succession, therefore those who belong to it are in the way of salvation," is the proper method of judging, we concede; but because a man is in the way of salvation, it does not follow that he will be saved, or that he is just before God. There are bad Catholics as well as good Catholics, and only those in the church who obey her, believe what she teaches, and do what she commands, and persevere unto the end, will be saved. "This method is the reverse of that of Christ." How does the author know that? Who gave him authority to speak in the name of Christ? Where is his commission sealed with God's seal? He must excuse us, but we prefer the Pope of Rome as the interpreter of God's law to the pope of the chapel in Freeman Place, Boston. We are not aware that our Lord has given this latter a commission to confirm his brethren, or to feed His sheep or lambs. "Christ teaches us to know the tree by the fruit." Agreed. But the first fruit to be borne by the good tree may be to keep the commandment of our Lord to hear the church,—may be humble submission to those whom the Holy Ghost has placed over us.

"We find holy men, men of God, in all churches." How know you that? How do you know that "Wesley and Baxter, Doddridge and Jeremy Taylor, Channing and Ware," were "holy men, men of God"? How could they be such, if they separated from God's church, or refused to believe God's word? Before you pronounce on their holiness, it would be well to be sure, either that they

obeyed God, kept his revealed law, as well as the law of nature, or else to prove that one can be a holy man, a man of God, who despises God's church, and teaches men to do the same, and who lives in habitual disobedience to God. The men you name may have had a fair outside, may have been moral in the ordinary sense of the word, but this is all you can say in their favor; and you name them, in fact, only in consequence of their talents, learning, or eloquence, and if they had been men of only ordinary intellect, you would never have named one of them as a saint, and, intellectually considered, the devil is far superior to them all. Nay, you claim for them only natural piety and philanthropy, which, though not sinful, are not sanctity, and avail nothing to eternal life. Heresy and schism are deadly sins, and though the man guilty of them should be guiltless in all other respects, he would be damned, and justly damned; and though dissipated cardinals, &c., if such there are, cannot, unless they repent, be saved, yet the worst cardinal that ever lived, while he retains the faith, is superior to the best heretic or schismatic that ever existed. The writer should remember that there are spiritual sins as well as carnal sins, sins of pride as well as of the flesh, and the former are as fatal to the soul as the latter, and far more dangerous, for they not unfrequently dress themselves in the livery of virtue. They are the chief sins of heretics and schismatics, in the beginning of their career, and therefore it is that these, even when appearing as angels of light unto men, are to be regarded as the most odious sinners before God.

As to what the writer insinuates with regard to Catholic countries, we have heretofore said all that is necessary. It is enough for Protestants to defend their own countries, without attacking Catholic countries. There are, no doubt, bad Catholics in the world, that will have their part in the eternal tortures which await all who die impenitent, but the church is no more responsible for the fact, than God himself is for the existence of sinners in the world. She, as he, respects the free will of men, and cannot make them good against their will. If men obeyed her, believed what she teaches, and did what she commands, Catholic countries would be far better even than the writer supposes they ought to be.

The remaining portions of the article we pass over in silence. We do not recognize the writer as an authorized

expounder of Scripture, and we have seen nothing in his attempts to set aside our arguments drawn from them, but his arrogance and his incapacity. It is no answer to us to assert on his own authority, or to say *he thinks* the contrary. He is not to us one who speaks by authority, although the founder of the Church of the Disciples.

In conclusion, we cannot help saying that it is extremely disagreeable to be obliged to follow a writer through page after page, who has no sense of what is requisite to honorable controversy, who throws out loose statements, and repeats worn-out objections, without betraying the least intimation that he is aware that they have been already answered. We have had no pleasure in following our present opponent. He, we must presume, knows perfectly well that we had anticipated all his objections, and answered them thoroughly; he knows, too, that as an honorable man he had no right to urge them, till he had set aside what we had already replied to them. If he rejoins, he must reply, not only to what we have now said, but to our previous answers, or we shall not hold ourselves bound in conscience or civility to notice him.

Of *The Christian Examiner* we have heretofore spoken favorably, but some of its recent writers have done much to degrade its character to the level of the lowest anti-Catholic publications in the country. The present writer is far inferior to Thornwell, and is not a whit above the Brownlees, the Dowlings, the Sparrys, and that brotherhood. We hope it is but a temporary aberration, and that hereafter this periodical, with which we have had so many associations, will retrieve its character, and prove itself a fair and candid *Examiner*.

THE CHRISTIAN REGISTER'S OBJECTIONS.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1852.]

It is not our custom to reply to the remarks of the newspaper press, secular or sectarian, on the doctrines we set forth, or the reasonings by which we sustain them; for they are seldom worthy of much notice, and we have rarely the time or the space to do it. Yet we are disposed to depart from our general rule in favor of the *Christian Register*, a weekly paper, published in this city as one of the organs of the Unitarians; for it is an old friend, and in a notice of our *Essays and Reviews* recently collected and published, it has spoken of us personally in terms not wholly uncivil, and has really made a serious attempt to offer some logical arguments against us. It is so seldom that we meet any thing, either in the secular press or in the papers devoted to some one of the Protestant sects, or to Protestantism in general, that is tolerable, on the score either of civility or logic, that we cannot but feel that this effort at both on the part of the *Christian Register* deserves to be frankly acknowledged and generously encouraged.

The writer begins by awarding us high praise as a writer, philosopher, and logician. Speaking of our *Essays and Reviews* he says: "They are written with great logical acuteness, with remarkable simplicity, precision, earnestness, and power. In his own field and with his own weapons, there are no abler writers among us than Mr. Brownson. As an adroit dialectician he has no equal. He has analyzed and thoroughly possessed himself of more systems of philosophy than other reputed scholars have even looked at. He has been no superficial student among the greatest masters of thought, and his mind is hardly inferior to the ablest of them in subtilty, in force of argumentation, and in extreme ingenuity." This is high praise, and although it says nothing of breadth or comprehensiveness of intellect, it still gives us a high and honorable rank with "the greatest masters of thought." "Yet," he adds, "we know of few able men whose writings do so little to carry us with them. There is such a show of dialectic skill that,

when we see no fallacy and have no disposition to dissent from his conclusions, we are not convinced. . . . . The wonderful dexterity with which Mr. Brownson proves every thing, makes us sometimes doubt whether he has really proved any thing. Instead of placing us where he professes to stand, on a basis of undoubting faith, he for the time creates in us a distrust of all logical deductions." That is, Mr. Brownson is, after all, no solid reasoner,—is but a shallow sophist, whose logic is mere show, dexterity, or sleight of hand. How will the *Christian Register* reconcile this with what it has just conceded us? This implies any thing but real logical ability, and is deserving of any thing but respect. It implies that we are a mere logical juggler or trickster, and by no means that we are an able man, who "in *force* of argumentation is hardly inferior to the ablest of the greatest masters of thought." It may serve the purposes of those against whom we direct our arguments to represent us as a mere dialectic juggler, and as able to cheat people out of their senses and make "the worse appear the better reason," but it can hardly be done consistently after having awarded us the praise of "simplicity, precision, earnestness, and power," of having "analyzed and *thoroughly possessed*" ourselves "of more systems of philosophy than other reputed scholars have even looked at," and of being "hardly *inferior* to the greatest masters of thought in *force of argumentation*" as well as in subtilty and ingenuity. The two characters are incompatible the one with the other, and our friends outside must make their election between them. Which of them they ought to elect, or whether either of them is our true character, it is not for us to say.

The *Christian Register* complains that our reasoning, instead of convincing it, creates in its mind "for the time a distrust of all logical deductions"; that is, we suppose, a distrust of reason itself. This tends to confirm what we have so often asserted, and for which we have been blamed by some of our Catholic friends; namely, that Protestants, sooner than admit the conclusiveness of our arguments for the church, will distrust or deny reason itself. We are rather agreeably surprised to find the *Christian Register* virtually conceding it. It cannot accept the church, or abandon its inveterate prejudice against her; consequently when it finds in our writings arguments for her which it is unable to convict of any fallacy, it is led to conclude, not

that its prejudices are unwarranted and that she may after all be God's church, but to distrust all logical deductions, that is, reason itself. Let the writer in the *Christian Register* analyze his own mind and weigh well the statement he makes, and he will hardly fail to perceive that he has really conceded that it is easier for him to deny reason than to embrace Catholicity.

The *Christian Register* apparently would insinuate that our reasoning cannot be solid because it does not convince its mind, and place it on a basis of undoubting faith where we ourselves profess to stand. We are only a dialectic necromancer, because our arguments do not generate in its mind full and unwavering conviction. But it should bear in mind that to such convictions something more than argument, or the exhibition of solid reasons to the understanding is necessary. In faith there is assent of the will as well as the intellect; and whatever the reasons presented to the understanding, faith never results if the will resists; for

> "A man convinced against his will
> Is of the same opinion still."

It is not the office of logic to produce faith, but simply to remove the intellectual obstacles to it; not to motive assent, but to demonstrate that there is no solid reason for withholding it, and that it ought to be yielded. There it stops even in human faith, much more in divine faith, or faith in the Christian sense of the term. We never rely on logic to produce this faith, or to make misbelievers or unbelievers true believers. If nothing but logic were needed, the whole world had long since been thoroughly Catholic, and no infidel or heretic had remained to be converted. Man is not pure intellect; he has will, affections, passions, appetites, and through these, dispositions and prejudices which can resist the most solid reasons addressed to the understanding, and which are overcome only by the grace of God. Logic has its place and its use, both of which are no doubt highly important, but it is never of itself alone sufficient to produce conviction. The most it can do, and all that it is expected to do, is to remove the intellectual objections that may be urged against believing, and to prove that one ought to believe and is in an abnormal state if he does not. The undoubting faith in Catholicity we profess is not illogical, is not opposed to reason, and has all the conditions reason can demand; but it is the effect of no reasoning, of no discursive process whatever.

It is the free gift of God, the product of divine grace obtained for us through the merits of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. If the writer in the *Christian Register* had been aware of this, he would have seen that he was himself very illogical, when he concluded that our arguments must be unsound because they failed to convert him. Faith is a virtue, and inelicitable without the voluntary act of the believer, and consequently it was absurd for the writer to expect our arguments to make him an actual believer, while he remained himself purely passive, or totally inactive in relation to faith.

It appears to be an impression entertained by our non-Catholic community that the primary object of our *Review* is to convert heretics and unbelievers, and that we rely solely on our logic as the instrument of their conversion. We of course desire the conversion of heretics and unbelievers,—to see all our Protestant and unbelieving countrymen, good, practical Catholics; but that is not the special end we have proposed to ourselves in our humble labors. Our *Review* is intended for Catholics, not for Protestants or infidels, and its more immediate object is the edification of our own Catholic community. We seek to be useful to Catholics, and in our discussions we consult what in our judgment will best serve their interests here and now. It is, for the most part, only indirectly and remotely that we seek the conversion of those without. Our first duties are to our own brethren, and our first affections are theirs, and we seek to correct such false notions of literature, philosophy, politics, and society as, owing to their exposed condition in an unbelieving and heretical age and country, may occasionally creep in among them,—to urge and encourage them to aim at what we may call a high-toned Catholicity, at a firm and bold profession of their faith, and an independent and fearless, though quiet, assertion of their rights as Christians, as citizens, as men. We aim, as far as possible with our feeble abilities and limited attainments, aided by the best advice we can obtain, to conduct just such a review as our Catholic friends themselves need in such an age and country as our own. They and their interests, not Protestants and their conversion, are therefore first in our thoughts and affections, and occupy our chief attention.

Certainly we are not indifferent either to the temporal or spiritual welfare of our Protestant and unbelieving countrymen. We are firmly persuaded that the temporal prosperity

of our country, the preservation of its civil institutions and its republican forms of government, and the maintenance of liberty, as distinguished from license, are dependent on the continuance and spread of the Catholic religion amongst us; and we are even more firmly persuaded that there is no spiritual freedom, no spiritual good, in any sense whatever, for our countrymen, but in proportion as they become united to the body of the church, as undoubting Catholic believers, and good practical Catholics. With these convictions, it cannot be a matter of indifference to us, whether they are converted or not. But we have believed, and still believe, that logic can do very little towards their conversion. Arguments directly for the church, or directly against the doctrines they profess are in our judgment of very little utility. The evil lies in the heart rather than in the head, and motives addressed to the affections are far more likely to be efficacious than those addressed to the intellect. It is to the conscience that we must chiefly speak, and it is only as we can make them feel that they have souls to be saved, that religion should be the great affair of their lives, that they are in a lost condition and should cry out speedily, "Lord, save us, or we perish," that we can effect much for their conversion. Then, again, conversion is the work of divine grace, and we can do little towards effecting it, except by our prayers. Logic and controversy are feeble instruments, but the fervent effectual prayer of the just availeth much. God will grant any thing to the humble prayer of faith. The best way to convert those without, the only way in which we can effectually labor for their conversion, is to live ourselves so as to merit the blessing of God upon our prayers. Hence, whatever tends to make Catholics faithful, obedient, humble, devout, prayerful, has an indirect, if you will, but a powerful, tendency to convert the unbelieving and the sinful. If all the Catholics here were what they should be, their prayers would obtain the conversion of the country. This is the doctrine we have always insisted on, and it is to mistake us entirely to suppose that our sole or our chief reliance is on logic, and therefore very unreasonable to pronounce us a mere juggler or sophister because men can read our arguments without becoming believers. Our arguments have their use, and seldom fail of accomplishing all we propose to accomplish by them. But we must tell our friends outside, that there is no power on earth, or even in heaven, to convert them against their will, or without their voluntary concur-

rence. They must be willing, and must themselves take part. The grace of prayer is given unto all men. Let them ask, and they will receive; seek, and they will find; knock, and it will be opened unto them. If they beg of God grace to open the eyes of their understanding, and to move and incline their will to the truth, they will find our arguments sufficiently conclusive; but without the grace which enlightens the understanding and inclines the will, no argument can affect them, and their conversion is impossible.

"This," continues the *Christian Register*, "is our first impression as we pass rapidly over his [Mr. Brownson's] pages, without stopping to analyze what we read. But when we stop at the most essential points in the argument, the wonder ceases. The adroitness of the dialectician becomes visible, and the single fallacy by which the whole train of argument becomes useless is detected. The engine is there. The cars are there, in admirable order. Every thing seems perfect. But in the single link which connects the engine to the cars is a fatal flaw, which the practised eye is sure to find." This is pleasant, but it is not what we should expect from a really skilful dialectician, who is remarkable for his "simplicity, precision, earnestness, and power," and "in force of argumentation is hardly inferior to the ablest of the greatest masters of thought." May there not be some mistake, Mr. Register? You surely are too modest to claim for yourself the high intellectual character you ascribe to Mr. Brownson, and may it not be that you are the party mistaken, and that you have imagined a flaw where none is? If you are right in your estimate of the ability and earnestness of the author, whom you cannot regard as sporting with his readers, it is far more reasonable to conclude that you imagine a flaw where there is none, than that he should leave his argument so fatally defective as you allege. It is far more probable that you should misapprehend or fail to appreciate his argument, than that he, if your account of him be correct, should turn out to be a mere shallow sophist. Suppose you re-examine the matter; perhaps you may find that the "fatal flaw" exists only in your own imagination.

But let us consider the proofs the *Christian Register* offers to establish the fallacy of our reasoning. "We take," it says, "an important example from the first article, entitled *The Church against No-Church*. For nearly fifty pages, with syllogisms enough to supply a whole treatise on logic,

the author has been preparing us for the conclusion, that Jesus Christ 'did commission *a body or corporation* of teachers, which, beginning with the apostles and continuing the identical body they were, must subsist unto the consummation of the world.' Admitting what has gone before, we are prepared to receive this proposition, provided *sufficient evidence* is given." Provided sufficient evidence is given, the *Christian Register*, we should hope, is prepared to receive this, whether he admits what has gone before or not, for it ought to be prepared to receive any proposition for which there is sufficient evidence. But the writer is mistaken in asserting that nearly fifty pages are devoted to a preparation for this conclusion, for at most only eight pages are so devoted, and thirty-six pages out of the nearly fifty he refers to are taken up with establishing substantially the same proposition by a process of rigid deduction from principles which are and must be conceded by every one who professes to be a Christian at all,—a process sufficient of itself, without the subsequent process in which the *Christian Register* professes to have discovered a "fatal flaw." This mistake is not calculated to inspire full confidence in the writer as an acute and candid critic.

"Here," says the *Christian Register*, after condensing and mutilating the passage objected to,* "the whole force of the reasoning by which the authority of the Church of Rome is sustained, depends on the word *corporation*, which Mr. Brownson has quietly slipped in with a meaning in no wise demanded or authorized by the words of Scripture which he has brought forward as the only decisive evidence in the case." But here are three mistakes at least. The whole force of the reasoning does not depend on the word *corporation*, for we give the reader his choice between the word *corporation* and another, since we say "a *body* or corporation of teachers." We do not slip the word in *quietly*, that is, without any attempt to justify its use, for we undertake to prove its propriety; and, furthermore, we do not bring forward the words of Scripture as the only decisive evidence in the case, but expressly state our ability to prove the proposition without citing the Scriptures at all. Thus we say, (p. 374,) "We do not depend on the Bible for the historical facts from which we conclude the commission of the *Ecclesia docens*, or body of pastors and teachers; for these

*Vol. V., pp. 375–379.

facts we can collect from other sources equally reliable, [that is, equally reliable with the Scriptures regarded simply as historical documents,] and do so collect them when we reason with unbelievers." The writer, again, has not cited the formal statement of the proposition we were defending. "The question before us, distinctly stated," we say, (p. 373,) "is, Has Jesus Christ commissioned a body of pastors and teachers, and given this body the promise of infallibility and indefectibility?" But let this pass.

"There is," proceeds the *Christian Register*, "no such word as body or corporation of teachers used by Christ." Expressly used, in the text cited, we concede; implied, we deny, for we have in the passage in question clearly proved the contrary. "As to Mr. Brownson's syllogism that the body of teachers can be identical with the apostles in but two ways, 1, personally, 2, corporately, it is only one of those unwarrantable but imposing assumptions which he is constantly making under the forms of logic." But as you cite us, there is here no syllogism at all, that we can discover, and, if you will do us the justice to regard what we ourselves wrote, you will concede that we made here no assumption, imposing or otherwise. The texts cited from St. Matthew (xxviii. 18, 19, 20,) and St. Mark (xvi. 15,) clearly prove that Christ did commission pastors and teachers. This point the *Christian Register* does not deny. The second point we establish is, that the commission was not merely a commission to the apostles personally. We do not assume this; we prove it, and the *Christian Register* virtually concedes it. But the commission was evidently a commission to the apostles, for our Lord is evidently addressing them, and he says, Go *ye*. In some way, then, the teachers commissioned must be identical with the apostles. Teachers were not to cease in the church with the apostles, and the commission evidently contemplated others who were to succeed them, for he says, "Behold, I am with *you* all days unto the consummation of the world." Here, then, we have a commission to the apostles in a sense in which they could and would remain *as teachers* unto the end of time. You cannot, on the one hand, separate the teachers in every sense from the apostles, nor, on the other, in every sense identify them with the apostles. You cannot identify them with the apostles personally, because in this sense the apostles are no longer living on the earth, and because they who received the commission were to remain as teachers

unto the consummation of the world, an event still future. The commission, then, though given to the apostles personally, must have been given to them in some other sense also, in which they still survive and will survive to the end of time. So much must be conceded on all hands. Now pray tell us in what sense the apostles can be said so to survive as divinely commissioned teachers, save as a body, or corporation of teachers, which preserves its identity though the individuals composing it are successively changed, as our bodies preserve their identity, though the material particles of which they are composed are constantly changing? The individuals die, the body, the corporation, survives.

This reasoning is solid; but even if it were not, even if it would not justify the use of the word *corporation*, the *Christian Register* would not be justified in its criticism. It charges us with quietly slipping in the word *corporation*, that is, with assuming it without offering or attempting to offer any thing in justification of its use, and making the whole argument turn on its meaning. This is not the fact. The argument does not turn at all on the meaning of the word, but turns on the meaning of the texts cited, which meaning necessarily implies the commission of the apostles not only as teachers in their personal or individual capacity, but also as a body or corporation of teachers. Whether such is really the meaning of the texts, or not, is the point in question, and we have not quietly assumed that it is; we have attempted to prove that it is. It is competent for the *Christian Register* to show, if it can, that our proof is insufficient, or that the reasons we assign are inconclusive; but it has no right to assert, that we have merely assumed that such is the meaning by adroitly slipping in the word *corporation*, for that is not true. We prove, first, that the commission was the commission of pastors and teachers; secondly, that the commission was given to the apostles; and, thirdly, that it was given them in a sense in which they can and do survive to the consummation of the world. These three points are shown to be evident from the very terms of the commission. But as the apostles as individuals are dead, and no longer survive as individual teachers, we conclude it was not given to them merely in their individual capacity; and as they can be said to survive only as a corporation or body of pastors and teachers, we conclude they were commissioned as such, that is, the commission instituted or constituted an apostolic

body or corporation of pastors and teachers. Each of these conclusions is absolutely logical and necessary from the premises, and the premises themselves are undeniable. There is here, then, no assumption at all, unless it be that what our Lord promised must be fulfilled, or, in other words, that God is true, and cannot promise and fail to perform. What has misled our no-church critic is probably the fact that we state our particular thesis prior to presenting the demonstration, —at the beginning, instead of reserving the statement of it to the end of the argument,—which we believe is not to be regarded either as a fault of logic or of rhetoric. We say the teachers and pastors who are commissioned must in some way be identical with the apostles, and that they can be identical with them only in two ways, 1. personally; 2. corporately; that is, they must be either the same individuals, or the same body or corporation, as the apostles. The critic is indignant at this very evident proposition, and scouts it as if it set bounds to the power and wisdom of God. "He who 'of these stones can raise up children to Abraham' is not cramped and limited in his operations by our narrow and arbitrary assumptions." Nothing in the world more true; but the question here does not turn on what God, metaphysically, can or cannot do. The question is whether certain commissioned teachers can be identical with the apostles in other than two ways, namely, either as the same individuals, or as the same body or corporation. If the critic says they can, we should be much obliged to him if he would tell us what that way is. God can give any commission he pleases, and to whom he pleases, but he cannot give a commission without giving one, nor a commission to a subject in the sense in which that subject does not exist, or to continue and operate unto the consummation of the world in a sense in which the subject cannot and does not exist until that consummation. He could not commission the apostles, save either as individuals, or as a body or corporation, for save in one or the other of these two senses they are inconceivable, and he could give them a commission under which they were to act until the consummation of the world only as a body or corporation, for in no other sense were they to exist in time until that event. What unwarrantable and imposing assumption is there here?

"Christ," says the *Christian Register*, "sent forth his teachers. As they perished, he raised up others to take their place and carry on their work. . . . . While they all re-

ceived the same words of divine truth, while they all looked up to him as their common Lord, and he in fulfilment of his promise was with them as their living head, they were all united in him, *one spiritual body*, under his authority, teaching all nations to observe whatever things he commanded them. This interpretation quite as naturally fills out the meaning of our Saviour's words as either of the suppositions which Mr. Brownson has assumed as the only suppositions which are possible. And so the labored argument of sixty-eighty pages falls to the ground." And so, with the writer's permission, it does *not* fall to the ground. We make no suppositions in the case, and present the reader no alternative as the *Christian Register* pretends; and if the critic understands the natural force of the words he has used, he has in his own interpretation conceded substantially all that he objects to, and consequently has refuted, not us, but himself.

"Christ *sent* forth his teachers." Then he commissioned them, gave them authority to teach, and commanded them to go forth and teach; for so much is implied in the word "sent." "Sent forth *his* teachers." Then none except those he thus commissions and orders forth are his teachers. These teachers "all receive the same words of divine truth," are "one spiritual body," with "one common Lord," one "living head," and under the authority of this "common Lord," "living head," "teaching all nations whatsoever things he commanded them." They are not only one body, but a persisting body. "As they perished, he raised up others to take their place and to carry on their work." What are these except the body or corporation of pastors and teachers we asserted as commissioned by our Lord, only described in looser and less accurate terms than we used? It is remarkable that no Protestant ever attempts to reason against Catholicity without refuting himself! Christ sent forth his teachers, the apostles, united as one spiritual body, with authority to teach all nations to observe whatever he commanded, and perpetuates the body by raising up, as individuals perish, new individuals to take *their* place and carry on *their* work. If this is not asserting that our Lord commissioned a body or corporation of teachers, we confess we know not what would be. The critic blames us for using the word *corporation*, accuses us of slipping it in quietly, and asserts that "there is no such word as corporation or body of teachers expressed by Christ, and no such meaning implied." Yet he himself uses the word *body*,

denominates the teachers sent or raised up to be "one spiritual *body*," in order to express what he conceives to be the meaning of our Saviour's words cited by us. The critic was for the moment off his guard. Nevertheless, let him not be too much cast down. Homer sometimes nods.

Perhaps the *Christian Register* thinks it escapes what is on its part a fatal concession by certain statements it introduces, which we have omitted; but what we have cited is positive, direct, and it would not be respectful on our part to suppose that the writer explains or qualifies it all away into a no-meaning in the same short paragraph. Nevertheless, here is the whole statement:—"Christ sent forth his teachers. As they perished, he raised up others to take their place and to carry on their work. *They may have been united under no visible organization. They may often have had no personal knowledge of each other's existence. They may have been scattered in distant parts of the earth, so as to have no communication with each other. They may have acted under different forms of church polity.* Still, while they all received the same words of divine truth, while they all looked up to him as their common Lord, and he in fulfilment of his promise was with them as their living head, they were all united in him, one spiritual body, under his authority teaching all nations to observe whatsoever things he commanded them." Now, let the additional statements which we have italicized mean what they may, it is here clearly and unequivocally asserted that the teachers receive the same words of divine truth, that is, have unity of faith; are one body, united in Christ their living head; and teaching *under his authority* alone, that is, by virtue of his commission, all nations whatever he commanded his apostles to teach. This is substantially all we attempted to prove by the texts, of which the *Christian Register* here gives its interpretation in opposition to ours. We might thus pass over the other matters introduced, as not *ad rem*. "They may have been united under no visible organization." This we know historically was not the fact, but we did not attempt from the texts the *Christian Register* is interpreting to prove the contrary. We attempted, indeed, to prove the visibility of the body of teachers, but in another place, and by other evidence, of which the Protestant critic, as a matter of course, takes no notice. The visibility follows necessarily from the office of teaching, because if not a visible body the teachers could not discharge the duties imposed by their

commission. "They may often have had no personal knowledge of each other's existence." If this means that there might have been a Christian teacher who had no knowledge of a Christian teacher or teachers besides himself, the *Christian Register* will oblige us by proving it; if it means that there were often Christian teachers who were ignorant of the existence of certain other Christian teachers, we can very readily concede it. "They may have been scattered in distant parts of the earth, so as to have no communication with each other." Save through the one body in which they were all united, this may, no doubt, sometimes have happened, as for longer or shorter periods it sometimes happens now to our missionaries. "They may have acted under different forms of church polity." If this means that they may have acted under different church polities, it is false and absurd, because the *Christian Register* concedes that they were "one body," with one and the same faith, under the same authority, with one Lord and one living head, and different polities implies different bodies, diverse authorities, Lords, and heads. According to the *Christian Register*, Jesus Christ is the immediate Lord and head of the body, and as he is one, and as there can be no polity without a head, it follows necessarily that there can be only one Christian church polity, and all polities distinguishable from that one have another than our Lord for their head.

"Here is one instance of fatally bad reasoning, just at the vital point of the argument." The bad reasoning, we are afraid, is the *Christian Register's*, not ours, and it is clear that its own interpretation, as far as consistent with itself, accords with our own. The *Christian Register* has done as well as it could, and deserves the credit of having labored hard to convict us of fallacious reasoning; but the nature of the case was adverse to its success. It did not take the pains to master our own reasoning, and imagined a flaw where none can be found. It finds itself obliged to concede that our Lord did send forth his teachers with full authority to teach all nations whatsoever he commanded them, and that these teachers constitute "one body" under Christ, their living head; therefore that Christ did commission a body or corporation of teachers, with full authority to teach. It is obliged to exclude from Christian teachers all who call themselves Christian teachers and are not of this body, and, as it holds as well as we, that Christian teachers must continue until the consummation of the world,

it is also obliged to concede the indefectibility of the body. As the first teachers perished, "he raised up others to take their place and to carry on their work," and continues, it must concede, and will continue to raise up new teachers, as the old pass off, till time shall be no more. These new teachers are the successors and continuators of the old, because they take *their* place and do *their* work. Hence, the *Christian Register* concedes every point, except one, that under this head we contend for; namely, the infallibility of the body of teachers. But if it concedes the rest, it must also concede that, for the infallibility follows necessarily from the commission to teach, and the promise of Christ to be with the body of pastors and teachers "all days unto the consummation of the world." The practised eye does not, therefore, find "a fatal flaw" in the link which "connects the engine to the cars."

"We detect something of the kind in every form under which Mr. Brownson has attempted to prove the exclusive authority of the Roman Catholic Church. 'We can establish,' he [Mr. Brownson] says, 'the regular succession of pontiffs from St. Peter to Gregory XVI. (now Pius IX.), and this establishes the unity of the corporation in time, and therefore its identity.' *He can prove no such thing.*" We have before us a complete list of all the popes from St. Peter to Pius IX., with the date of each one's accession to the pontificate, and the length of his reign; and with the exception of the last, yet living, the year and day of his death, taken from official and authentic records. This is at least *prima facie* evidence, and sufficient till something is introduced to produce a contrary presumption. "He cannot prove that St. Peter ever saw Rome, still less that he ever exercised any authority over the other apostles like that which the Bishop of Rome exercises over the other bishops." The first assertion here is simply ridiculous, and the *Christian Register* might just as well say that we cannot prove that there was ever such a personage on earth as Jesus of Nazareth. There is, as the *Christian Register* well knows, if it has studied the question, precisely the same kind of evidence to prove that St. Peter was at Rome, and was bishop of that see, that there is that our Lord was crucified at Jerusalem, and to deny its sufficiency in the former case is to deny its sufficiency in the latter. You have in the latter case only uniform tradition and institutions growing out of the fact, and dating back to the

time, and in the former you have the same. The see of Rome has existed uninterruptedly from the time of St. Peter, has always been called by his name, and its uniform tradition is that he was its founder. This tradition has been recognized by the whole Christian world, in every age, uncontradicted save by here and there an individual in very recent times. This is proof enough.

The second assertion, namely, that we cannot prove that St. Peter "exercised any authority over the other apostles like that which the Bishop of Rome exercises over the other bishops," amounts to nothing, even if true. All the apostles had each an extraordinary mission, and were, like St. Peter, inspired by the Holy Ghost, and he had no occasion to exercise an authority over them of the kind his successors exercise over other bishops. The other bishops succeed not to the extraordinary mission of the apostles, that is, to the apostleship, which each of the apostles received, but simply to the episcopate. The successors of St. Peter alone succeeded to the apostleship, and their authority is not authority over apostles, but over bishops. But that St. Peter was the prince or chief of the apostles is clearly proved from Scripture and uninterrupted tradition, and, if our Lord had not established the primacy of authority and jurisdiction in him and his see, the Bishop of Rome and his successor could never have caused himself to be acknowledged as supreme visible head and ruler of the church. The supremacy of the see of Rome is distinctly recognizable throughout the Christian world prior to Constantine, as has been amply proved by our authors, and therefore before the popes were able to exercise or call to their assistance one particle of temporal power. It was not, therefore, and could not have been, by the aid of the temporal power that they established their supremacy. Since the governments of Europe became Christian, the general and almost uniform tendency of their action has been, not to strengthen, but to weaken, the authority of the pope over the bishops. How, then, came the supremacy of the popes to be established? Were they ambitious, greedy of power? Suppose they were; they cannot be said to have been more so than were the other bishops, and the tendency in each bishop must have been as strong to resist papal encroachment as in the pope to encroach, and the tendency of all united must have been incalculably stronger. How, then, did the pope alone, who according to you must have been in the beginning only

the equal of any other bishop as to his office, impeded rather than aided by the temporal powers, succeed, against the united tendency of all the bishops throughout Christendom, in usurping an unjust authority over them all? He could have established his authority only by a miracle, and a miracle can never be wrought in favor of usurpation and injustice. It is impossible to explain the possession or exercise of the supreme authority of the Bishops of Rome, except on the supposition that it was a part of the original constitution of the church. It evidently was not and could not have been acquired little by little, through the strength of the Roman Pontiff and the weakness of the other bishops.

"In the historical, as in the logical argument, an important link is wanting." A decided mistake; for no link is wanting in either. "We recognize the church under the original apostles." Are you sure of that? "There is no intimation of any supremacy or superiority of Peter over others." By what authority do you say that? You cannot read even the New Testament without perceiving the contrary. Peter is always there represented as the first, and receives from our Lord a special commission,—"Feed my sheep," "Feed my lambs," "Confirm thy brethren,"—which necessarily implies, not only a superiority, but a very great superiority. "Afterwards we see the church submerging [emerging?] from a period of which we know scarcely any thing; but with features so changed that we can hardly resist the belief that it had departed from its original simplicity, and had already begun to borrow largely from human inventions and from a heathen worship." That is, you paint a fancy piece which you call a portrait of the church under the apostles, and because subsequently you find it is not a likeness, you gravely conclude the church must have changed her features! Admirable logic! It would not be unreasonable to ask you to prove that your fancy piece is a true likeness of the original features of the church, before you conclude from the fact, that as she emerges from the period of persecution into the full historical light of the third and fourth centuries, she differs from it, she has changed, and no longer resembles herself. Then, again, it is not to reason very wisely to suppose that the church in the martyrage, when Christians were in their greatest fervor, faith was strong and love invincible, rejoicing to suffer for Christ's sake, would depart from her original simplicity; and that then, when she was suffering the most severe persecutions

from the heathen and from wicked men, she would be in the temper to borrow largely from human inventions and from a heathen worship. Adversity purifies, instead of corrupting, and if the church could be corrupted at all, it would be in her seasons of worldly prosperity, not in her seasons of temporal adversity. Moreover, the features which The *Christian Register* would contend were borrowed from a heathen worship were hers before they can be found in any form of gentilism. It is a favorite theory with the Unitarians and with some German authors, that those doctrines and practices of Christianity to which they object were introduced into the church through Neo-platonism; but, unhappily for this theory, they were all in the church before Neo-platonism was born, and as a matter of fact, were borrowed by Neo-platonists from Christianity. Neo-platonism was born with Plotinus, who commenced philosophizing in 260, and who was accused by the gentiles of Christianizing. The Emperor Julian the Apostate reorganized paganism throughout the empire, and gave it some features in common with the Christian hierarchy; but those are features which you shall in vain look for in the heathen world prior to the Christian Church. A little acquaintance with chronology is sometimes a convenience. The *Christian Register* made a slight mistake; it is its logic, not ours, that fails for want of historical evidence.

But the *Christian Register* brings up another and a still more important instance of our defective logic. To place this new instance fairly before our readers, we must cite the passages at length from our article entitled *Protestantism ends in Transcendentalism*, from which the instance is professedly taken:

"Finally, it will, perhaps, be alleged, inasmuch as all Protestants did at first, and some of them do now, appeal to the written word, or the Holy Scriptures, in justification of their dissent, that they have in these a real or a pretended authority, external to and independent of the dissenter, distinct from and paramount to that of the church. But a moment's reflection will show, even if the Scriptures were not in favor of the church, that this is a mistake. The Holy Scriptures proposed, and their sense declared, by the church, we hold with a firm faith to be the word of God, and therefore of the highest authority; but, if not so proposed and interpreted, though in many respects important and authentic historical documents, and valuable for their excellent didactic teachings, they would not and could not be for us the inspired, and, in a supernatural sense, the authoritative, word of God. To the Protestant

they are not and cannot be an authority external to the dissenter; because, denying the unwritten word, the church, and all authoritative tradition, he has no external authority to vouch for the fact that they are the inspired word of God, or to declare their genuine sense. If there be no external authority to decide that the Bible is the word of God, and to declare its true sense, the authority ascribed to it in the last analysis, according to the principle we have established, is only the authority of some internal principle in the individual dissenting; for, in that case, the individual, by virtue of this internal principle, decides, with the Bible as without it, what is and what is not God's word, what God has and has not revealed; and therefore what he is, and what he is not bound to believe, what he is and what he is not bound to do."—Vol. VI., pp. 120, 121.

"If we assert the right of private judgment to interpret the Holy Scriptures, we must assert its right in all cases whatsoever; for the principle on which private judgment can be defended in one case is equally applicable in every case. Will it be said that private judgment must yield to God's word? Granted. But what is God's word? The Bible. How know you that? Do you determine that the Bible is the word of God by some external authority, or by private judgment? Not by some external authority, because you have none, and admit none. By private judgment? Then the authority of the Bible is *for you* only private judgment. The Bible does not propose itself, and therefore can have no authority higher than the authority which proposes it. Here is a serious difficulty for those Protestants who set up such a clamor about the Bible, and which shows them, or ought to show them, that, whatever the Bible may be for a Catholic, for them it can, in no conceivable contingency, be any thing but a human authority. *The authority of that which is proposed is of the same order as that which proposes, and cannot transcend it.* This is a Protestant argument, and is substantially the great argument of Chillingworth against Catholicity. Nothing proposes the Bible to Protestants but private judgment, as is evident from their denial of all other authority; and therefore in the Bible they—not we, thank God!—have only the authority of private judgment, and therefore only the word of man, and not the word of God. If the authority on which Protestants receive the word of God is only that of private judgment, then there is for them in the Bible only private judgment; and then nothing to restrict private judgment, for private judgment can itself be no restriction on private judgment."—*Ib.* pp. 125, 126.

The *Christian Register* attempts to retort the argument we here use, and from our own principles of reasoning to show that, if Protestants have in the Bible taken and interpreted by private judgment only private judgment, we have in the church only private judgment; for we ourselves, it contends, have nothing else on which to take the church,

or by which to interpret her teachings. This is not original with the *Christian Register*. Chillingworth attempted the same retort, and Dr. Edward Beecher, in the *Christian Alliance*, and the *Episcopal Observer*, in replying some time since to this same article of ours, also attempted it. It would seem, therefore, that Protestants really imagine that the retort is allowable, and capable of being sustained. "How am I," says the *Christian Register*, "a Protestant, out of the Roman Catholic church, to recognize it as a supernatural and infallible authority? Through my own private judgment. No other way is possible with the church any more than with the Bible. Hence the authority of the church can be only private judgment."

We have answered this objection time and again in our pages, and it is answered substantially in the essay entitled *The Church against No-Church*, where we establish the infallibility of reason in her own province. But our Protestant friends are poor philosophers, and very slow to understand distinctions which are not in their favor. The objection asserts that we take, and must take, the authority of the church to teach on private judgment, because we have, and can have, nothing else on which to take it. This we very explicitly deny. Th authority of the church to teach rests on the divine commission. "But the fact of the commission; you take that on private judgment." Not at all. We take it on historical testimony. "But that historical testimony is taken on private judgment." Wrong again; for that testimony is addressed to the common reason of all men, and not simply to the private judgment of the individual. Here is the error of our Protestant friends. They recognize no distinction between reason and private judgment. Reason is common to all men; private judgment is the special act of an individual, an individual judgment, formed, not by virtue of a principle common to him and other men, but by a principle of judgment proper or peculiar to himself. Where the judgment is formed by a standard, criterion, rule, or principle of judgment common to all men, or by testimony addressed to the common reason of all men, the judgment is catholic, not private. That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time; every contingent existence must have a cause not contingent—are not private judgments, but belong alike to all men. That there was such a city as pagan Rome, and such

a man as Julius Cæsar, are historical facts provable to the common reason of all men, not private judgments. In all matters of this sort there is a criterion of certainty beyond the individual, and evidence is adducible which ought to convince the reason of every man, and which, when adduced, does convince the reason of every man of ordinary understanding, unless through his own fault. Private judgment is not so called, as the *Christian Register* appears to imagine, because it is the judgment of an individual, but because it is a judgment rendered by virtue of a private rule or principle of judgment. Are the planets so many worlds, inhabited, as is our earth? You say, Yes, or No. Either, on your part, is a private judgment, because it is based on no principle of reason, and supported by no testimony,—in a word, supported by nothing out of yourself as an individual,—and is, therefore, nothing but a private opinion, and would be nothing else, even though the mass of mankind should entertain it. The distinction here is sufficiently obvious, and from it we may conclude that nothing is to be termed *private judgment* which is demonstrable from reason or provable by testimony.

Now we take, in our argumentative process with unbelievers, the church on reason and testimony, and therefore not on private judgment, as we show in the article referred to:

"Taking the facts in the case to be as here supposed, the only points in the process to which exceptions can possibly be taken, or which can by any one be alleged to be not infallibly certain, are, 1. The competency of natural reason from historical testimony to establish the fact that the miracles were actually performed; 2. Admitting the facts to be infallibly ascertainable, the competency of reason to determine infallibly whether they are miracles or not; 3. The competency of reason to conclude from the miracle the divine authority of the miracle-worker; 4. Its competency from historical documents to ascertain infallibly the fact of the appointment of the body of teachers, and the promise made them. These four points, unquestionably essential to the validity of the argument, are to be taken, we admit, on the authority of reason. Can reason determine these with infallible certainty? But, if you say it can, you affirm the infallibility of reason, and then it of itself suffices, without other infallible teacher; if you say it cannot, you deny the possibility of establishing infallibly the infallibility of your body of teachers.

"Reason is infallible within its own province, but not in regard to what transcends its reach. To deny the infallibility of reason within its province would be to deny the possibility not only of faith, but of both

science and knowledge, and to sink into absolute scepticism,—even to 'doubt that doubt itself be doubting,'—which is impossible; for no man doubts that he doubts. Revelation does not deny reason, but presupposes it. The objection to reason is not that it cannot judge infallibly of *some* matters, but that it cannot judge infallibly of *all* matters. But, because it cannot judge infallibly of all matters, to say it can judge infallibly of none is not to reason justly. As well say, we are not infallibly certain that we see the tree before our window, because we cannot see all that may be going on in the moon. It is infallibly certain that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time; that two things respectively equal to a third are equal to one another; that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; that what begins to exist must have a creator; that every effect must have a cause, and that every supernatural effect must have a supernatural cause, and that the change of one natural substance into another natural substance is a supernatural effect; that every voluntary agent acts to some end, and every wise and good agent to a wise and good end. These and the like propositions are all infallibly certain. Reason, within its sphere, is therefore infallible; but out of its sphere it is null.

"Human testimony, within its proper limits, backed by circumstances, monuments, institutions which presuppose its truth and are incompatible with its falsehood, is itself infallible. We have never seen London, but we have no occasion to see it in order to be as certain of its existence as we are of our own. History, too, is a science; and although every thing narrated in it may not be true or even probable, yet there are historical facts as certain as mathematical certainty itself. It is infallibly certain that there were in the ancient world the republics of Athens, Sparta, and Rome; that there was a peculiar people called the Jews, that this people dwelt in Palestine; that they had a chief city, named Jerusalem, in this chief city a superb temple dedicated to the worship of the one God, and that this chief city was taken by the Romans, this temple burnt, and this people, after an immense slaughter, were subdued, and dispersed among the nations, where they remain to this day. Here are historical facts, which can be infallibly proved to be facts.

"Now, the miracles, regarded as facts, are simple historical facts, said to have occurred at a particular time and place, and are in their nature as susceptible of historical proof as any other facts whatever. Ordinary historical testimony is as valid in their case as in the case of Cæsar's or Napoleon's battles. Reason, observing the ordinary laws of historical criticism, is competent to decide infallibly on the fact whether they are proved to have actually occurred or not. Reason, then, is competent to the *first* point in the process of proof, namely, the fact of the miracles.

"It is equally competent to the *second* point, namely, whether the fact alleged to be a miracle really be a miracle. A miracle is a supernatural

effect produced in or on natural objects. The point for reason to make out, after the fact is proved, is whether the effect actually witnessed be a *supernatural* effect. That it can do this in every case, even when the effect is truly miraculous, we do not pretend; but that it can do it in some cases, we affirm, and to be able to do it in one suffices. When we see one natural substance changed into another natural substance, as in the case of converting water into wine, we know the change is a miracle; for nature can no more change herself than she could create herself. So, when we see a man who has been four days dead, and in whose body the process of decomposition has commenced and made considerable progress, restored to life and health, sitting with his friends at table and eating, we know it is a miracle; for to restore life when extinct is no less an act of creative power than to give life. It is giving life to that which before had it not, and is therefore an act which can be performed by no being but God alone. Reason, then, is competent to determine the fact whether the alleged miracle really be a miracle. It is competent, then, to the second point in the process of proof.

"No less competent is it to the *third*, namely, the divine commission of the miracle-worker. In proving the event to be a miracle, we prove it to be wrought by the power of God. Now, we know enough of God, by the natural light of reason, to know that he cannot be the accomplice of an impostor, that he cannot work a miracle by one whose word may not be taken. The miracle, then, establishes the credibility of the miracle-worker. Then, the miracle-worker is what he says he is. If he says he is God, he is God; if he says he speaks by divine authority, he speaks by divine authority, and we have God's authority for what he says. The third point, then, comes within the province of natural reason, and may be infallibly settled.

"The *fourth* point is a simple historical question; for it concerns what was done and said by our blessed Lord in regard to the appointment of a body of teachers. It is to be settled historically, by consulting the proper documents and monuments in the case. It is not a question of speculation, of interpretation even, but simply a question of fact, to which reason is fully competent, and which it can, with proper prudence and documents, settle infallibly."—Vol. V., pp. 370–373.

The *Christian Register* may reply, that it may vindicate the authority of the Scriptures by reason and testimony, and therefore that it is not true to say that it has in them only private judgment. May thus vindicate their authority as historical documents, we concede, and also contend; but as divinely inspired documents, we deny, because divine inspiration is a supernatural fact, remaining in all senses in the supernatural order, and therefore not cognizable by natural reason. But if by the miracles we establish the divine

commission of the sacred writers, why may we not infer their inspiration as writers from it, as well as you infer from it the authority and infallibility of the church or body of pastors and teachers? Because, 1. In the case of the greater part of the sacred writers, to say the least, you cannot establish by miracles the fact of their divine commission; and because, 2. You have in the case even of those whose divine commission to teach you can through the miracles historically establish, if such there are, no declaration of their own that they were divinely commissioned or divinely inspired to write. Whether the Scriptures are inspired or not must, therefore, be for you mere private judgment; but that the church has authority to teach rests on the express declaration of our Lord himself, proved by the miracles he performed to be sent from God and to speak with divine authority, even on the ground as to his divinity assumed by Unitarians.

It may be objected, after all, that, since the authority never transcends the authority on which it is received, the authority of the church, being taken on natural reason, is only the authority of natural reason, which is not sufficient for faith, for the church is the witness to the fact of revelation, and we contend that the witness to that fact must be supernatural. That we have in the argument only the authority of reason for asserting the supernatural authority of the church, and therefore only the authority of reason that what she teaches of the supernatural order is true, we frankly concede, and never have pretended and never do pretend to the contrary. But this is enough for all the purposes of the argument. This proves to reason that the authority is supernatural and infallible, and therefore that whatever the church teaches is infallibly true. This is all that reason can ask, because it answers every objection that reason can urge. It is enough for rational proof, enough to render the logical process complete. Of course, it is not enough to enable us to elicit an act of supernatural faith. It is sufficient for what theologians term human faith—*fides humana*—and it were absurd to ask more than human faith from any rational or logical process whatever. This human faith does not, indeed, make one a Christian; it does not bring him into the supernatural order, and enable him to elicit the Christian virtues. It leaves him still in the order of nature, without doing any thing positive to translate him into the order of grace. Supernatural faith in the

subject—divine faith, as theologians term it, *fides divina*, as distinguished from human faith—is the gift of God, an infused virtue, and is elicited only by supernatural grace, or, as it is termed, the *donum fidei*, or gift of faith. The creditive subject must be elevated by this gift above nature to the plane of the supernatural credible object, in order to elicit what we call an act of faith. This is the case with every Catholic believer; and when so elevated by grace he believes without any discursive process whatever. But this supernatural faith, proceeding from a supernatural principle infused into the subject and seizing the supernatural object with supernatural energy and firmness, belongs solely to the believer, and is never the result of any logical process whatever, and is never demanded of unelevated or natural reason. Conceding, then, that in the argument for the church we do not rise above the principle of natural reason, it is no objection, because nothing more is necessary to the conclusiveness of the argument, although something more, and even of a different order, is essential to conversion or to eliciting an act of supernatural faith.

The retort of the *Christian Register* cannot be sustained, and its third instance of fallacious reasoning on our part exists only in its own misconception. But it continues and attempts to retort upon us the argument we use to prove that the Protestant, in the Bible interpreted by private judgment, has only private judgment.

"Again, Mr. Brownson maintains the necessity of an infallible church, because faith is essential to salvation, and faith is a belief in all the truths that Jesus taught. But no man, without such an infallible guide, can be sure that he has the truth and nothing but the truth, and therefore without such a guide no man can be saved. We may read the Bible, he says, but no fallible man can be sure that he receives the truth there as it was in the mind of Jesus and his apostles, and therefore a true faith [from reading the Bible] is impossible. But how is this? There must somewhere be a point of contact between the infallible supernatural teacher and the weak and fallible disciple, and wherever that point is *there is liability to mistake*. If I may not receive the words of Christ, the supernatural infallible teacher, in the sense in which he spoke, neither can there be any certainty that I receive the interpretation put upon them by the church in precisely the sense which my infallibly supernatural teacher, the church, attaches to them. The argument here is as strong against the church as against the Bible. With Mr. Brownson's definition of the faith essential to salvation, there is no such thing as faith or salvation possible, except with those who belong to the infallible order, and even they as individuals are fallible, and therefore as individuals cannot be saved."

Faith that can be deceived is not faith, but merely persuasion, or opinion, unless we are to change at our own caprice the established sense of words. We defined faith as it is usually defined by theologians, in the sense in which it is generally received, and if the *Christian Register* denies that sense, it must forego the use of the word, for it has no right to use it in an arbitrary sense of its own. The first remark, therefore, which we make on this extract is, that it denies all faith and even the possibility of faith. Let this not be set down to the Unitarianism of its author. The same argument of ours has been commented on by Unitarians, Episcopalians, and Calvinists, and they all take the ground of the *Christian Register* in opposition to it. We commend this fact to those of our Catholic friends who think us too severe and sweeping in our remarks, when we allege that Protestants have no faith and even contend that faith is not possible. "There must somewhere be a point of contact between the infallible supernatural teacher and the weak and fallible disciple, and wherever that point is there is liability to mistake." If this be so, then there can, of course, be no infallible faith, and therefore all Christians may have been deceived, may have been mistaken in their belief that Christ has come into the world, and has suffered and died for them, —that there is a future life, a future judgment, a heaven and hell; and, notwithstanding their cheering hopes of immortality, they may have been like the beasts that perish. How true it is that they who are out of the church have lost, not only faith, but all conception of faith in the proper sense of the term!

The *Christian Register* is misled by its unsound philosophy, which makes the truth of all knowledge depend entirely on the subject knowing, or teaches that the light by which objects are apprehensible is a purely subjective light, and therefore that the object derives its intelligibility from the subject apprehending it. This is a mistake. We intellectually apprehend objects because they are intelligible, instead of their being intelligible because we apprehend them, and hence the light by which they are intelligible is objective, not subjective. Consequently, if that light is infallible, the apprehension, as far as it goes, is infallible. Thus St. Thomas, whom we dare cite even to the *Christian Register* as a philosopher, maintains that the intellect is always true. It is very true that there must always be a point of contact somewhere between the teacher and the

disciple, but not therefore is there always liability to mistake on that point, because the affirmation is made by the teacher, and not by the disciple, by virtue of the objective and not of the subjective light, and if the teacher is infallible, it is precisely on the point of contact that the disciple cannot mistake or be deceived. To deny this is to fall into universal scepticism, and a man who avows universal scepticism is not permitted to attempt to reason, for to reason is to affirm reason and to assert the principle of certainty. If the *Christian Register* falls back on universal scepticism, it cannot open its mouth to us, or say a single word for or against us; if it admits certainty at all, it must concede that on the point where the infallible teacher and the disciple come in contact there is no liability to mistake.

As to the attempted retort of our argument, we answer, there is a disparity. The church is a living teacher, and interprets her own words, the Bible is a dead book and does not interpret itself. If Christ were present speaking as he was present speaking to his apostles, there would be necessarily no more liability of mistaking his words than those uttered by the church. But when his words and those dictated by the Holy Ghost to the apostles are not spoken by a living voice, but merely recorded, and recorded as they are in the Bible, no man of common sense and common honesty can pretend that they are no more liable to be mistaken than the teachings of the church, always present, if there is any difficulty, to explain it, and if any misapprehension, to correct it. The retortion therefore fails, and again it is the *Christian Register's* logic, not ours, that is at fault. It is it, not we, that should be accused of having "a fatal flaw" in the link that connects the engine to the cars. That was a rash accusation on the part of the *Christian Register.*

"Such is the absurdity involved in Mr. Brownson's reasoning on the most momentous of all subjects." The absurdity is in the *Christian Register's* own fancy. As yet it has not detected a single flaw in our reasoning, or substantiated its charges on a single point. "Yet because we cannot acknowledge the monstrous assumptions of a church which claims such a power, there is no end to the abuse that is poured upon us." No such thing, Mr. Register. In the first place, you are not abused at all; and in the second place, you are complained of, not because you cannot acknowledge "monstrous absurdities," but because you shut your eyes to plain

truth, reject God's church, and refuse to yield to solid reasons,—because you propagate doctrines as Christian truth which you know repose only on your private opinions, in regard to which you are well aware you may be mistaken, and for which you must yourself confess you have no adequate authority. You preach your own words instead of God's word, and thereby err yourself, and lead others into error to the ruin of their souls. This is why the severe language you cite from our pages against Protestants is used. That language is not complimentary, we concede; it is plain, strong, energetic, and very much to the purpose; but it is not abusive, for the conduct of Protestants even more than justifies it. Nor is it, as you insinuate, uttered in an angry tone. "This sounds to us like angry abuse poured out by an unsuccessful and disappointed assailant." The *Christian Register* can hardly say this seriously of any language we have used. It cannot read our pages without being well aware that we never write under the influence of passion, that we write always with a perfect command of our own temper, and with words chosen with due deliberation. And in what have we been unsuccessful or disappointed? We have been unsuccessful in no controversy we have waged, and have been disappointed in nothing, or if in any thing, only in the feebleness and want of candor in our Protestant opponents. Compare our language with that habitually used by Protestants when speaking of Catholics and Catholicity, and it is the very quintessence of mildness itself. Even the *Christian Register* itself, in this very article on which we are commenting, unconsciously uses language far more offensive to Catholics than any we have used is to Protestants, and yet we have selected it to reply to, because it is the least faulty in that respect of any article of the sort that has fallen under our eyes, save in the *Mercersburg Review*, the only Protestant periodical in the country, with which we are acquainted, that does not feel itself at liberty to outrage common decency when it speaks of us or of our church. We suppose the *Christian Register* calls a sentence like the following very polite and respectful: "When we think of Mr. Brownson, with his commanding intellect, his great intelligence and fearlessness of thought, his once Christian views of spiritual worship, as due to God only, it is with painful humiliation and sadness that we find him *the victim of the low superstition* which is implied in language like the following from his preface:

'Placing this volume, though all unworthy, under the protection of our blessed Lady, as I do myself and all my labors and interests, I send it forth to the public,' &c." Here the critic plainly charges us with having become the victim of idolatry and superstition, when, poor man! it is doubtful whether he can give even an intelligible definition of either. "When once a man has wandered from the simplicity of the Christian faith, and given up the truth as it is in Jesus, there is no end to the degradation and delusion into which he may be led." Nothing more true, and if the *Christian Register* has any doubts on the subject, the study of Protestant heresiarchs and sects will remove them. "The history of such a mind is one which we look upon with profound pity and sorrow." We look upon it with the same feeling. "The mournful absurdities into which the powerful intellect has involved itself is the least painful part of the picture." No doubt of it.

Now all this lamentation over us is mere affectation, and the *Christian Register* cannot even hope to deceive even the most credulous of its readers by it. Unitarians, generally, entertain a far higher and a far sincerer respect for us personally than they did when we were one of themselves. Their very deportment to us when we meet one of them proves it. The profound pity and sorrow the *Christian Register* speaks of on our account is all moonshine. Why should its excellent editor feel either? He does not doubt that we are at least as safe as a Catholic as we should be as a Unitarian; for he and his Unitarian brethren hold a man can be saved in any religion, or in none at all. None of them believe in the eternal punishment of the sinner. In the Christian sense, they believe neither in heaven nor hell, and the only future state they acknowledge, unless they have very much changed of late, is the continuance of the soul in a future natural life. As to idolatry, the *Christian Register* well knows that our views of worship are, to say the least, as spiritual as ever they were, and that no Catholic believes it right to pay supreme worship to any but God alone. As for superstition, we were in the habit of praying to the Blessed Virgin and the saints when a Unitarian minister, and also for the dead. It *was* superstition in us then, we fear, but it is not now; for now we have authority for doing so, and we ask nothing of the saints that they are not able to do. If we had dedicated the volume to our natural mother, and placed it under her pro-

tection, the *Christian Register* would never have dreamed of calling it superstition. Let it remember that our blessed Lady, our spiritual mother, is equally near and dear to us, and loves us with a purer and far more tender love. If the Blessed Virgin had been still alive on earth, the *Christian Register* would not have called us the victim of superstition, if we had placed it under her protection. Well, let it know that the Blessed Virgin is as truly living as when she stood by the foot of the cross, and has none the less power to grant us the protection we ask of her. We call her Blessed; will the *Christian Register* dare deny that she is blessed, and the most blessed among women?

But enough. The remainder of the article contains nothing calling particularly for remark. We have considered and replied to every thing like argument we have been able to detect in the *Christian Register's* article, and we have aimed to reply fairly and logically to every point it has made. We trust we have replied with at least as much candor and courtesy as the *Christian Register* itself has observed. We have replied to the article, notwithstanding it appeared in the columns of a weekly paper, because it seemed for the most part to be seriously written, and because, though short, it contains the best that Protestants can say against us or our church, the sum and substance of all that approaches to argument they ever have said or ever will say. They may write volumes, but they will say no more than the *Christian Register* has said. We trust, therefore, our readers will pardon us the space we have given it, and not accuse us of making too much of a small thing. Our logic was assailed, and we have chosen to vindicate it, because in so doing we could show how weak and insignificant is all that Protestants have to allege against the church, and therefore how unimportant it is to pay any attention to their objections.

A CONSISTENT PROTESTANT.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1853.]

THEODORE PARKER, as our readers are aware, is a Protestant minister of the Congregational order, in this city, who has gained within the last few years no little notoriety. He was brought up, we believe, in the way of thinking of our Puritan fathers, but made his first appearance before the public as a minister in connection with the Unitarian Congregationalists. What he calls himself now, or wishes others to call him, we are unable to say; but judging from the sermons before us, we presume he would not be pleased to be called a Christian, and would prefer to be called simply a man, perhaps, THE MAN, by way of eminence, as the only real and true man among us.

In the commencement of his career, we knew Mr. Parker well, and regarded him as a young man of great promise; he was of the same school with ourselves, and was closely connected with our dearest personal friends; we counted much on him as a fellow-laborer in the work in which we were then engaged; and were among the very few Unitarian ministers who ventured to defend him from the attacks of his more conservative brethren. We did not, however, accept even then all his views, and we detected in him a disposition to push Protestantism even further than we were prepared to go; but we trusted that as he grew older he would become less unbelieving, and more Christian, and as we knew him to be well grounded in the great Protestant principle of the right of private judgment, we gave him our hearty sympathy, and such support as we had to give. We knew him to possess good natural abilities, great quickness of mind, a ready wit, and a brilliant fancy,—to be a diligent student, a great reader, and a scholar of more than ordinary attainments among the scholars of our country, and we hoped that he would ultimately prove a real bene-

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* *Two Sermons preached before the Twenty-eighth Congregational Society, in Boston, on the 14th and 21st of November, 1852, on leaving their Old and entering a New Place of Worship.* By THEODORE PARKER, Minister of that Society. Boston: 1853.

factor to his race. It was thus we regarded him when we were ourselves still a Protestant, dreaming of "the Church of the Future," or of a new church to be founded by men, and as far in advance of the old church, as the old was in advance of Greek and Roman paganism. We may say, now that we can look upon him and his works from the Catholic point of view, that he is a more consistent Protestant than we ever were, or ever could have been, and has proved himself, upon the whole, an abler man than we ever expected him to be.

Mr. Parker complains in these sermons of the opposition he has encountered, represents himself as persecuted, and tells us that he is hated, perhaps no man in the community more so. We think he is mistaken in this. No man in this community differs more widely from Mr. Parker than we do, more thoroughly detests his views, or has written so much against them; but the thought of hating him never came into our head or our heart. Hatred cannot be felt by us for such a man as Mr. Parker; we pity him too much to hate him. He is not, and never has been, a persecuted man; he is and always has been treated with remarkable tenderness; and he enjoys a consideration and exerts an influence which prove that the Protestant heart of the community beats in secret unison with his own. He may not be personally popular, but it appears to us that he fancies himself persecuted and hated simply because he has an overweening love of approbation, and has placed his pretensions a little too high. He has learning, wit, eloquence; but he is neither strong nor amiable. He has a little dash of sentimentalism; but he has not the large, loving heart. He has no consideration for others, no self-forgetfulness, no disinterestedness, no generosity. He can never understand what he owes to an opponent, and has nothing but sarcasm and abuse for those who differ from him. He attacks every class of the community, denounces every doctrine and institution not in accordance with his private reason, and when called upon to defend his own course, he either takes refuge in undignified silence, or replies with a repetition of his sarcasms and abuse. He denies all authority, and then frets and scolds, or whines and whimpers, because he is not listened to as a divinely commissioned teacher. He proclaims the absolute right of private judgment in all men, and then regards himself as personally attacked, insulted, abused, persecuted, if others

exercise the right of private judgment against the doctrines he puts forth. He denies the authority of the church, of the Bible, of prophets, apostles, and even our Lord himself, and yet feels that we do him great wrong when we refuse to accept his own utterances as divine oracles, and to bow down to him as more than Bible, church, prophet, apostle, or Messiah, and worship him as the incarnate God. His pride blinds his judgment, and prevents him from seeing that, if there is any hostility to himself personally in this community, it is provoked by his own selfishness and arrogance, by his own want of proper consideration for others, and neglect of the ordinary courtesies of civilized life. He professes to be a man, and yet is grieved that he is not treated as a god; to speak merely from his own heart, and yet demands that he be listened to, if not as God, yet as one authorized to speak in the name of God. He ought to see that this is absurd, and that he must prove himself a god before he can reasonably complain of not being worshipped as God; or at least that he is authorized by God to speak in his name, before he can expect us to receive his utterances as divine oracles, or embrace them as truth merely because they are his utterances.

We have no disposition to single Mr. Parker out from the Protestant world as a special object of our attack,—we would rather defend him from the attacks of his Protestant brethren; but we confess that he renders this difficult, by his uniform refusal to reply to the objections seriously and respectfully urged against his doctrines. Mr. Parker, we may presume, regards the views which from time to time he puts forth as important; and he must know, since he rejects all authority, that the simple fact that he puts them forth is not a sufficient reason why we should believe them. He must regard himself in putting them forth as making his appeal to reason, and therefore as bound to abide by the judgment of reason. When, then, his views are taken up by others, and good reasons, or what appear to men of solid judgment as sufficient reasons, are adduced for not entertaining or for rejecting them, he is bound by every principle of reason and morality, either to reply and show that those reasons are inconclusive and his views may be true in spite of them, or else abandon his doctrines themselves, as shown to be untenable. This is a simple dictate of common sense. But this Mr. Parker never does. In no instance that has come to our knowledge has he ever met

an objection that has been urged against his doctrines. He cannot be reasoned, coaxed, or shamed into a reply, we say not to attacks on himself, but to sober arguments against his views. Who attacks them, he seems to hold, attacks him personally, and as it is more dignified and manly to leave attacks on ourselves unreplied to than it is to reply to them, he concludes that he is not only under no obligation to reply to the objections urged against them, but that he really deserves honor for his magnanimity in forbearing to do so. This is a part of Mr. Parker's conduct that we cannot easily defend, and it necessarily excludes him from the class of honorable opponents, and even of honorable men. He will not reason or give a reason to those that ask him for the hope that he professes to have in him. He shrinks from every challenge. This is a charge against himself personally, which he can refute or wipe out only by changing his course; although we admit that his refusal to reply to arguments against his views is his best policy, in case he loves his own views more than he loves truth, for were he to undertake to defend them against sharp-sighted opponents, he would very soon find that he could no longer hold them without incurring universal derision.

It is singular that it should be so, and yet you never find a man denying all authority in matters of belief who does not require you to listen to him as one having authority. A Catholic in stating what his church teaches, that is, in teaching the dogmas of his church, is clear, precise, and positive, because he speaks by an authority not his own, and to which he owes himself the same submission that is exacted of others. He when questioned has only to answer, The church teaches it; or if that answer does not suffice, he simply adduces the divine commission of the church to teach, and there ends the controversy. In all this he himself counts for nothing; his personal authority is considered neither by himself nor by others. He claims nothing for himself, and never dogmatizes. He tells only what he is told, and places himself above nobody, and asks nobody to believe any thing on the strength of his wisdom, sagacity, virtue, or learning. He is or may be perfectly humble, and there is nothing in his position or conduct to offend the pride of the most sensitive. God is all and in all, and the church, as the organ of the divine word, is always between him and his audience. A true Catholic, then, can never be

a dogmatist, can never be arrogant, can never assume any authority of his own. In discussing matters not decided by his church, or what are regarded as open questions, he may be firm, decided, earnest; but he relies not on his personal convictions, and claims respect for his opinions only in so far as he supports them by solid reasons. We hear ourselves sometimes accused of dogmatism; but we only smile at the charge. In stating the defined doctrines of the church and the universal dictates of reason, we always speak affirmatively, and state them as matters not to be disputed, not indeed because we state them, but because taught by an authority which cannot err, and which all alike are bound to accept. We thus state dogmas, but do not ourselves dogmatize, for they are not laid down as dogmas on our authority. In open questions, we never state our opinions as dogmas; we always give them as opinions, and, of course, as matters which may be disputed, for opinions, be they yours or ours, are always open to discussion; it is only faith, which is not opinion, but certain truth, that may not be questioned. Undoubtedly, we hold our opinions important, and defend them with earnestness, but we never yet felt that they were important because they were ours, and we never expect them to be received by others, except in virtue of the reasons independent of ourselves that we assign for them. Others have the right to dispute them, and if they show solid reasons against them, we are bound to abandon them. Thus it is with us, thus it is with every Catholic. There is no egotism, no assumption, no arrogance. The appeal is made never to a private, but always to a public tribunal, to a Catholic authority, to the universal church in matters of faith, and to universal reason in all other matters.

But the man who, like Mr. Parker, rejects all authority, who denies the authority of the church, the Scriptures, and the common reason of mankind, and asserts the unrestricted freedom of private judgment, is sure to set himself up as authority, and to claim for himself personally all the authority and infallibility that we Catholics claim for the sovereign pontiff or the church of God. Mr. Parker will suffer no authority in matters of belief above his own private judgment, and yet he sets himself up as supreme pontiff and god. No doubt he does it unconsciously, yet he does it; and we feel at every page of his writings that here is a mortal man, a weak and erring man, affecting to speak in his

own name with divine authority. Whence comes this? It comes, dear reader, from the fact that the human mind is so constituted that it cannot dispense with the principle of authority, and must always recognize and assert it in some shape or other. The fact is certain. All nations and all individuals in all ages of the world have, so far as history and tradition can be relied on, always admitted all the authority that we Catholics assert and contend for, and the difference is never as to the authority, but as to whom it belongs, or to who or what are its organs. The atheist admits it no less than the theist, only he ascribes it to nature, and the other to God. The divine, the pontifical, and the political authority was recognized and asserted by pagan no less than by Christian Rome. The pagan emperors claimed, and by their pagan subjects were acknowledged, to be at once emperors, supreme pontiffs, and gods, as every tyro in Roman history knows. The Protestant reformers, though they rejected the authority of the church, and made war on the principle of authority itself, yet recognized as much authority as they opposed, and claimed it for the prince, the state, the Scriptures, the sect, or the individual. They acknowledged even in spite of themselves a supreme authority somewhere to decide all questions of belief and conduct, and it were no difficult matter to resolve all the controversies of their motley descendants into disputes as to who or what is this authority, to whom it belongs, and who or what is its organ. Your modern liberalism, which rejects the church, the Bible, and kings and kaisers, and assumes for its motto, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, though affecting to deny all authority, yet asserts the supreme authority of the people, and tells us of people-king, people-pontiff, and people-god. The Come-outers, the men and women who deny the church, the king, and the people, yet assert the same authority for each individual, and maintain boldly that each individual has the right to say for himself, "I am the state, I am the church, I am sovereign pontiff, I am God." The reason lies in the constitution of the human mind, and in the nature of things. To speak in the language of a prevalent philosophy, which, however, is not ours, the *ideas* of the true and the good are inseparable from human reason, and the idea of supreme authority is inseparable from the ideas of the true and the good. Hence the human mind cannot operate without asserting supreme authority for both intellect and will, and when the individual fails to recognize

it elsewhere, he necessarily asserts it for himself, and falls into the palpable absurdity of denying all authority, and of asserting supreme authority for his own personal convictions. He cannot help himself if he would, because supreme authority is an internal truth, because it really exists, and the human mind cannot deny it, any more than it can affirm pure negation. The church lies, no doubt, in the supernatural order, above the reach of natural reason; but she is constituted in harmony with the principles of reason, and not one of her principles can be denied without denying reason itself; and there is no normal exercise of reason without the full recognition of the principles on which she is constituted, and on which she uniformly insists.

Freedom is not in exemption from all authority, but in exemption from all unjust, usurped, or false authority. Tyranny is not in the exercise of authority, but in the exercise of a usurped authority, and hence tyranny and the loss of freedom are always in proportion to departure from the authority of God, or rejection of the authority which he delegates. They who depart the furthest usurp the most authority, and are the greatest tyrants in principle, and as none depart further than Mr. Parker, so nowhere will you find a greater tyrant, or one less the friend of true freedom, whether civil or religious. We never read any writings which were more despotic in principle, or which contained less of the spirit of true liberty, than those of Mr. Parker. There is liberty on his tongue, but none in his heart; there is in words the proclamation of brotherhood, in spirit there is only rancor, hatred, bitterness, spite. Asserting the absolute freedom of opinion, he denounces in the severest terms all who do not agree with him; contending for the utmost freedom of action, and the rectitude of all human conduct, he denounces as monsters of iniquity all who do not square their lives by the arbitrary rules he chooses to lay down. Asserting in lofty terms the infallibility of all human nature in all ages and nations, he holds all men but himself to have fallen into damnable errors, and to deserve to be compassionated as fools or to be execrated as the enemies of God and man. Does he regard himself as consistent in all this! Can he not understand, that if all opinions are free, all are equally respectable? that if each has a perfect right to form his own opinions for himself, no one can be rightfully censured for his opinions, let them be what they may? that if each man's conscience is his sover-

eign rule of right, he has no right even in thought to arraign any man for his conduct, however different it may be from that enjoined by his own conscience? that if each man's reason and conscience are infallible, or if human nature in all men be infallible, there is and can be no error or sin in the world, and therefore he has no right to censure or accuse any one or any thing in the universe, in past or present times? It is hardly consistent for an optimist to talk as a pessimist, although professed optimists we have generally found to be in practice the most bitter and censorious of our acquaintances. They seem to think that holding all to be good gives them the privilege of denouncing all as evil, as to profess philanthropy gives one the privilege of hating every man in particular, and disregarding all the ordinary affections, courtesies, and civilities of life.

We are very far from wishing to throw any doubts on Mr. Parker's honesty or sincerity. We have been ourselves a Protestant minister like himself, and perhaps when we were so, we had most of the faults we detect in him; but he strikes us as greatly deficient in candor, we will not say in stating his own views, but in stating the views of others. He is not truthful, and he misstates apparently without scruple what he terms the popular theology. What he terms popular theology is for the most part Protestant theology, for which, as a general thing, we have as little respect as he has; but we hold that, however absurd or mischievous the views or systems which we oppose may be, we are bound in conscience to represent them correctly, and to oppose them for what they really are, not for what they are not. A victory gained by misrepresentation is never honorable to him who gains it, and of no advantage to the cause of truth. Now Mr. Parker uniformly misrepresents the popular theology, especially in those respects in which that theology coincides with ours, and all his witticisms and capital hits are founded on gross misrepresentations, and what seem to us wilful misstatements. It is reported that, preaching one day, he remarked that "with regard to the Bible different views are entertained. Some hold," he said, "to its plenary inspiration, that every word from the beginning of Genesis to the end of Revelation was dictated by infallible inspiration, and that the angels in their song at the birth of Jesus quoted the Septuagint version, and misquoted as they sang." The point of the joke supposes, as every one may see, that the angelic song, the *Gloria in Excelsis*, professes

to be a quotation from the Septuagint, and is a misquotation; but in fact it professes no such thing, and nothing in it or in the Scriptures gives one any right to pretend that it claims to be a quotation. The joke was obtained simply at the expense of the truth, and a false impression was made upon the audience, the majority of whom most likely would never think of questioning the fact assumed. This is only a specimen of what meets us on almost every page of the author's theological writings. The sermons before us are full of misstatements equally gross and barefaced, some of which before we close we may have occasion to point out. This fact proves that, though Mr. Parker may be sincere and honest in his views and aims, he is not an honest scholar, and is worthy of no reliance when the views and aims of others are concerned. He is not truthful, and evidently acts on the principle that the end sanctifies the means. We are sorry that it is so, for these things naturally excite hostility to him, and prevent us from assuming that the opposition he complains of is purely opposition to his doctrines, and from giving him our unqualified esteem as a brave man bravely struggling to sustain a cause which he regards as just and noble, although deceived. We esteem high moral qualities, even in the natural order, wherever we discover them, and we sometimes discover them coupled with false doctrines,—doctrines which we look upon with abhorrence; but we confess that we cannot esteem a man who lacks candor and truthfulness, who seems prepared to resort to any means which promise him a momentary triumph, or an undeserved laugh at his opponents. We cannot laugh with such a man, however witty, for his laughter is satanic; we cannot laugh at him, for to witness the abuse of the noble powers which God gives us is always painful.

We confess, and we are sorry to be obliged to confess, that we cannot regard Mr. Parker as either a strong or a truthful man. He is not a man of broad and elevated views, of high and generous aims, of a frank and noble nature; in his most serious efforts and loftiest aspirations there is always something low, something mean, something paltry. We always find something sinister and cowardly in every page of his writings, or at least something weak and spiteful, and he is the last man of our acquaintance to whom we could award the high praise he most covets, that of true manliness. Yet, with all these drawbacks, Mr. Parker is

far from being unpopular, and he is not seldom commended for the lofty and stern morality of his preaching. He may not be as fashionable as some of his brother ministers, but he is by far the first Protestant minister in this city as to talents, learning, and influence. It is idle to attempt to ignore him, or to pretend that his influence is diminishing. There is no evidence that he is sinking, or is likely to sink, into insignificance. For eight years he has sustained himself and continued to interest one of the largest Protestant congregations in the city, and that too in spite of the Protestant press and pulpit and the personal disadvantages we have indicated. He and his followers have just left their old and entered a new and much superior place of meeting, and it would seem that the number of his hearers is constantly increasing. His influence is not confined to this city. Strangers from all parts of the United States who visit us flock to hear him; his partisans are numerous in every town in the commonwealth, and he is invited to lecture before lyceums and literary institutions in other and distant states of the Union. His works are republished in England, and the party in Great Britain represented by the *Westminster Review* refer to him as the great man of our country, and reckon him as one of the great men of the age. He is a fact in our community, nay, in the American and British Protestant world, which cannot be overlooked, and which wise men must meet and dispose of as best they may.

Now the fact of the comparative popularity and undeniable influence of such a man in a Protestant community is very significant. We cannot ascribe it to his personal qualifications, we cannot ascribe it even to his eloquence, his wit, or his learning,—at least only in part; we cannot ascribe it any more to mere popular caprice or love of novelty. Certain it is that it can be explained only by conceding that he strikes a chord which vibrates through the whole heart of our Protestant community, and expresses its own secret thought, better than it can express it for itself. His strength lies in his genuine Protestantism, in his harmony with the Protestant tendencies of the community, and his bold development and eloquent statement of what Protestantism has seldom avowed to itself, it may be, but of what, as Dr. Newman would say, it has all along *meant*. He holds the place he does, because, disregarding the exterior forms of the Protestant world, its cant and pretensions, its shams and

inconsistencies, he makes himself the faithful exponent of the interior spirit and maning of Luther's reformation; because he tells in tolerably unequivocal terms, if not what that reformation professes to be, at least what it really is; if not what it is with the Protestant sects who still make some pretensions to dogmatic theology, at least what it must become, and rapidly is becoming, with all. It is in him we can best study Protestantism, and in this point of view his doctrines become significant and worth considering. Happily for us, he has given in these two sermons, especially in the first, as clear, as precise, and as unequivocal a statement of his views, as it was in his nature to do. He is rendering an account of his stewardship, and reciting what he calls his theological programmè, or, as our politicians say, "defining his position."

Whoever studies his "scheme of theology," (pp. 5–16) cannot fail to perceive that he unhesitatingly rejects all supernatural revelation, the whole gracious providence of God, and accepts only a very meagre system of naturalism, or natural mysticism. He, in words at least, admits a creative God, but he admits no gracious providence, and the only providence he recognizes is the providence which he says God owes to man. God, in all he does for us, is simply paying us what he owes us, which excludes all conception of grace or bounty. If God is in his providence only paying his honest debts, where is the room for gratitude? We may be very glad that he pays us what he owes us, but we can owe him no thanks. Mr. Parker is very clear in stating what God owes to us, but very vague and confused in stating what we owe to God. He fails, also, to explain how the Creator can render himself the debtor of his creature, who is and must be his absolute property. He does not tell us how the infinite, the perfect, the absolute God can be placed in the category of relation, and he does not inform us what is the ground of the reciprocal relation he assumes between God and man. God, if absolute, perfect, infinite, cannot be the subject of any relation whatever, and can never be necessarily under any obligation to any of his creatures. They can never oblige or bind him to them, for they are bound in all they have and are to him, and whatever he owes them, he owes them only in consequence of his own promise, in which it is impossible for him to lie, freely made to them, either in creating them or through revelation to them.

The author, it is clear, intends to assert the absolute perfection of God, and at the same time the innate goodness of man. He asserts that God always does his own will, which is true, and that man, though endowed with free will, always does the will of God. He denies the fall, and maintains that all the Creator's works are now as perfect as they came from his hands, and perhaps even more so, for he holds the modern doctrine of progress. How, then, does he explain the origin of evil, the error, sin, and guilt of man? We cannot understand how there can be any sin, or any thing, on his system, wrong in man. Yet no Calvinist, gloating over his absurd doctrine of total depravity, ever found more in the world to condemn, or less in the general conduct of mankind to approve! He makes the test of a man's virtue to be, not his obedience to God, but his fidelity, his truthfulness to himself. Thus an atheist, if true to himself, is a good man, a religious man, and should escape all personal censure. A very convenient doctrine this, which canonizes every man, whatever his errors or iniquities, if in them he is only faithful to his own convictions and instincts. Anger, revenge, lust, are as natural in some men as love, mercy, and purity; and consequently they in whom they are so cannot be truly moral without indulging them. This is your preacher of a lofty and stern morality, entitled to denounce weekly the Christian world for its vices, crimes, and sins! These vices, crimes, and sins must be, on his system, in mortification, self-denial, or the restraint which in obedience to the teachings of the Gospel Christians have endeavored to practise.

The author clearly rejects the doctrines of original sin, of redemption through the cross, of regeneration, and final beatitude. He denies both heaven and hell, and gives it as an instance of popular error on the part of our Lord himself, that he taught eternal torment. If he believes in a future life at all, he believes in only a natural immortality, while he denies a future state of retribution, or of rewards and punishments, in which he is less Christian than the ancient gentiles, and falls below the heathen, none of whom, except here and there an individual, ever denied a future state of existence and retribution. What the heathen denied was not the immortality of the soul, but the supernatural beatitude of the saints, and the resurrection, that is, the resurrection of the body. The life and immortality brought to light or revealed by our holy religion is not the natural im-

mortality of the soul, but the supernatural life and immortality, or immortal glory, of the saints, purchased by the merits of the incarnate Son of God. The resurrection of the dead, which we profess to believe, is the resurrection of that which dies, therefore of the body; not of the soul, for the soul never dies, except morally, and consequently there can be no resurrection of it from the dead.

The author denies prayer in the Christian sense, that is the propriety of prayer as a petition, and represents popular theology as teaching that prayer changes the mind of God. Here is another instance of his misrepresentation. Popular theology does not teach that prayer changes the mind of God, nor is it necessary to assume that God cannot answer our prayers without changing his purpose. God grants us harvests in answer to our industry in cultivating the earth, and if we neglect to till the earth, and to put in the seed in due season and due order, he withholds the harvest. Does our industry change the mind of God? In the universe of God there is a vast system of means adapted to ends, and if the means are complied with, the ends are secured; if they are neglected, the ends are not secured. Prayer, in the designs of Providence, is a means to certain ends; in other words, God gives certain things to them that ask them, and withholds them from those who refuse to ask for them. Where in this is the notion that prayer, any more than industry, changes the mind of God?

The author insinuates that the Christian plan of redemption is an afterthought with God; that sin took him by surprise, and defeated his original intentions, and hence the God of popular theology is not infinite either in knowledge or in power. This is another instance of misrepresentation, and of very false reasoning. Popular theology teaches nothing like this. It never teaches that the redemption became necessary in consequence of any original defect in man as he came from his Creator, or any thing in man's transgression that thwarted the original designs of the Creator. If man had not sinned, the redemption would not have been needed and would not have been made, although the Son of God might even then have become incarnate, not to make satisfaction for sin, but to elevate and ennoble human nature by its union with God. Yet that man would sin was known from the beginning, and the decree to redeem him through Christ crucified was coeval with the decree to create him. Hence our Lord is called "the Lamb slain from the founda-

tion of the world." Would Mr. Parker maintain that an infinite God cannot treat his creatures differently according as they use or abuse their free-will, and that he must treat the creature the same and give him the same reward, or secure for him the same end and by the same means, whether the creature conduct in one way or another? If so, as he must do, in order to justify his insinuations, can he not see that it is he who limits the power and freedom of God, and who denies the very infinity he boasts of holding?

Mr. Parker denies the inspiration and authority of the Holy Scriptures, and perhaps in terms, too, which bring him within the statute against blasphemy. "I do not believe," he says, "in the miraculous inspiration of the Old Testament or the New Testament. I do not believe that the Old Testament was God's first word, nor the New Testament his last. The Scriptures are no finality to me. Inspiration is a perpetual fact. Prophets and apostles did not monopolize the Father. He inspires men to-day as much as heretofore." Here the inspiration, the supernatural inspiration, of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament is not only denied, but denied with a sneer, and their authority is plainly set aside in the declaration, "The Scriptures are no finality to me." It amounts to nothing that he says, "Inspiration is a perpetual fact," for he can admit none but simply natural inspiration, since he says, "I do not believe there ever was a miracle, or ever will be." No miracles, then no miraculous, then no supernatural inspiration, and then no supernatural revelation of the will of God, either in ancient or modern times. He who so maintains denies *in toto* the Christian religion, and is far less of a Christian than were the old heathen; for none of them, as we recollect, except avowed atheists, ever went so far as to deny all miracles and all supernatural revelations from God to man. The author is a great believer in progress, but old Plato and Cicero were some distance in advance of him, save in the work of denying. But after all, what a singular confusion of ideas he must labor under, to imagine that to have revealed his whole will to man in ancient times, through prophets and apostles, reflects dishonor on the infinity of God, and is a disadvantage to mankind in the present! Cannot the author conceive that God, in revealing himself formerly, did it not merely for the private benefit of those by whom he revealed himself, but also for all who should believe in him through their word? Would he have us suppose, that only they by whom

God founds a state or organizes a civil government can be benefited by it? Is not the chief benefit for those who are to live under the government through all the ages of its continuance and wholesome operation? Are we who live under our free institutions less favored than they by whom they were introduced and established?

Mr. Parker rejects the Scriptures and the church; he goes further, or what by some may seem to be further, and denies even our Lord himself. "I do not believe," he says, "the miraculous character of Jesus. I take not the Bible for my master, nor yet the church; nor even Jesus of Nazareth for my master." This is plain, and unambiguous. No man of common sense and common information can pretend after this to regard Mr. Parker as a Christian, unless it be an apostate Christian, as was the Emperor Julian. "I am ready to believe that Jesus taught, as I think, eternal torment, the existence of a devil, and that he himself should ere long come back in the clouds of heaven. I do not accept these things on his authority. I TRY ALL THINGS BY THE HUMAN FACULTIES." Here it is; he denies the authority of the Bible, of the church, of Jesus of Nazareth, and admits only that of the human faculties, that is to say, of Theodore Parker! But he is not content to stop even here; he goes so far as to charge our Lord with error and sin. "He [Jesus] is my best historic ideal of human greatness; not without errors, not without the stain of his times, and, I presume, of course not without sins; for men without sins exist in the dreams of girls, not in real fact." Thus our Lord is reduced to the level of a simple man, to nothing but a man, and an erring and sinful man, stained with the errors and sins of the age in which he lived. This is enough. And this is said in this city, by a professed Christian minister, pastor of the Twenty-eighth Congregational Society in Boston, and published by a respectable firm, one member of which is, we believe an Episcopalian. How will our professedly Christian community, pretending immense reverence for the Scriptures, making the Bible an object of their idolatry, bear to have their secret told in such plain and unequivocal terms? As they have borne it, we presume, for the last eight years,—with an affected contempt, but inward respect, for the preacher and his preachment.

Mr. Parker's standing and success in Boston, the Geneva of the New World, this old Puritan city, once pronounced the paradise of Protestant ministers, are an admirable comment on the innate tendencies of Protestantism, and, to all

who can trace effects to their causes, a full proof of the position we have so often assumed, that "Protestantism is not a religion." It is in vain that Protestants affect to disown Mr. Parker, for, say what they will of him, he is a consistent Protestant, and far more consistent, and for so much far more respectable, than they who would disown him. He is, doctrinally considered, only Luther developed or completed. He rejects indeed all dogmatic Protestantism, but dogmatic Protestantism from the first was only an inconsequence. Protestants, having rejected all ecclesiastical authority, every thing like a church with either the authority or the capacity to teach, retained no right to dogmatize, no authority competent to impose dogmas of any sort. They could dogmatize only by assuming what in protesting against the church they declared to be an unjust and usurped authority. To denounce all dogmatic teaching, and therefore all dogmatic Protestantism, is only to be a consistent Protestant, is only to be true to the great Protestant principle of private judgment. There are only two great systems possible, the supernatural and the natural, the Jewish and the gentile, the Catholic and the Protestant, the church and the world. These two systems have always been in the world and in mortal conflict, and he who adheres not to the one must necessarily accept the other. All attempts to reconcile the two, and to embrace both at once, are only so many compromises of principle, and are as absurd as to say in the same breath, "Good Lord," and "Good Devil."

The one system is based on the fact that God in his original plan, if we may use the word, intended man for a supernatural destiny, which he forfeited by sin, and regains only through the merits of Christ crucified. Man, if he had not sinned, could never have gained by his own natural forces his destiny, and he needed grace before the fall as well as since, to elevate him to the plane of the supernatural beatitude for which his Maker designed him. This fact our dogmatic Protestants overlook or deny. They assume that the heavenly beatitude, the true end for which we are to live, was within the reach of our nature or our natural faculties prior to the fall, but is altogether above them since that deplorable catastrophe. Hence their absurd and monstrous doctrine of total depravity, which teaches that original sin consists, not only in the loss of original justice in which man stood before transgression, but in the loss of our natural spiritual faculties, and the corruption of our whole nature.

Hence their doctrine of redemption, which makes the work of the Redeemer merely that of reintegrating nature, or rather, of atoning for transgression, and conferring upon the elect by free grace, without any reference to their personal character, the beatitude which, if we had not sinned in our first parents, we could have attained to by our natural forces. Here was the fundamental theological error of Luther, Calvin, Baius, and Jansenius, and this error Mr. Parker sees clearly enough, and very properly rejects; but in rejecting it he merely frees the original naturalism asserted by these heresiarchs from its inconsistencies, and denies the supernatural altogether. But the fact is, that man was before the fall under a gracious providence, and was constituted in a state of justice or sanctity by supernatural grace, a grace which elevated his nature to the plane of his supernatural destiny. If Adam had not sinned, this grace would have been transmitted to his posterity in the order of generation; but by sinning he forfeited it for himself and all his posterity. Original sin consists in the loss of this original supernatural justice or sanctity in which man was constituted by grace, not by nature. In losing this, in being violently despoiled of it by sin, man lost also the integrity of his nature, exemption from disease, from death, &c.,—which is not a part of pure nature, and which was a favor granted on condition of obedience,—and became wounded in his natural faculties, his natural understanding being darkened and his free-will attenuated. But he lost no natural faculty, and his essential nature remained wholly unchanged. Nature by the fall was despoiled of supernatural grace and gifts, and turned away from God, that is, escaped from its original subjection to his law, and now needs to be converted, before its natural motions can tend towards him. Still, we have essentially the nature, and all the nature, we had before transgression.

The redemption of Christ is not to restore to nature lost faculties, is not to change our nature, or to confer on us heaven as a free gift, in spite of our own exercise of free-will, or irrespective of our intrinsic justice; but to make satisfaction by obedience for disobedience, to heal the wounds of free-will suffered by the fall, and to elevate us to the plane of our supernatural destiny, or to infuse into us the grace which restores to us the supernatural ability to gain a supernatural beatitude, that is, a beatitude above the reach even of our unimpaired natural forces. If Mr. Parker had known this view, he would have seen that his reasons for

rejecting the Protestant popular theology are no reasons for rejecting the Catholic, and that his sneers do not affect us in the least, save so far as he seeks to convey the impression, that on these points Catholics and the so-called Orthodox Protestants hold the same doctrine. But as man could never have gained heaven by his natural powers, and as he had by sin forfeited and lost the grace by which he was constituted originally in a state of justice or holiness, it is evident that he could be saved and gain his supernatural beatitude only through a Redeemer. Hence the Christian religion has always been the only religion by which man could come to the knowledge of the means and conditions of salvation; and as these means and conditions necessarily pertain to the supernatural order, it is plain that the Christian religion must have been communicated to man, if at all, supernaturally, as the whole economy of redemption and salvation was necessarily supernatural. Hence the Christian or Catholic system necessarily supposes that the requisite knowledge and helps to gain our predestined end must come to us *ab extra*, instead of coming from ourselves,—from God, and not from man,—and therefore depend entirely on the divine will, and must be received on divine authority; for it is evident that we can know nothing of the matter save by a supernatural revelation, and accomplish nothing save by the divine assistance, not included in nature, but graciously bestowed to supply the inherent inadequacy of nature. It is equally plain that the truth of the whole revelation must be taken on authority, not on interior and intrinsic evidence, whether that authority be that of patriarchs, prophets, or apostles, the Scriptures, the church, or unwritten tradition, because being above natural reason it must be received by faith, and not by sight, and faith is, by its very definition, assent on authority, and, to be true faith, must be assent on an authority which cannot err.

Now this system of supernaturalism is what we call Catholicity,—a system which teaches us that we are designed for a supernatural beatitude, and therefore can attain to it only by grace, and since we have fallen, only by the grace of redemption through Christ crucified. Christ, indeed, was actually crucified only about eighteen hundred years ago, yet the system of redemption and beatitude through him, in virtue of his incarnation and merits, was revealed in substance to our first parents, and has always been in the world, as the one only true religion for all times, places, and per-

sons. It was the primitive religion of the race, and has been transmitted to us from Adam, through the patriarchs, the synagogue, and the Roman Catholic Church. Through this channel it has been transmitted in its purity and integrity. The faith of the people of God before the coming of Christ was the very faith which we now profess, only they believed in a Christ to come, and we in a Christ who has come, and our faith is far more explicit than was theirs. That Catholics are of the spiritual line of the patriarchs and of the faithful Jews, and thus distinguished from and opposed to that of the gentiles, is a fact that no person who has investigated the subject can for a moment doubt. This system, common to us and the faithful before Christ, embraces as one of its essential elements an authoritative priesthood, and is, as even its enemies concede,—sometimes assert as a reproach,—a sacerdotal system. Strike out the priesthood, and authoritative teachers, and you demolish the whole system, and it becomes, practically considered, nothing more than a forgotten dream.

Now it is obvious to every man of ordinary information, that Protestants of every sect reject expressly the sacerdotal principle, and also that of authority, and then, of necessity, this whole system of supernaturalism. Take them as distinguished from Catholics, and it is clear that they accept the elementary principles, not of the Catholic or supernatural system, which is common to us, the patriarchs, and the synagogue, but of the system opposed to it, that is, naturalism, gentilism, or heathenism. The gentiles of the old world did not reject all at once the primitive religion. Nay, they seem to have retained much of the primitive tradition, though in a corrupt form, perverted from its original sense, and mingled with their own speculations and fancies. They seem to have begun by merely rejecting the authority of the patriarchs, and establishing national religions, under purely national priesthoods; which is not singular, since the royal and priestly dignities were originally united in the person of the patriarch. When the family through apostasy and violence gave way to the nation, and the national—gentile—order supplanted the patriarchal, it was perfectly natural that the sacerdotal dignity no less than the royal should become national, and sometimes the priesthood be superior and sometimes inferior to monarchy. But as the national order succeeded to the patriarchal only through the rejection of the authority of the primitive traditions, and the emancipation

of natural reason, either that of the state or that of the individual,—in the ancient world rarely that of the individual,—from its subjection to primitive revelation, gentilism was in principle the assertion of naturalism, and the rejection of true supernaturalism. It became in the end, we all know, not merely naturalism, but demonism, for all the gods of the heathen were devils. The pagan religions, aside from their superstitions, were, as contrasted with the Catholic religion, what Benjamin Constant calls Free Religions, especially under the Greek and Roman type, because they recognized no authoritative teachers, and no divinely consecrated priesthood. None of them demanded as their basis faith, in the supernatural sense, or proposed for man as his reward a supernatural beatitude. Their priests were conjurers or jugglers, rather than priests, and had none of the characteristics of teachers and pastors. They gradually sunk into insignificance and contempt, and left, so far as the civil authority did not intervene, the human mind free to speculate and err uncontrolled.

Protestantism differs, no doubt, externally from the various forms of heathenism, and bears traces of having separated from Catholicity since the coming of Christ and the introduction of the New Law; yet in principle it is, like gentilism, a rejection of the Catholic system, and therefore an assertion of pure naturalism. It rejects the priesthood and all authoritative teaching. Its constant tendency is to become a free religion, subjected to no superhuman authority. Episcopalians cannot induce the world to call their ministers priests, and the majority of them laugh at the teaching authority of their so-called bishops. Whoever has been a Protestant knows well that he experiences a constant struggle between reason and what he terms faith; that is, between his private judgment and the fragments of supernaturalism which Protestants have retained, or endeavour to retain, from the Catholic Church. Every thinking Protestant knows that the mysteries which are still held by some Protestants have very little significance for him, that they seem to him to have no sufficient reason, and to be utterly repugnant to his general system of thought. He may think he ought to believe them, and fear that he will be damned if he does not, and yet he is conscious that he has no adequate authority for believing them, can see no purpose they can answer, and is constantly tempted, when he reflects on the subject, to reject them. He never, so to

speak, takes to supernaturalism; he wishes to be free from it; he inwardly rebels against it, and feels that, if he was permitted to fall back on natural reason, he should be freed from an intolerable thraldom, and be far less unhappy. The force of habit, of education, of the remains of Christian tradition, and perhaps the interior workings of divine grace to effect their conversion, restrain many Protestants, perhaps the majority of them, from following what seems to them the more reasonable course; but, nevertheless, their supernaturalism is regarded as an inconsistency, and is felt to be an intolerable burden, which they would gladly throw off if they dared. Hence it is, that, when a young man of some energy and independence of thought, bred a Protestant, not of the liberal sort, once becomes distinctly conscious of doubting the mysteries professedly retained by Protestants, he can hardly help regarding all that Protestants say, and even say well, in defence of Christianity in a general way, as mere cant or sophistry, and as said, not from conviction, but in the way of their craft. It rarely has any weight with him, because he cannot understand any reason for it on avowed Protestant principles, and because it is all repugnant to his natural reason, sometimes even more than to his natural heart. All this shows that there is an innate repugnancy in Protestantism to the whole Catholic system,—to all real supernaturalism,—and therefore that Protestantism is essentially naturalism, and retains the supernatural only by doing violence to itself.

This struggle between faith and reason is something wholly foreign to the Catholic mind, and the real Catholic finds it hard, unless he has been bred a Protestant, even to conceive of it, because Catholicity, though it requires us to do violence to the flesh, never requires us to do violence to reason. Catholicity is not a rationalistic, but it is a rational religion, and at every step satisfies the demands even of the most rigid reason. We were told so before we came into the church, but we could hardly believe it, and even when we were permitted to enter, we did not doubt but we should still find something of that interior struggle between faith and reason, which had rendered us so miserable as a Protestant, so hard is it for a Protestant mind to conceive the possibility of perfect harmony between faith in the supernatural and the dictates of reason. We have not thus far been troubled with any struggle of the sort, and we are unable to conceive how, as long as we remain a

Catholic, we can be, because in Catholicity all has a sufficient reason, is sure to have a purpose worthy of itself, and nothing is required to be believed but on an adequate authority, and thus the demands of the highest reason are satisfied. The mysteries are not, indeed, taken on the authority of natural reason; nevertheless, they are taken on an authority which natural reason finds to be sufficient for all her wants. The Protestant, the best-disposed Protestant, cannot conceive this to be even possible, and when we say it is not only possible, but a fact, he distrusts either our honesty or our judgment. He immediately begins to adduce things which we as Catholics must believe, which seem to him incredible, and which really are incredible to him in his present state. But whence all this? The reason is, that faith and reason are to him on his Protestant principles really antagonistical, and the one can exist only by the expulsion of the other. They are so to him because his own supernaturalism is incomplete, fragmentary, incoherent, and, as far as he can see, answering no purpose but the support of a sham ministry. This shows that the order of his thought is naturalistic, and that, instead of being truly of the line of the patriarchs, he is of the line of the gentiles, and in order to be consistent with himself he must reject whatever is supernatural, and fall back on pure naturalism; that is, deny the fall, deny original sin, the necessity of mediation, of the atonement, of redemption, assert, with Luther and Calvin, that man was made for a beatitude within the reach of his natural forces, and hold that he can now as well as ever attain to it by the normal use of his natural faculties, without supernatural assistance.

Protestantism, by rejecting the sacerdotal principle and that of authoritative teaching,—which it certainly does, because it confessedly has no sacrifice to offer, and its boasted principle is private judgment,—and by asserting that the beatitude for which man was designed by his Maker was within the reach of man's natural faculties prior to transgression, and therefore within the natural order, plainly denies, it seems to us, all supernaturalism, and commits itself irrevocably to naturalism. We cannot see how it can be otherwise, since it denies that the beatitude for which man was made was in the supernatural order, and allows it to be supernatural only in relation to his fallen nature. It is evident that man lost by sin no natural faculty, for he is still man, which he would not be if deprived of any natural

faculty, especially if deprived of his spiritual faculties, reason, and free-will, as Luther and even Calvin teach. If he is man, he retains his essential nature, and therefore all his natural faculties. If, then, his beatitude was ever within the reach of his natural faculties, it must be still, and therefore the whole system of grace or redemption and salvation through the cross falls to the ground, because it has and can have no sufficient reason,—no end to answer.

The great and fundamental error of all Protestantism seems to us to be precisely in the denial of the Catholic doctrine, that man was originally designed, not for a natural, but a supernatural beatitude,—supernatural, not only in relation to his present state, but also in relation to his original state prior to transgression. To this fundamental error, we think, may be traced all its special errors, and all the horrible doctrines of the modern infidel world, and that too whether this error was adopted prior to the rejection of the Catholic priesthood and the authority of the church, or whether it was adopted subsequently, in order to justify that rejection. Certainly it is an error which excludes the supernatural, and involves pure naturalism. We repeat, therefore, that Mr. Parker, in rejecting all dogmatic Protestantism, all the Christian mysteries, the whole traditional system of supernaturalism, and falling back on nature and the human faculties alone, is a consistent Protestant; and whatever censure he may deserve from us, he deserves none from his Protestant brethren, and his success is a proof that not a few of them fully agree with us in this.

In conclusion, we would say a word to Mr. Parker himself, if we had not good reason to believe that nothing we can say will weigh a feather with him or his followers. We know, perhaps, even better than he does, the world in which he lives, for we lived in it before he did, and have lived longer than he has; we know his system, if system it can be called, as well as he knows it, and knew it, and preached it in all its essential features, while he was still pursuing his academical studies. We have no trouble in understanding either his system or his position, and we are not at all disposed to deny, that, apart from his relation to the Protestant world, he has some good aspirations, and at least glimpses of some truths, which are not only truths, but truths of considerable magnitude. He has detected much of the hollowness of modern society, and sees with tolerable clearness the vanity of the pursuits of the so-called respect-

able classes, though in this respect he falls far below Carlyle, and even Emerson. He sees that the morality of our Protestant community is mere decorum, worldly prudence, or thrift; that its faith is opinion, and opinion but loosely held, and that its piety is mere cant or fanaticism. He wants to see revived in it a living faith, to see around him, though he understands not what it is, or what are its conditions, a pure and spiritual morality. All this, and much more to the same effect, we are quite willing to concede him. But whatever of truth he sees is no novelty to the church, and exists in her doctrines, in its unity and its integrity. The results he wishes he can never obtain save through her ministry. The evils he deplores are only the natural consequences of rejecting her authority, despising the graces which she dispenses, and falling back on naturalism. He is very wrong in confounding even dogmatic Protestantism with Catholicity, and holding the church responsible for the errors and vices which she anathematizes, and which prevail only because she is not loved, honored, and obeyed. What he complains of is the legitimate fruit of the naturalism to which he is himself wedded, and to render that naturalism more pure is only to aggravate the evils he at times so eloquently deplores, and so energetically denounces. They come not from the aspiration of men to an heroic sanctity and a supernatural beatitude through the grace of Christ, but from the fact that men propose to themselves only a natural beatitude, only a heaven in the natural order. And how does he propose to cure them? Solely by confining men to that order, and preventing them from aspiring to any thing above it. He thinks he proposes a lofty ideal, when he proposes simple nature; the Catholic regards his loftiest ideal as far too low and uninspiring; he thinks he preaches a pure and spiritual morality, and yet it is only the morality of the Epicurean sty. Were his intellectual and moral system to prevail, mankind would forget their true dignity as men, and sink to the level of mere animals. He offers the famishing soul only husks with the swine, and seeks to satisfy the deep wants of our spiritual nature with mere provender for the body. But the soul possesses a dignity and worth far above his most sublime conceptions, and disdains the highest and most perfect natural beatitude. We know something of these cravings of the soul which he and his friends experience, and we can tell him that nature has nothing wherewith to satisfy

them. She is impotent to quench the thirst, or to appease the hunger of the soul, because the soul was never made for a natural beatitude. All he can offer the soul at best is knowledge of natural things, wealth, honor, and sensual pleasures, and she never—the experience of all ages, of our own perhaps more than most others, proves it,—finds her appropriate food in these, which soon pall upon her taste and are loathed. You must seek further, and on a higher level. Confined to nature, you must soon sink below nature, and live only as the beasts that perish, or, as you seem to be doing, fall into downright demonism.

It is a sad mistake on the part of Mr. Parker and his friends to suppose that nature is able to suffice for our beatitude, or that to assert for man a supernatural beatitude, and bid him through grace aspire to it, is a degradation of his nature. Mr. Parker professes to believe in a future life and a future heaven for all men, for he is a Universalist, and believes in the eternal torment of no one. Can he tell us what is to constitute that heaven, the beatitude of that future life? It must, according to him, be a natural beatitude, and therefore be a beatitude within the conception of the natural man, and of the same order with that which nature gives in this life. What is it to be? The practice of virtue? The practice of virtue is not without its satisfaction, we are willing to admit, but mankind generally do not find it sufficient to induce them to make the sacrifices which it usually demands, and, moreover, the practice of virtue appertains to a state of probation, not to a state of final beatitude, and is a means of obtaining our end, not our eternal end itself. Heaven, then, which is our end, cannot be placed in the practice of virtue. In what then? In progress, indefinite progress from the imperfect to the perfect? But progress is going towards heaven, and must end when we reach it, and therefore cannot be heaven itself. If it is to be endlessly continued, heaven is never to be gained, and then perfect beatitude is for no man. Does it consist in loving? Whom or what? In loving our fellow-creatures? Who knows not that creatures can never exhaust our love, or satisfy the soul's need of loving? God? As seen in nature with our natural faculties, through a glass, darkly? We see him thus now, and yet thus to see him is not perfect beatitude. Turn the matter over as you will, and give what answer you please, if you concede only natural beatitude, you can hope for nothing

hereafter above what we experience here, nothing but a second and unimproved edition of our present life, which, even in its best state, falls immeasurably below a happy life. Say we not well, then, that Mr. Parker's highest ideal is far too low and worthless for us? We look for a heaven of perfect beatitude, and we aspire, not in our own strength, but by the proper exercise of our faculties, excited, elevated, and assisted by the grace of God purchased for us by the merits of his dear Son, obedient for us even to the death of the cross, to see him not merely through a glass darkly, as reflected by his works, whether of nature or of grace, but face to face as he is in himself, and to feast our soul eternally on his infinite fulness, his infinite wisdom, beauty, goodness, and love. Is there degradation to our nature in this? You think so, only because you borrow your notions from Protestant theology, and suppose that grace supersedes nature, instead of elevating and assisting it, and that heaven is conferred, not as that for which we are intrinsically prepared, and as a reward of our personal holiness, but as a simple gift irresistibly conferred by a sovereign act of favor, irrespective of our personal character; as the Catholic holds it, it is the supernatural elevation of our nature to union with God as the SUPREME GOOD.

THE ECLIPSE OF FAITH.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October 1853.]

THIS is an American reprint of an English work, attributed to Mr. Henry Rogers, of whom, we must confess, we know nothing except that he is the author of several very striking articles in *The Edinburgh Review*. The work itself, however, is one of the most remarkable works on religious topics, that has recently issued from the Protestant press, whether in England or in this country. It is directed chiefly against modern spiritualism, or what Mr. Andrews

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* *The Eclipse of Faith*; *or, A Visit to a Religious Sceptic*. Fourth Edition. Boston: 1853.

Norton of Cambridge, some few years since, very happily denominated "the latest form of infidelity," and which we have often treated in these pages under the name of transcendentalism, of which Mr. Morell in Scotland, Theodore Parker and Horace Bushnell in this country, and Francis William Newman in England, are the representatives best known to our readers. Its design is to prove that this modern spiritualism, which professes to be Christian, and more Christian than Christianity itself, and which rejects all external authoritative revelation and falls back on a spiritual faculty of man's own nature as the source of all religious truth, is in a religious point of view a mere illusion, and that there is no medium between rejecting the Bible as an external authoritative revelation and the rejection of all religion; and therefore that the modern spiritualists, whatever they may pretend to the contrary, are really infidels,—as much so as the old English deists or the French philosophers of the last century. He proves this, we think, in a masterly manner, with great acuteness and force of reasoning, and with still greater wit and pleasantry.

But the point to which we more particularly wish to direct the attention of our readers is the distinct admission by our author that there is a subtle infidelity sapping the religious belief of the people of England, that an eclipse has come over the faith of the Protestant world, and that the great battle is now to be fought for Christianity itself. All this is unquestionably true, and we are glad to find that it is beginning to attract the attention of Protestants themselves, and that grave and learned men like our author see and confess that there is serious cause for alarm. To such Protestants as really desire to be Protestants without rejecting all Christian belief and giving up all religion, the present aspect of the Protestant world is very far from encouraging. That world is rent asunder by two formidable parties moving in opposite directions, and each alike hostile to the Christian or religious pretensions of Protestantism. Between Tractarianism on the one hand, and modern spiritualism on the other, what is called "Protestant Christianity" threatens to disappear, and the author has sounded his note of warning none too soon,—most likely not soon enough.

The Protestant world, as it presents itself to the philosophical spectator, is distinguishable into three classes,—the

Catholicizing class, the infidelizing class, and the unthinking, unreasoning, or inert class. These three classes have their origin and foundation in Protestantism itself. Protestantism, as we often have occasion to repeat, strictly taken, is purely negative in its character; but loosely taken, as it is by Protestants generally, it is a mixture of certain half-truths, or mutilated dogmas, retained by the reformers from the Catholic Church, and certain infidel principles and denials which the reformers opposed to Catholicity. As embodied in the formulas or symbolical books of the several sects, the Catholic elements retained are incomplete and insufficient, and the infidel elements remain undeveloped. The unthinking, unreasoning, or inert Protestants, who are a very numerous body, see nothing of all this, and never once suspect that Protestantism is not all of a piece, or that it is made up of heterogeneous elements, and is in itself incoherent, incomplete, and insufficient,—uncertain, self-contradictory, and unsatisfactory to the mind that really thinks and reasons. Pressed by no logical wants, feeling no necessity of unity, consistency, and completeness of doctrine, they are content to receive passively, without a thought or a question, the formulas of their respective sects, and find scope for whatever of mental activity they may have in matters unconnected with religion. In a religious sense, these are simply dead, and of no account. But the other two classes are aware of the incomplete and contradictory character of Protestantism as it came from the reformers, and as it is still vaguely and nominally held. They both see that it is heterogeneous and incomplete, and they feel deeply and strongly the necessity of clearing it of its inconsistencies, of reducing it to doctrinal unity, and of developing and completing it. The first class seize upon its Catholic elements, that is, on the Christian doctrines, which, in a form more or less mutilated, it still professes, and seek to develop and complete them in a Christian sense; the second class seize upon the distinctively Protestant elements, and seek to develop and complete them in a Protestant sense. Thus the tendency of the former is necessarily to Catholicity, and of the latter, to infidelity. These two classes are all in the Protestant world that it is necessary to consider. They divide between them all the intellectual life and activity in regard to religious subjects that Protestants can lay claim to. The other class, under the religious point of view, are nobodies, at best only an inert mass.

The Catholicizing and the infidelizing classes of Protestants have been very well represented in England by two brothers, John Henry and Francis William Newman,—both remarkable men in their way, and very nearly equally distinguished for their ability, their acquirements, and their earnestness. Both were brought up Protestants in the Anglican Church; both early felt the incompleteness and insufficiency of the Protestantism of the reformation, and both wished to be Christians without ceasing to be Protestant or breaking with the reformers. But from this point they began to diverge. The elder brother, now a Catholic priest and superior of the English Oratorians, assuming that the real sense of the reformation lay in the elements of Christian truth it retained, seized upon these, disengaged them from the negative principles connected with them in the minds of the reformers, and labored to develop and complete them in a Catholic sense. He thus originated the Tractarian or Puseyite party, whose aim is to be Catholic, without being Roman. But he soon found that he could not develop and complete Protestantism in the sense of the Catholic truths it professed to retain, without going to Rome, because only in her communion can Catholic doctrine be found or held in its unity, integrity, and completeness. The younger brother, a more genuine Protestant from the beginning, assuming that the essence of Protestantism must lie, not in what it professes to hold in common with the church, but in the principles and denials which it opposed to her, seized upon these principles and denials, the infidel elements of Protestantism, and sought to disengage them from the popish elements still retained, and to develop and complete them in a distinctively Protestant sense. But he soon found that he could not accomplish this purpose without pushing the Protestant denial of the authority of the church, and its rejection of the sacraments and the priesthood, to their legitimate consequences, and that he could not do this without rejecting all external authority, all external revelation, and falling back on his own spiritual nature, as his only authority in religious matters, and the only revelation of the will of God to man. Both seem to us to have been equally sincere in the outset, and both, considering the respective assumptions with which they started, to have been equally logical, and to have arrived at conclusions equally inevitable. Neither foresaw where he must end. The elder brother, resolved to be a Christian let come what might,

found himself obliged to seek admission into the communion of the Catholic Church; the younger, resolved at all hazards to be a Protestant, has found himself obliged to give up every thing distinctively Christian, and to fall back on mere naturalism.

It is chiefly against the conclusion to which, in his endeavor to be a consistent Protestant, Francis Newman has been forced to come, that the work before us is directed. The author does not directly attack the conclusion itself; his main endeavor is to show that it is unchristian, and that the school which accepts it, however it may deceive itself, whatever use it may make of the New Testament, or whatever the praises it may affect to bestow upon the Author and Finisher of our faith, is really as infidel as that of Voltaire or D'Holbach, and far more absurd. In this, certainly, as our readers well know, we agree with him, for we have maintained the same over and over again in our writings against Theodore Parker and the transcendentalists; but is the author aware that, in proving this, though he proves much to our purpose as Catholics, he proves nothing to his own as a Protestant? The real point he has to prove is, not that there is no medium between infidelity and rejecting the Bible as an authoritative external revelation, but that a logically minded Protestant can consistently with the distinctive principles of Protestantism hold the Bible to be such a revelation, or admit any external authoritative revelation at all. This is the question he has to answer as a Protestant, and to this question he gives no answer.

The author must allow us to protest against the severe manner in which he treats his infidelizing brethren. These men deserve his respect, not his censure. As long as he chooses to remain a Protestant, and to maintain the justice of the reformation, he has no right to complain of them. On his premises they are manifestly right, and he is manifestly wrong. These men have had no more wish than he to reject Christianity; they have only wished to maintain the reformation, for which as a Protestant he should be grateful to them. They have all been brought up in his Bible Protestantism, whatever that is; they have all been bred to regard the Bible as the word of God, as an external, authoritative revelation of the divine will, and as able, as interpreted by the private judgment of each, to make them wise unto salvation. Many of them commenced their career with great piety and fervor, after the Protestant fashion, and it

must not be supposed that it has been without a long and painful internal struggle that they have rejected all authoritative external revelation, and fallen back on the "oracle within," and sought to satisfy the religious wants of their souls with modern spiritualism. *The Phases of Faith*, by Francis Newman, one of the most truthful and instructive books that has been published in our day, to those who know how to read it, although the most erroneous and false in its conclusions, unanswerably proves this. It is in no spirit of wantonness, of irreverence, or of unbelief, that the earnest-minded Protestant inquirer, feeling himself bound at all hazards to be a Protestant, and holding, as all Protestants are bound to hold, that Catholicity is a gross and debasing superstition, gives up the Bible, gives up all external revelation, and seeks to derive a religion adequate to his wants from his own spiritual nature. He does so, not because he would get rid of the Bible, not because he would throw away all religion, but because Protestantism leaves him no other alternative, and he can on no other condition retain even a shadow of religion, without ceasing to be a Protestant. Never shall we forget the joy with which our own heart bounded, when we fancied that Benjamin Constant had proved that religion has a firm and solid foundation in a law of human nature, universal, permanent, and indestructible as that nature itself,—not indeed because it saved us from the necessity of believing the Bible or of submitting to an external authoritative revelation, but because for the moment it seemed to restore us to communion with the religious world. It was indeed but the straw to which the drowning man clings, but it seemed to us something more, and to give us the right to say, I too am a believer; I too can look up to heaven and say, My Father; around upon mankind and say, My brothers. We dare here take our own experience as a Protestant as the key to that of the modern spiritualists. We had a horror of infidelity, and we were utterly unable, without renouncing the reformation and becoming a Catholic, to maintain belief in the Bible as an authoritative external revelation. Unless, then, we could find a medium between believing it as such revelation and absolute infidelity, we must either go to Rome or give up all religion. No such medium save that of the modern spiritualists was even conceivable, and we adopted it as the only alternative between Catholicity and infidelity.

It is not strange that the other two classes of Protestants

should fail to appreciate the infidelizing class;—the dead, unthinking class, because it is dead and unthinking, and has no suspicion of the inconsistency, incompleteness, and insufficiency of the Protestantism they passively receive from their sects. They perceive and feel none of its difficulties, and therefore draw the most unfavorable conclusions against those who are laboring in any direction to remove them. The Catholicizing party can hardly feel the difficulties felt by the infidelizing party, because they take it for granted that Protestantism lies essentially in the Christian doctrines it professes to hold, and that all one has to do to be a good Christian, and at the same time a good Protestant, is to develop and complete these doctrines in a Christian sense. They regard the tendency of their infidelizing brethren as alike hostile to Christianity and to the real sense of the reformers, and hence undertake to recall them by the authority of the Catholic truths still nominally held in their communion, without considering whether they have or have not any right to use it. John Henry Newman never seems to have been aware of the real difficulties of his younger brother, and he sought to retain him by alleging the authority of the church, which he might well have done, if he had been a Catholic priest, but which in a Protestant minister was only intolerable arrogance. If we credit his brother's account of the matter, Francis told him, and as long ago as 1824, that to be consistent he ought to go to Rome, and would ultimately go there, if he did not renounce his high-church pretensions. Francis, being a better Protestant than his brother, saw far more clearly the logical result of attempting to develop and complete Protestantism in a Catholic sense, and he seems early to have been convinced that he must either abandon all the positive doctrines professed by Protestants, and place Christianity solely in its negative elements, or go to Rome, unless he chose to reject all religion. Go to Rome he would not, because, as against Rome, he took it for granted that the reformation was right. Whatever else might be true, popery, he felt certain, was false, and whatever else might be false, Protestantism, he held, must be true. It was of no use, therefore, to prove to him that he was false to Anglicanism; what he wanted was to be shown how he could consistently hold the positive Christian doctrines Anglicans professed, without being false to the reformation. Here was his difficulty, and this difficulty was not met.

How to be a Christian without renouncing the refor-

mation, is the great problem for every thinking Protestant. This was the problem with which we ourselves struggled from 1830 to 1844, and which we tried in vain every possible way of solving. It was the necessity we were under of rejecting each solution as soon as tried, that gave rise to the charge of fickleness and of constantly changing our opinions, which an unscrupulous newspaper press is so fond of urging against us. We fell back, as we have said, on modern spiritualism, as the only alternative we could find between Catholicity and infidelity. But we finally succeeded in discovering, what our author proves, that this modern spiritualism is only another name for the rejection of all religion. Then there was for us no alternative but Catholicity or infidelity, and we chose Catholicity, through we should have retained to a far greater degree the sympathies of our Protestant friends, if we had taken the other alternative. The issue, however much Protestants may dread it, or try to evade it, must come to this at last. The old Protestant controversies are obsolete. Protestantism, as laid down in the formularies of the sects, has gone to seed ; its stalk is withered and dry, and its root is dead. It has exhausted itself, and now only cumbers the ground where it grew. It is what Carlyle very justly calls a sham. All living and active intellect deserts it, and ranges itself either on the side of the Catholicizing party, or on that of the infidelizing party, and the only real question now anywhere seriously debated is, whether we shall be Catholics or infidels. All who have any tolerable understanding of the movements going on in the Protestant world see this, and in vain do the old hunkers or the old fogies that gather round the broken shrine of their idol seek to make up another issue. Their lamentations only excite ridicule, and their arguments will only hasten the terrible issue they are so anxious to escape. Neither party can be recalled to the dead formulas of the sects, for both have thought too much, and have become too clear-sighted, to be content with what has neither life nor sense.

The author is well aware of the existence of the two parties in the Protestant world, and of the danger they threaten to Protestantism as a religion ; but he thinks the principal is from the infidelizing party. We are not quite sure of this. The Catholicizing party may not be the most formidable in Great Britain and the United States, for, unhappily, the people of these two countries are fearfully engrossed with purely material interests, and pay comparatively

little attention to the wants of the soul. Their thought, so to speak, is materialized, and their studies are chiefly of the physical sciences and their application to the industrial arts. Money is their idol, the exchange is their temple, merchants and bankers are their clergy, and trade their *cultus*, or external service. Nevertheless, even in these countries, the Catholicizing party is powerful. It gains strength every day, and constantly are fresh, warm, ingenuous hearts calling upon Protestantism to answer whether she be really a religion or not. Every hour is she reminded of her incompleteness and insufficiency, alike for the intellect and the heart. Everywhere are her famishing children begging her for the food she has not to give. Can she hope to retain their love and obedience, if, when they ask her for a fish, she gives them a serpent; for bread, she gives them a stone?

If we pass into Protestant Germany, we find the Catholicizing party still more powerful, and gaining every day on the infidelizing party. Germany is not at all what she was a few years ago. A powerful reaction has taken place there against rationalism and transcendentalism. Whatever is respectable in more recent German thought and German scholarship is on the side of the Catholicizing party. To be sure of this, we need only study the later German theology, so ably and faithfully represented in this country by Drs. Nevin and Schaff, of the so-called Mercersburg school. Perhaps still better evidence of it is furnished by the later German historians, whether they write general or particular, secular or ecclesiastical history. Neander himself furnishes ample materials for refuting the Centuriators of Magdeburg, and Leo leaves the Catholic student little to desire. The taste for solid studies still survives in Germany, and the German mind still retains its freshness, its energy, and its earnestness. It is freer than the mind of any other modern nation from that *frivolezza* which Gioberti so justly represents as the principal characteristic of our age. It has a straightforwardness, a down-rightness, a heartiness, from which, in spite of its tendency to theorize, great good may well be expected. The seriousness and erudition with which German scholars have vindicated Catholic ages and Catholic characters cannot fail to have a powerful influence on the course of German thought, and must tend not a little to strengthen the Catholic reaction now everywhere so visible. Nobody, in Germany, who is anybody, would risk his reputation in repeating the old Protestant versions of church history, or the old

Protestant sneers at the middle ages. Such a man would be looked upon as a new Rip Van Winkle. We confess we hope much from the Catholicizing Protestants of Germany, —more indeed than from the Tractarians of England and this country; and it seems to us not unlikely that Protestantism will find itself before many years, not only tried and condemned, but executed, in the very place of its birth. Our author may sneer, may speak of the madness and folly of expecting to revive the faith of the past; but he would do well to remember that what he calls the faith of the past has never itself fallen into the past; it has been always a living faith, and to revive it in the Protestant world is only to turn that world from the dead to the living.

But be this as it may, there is no question that the danger from the infidelizing party is great. In the author's own country that party is becoming numerous, strong, and active, and Protestants have nothing but a certain *vis inertiæ* to oppose to it. To oppose to it the Catholicizing party is only to call in the Saxons to expel the Picts and Scots. The Catholicizing party may indeed expel the infidelizing party, but to the advantage of Catholicity, not to that of Protestantism; for the Catholicizing party need only the courage to be consistent, and follow out their dominant principles to their legitimate conclusions, in order to embrace the Catholic Church, as is conceded or maintained by all not of the party itself. It is of no use to oppose to them the dead and putrid carcass of the Protestantism of the symbolical books, nominally retained by the sects, for it is the living and active they seek, not the dead and rotten. Our author, indeed, attempts to oppose to them a sort of Bible Protestantism; but it is precisely Bible Protestantism that they have for sufficient reasons rejected, and which as Protestants they find it impossible to hold. He tells them that they have no medium, as Protestants, between accepting the Bible as an authoritative external revelation, and rejecting all religion. Be it so. But tell us, say they, how we can accept that, and not be logically required to go further, and make our peace with Rome. You require us to be Protestants, to anathematize popery, and pull the pope's nose. All very good. We are ready to do all this, and more too if you require it. But tell us how we can be free to do all this, and yet assert the Bible as an authoritative external revelation? Here is a question the author does not and cannot answer.

We as Catholics, unquestionably, hold the Bible to be the

word of God, and an external authoritative revelation of his will; but no Protestant can consistently hold this, and whenever Protestants assert it they abandon the distinctive principles of the reformation, and take their stand on Catholic ground. Here is the fact which our author overlooks. What does he gain, then, by proving that the rejection of the Bible as such revelation is the rejection of all religion? He proves nothing to his purpose, and relieves his infidelizing brethren from no difficulty. All he proves, if he proves any thing, is that there is no medium between Catholicity and infidelity. With all his ability and acuteness, the author, when he has no longer our principles to reason from, and has something positive of his own to establish, falls into the ordinary cant of his party. He talks of the Bible as an external authoritative revelation, and asserts that there is no medium between accepting it as such and absolute unbelief. All very well. So far we sustain him. But what does he mean by the Bible? Is the Bible any thing save in its true and genuine sense? What is that sense, the only sense in which it is or can be an external *authoritative* revelation from God? Who shall tell us? Shall each one determine it for himself, by his own private judgment? So he maintains, and so he must maintain, or cease to be a Protestant. Then the Bible is to each one just what he interprets it to be, and may teach as many different doctrines as there are interpreters. It is a contradiction in terms, then, to call it an external authoritative revelation; for then the authority is not in it, but in the private judgment of the interpreter. These various interpretations, these different and contradictory doctrines which the sects deduce from the Bible, cannot all be true; yet what means or what right have you to distinguish between them, since all stand on the same footing? Each has the Bible interpreted by private judgment in its favor, and no one has any thing more. The Bible and private judgment must always be equal to the Bible and private judgment, and therefore as respectable and as authoritative in the case of one as in that of another, and therefore respectable and authoritative in the case of none.

The author very happily refutes Parker's "Absolute Religion," and Newman's "spiritual faculty," by showing that neither is or gives a determinate system of religious doctrine and practice, but may coexist in the same mind with the grossest errors, the most debasing superstition, the foul-

est crimes, and the most disgusting immorality. He shows that either is a mere abstraction, at best a mere susceptibility to religion; and he further concludes against the authority of each from the fact, that scarcely any two of the modern spiritualists are agreed as to what are its specific teachings or requirements. This is just reasoning; but does not the author see that it may be retorted upon him with murderous effect? By the very same process by which he refutes Parker's "Absolute Religion," and Newman's "spiritual faculty," they may refute the Protestant rule of the Bible interpreted by private judgment. The Bible interpreted by each one for himself is in precisely the same predicament with the "Absolute Religion" and the "spiritual faculty" with which he makes himself so merry. Who needs to be told that, so taken, it is no specific or determinate religion; that the assertion of the Bible so interpreted may coexist in the same mind with the most shocking errors; or that the doctrines which Protestants derive from it, or hold with it, are as various as the sects into which the Protestant world is divided, and almost equal in number to that of individual Protestants themselves? If he has a right to conclude against modern spiritualism from the fact that it does not secure to its adherents pure, unmixed truth and uniformity of belief, why not the modern spiritualists for the same reason conclude against the Bible interpreted by private judgment?

The author refutes the modern spiritualists so far as they make any pretensions to Christianity, and seeks to recall them to Bible Protestantism. But what in the world *is* Bible Protestantism? Will all Bible Protestants give us the same answer? Shall we not receive from the sects different, and even contradictory answers? Our author himself appears to be a Church-of-England man. But what is Church-of-Englandism? Who can tell? Ask Dr. Pusey and the Tractarians, and you have one answer; ask Dr. Whately, or the Archbishop of Canterbury, and you have another, and a very different answer. To talk of Protestantism as something specific, definite, fixed, and determinate, betrays a want of common information or of common honesty, and the author's Bible Protestantism must be conceded to be as vague and as indeterminate as Parker's "Absolute Religion," which is, as he himself attempts to define it, Be good and do good, and then—you will be good and do good. No doubt of it; but what is it to be good and to do good?

What is good? And how are we to be good and to do good? All see that this "Absolute Religion" is a mere abstraction, and therefore a nullity. What else is Bible Protestantism, which may mean any thing or nothing, and has no meaning except that which the individual or sectarian Protestant mind gives it?

Protestants fall uniformly into the mistake of confounding belief that the Bible is inspired and contains an external revelation, with a belief of the revelation itself,—two very different things. To believe that God has made such revelation, and that the Bible contains it, of itself implies no belief of what God has revealed. The revelation, although contained in the Bible, is not the Bible as a mere book, but is the sense of the Bible, and is and can be believed only as that sense is intellectually apprehended and assented to. Before you can claim to have believed that, you must know what it is. This you cannot know without an interpreter of some sort,—either an external authoritative interpreter, as we hold, or an internal interpreter, as you maintain. As a Protestant, you cannot assert an external authoritative interpreter, because that would require you to recognize the authority of the Catholic Church, and to abjure your Protestantism, a fact we beg you to remember when reasoning against the spiritualists, as well as when reasoning against us. You must then fall back on the internal interpreter, that is, private judgment, or a spiritual faculty of the soul. Here you have only your own private judgment, or your own spiritual faculty, to determine what is the revelation God has made, and this is not adequate for faith, because it determines differently with almost every different individual. This not being able to determine with sufficient certainty for faith what the sense of the Bible is, it follows that the Protestant may believe that the Bible contains an external authoritative revelation, and yet not believe that revelation itself.

Protestants sometimes reply to this, that God, when he made his revelation, intended it to be believed, and therefore he must have so made it that all who are required to believe it can ascertain with sufficient certainty for faith what it is. He made his revelation in the Bible, and therefore private judgment must be able to determine what it is from the Bible alone, without any external authoritative interpreter. The conclusion does not happen to follow. Unquestionably, the revelation which God has made must

be ascertainable by all who are commanded to believe it. But it is not ascertainable from the Bible interpreted by private judgment. Therefore that is not the way by which God has made it ascertainable. This conclusion is evident on the very face of the Bible itself. God could never have intended that men should learn the faith from the Bible alone, or from the Bible privately interpreted, because it is obvious, from the face of the book itself, that it was addressed to believers, whom it everywhere presupposes to have been already instructed at least in the rudiments of the faith. There is no getting over this fact. The Gospels were manifestly written for the instruction and edification of believers; the Epistles are all addressed to the faithful, and are nearly all simply pastoral letters designed to correct particular errors into which the faithful had, here or there, fallen, or were in danger of falling, and to give them in particular localities fuller instructions on certain points of doctrine or practice in regard to which they had been but imperfectly taught. It is very absurd to pretend that a book of this sort, which was addressed to those who had already received the faith, which everywhere presupposes the greater part of the faith to be already known, and refers to its principal dogmas only as matters already believed, was intended by the Holy Ghost to be the medium, and only medium, of teaching the faith to those ignorant of it, and to be, as interpreted by private judgment, the rule for determining the revelation of God. God is infinitely wise, and the characteristic of wisdom is to adapt the means to the end. But here were no such adaptation. Common sense is sufficient, if exercised, to satisfy every one that God never designed the Bible without the intervention of the living teacher as the fountain from which his revealed word was to be drawn. Deny the divinely commissioned living teacher, and you can make nothing of the Bible. It is to you without significance, or at least a mere dumb idol, or a temptation and a snare.

It is hardly worth while to notice the pretence of some Protestants, that the Bible interprets itself. It does no such thing. No book interprets itself. If the Bible interpreted itself, it would have the same meaning for all, and none who read it could dispute as to its sense. But such is not the case; for the diversity of opinions as to what the book teaches among Bible readers is notorious and proverbial. The book itself being invariable, the same to all and to

each, it is certain that diversity of opinions as to its sense can originate only in diversity of interpretation, which there could not be if it interpreted itself. We repeat, therefore, the dilemma in which the Protestant necessarily finds himself. The Bible must have an interpreter, either external or internal. If you assert the former, you must renounce your Protestantism, and return to the church; if the latter, you must abandon the Bible as an authoritative external revelation, because you have no means of ascertaining with sufficient certainty for faith, that is, a certainty that excludes doubt, what is the revelation, and therefore it cannot be alleged as authority for determining that revelation. Moreover, if God has not so made his revelation in the Bible as to be ascertainable from it, he has not intended that we should ascertain it from the Bible. Therefore the Bible is not an *authoritative* external revelation. Therefore it is to be placed in the category of all well-intentioned books, and accepted so far as its teachings are confirmed by the "oracle within," and no further,—the precise conclusion of Parker and Newman, which our author justly resolves into the rejection of all religion.

We assure the author that he has no logic by which he can set aside this conclusion. The great difficulty is here in Protestantism itself. It has always betrayed, and will betray, its friends; for if you take it on its professedly religious side, and seek to develop and complete it in a Christian sense, it conducts you to Rome; if you take it on its purely Protestant side, on the side of its denials of Catholicity, and seek to develop and complete it in a purely Protestant sense, it conducts you to infidelity. There is no help for it, for Protestantism cannot stand on its own feet, or subsist as a form of Christianity. Whatever it has that even the great body of Protestants call Christian, are the doctrines, more or less mutilated, which it retained from the Catholic Church, and which find their complement, their unity and integrity, only in her teaching. Every intelligent, thinking, and reasoning Protestant must therefore, in spite of himself, either Catholicize or infidelize. The author in the work before us wishes to do neither, but the Catholic reader perceives at once that he has nothing of his own to oppose to either party, and is as weak, as vague, and as absurd as the modern spiritualist the moment he has no longer the authority of our church to back him. He asserts the Bible as the word of God, for we do and have always done the same, and

he can sustain his assertion by our authority; he insists on an external authoritative revelation as essential to Christian faith, and in this too he is backed up by us. In these matters he is strong with our strength. But when he has to maintain something for which he cannot plead the Catholic church or Catholic tradition, which as a Protestant he is bound to reject, something in which he separates from us, he cannot stand a moment before his infidelizing opponents. Assuming our church to be true, and Christianity to be identically what she teaches, he proves very clearly that he who rejects the Bible and all external authoritative revelation is an infidel; but deny our church, assume the justice of the reformation in its attacks on Catholicity, and the truth of the Protestant denials, can he then say this? By what authority, then, can he say that the principles of these denials which the infidelizing Protestants seize upon and call Christian, and assert as the very essence of Christianity, are not so? Who gave him authority to say for others what is or is not Christian? Wherefore has he any more right to insist that his notions are Christian, than they have that theirs are?

But it is unnecessary to pursue this line of remark any further. Protestants no doubt sometimes forget their Protestantism, throw themselves unconsciously back on Catholic principles, and produce some able and learned works in defence of the Christian religion. But these works have on Protestant principles no value, because whatever tends to prove Christianity or to refute infidelity tends to prove the Catholic Church, without which Christianity is a mere abstraction, or an unmeaning word. There are no abstractions in nature; no abstraction exists *a parte rei*; and whatever exists at all, exists in a concrete form. There is no Christianity existing in the abstract, and not in the concrete; and they who talk of "our common Christianity," or Christianity common to the church and the sects, talk nonsense, if they do not talk blasphemy. A partial or an abstract view, which shall be a true view as far as it goes, may no doubt be taken of Christianity, and such a view the sects very possibly may and sometimes do take; but that view is simply a mental fact, and is in no sense Christianity itself, as an objective reality. Christianity is a concrete existence, and, like every concrete existence, has one form and one only. It is Catholicity or it is nothing. So, then, whatever Protestants may on our principles prove that is coincident with

Christianity, it is idle to suppose that on their own principles they ever do or ever can advance a single step, either in proving the Christian religion or in refuting infidelity.

To the hard things the author says here and there in his work against our religion, only a brief reply is required. He would have us believe that Catholics deny the authority of the Bible, because they assert a divinely commissioned and assisted authority for declaring its true sense. Does the lawyer deny the authority of the law because he asserts that the court has power to declare and apply it? The Bible, we have seen, must have an interpreter. We assert for interpreter the church of God, appointed and aided by our Lord himself to declare infallibly its true and genuine sense; the author asserts for interpreter each reader's own private judgment, that is, asserts for each reader the same authority that we assert for the Catholic Church. If we supersede the Bible, pray, what does he do? If he does not, pray, by what right does he say we do? Which is more respectful to the Bible, subjecting it to an infallible interpreter who cannot err as to its sense, or to an interpreter who can err and confessedly does err? After all, our author does not rise above mere vulgar Protestantism. Undoubtedly we take the Bible as interpreted by our church, who has authority to determine its sense; but it is only the true and genuine sense of the Bible that is God's word, and that sense once determined is law for all Catholics,—for the pope and bishop, as well as for the humblest layman. And from it there is no dispensation.

The author considers, also, that to be required to believe on the authority of the church is spiritual despotism; but he himself asserts that to deny an external *authoritative* revelation is tantamount to infidelity, and maintains, and requires all to maintain, that the Bible is such authoritative revelation. He then requires all to believe on the authority of the Bible, and, we presume, recognizes no one's moral right to believe any thing contrary to its teachings. God in the Bible says so, is for him a final answer to all questions. If God in his church says so, which is final for us in all cases, is spiritual despotism, how does he escape the charge of asserting a like despotism? What in relation to mental freedom is the difference in principle in saying that we are to believe what the church teaches, or that we are bound to believe what the Bible teaches? The rule is as absolute in the one case as in the other, and the only difference is, that

in the one case we have a living teacher, with regard to whose teaching there is no obscurity or uncertainty, while in the other we have a dead book, whose teachings after our best efforts remain dark and doubtful. In the one case we may have certain truth, in the other we can have only uncertain opinions or mere guesses; but the submission demanded to authority is precisely the same in both cases. It is singular that Protestants, who are continually asserting the authority of the Bible, and at the same time denouncing the Catholic Church as a spiritual despotism, never appear to be aware of this! The probability with the majority of Protestants is, that the assertion of the authority of the Bible is only an indirect way of denying all authority; for the Bible is authority with them only so far as they fancy it is in their favor. When it is against them, they deny or explain it away.

But it is time to draw our remarks to a close. There is no doubt that a crisis is forming in the Protestant world, rent as it is by the two contrary movements we have described. The author is right in calling his work *The Eclipse of Faith*. All who are living and active among Protestants feel that for them faith is at least eclipsed. We have but to study with some little care the movements in regard to religion among them, to be assured that they are well aware that thus far, as to what it has established, Protestantism has proved a failure, and the reformation has belied its promises. They see and feel that they cannot stay where they are; that they must either recede or push on further. Their Protestantism, as it has been and is, does not satisfy them, and their movements are all directed to obtaining a religious form and faith which they have not. The most stanch Protestant feels that Protestantism is not, though he trusts it will speedily become, the truth. The later German theologians, the Catholicizing school, are looking for something more than they have, and the infidelizing school is not contented with the position it has taken up. All feel that something is wanting, that as yet their Protestantism is incomplete and insufficient. They are seeking, not practising, religion. Hence on all hands is the effort going on to complete Protestantism in one sense or another. We have no disposition to treat with unkindness these efforts, and indeed we are pleased to see them, for they must soon bring about, if they have not already in fact brought about, a crisis in the fate of Protestantism, since on the one hand they will lead

from Protestantism to the church, and on the other will make it clear to all that Christianity cannot be retained without renouncing forever the Protestant reformation. They will force all to acknowledge that the real issue of our age, as we asserted some nine years ago, is between Catholicity and infidelity. This is the real issue, let who will deny it. Out of the Catholic Church faith is not merely eclipsed, it is extinct.

We cannot look upon the Protestant world, whose hopes, fears, and passions we so long and so deeply shared, without being ourselves more or less moved. The little of life they retained from the church has been exhausted; the few rays of light which were reflected upon them from the truth which for them had sunk below the horizon are gone out. God and heaven recede from their view. For them the bright stars are extinguished, the sun is darkened, and the moon turned to blood. The earth quakes beneath their feet, and the universe seems on the brink of dissolution. Fear seizes their hearts, and the poor Protestant seems to himself to stand alone on a mere point in space, with a universal blank around him. He sees no Father in heaven, no kindred on earth. The frightful abyss yawns on all sides of him, and he is unable to endure it. He would fain fill it up even with "spirits and goblins damned." He feels that it would be a consolation to believe even in the devil, for the devil is something, and something is better than nothing. What shall the poor man do? Return to the church of God, draw new life from her breasts, and rest his weary head upon her maternal bosom? No, he will not yet do that. Absolute denial he recoils from with horror. What then shall he do? Alas! we see what he will do, nay, what he has done and is doing. He revives long-forgotten necromancy, invokes the spirits of the dead, and reëstablishes in the nineteenth century the worship of demons. The fact stares us in the face. Here, then, proud and loud-boasting Protestantism, is what you have come to at last. You can go no further. You can sink no lower, for a lower deep there is not. You have sunk to the lowest depths of ancient heathenism, and in our very midst, in our own city, called not inaptly the Athens of America, you revive and practise the grossest superstitions of the old gentiles, from which two thousand years ago Catholicity had redeemed the world. It is not a thing pleasant to think of.

Is the darkness of heathenism to gather once more over

the world, and are the devils to have again their temples and their worship, and again to deceive the nations by their ambiguous oracles and their lying wonders? We do not believe it. But Protestants, it seems to us, must soon see that the only salvation of the race from this terrible catastrophe is in a return to the Catholic Church. She alone has power to put the demons to flight, to dispel the darkness of error, and dissipate the clouds of superstition. She has done it once for the nations, and she can and will do it again, when they shall have learned enough from their apostasy to feel that apostasy from the church involves sooner or later a relapse into demonism, or the worship of devils. Have they not already learned this? We think they have, or well-nigh learned it, and therefore we regard the fall of Islamism and Protestantism as an event by no means distant. Events march in our day with fearful rapidity, and as God is now evidently intervening in a special manner in behalf of his Spouse, his Beloved, for whom he gave his life, and whom he hath purchased with his own blood, there is no saying how soon such an event may take place.

Turkey is only propped up by the rivalries of the Christian powers of Europe, but must fall at furthest within a very few years, in spite of those rivalries. And her fall will involve that of Islamism. Russia, a schismatic power, may indeed come down to the Bosphorus, which for a time may be disastrous; but if she does, she must, in order to continue there, cease to be schismatic. England will ere long lose her colonies, for she is adopting the system of allowing them to govern themselves, and, once accustomed to govern themselves, they will not long consent to remain in the condition of colonies; and once reduced to her island home, she ceases to be able to uphold Protestantism, and must herself return to Catholic unity, which she broke only in a pet and for political reasons. This country, of course, will follow in the footsteps of England. China must soon openly tolerate our missionaries, and Japan be opened to them, and then the whole world will acknowledge the successor of the Fisherman as the Vicar of Christ on earth. The child may be now born that will live to see this glorious consummation, which sooner or later is sure to be effected. The powers of darkness have had their day, and though the church in this world will always be the church militant, yet not always shall we look back upon the middle ages, and regret them as the Ages of Faith.

ERRORS OF THE CHURCH OF ROME.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1853.]

A MAN by the name of Paul Dudley, we know not how many years since, left a fund to Harvard College, for the establishment of a Lecture, to be delivered annually, we believe, in support of natural and revealed religion, and against infidelity, prelacy, and papacy. Consequently, once in four years we are treated to a lecture against the church of Rome. This year the lecturer was Dr. Burnap, of Baltimore, a literary man of some pretensions, a passable scholar, and, as far as we have heard, a very respectable gentleman, belonging to the extreme Right, as Mr. Parker belongs to the extreme Left, of the American Unitarians.

We have read Dr. Burnap's Lecture with some attention, but we do not find that it rises above the level of mediocrity. It contains nothing novel or striking, and is remarkable neither for the depth of its views nor the clearness, force, and relevancy of its reasoning. It is an hour's public talk of a polished gentile, of very moderate abilities, on a subject of which he knows nothing, not even so much as to suspect his own ignorance, and is as entertaining and as instructive as we can reasonably expect such talk to be. The author's self-complacency is, upon the whole, rather amusing, and his *naïveté* is charming. Many a man has lectured against the Catholic Church, who has shown himself as weak, and far less polite and good-natured, and the ablest of those who have sought to immortalize themselves like him of old who fired the temple of Ephesus, have seldom done much better. He is free from the nastiness of Leahy and Giustiniani, and the vulgarity and malignity of Achilli and Gavazzi, and not much inferior to those anti-popery celebrities and pets of Evangelical saints in the appositeness and cogency of his reasoning.

After an introduction of some length, in which he mani-

*The Errors and Superstitions of the Church of Rome. Being the Dudleian Lecture delivered in the Chapel of Harvard College, on Wednesday, May 11, 1853. By GEORGE W. BURNAP, D. D., of Baltimore, Md. Published in the Christian Examiner. Boston: July, 1853.

fests considerable alarm at the rapid spread of Catholicity in this country, the lecturer proceeds to his subject, and says:—

"It is my purpose to-day to address you on three fundamental errors of the Church of Rome;—in the first place, its ultra-conservatism; in the second place, its corporate spirit; and in the third place, its unfriendliness to the diffusion of the Sacred Scriptures.

"Let it be understood, however, that in handling these topics I shall abstain from every thing sectarian and personal. Accustomed to associate in the daily intercourse of life, for more than a quarter of a century, with the members of the Catholic communion, I should be false to truth and to the courtesies of Christian charity, were I to indulge in any disparagement of the personal or Christian character of the disciples of that faith. A descendant of the Pilgrims has much to learn in this respect, when he leaves the keen atmosphere of Protestant New England. He will be surprised to find that all good men possess a common Christianity; that dogmas which he has been taught to denounce as pernicious and deride as absurd may abide for a lifetime in the mind quiescent and innoxious; that in the Catholic mind, more perhaps than any other, dogmas are laid aside to slumber, and really pervert the mind less than in some Protestant denominations, and the man is left to the guidance of the good impulses and rational principles of human nature. At any rate, in the spirit of reverence and a warm and active benevolence he will find some of the brightest examples in the Catholic Church. Having made these concessions, demanded by truth and experience, I proceed with the greater freedom to discuss what I deem the errors of our brethren of the Christian household in that communion."—pp. 49, 50.

We must leave the author to define, when he finds himself at leisure, what he means by this "common Christianity" of which he speaks with so much unction, and which we suppose is every thing in general and nothing in particular, and pass to the consideration of his proofs and illustrations of the three fundamental errors which he lays to the charge of our church.

1. The first fundamental error is ultra-conservatism. Dr. Burnap regards it as a fundamental error, not that the church is conservative, but that she is *ultra*-conservative, that is, more than conservative, or conservative overmuch. A Unitarian of the right could not denounce conservatism altogether, for if he should, how could he complain of Theodore Parker? and he cannot commend conservatism without some qualification, for if he should, how could he vindicate his Unitarianism? Up to a certain point he can be conservative, but beyond that point he must be a radical, and

favor the rejection of the old and the introduction of the new. The error of the church, then, is not conservatism, but ultraism. The first thing to be settled is, therefore, the limits of conservatism, or the point up to which conservatism is conservatism, and beyond which it is ultraism, or an excess of conservatism; for before you can say what is the error on a given subject, you must know what on that subject is the truth. Now where is this point? Or where does the conservatism end and the ultraism begin? By what authority does Dr. Burnap determine this point? His own? But, *salva reverentia sua*, that does not suffice. Mr. Parker may differ from him, and contend that it should be placed much further forward; and why is the authority of Dr. Burnap, the Unitarian minister of Baltimore, to be taken as paramount to that of Mr. Theodore Parker, a Unitarian minister of Boston? "Mr. Parker is an infidel, and goes too far." So you say. But he denies it, and says you are an old fogie, and do not go far enough. Dr. Pusey, again, says that you yourself are an infidel, and go too far; you deny it, and say he is an old fogie, and does not go far enough. Why are you good authority against Mr. Parker, and Dr. Pusey not so against you? Or why is Mr. Parker's authority less against you, than yours against Dr. Pusey? You tell us that the doctrine of the Trinity is an error, "one of the first aberrations of the church in point of time," and therefore must hold that to preserve it is ultra-conservatism. But here the whole Trinitarian world rises up and flatly contradicts you. Who is to decide between you? You say our church is ultra-conservative. This is your assertion. She denies it, and you must be aware that, at the very lowest, her denial is as good as your assertion. The Catholic, man to man, is, at worst, the equal of the Protestant. You, an individual Protestant, say the Catholic Church is excessively conservative; we, an individual Catholic, say she is not. We are equal to you, and therefore our denial reduces your assertion to zero, and you are just as far advanced as you were before you opened your mouth, and no further.

Here is a grave difficulty. Before Dr. Burnap can charge the church with being *ultra*-conservative, he must determine what is the point at which the conservatism ends and the ultraism begins. This must be a fixed point, for if it be not, he alleges nothing against the church but his own opinion, which is of no moment. But we cannot see how he can de-

termine this point. We are willing to grant that ultra-conservatism, if the thing is conceivable, is an error, for there may be error of excess as well as of defect; we concede, also, that if the church has pushed her conservatism to excess, she has erred even fundamentally, and should be rejected; but the author should recollect that it is his business to prove that she has done so, and that he cannot possibly prove this before having settled the question as to the point at which conservatism must stop,—the point at which he may say, Thus far and no further; for till he has done that, he cannot say what is *ultra* or what is not, and has no fixed criterion by which to distinguish between conservatism and ultraism. But the difficulty is, he has nothing but his private opinion by which to settle that point, and his private opinion is neutralized, not only by the teaching of the church, which even as her private opinion is worth as much as his, but by the private opinion of his Protestant brother Parker on the one hand, and of his Protestant brother Pusey on the other. The only way he could possibly settle it would be by an appeal to a catholic authority, admitted alike by Catholics and non-Catholics; but such an authority he does not appeal to, and cannot, because there is for him no such authority.

We suppose that it must be conceded on all hands that the church, since the author fully grants that she was the church of Christ and for long ages the only church of Christ, had from the beginning the right and the duty to preserve her own existence and the truth committed to her charge. To do this, we may suppose it will be granted, is only legitimate conservatism, and if the church has done this, and only this, she cannot be justly accused of ultraism. To sustain his charge, then, the author must prove that she has done something more. But how will he do it? To do it, he must know what she was as to her own existence in the beginning, and what, and precisely what, was the deposit of truth which she received. Does he know this? Has he any authority by which he can say infallibly what she was and what she received? Of course not. He has only his conjectures and opinions, and the conjectures and private opinions of others as liable to err, perhaps, as himself. Does he say the church has become changed, and is no longer what she was? Then his charge is not, that she is ultra-conservative, but that she has not been conservative enough. Does he say, as in fact he does, that she has de-

viated from the truth, and in her progress through ages of ignorance and barbarism has fallen into many aberrations? The charge, again, is not that of being ultra-conservative, but that of not having been even conservative. If he says she remains what she was, and carefully preserves without change or alteration, addition or diminution, the deposit which she received, then he must concede that she is simply conservative, and not ultra, unless he would have her abdicate herself, abandon the truth, and become the patroness of error.

The trouble we have with Dr. Burnap is, that he does not keep to his thesis, that he lays down one thesis and speaks to several others. The whole subject is confused in his head, and equally confused in his speech. We had the right to expect, when he announced his subject to be "the errors and superstitions of the church of Rome," that he would specify those errors and superstitions, and proceed to prove them. When he charged her with these fundamental errors, of which the first is ultra-conservatism, what more reasonable than to suppose that he would undertake to establish them? But he does no such thing. He includes all her supposed errors and superstitions under the three heads, and then undertakes to show how she came to fall into them, to excuse her for having patronized them for fifteen hundred years, and to condemn her for holding them now, or not taking sides with the reformation, as he develops it. In other words, he takes for granted the errors and superstitions which he should have proved, and then undertakes to say how far the church should or should not be blamed for them. He takes for his text the words of St. Paul, Acts xvii. 30: "And the times of this ignorance God winked at, but now commandeth all men everywhere to repent"; or, rather, "And God indeed having overlooked the times of this ignorance, now declareth to men, that all should everywhere do penance." From this text he proceeds to argue that the church, down to the end of the middle ages, to the revival of Greek literature, and the holding of the Council of Trent in the sixteenth century, when she was the only church, and contained all the Christianity there was in the world, should not be blamed for her errors and superstitions, for they belonged to the times, and not to her. She did what she could to avoid them, and to train up the world in the principles of the Gospel; but the times were too hard for her. The Jews could hardly

be expected to pass over to her "without carrying their old opinions, usages, and prejudices with them into a religion cognate and analogous to their own," and much more difficult was it for the pagan, on becoming Christian, to "abandon his old religion at once, with all its opinions, usages, and associations." (p. 51.) "Accustomed to worship a variety of deities, the pagans felt no incongruity in exalting Christ and the Holy Ghost into the rank of divinities, and making them participants in the glories of the Godhead. Accustomed to an iron rule and a rigid subordination in the civil organization of the Roman Empire, the church, when it grew up as an outward institution, was formed by the Roman spirit upon the same model, and the same tendency to centralization, to conquest, and domination, which had placed the Cæsars on the throne of universal empire, afterwards stretched the sceptre of the pope over the civilized world." (*ib.*) The confessional grew out of the necessities of the times, "but that it was adopted with dishonest purposes is highly improbable." (p. 52.) So of asceticism, "originating in the philosophical doctrine of the impurity of matter, it found some countenance in the Jewish tradition of the Fall."

"The influence of all these causes upon Christianity, its doctrines, its outward form and its mode of administration, was inevitable. Nothing but a perpetual miracle could have prevented it. 'The light shone in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not.' And they exonerate in equal measure the Catholic Church, that is the Christian Church, the only church which then existed, from the charge of intentional and deliberate wrong."—p. 53.

All this is no doubt very ingenious and very liberal, and yet is nothing to the purpose. Before the author undertook to write an apology for the errors and superstitions of the church from the apostles down to the sixteenth century, he should have specified them, and proved that they really are errors and superstitions, and that she adopted them. We do not thank him for his apology; for if our church is what she professes to be, she needs no apology; if she is not, she deserves none. It may be very Protestant to apologize for an erroneous and superstitious church, but it is not very Catholic. If the church can fall into error and superstition, she is an imposition upon mankind, a temptation, and a snare, the synagogue of Satan, not the church of God, and whoever undertakes to defend her only condemns himself. The whole theory of the author is a baseless fabric,

and, instead of saying any thing for the church of the Dark Ages, only exposes him to ridicule for his ignorance of facts, and to grave censure for the loose and immoral principles he assumes. Let him without going any further prove that the church has at any period of her existence taught or countenanced error or superstition, and he may be assured that no Catholic will any longer uphold her. But he must prove this, not take it for granted, or imagine that the attempt to account for her errors and superstitions will be accepted as proof that she has errors and superstitions. In Paul Dudley's day this might have passed, but will not pass in ours. Then a Protestant could have it all his own way in New England, and could say what he pleased against the Catholic Church, without any fear of being called to an account or required to substantiate his charges. The law had taken care that the Papist should remain silent. But it is not so now. The Catholic is here to speak for himself, and he will not suffer his religion to be calumniated without at least contradicting the calumniator.

But though the church is excusable for her errors and superstitions during the ages of ignorance and barbarism which preceded the reformation, she is not now. Thus the author continues:—

"After the darkness of the middle ages was passed, after the revival of learning, the invention of printing, and the general diffusion of knowledge over Europe, a totally different state of things took place. That advancing light revealed great errors in doctrines which had long been innocently held, great abuses of administration, which a more sensitive conscience could no longer tolerate; and a ritual adapted to a rude and sensuous age was no longer edifying to an intellectual and refined one. The whole world became clamorous for reform. Beginning with a few brave and clear-sighted spirits, the voice of remonstrance spread among the multitude, it rose and swelled, till it became as the sound of many waters. And the burden of their cry was, Reform. 'The times of this ignorance God winked at, but now commandeth all men everywhere to repent.'

"The Church was at length aroused, and assembled to take order on the altered condition of the world. At the Council of Trent, commenced in the year 1545, the Catholic Church took her final ground and decided her destiny. She had arrived at the parting of the ways, and her path was to choose once and for ever. The question was distinctly put to her, Would she belong to the future or to the past? Would she join the march of progress, or throw her whole weight against the cause of human advancement? She deliberately chose the latter alternative.

She cast in her lot with the past, and made it henceforth to be her interest, and, as she conceived, her duty, to arrest and war against the progress of the human race. From that hour her relation to mankind was completely reversed, and every thing with her has gone wrong. Up to that hour she had been the best friend that humanity had ever had. She had renovated the whole face of the civilized world. She had been the conservator of every thing valuable in the ancient civilization, which had survived the wreck of the Roman Empire. She had been the pioneer in all generous enterprises for the amelioration of the condition of the human race. She had been a patient laborer in the great field of human improvement. But when she had contributed to reform every thing else, she refused to reform herself. As a church, an association of fallible men, she was human, and of course liable to err; but she chose to assume the attribute of infallibility. Religion and the Bible are divine and unchangeable. But theology is human, a science deduced by fallible human reason from the Bible, the phenomena of man and the universe. It is a human production, and therefore capable of revision, and requiring amendment from age to age. But the Church of Rome claims for her theology an absolute infallibility. She demands, therefore, that it should be held immutable, and be placed on the same level with the Sacred Scriptures themselves."—pp. 53, 54.

The argument here, if argument there be, is that the church, though excusable, when the world knew no better, for her errors and superstitions, is inexcusable now, when the age of light has come, for still holding on to them, and not allowing them to be put away. She is determined to remain, and in the Council of Trent obliged herself to remain, through all coming time, what she was through the middle ages, and therefore she is *ultra*-conservative. But suppose she did in the Council of Trent bind herself to remain unchanged, to wear the same form she had always worn, to teach the same doctrines she had always taught, and to observe the same ritual she had always observed, how does that prove that she is *ultra*-conservative? The author has not proved, he has only assumed, that prior to that council she had erred in doctrine or practice. And if she had not erred, the obligation she then took—although everybody knows that it was no new obligation—only bound her to be conservative, which the author concedes she ought to be. In 1545 the church, according to the author, "had arrived at the parting of the ways, and her path was to choose once and for ever. The question was distinctly put to her, Would she belong to the future or to the past? Would she join the march of progress, or throw her whole

weight against the cause of human advancement? She deliberately chose the latter alternative." (p. 53.) If she did, and it was something she had not done before, she innovated, and the author's charge of ultra-conservatism is ill laid. But is this certain? Is it certain the church waited till 1545 to choose her path once and for ever? Is it certain, again, the side she took was against progress, against the cause of human advancement? This needs to be proved, not simply assumed. The author concedes that prior to 1545 the church had been on the side of progress, and "the best friend that humanity had ever had. She had renovated the whole face of the civilized world. She had been the conservator of every thing valuable in the ancient civilization, which had survived the wreck of the Roman Empire. She had been the pioneer in all generous enterprises for the amelioration of the condition of the human race. She had been a patient laborer in the great field of human improvement." The church is always the same. It is certain that she chose in 1545 no new path, underwent no change, and the precise complaint the author brings against her is that she did not, would not change. It would seem, then, even according to his own showing, that she did not deliberately take her stand against progress, and throw her whole weight against the cause of human advancement; but continued on the course she had always pursued, and which for fifteen hundred years had proved so eminently successful in their favor. May it not be that the reformers were the party in the wrong, and that the church condemned them, and refused to accept the path they indicated, because it was the path, not of progress, but of destruction, because it would conduct away from God and heaven, and undo all that she, with so much labor, patience, and suffering, at the cost of so many sacrifices, for fifteen hundred years, had effected for the human race? This view of the case is very conceivable, and is the more natural inference from the important concessions which the force of truth has wrung from the author. What has the author to oppose to it? His opinion? But what is that worth? His opinion is at least contradicted by our opinion, and we should like to know why his opinion on the subject is of more weight than ours?

"But when she had contributed to reform every thing else, she refused to reform herself." If the church had done, and was doing up to that hour, all the author asserts, what need had she of reforming herself? How does the

author know that she needed reforming? or how can he say that she was not right in refusing to reform herself, and that, if she contributed to reform every thing else, she did not contribute to all the reformation that was required? "As a church, as an association of fallible men, she was human, and of course liable to err; but she chose to assume the attribute of infallibility." But certainly not then for the first time, dear Doctor. She assumed that attribute in the sixteenth century no more than she had assumed it in the fourteenth, the twelfth, the ninth, the sixth, the fourth, the second, or the first century. Rightly or wrongly, she had always claimed that attribute, and claimed it just as distinctly, and acted on the assumption that she possessed it just as decidedly, when she was aiding, according to the author, progress and the cause of human advancement, as now, when he accuses her of opposing them. The church is, if you will, an association of fallible men, but by what authority do you assert that she is only that? She claims to be more than such association; she claims to be human and at the same time divine, as is her heavenly Spouse,—to be a divinely organized, protected, and assisted institution, for teaching the divine word and administering the divine law, and therefore in these respects not fallible, but infallible, by virtue of the Holy Ghost who dwells in her. Allow us to say, that to invalidate this claim you must adduce something of graver authority than your own opinion, even were that more respectable than it is.

"Theology is human, a science . . . . capable of revision, and requiring amendment from age to age. But the Church of Rome claims for her theology an absolute infallibility." A poor quibble. In the sense in which theology is a human science, it is false to say that the church claims for her theology, or any theology, absolute infallibility. She does no such thing. In the sense of revealed truth, as the faith, or what God has revealed and commanded us to believe, she asserts, indeed, that it is infallible, and before you accuse her of error, you must prove that she proposes as revealed truth something which God has not revealed. "Jesus Christ prescribed no specific or immutable form to his Church." So you say; but how know you that? You think so? Well, we think differently. Jesus Christ established a church, for you speak of "*his* Church." If he established a church at all, he gave it a specific form, for nothing does or can exist without a specific form, as you

must know, if you have ever learnt and remember your philosophy. If he established his church to endure unto the end of the world, he gave it an *immutable* form; for to change the specific form of a thing is to destroy its existence, and either to annihilate it or to convert it into some other existence. The author says, though "Jesus Christ prescribed no specific or immutable form to his Church, or to that organization which naturally and necessarily took place among those who received his religion, this much he did ordain, that it should not be hierarchical." And he quotes several texts from the Gospels to prove it. But how will he assure us that he rightly understands those texts? Is he not a fallible man, and liable to err? How then shall we hold his application of these texts to be conclusive? Dr. Pusey will tell him they mean no such thing, and will cite texts equally strong to prove that our Lord did give to his church the hierarchical form. Why shall Dr. Burnap be credited in preference to Dr. Pusey? "The Christian Church was left to take that [organization] which circumstances might render expedient." How does the author know that? Very respectable men maintain the contrary, and it is very evident from history that the church set out from the apostles with the precise specific form she now has. But suppose it was so, who was to judge of the expediency? Each individual believer? That were disorganization, sheer individualism, and would make the author contradict himself in terms. The minority? Whence the evidence? The majority? Then the case, we fear, must go against our author, for he is in a decided minority, and the great majority of believers of all times have adhered to the hierarchical and papal forms of the church?

"The error lay in ultra-conservatism, in imagining that there was not the same freedom in laying aside as there had been in adopting the forms of outward administration." (p. 55.) So this, after all, is ultra-conservatism,—not asserting the same freedom in laying aside as in adopting the forms of outward administration. Will the author tell us any form which the church has ever held herself free to adopt, that she does not hold herself equally free to lay aside when she judges it expedient? Every canonist will tell him, that what the church of her own legislative authority has enacted, she can and often does abrogate. Wherever there was freedom in adopting, there is freedom in laying aside. What the church says she cannot abrogate is the divine leg-

islation, what has been expressly enacted and ordained by God himself. Would Dr. Burnap have her do that? "The mistake consisted in imagining that there was no difference between the tenth century and the sixteenth." (*ib.*) Pray, who was it that committed that mistake? But is there any difference between truth in one century and truth in another? If so, what is that difference? if not, what is it you complain of? "That because the church might be kept stationary, the world would remain so too." (*ib.*) So you would have a movable and moving church, here to-day and there to-morrow, one thing in this age and another thing in another,—not a church teaching the world the truth and directing it in the way of salvation, but a church tossed to and fro and carried about by every wind of doctrine, conforming to the world, following it, whatever crotchet it may get into its head for the time, and, if it chooses to go to the devil, going there along with it. It is very certain that on this subject you and we do not think alike.

The trouble, according to the author, is, that the church as she ceases to be a child, does not put away childish things.

"But the error lay in ultra-conservatism, in imagining that there was not the same freedom in laying aside, as there had been in adopting, the forms of outward administration. The mistake consisted in imagining that there was no difference between the tenth century and the sixteenth; that because the church might be kept stationary, the world would remain so too; that because the human mind had had its infancy, it never could have its maturity and manhood. The church overlooked the wisdom of the apostle. 'When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; but when I became a man, I put away childish things.' The manhood has come, but, contrary to the law of nature, the childish things are not put away."—p. 55.

How does the author know that there was any error or mistake in the case? He asserts there was, but he does not happen to prove it. How does he know that the church ever had any childish thing to put away, or that she ever thought or spake as a child? The law which he alleges is not universal. It is not applicable to the Divinity, and Adam was created, not a baby, but in the perfection of a full-grown man. By what authority, then, does he assume that such was not the case with the church? It might have been, and how does he know that it was not? By what authority does he assume that the church, on her first going

forth, was a child, subject to the law of development and growth as a human being? If she has her human side, and on that side a growth which can be only extension in space and time, she has also her divine side, or is held to have it, and on her divine side, the only side now in question, she has and can have no childhood or old age, no development or growth; for the Divinity, we suppose it will be conceded us, does not grow, and is never young, never old, and therefore she not only might, but must have begun, not as an infant, not as a child, thinking as a child and speaking as a child, but in the full possession and exercise of all her divine faculties, complete and perfect in all her parts, and able to discharge all her functions. The author is not at liberty, therefore, to say she must have been a child, and have had childish things, or declare her ultra-conservative because she refuses to put away childish things. He must first prove that she has childish things to put away, and it will be time enough to reply when he has brought in his bill of items, and the evidence by which he proposes to sustain them.

But after all, what does all that the worthy doctor advances in proof of the ultra-conservatism of the church amount to? At the very best, it amounts only to this,—that his theory of Christian doctrine and practice is different from that asserted by the church, and she requires all her children to believe hers and to reject his. Here is the whole. Dr. Burnap does not agree with the church, and the church does not agree with Dr. Burnap, and since she does not agree with him, she is, in his opinion, ultra-conservative, opposed to "progress, and throws her whole weight against the cause of human advancement"! He will pardon her all her alleged errors and superstitions during the Dark Ages, her having taught the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, Original Sin, Redemption, &c., established the confessional, and favored asceticism, if she will now only abandon her old pretensions, place herself in harmony with the new times, adopt modern ideas, encourage modern innovators and innovations, and conform to Unitarianism after Burnap, of Baltimore, and not after Parker, of Boston. He is not, after all, particular as to what doctrines she teaches, or what practices she approves, if she will not put her doctrines forth as divine truths necessary to be believed, and insist on her practices as necessary to be observed, and will leave her children free to speculate as they please, and adopt any notions or observe any prac-

tices which they happen for the time being to fancy. Very liberal and condescending indeed! And what an obstinate, bigoted, and stupid old woman the church must be, to refuse to gratify him and his friends in so small an affair! Why can she not be as liberal to him as he is to her? If she would be, she would have him her friend, at least till some new light broke in upon his mind, or he got a new kink in his head, and—nobody else! This is really the sum of all he says, and this he has judged worthy to be written in this nineteenth century by a Unitarian Doctor of Divinity, to be delivered in the Chapel of Harvard College, the oldest and most illustrious literary institution of the United States, and to be printed in *The Christian Examiner*, the first literary, philosophical, and theological organ of the American Unitarians! Perhaps he has judged rightly.

The *gravamen* of the author's objection against the church is, that since 1545 she has refused to "join the march of progress, and has thrown her whole weight against the cause of human advancement." We shall not stop to dispute the false and absurd theory of progress which the author assumes, and which underlies his whole thought, but we will simply ask him to specify a single truth, known by him or any one else to be a truth, which she does not teach, or which she forbids us as Catholics to hold. We ask him also to specify a single virtue which she forbids or does not enjoin, a single discovery of modern science, not a mere hypothesis, which she does not accept, or a single movement or enterprise of modern philanthropy which it is certain tends to the amelioration of the individual or of society, that she refuses to encourage, or does not sanction. Let us have no more vague generalities, which mean every thing or nothing, no more noisy declamations, no more unsupported assertions. Let the matter be brought to a test. Show us some truth which, but for the ultra-conservatism of the church, we might have had that we have not, or which we might hold, if we renounced her authority, that we cannot hold now. Show us, we beg you, some good which can be done for mankind, either in relation to this world or to the next, which, as genuine Catholics, we are forbidden or not commanded to labor for, and which she has prevented from being obtained. Show us, finally, what genuine progress the church opposes, in what respect she throws her weight against the cause of human advancement. Give us facts, dear Doctor, not speculations,

—facts, not mere opinions,—certainties which cannot be gainsaid, not mere conjectures, or vague dreams. If you can do this, do it, and we are no longer Catholics; if you cannot, as you well know you cannot, then cease your perpetual clamor about the church being opposed to progress or human advancement, for your clamor can only mean that the church opposes progress and human advancement simply because she opposes you and your insane speculations and ridiculous projects of reform, in which case, to say the least, you are as likely as she to be the party in the wrong.

That the church opposed the reformers in the sixteenth century, the Puritans and kindred sectaries in the seventeenth, the philosophers and Jacobins in the eighteenth, and opposes the socialists and communists in the nineteenth, is very true, and well is it for the world that it is true; for these have all, the author himself being judge, deserved to be opposed. If the church had sanctioned Luther's doctrine of the serf-will, Calvin's of election and reprobation, the common doctrine of all the reformers, that man by the transgression of Adam lost his spiritual faculties and became totally corrupted in his whole nature, or the doctrine of justification by faith alone without works, the author himself would have denounced her, for he, no less than she, rejects all these doctrines. Excepting those relating to the sacraments and the papacy, there is scarcely a point of doctrine on which she has condemned the reformers, on which he does not also condemn them. Why, then, blame her for not approving the reformers? He, like ourselves, is, we believe, a descendant of the old English Puritans, but he has hardly departed less from them than we have, and in several respects he departs even further. He rejects as error or superstition, bigotry or fanaticism, all that they called Christian, and will he pretend that the church proved herself hostile to the interests of progress, and threw her whole weight against the cause of human advancement, because she condemned them? The author claims to be a Christian; will he, then, maintain that the church was ultra-conservative because she refused to make common cause with such Free-Thinkers as Collins, Tindall, Toland, Morgan, Mandeville, Voltaire, Rousseau, Helvetius, Diderot, D'Alembert, and D'Holbach, and to encourage the old French Jacobins in their terrible war on religion and society? Does he say that it would be for the interests of progress, and would favor the cause of human advance-

ment, for her to approve and encourage your Saint-Simonians, your Owenites, your Fourierists, your Icarians, your Women's-Rights men, and your Bloomers? In the non-Catholic world, there no doubt is a constant succession of reformers, projectors, schemers, visionaries, dreamers, following one another as wave follows wave. Each has his panacea, his "Morrison's Pill" for all the ills flesh is heir to, and is always just on the point of recovering the terrestrial paradise; but what wise man can place confidence in any one of their nostrums? These would-be reformers are but children amusing themselves with blowing soap-bubbles with a pipe-stem in a tin porringer. Is the church to be condemned as the enemy of human advancement, because she refuses to take these bubble-blowers to her bosom, and cherish them as the sages, seers, and philosophers of mankind? Is she to be denounced as ultra-conservative, because she takes their bubbles for what they are, and refuses to commend them as new worlds, no less solid than brilliant?

Perhaps what you demand is, not that the church should indorse each individual bubble-blower, or attempt to construct the whole world after the pattern of each particular bubble blown, but that she should herself become a bubble-blower, encourage all bubble-blowers, and declare bubble-blowing the noblest employment man can make of his faculties. Her precise error is, that she will neither blow bubbles herself, nor suffer those that would to blow them. Therefore is she opposed to the interests of progress, and throws her whole weight against the cause of human advancement. This is probably your real objection. But can you refer us to any good that has ever come from your favorite employment of bubble-blowing? What has been gained for humanity by that reckless spirit of speculation and inquiry, which treats all subjects as uncertain and doubtful, and requires all our faculties to be employed in devising and refuting schemes of improvement? Nothing as yet, perhaps you will reply; but then it is just about to gain something. Moreover, it keeps us employed, our minds active, constantly on the stretch, and that itself is worth something, and is infinitely better than the intellectual death produced by your church. Alas! poor bubble-blowers! do you not see that in all this you assume that the truth is unknown, that God has made no certain revelation of his will, that the possession of truth kills the mind, and that there can be life only in seeking and not finding? Much of this may be true of non-Cath-

olics, but is it their advantage, or is it their misfortune or their shame? In your actual state, free inquiry assuredly is your right and your duty, but only because you have not the truth, and are bound to seek it. But to assume that the great business of life is to be seeking after the truth, is to assume that we are to be always seeking without ever finding, and to make the apology of those whom the apostle condemns as "always learning, and never attaining to the knowledge of the truth." The real business of life cannot be in seeking the truth, because the commencement and conduct of that business demand the knowledge of the truth, and no one till he has that knowledge can be said properly to live, for it is through it that we are spiritually begotten. God reveals to us the truth, and the business of life is to accept and apply it. The truth is not to be sought for the sake of the seeking, but for the sake of the end to be obtained by its possession and application. Mental activity, like all activity, is good or bad, according to the end to which it is subordinated; but for its own sake alone, that is, without any end, it is the activity of a fool, not the activity of a wise man. Free mental activity, or freedom of mind, is certainly desirable, and is always to be encouraged; but it is found in truth only, never in falsehood or error. *Veritas liberabit vos.* It is the truth that makes free, and without it you are in the bonds of ignorance, exposed to every fatal error, and the slave of every illusion. The three hundred years of experience which Protestants have had of the operations of the spirit you condemn the church for anathematizing, ought to suffice to shut your mouth for ever. What has that spirit done for you? It has filled your minds with doubt and your hearts with bitterness; it has led you to reject all certain revealed truth, and to fall back on the insufficient light of reason, to deal with familiar spirits, to revive ancient necromancy, to re-establish in this very city—not inaptly called the Athens of America, since ancient Athens was noted for its superstitions—the worship of demons, to substitute for the word of God the instincts of man, and to deify the passions, pride, lust, and revenge. This is solemn fact; it stares you in the face, and you cannot deny it, however you may try to disguise it, or to explain it away, There stands the fact, and with what face, or want of face, can you clamor for that spirit, and declare the church ultra-conservative because she anathematizes it, and bids you beware of it?

2. But it is time to proceed to the consideration of the

second fundamental error which the author alleges against the church, namely, her "corporate spirit."

"I now come to the second fundamental error of the Roman Catholic Church,—its corporate spirit. This, I am aware, is an awkward phrase, and perhaps needs definition. I mean by it, a disposition to sacrifice every thing to the interests of a gigantic and perpetual corporation. This was first manifested in the establishment of a hierarchy, in the continual elevation of the clergy and the depression of the laity, in the association of church with church, the subordination of provincials to metropolitans, and, finally, the subjugation of the whole Western Church to the Bishop of Rome; the establishment of religious orders, the vows of celibacy, obedience, poverty, and seclusion, the prohibition of marriage to the clergy, and the unreserved consignment of the priesthood, body and soul, as bondslaves of the Church; the submission of the individual conscience at the confessional, and the denial of the right of individual judgment in matters of faith,—all these things constitute a mass of sacrifices of the individual to the interests and ambition of a corporation, such as finds no parallel in the records of the human race. It is wonderful that this was ever submitted to at all, and still more wonderful that it has continued so long."—p. 56.

The fundamental error consists, he tells us, in "a disposition to sacrifice every thing to the interests of a gigantic and perpetual corporation." *A disposition* on the part of whom or of what? Of the church? Of the church in her corporate capacity, or on the part of her individual members? Is it a disposition enjoined by the church, or simply counselled by her, and voluntarily entertained and complied with by individuals? Is this disposition an error, because the corporation is *gigantic*, or because it is *perpetual*, or because it is at once both *gigantic and perpetual?* Would it cease to be a fundamental error if the corporation were small and temporary? In a word, is it an error because the corporation is a corporation, or because it is a corporation of a particular sort? Is it an error because the corporation is human, or would it be also an error if the corporation were divine? These are questions not answered by the definition itself, and yet they are not without grave importance. This disposition "was first manifested in the establishment of a hierarchy, in the continual elevation of the clergy and the depression of the laity, in the association of church with church, the subordination of provincials [suffragans?] to metropolitans, and, finally, the subjugation of the whole Western [why not say also the whole Eastern?] Church to the Bishop of Rome";

that is, in the establishment of the hierarchical and papal constitution of the church. But if God himself ordained or established this hierarchical and papal constitution, and imposed it upon the church as a law from which she could no more depart than an individual can take his own life without ceasing to exist, would our author say, then, that it is a fundamental error? He would not dare say it, for then the corporation would be a divine corporation, and its interests would be divine interests, and the disposition to sacrifice every thing to them would be just and proper. That disposition can be an error only on the supposition that it is a purely human corporation, with only human rights and interests. The objection, then, is not well laid. It should have been, not that the church is a corporation, gigantic and perpetual or otherwise, but that she is a merely human corporation, and therefore with no authority to demand, and with no right to receive, the sacrifice of every thing to her interests, for God is above every thing human, and we must obey him rather than men. This is the only form in which the author could legitimately bring his objection, unless he was prepared to deny the right of God himself to give his church the hierarchical and papal constitution, and therefore affirm that God can err and do wrong; and having brought it in this form, he should have proceeded to prove, not that she requires every thing to be sacrificed to her interests, but that she is a purely human corporation, holding her charter only from men, and possessing only human rights and interests. If he had done this, he could have legitimately concluded that the corporate spirit he objects to is a fundamental error; but then there would have been no need of drawing such a conclusion, for the proof that the church is a purely human corporation would of itself have been sufficient to induce all Catholics to abandon her. But it so happens that he has not proved this; he has only quietly assumed it, and from it concluded that the corporate spirit is an error, when, for aught that he shows to the contrary, it may be the true and proper spirit for a Christian.

The establishment of a hierarchy, if done by men on their own authority, is an error, a wrong, for men have of themselves no right to do any thing of the sort; but if done by God, or by men under his authority, it is not an error, and no man who believes in God and recognizes his universal dominion dare say it is. The elevation of the clergy above the laity as to their office, which is all that can be alleged,

if by divine appointment, is no error, and can no more be objected to than the elevation of magistrates above simple citizens. The associating of church with church, the subordination of suffragans to metropolitans (if a fact), and the subordination—there is no *subjugation* in the case—to the bishop of Rome as chief pastor, if done by the ordination of God, cannot be complained of, and is absolutely necessary if the church is to be one, to be a kingdom, a true spiritual polity, for the government of all men and nations. None of these things can be objected to without blasphemy, if the church holds her charter of incorporation, as she alleges, from Almighty God himself, who is King of kings and Lord of lords, who has absolute dominion over all creatures, and may do according to his will in both heaven and earth. The sacrifice they demand or authorize would then be to God, to whom belongs all that we are or have. Plainly, then, the author should, in the outset, have proved that the church is simply human; for only on the supposition that she is, and that she is not divinely instituted, can any of the things he alleges be objections to her. But not having done this, he has only blundered in logic, history, and moral theology.

The other things immediately added in the passage cited may prove the corporate spirit of the church, if the author pleases; but what if they do? He has not yet proved that the corporate spirit is an error. He had to prove the fact of the corporate spirit, and its erroneousness. The first he proves, but unnecessarily, for nobody denies it, and all Catholics will concede it. The second, the only contested point, he assumes, takes for granted, and simply argues that the church is in a fundamental error because she has a corporate spirit! The vows he enumerates prove nothing to his purpose, unless they are wrong in themselves, and can on no supposition be lawful. But that they can in no case be lawful he assumes, but does not even attempt to prove. The fact that the church has established religious orders proves nothing against her, unless such orders are repugnant to the law of God, which from the very nature of the case he cannot prove. Religious orders, and the vows of chastity, obedience, and poverty, are all in the supernatural order, both as to their origin and end, and can neither be defended nor condemned, except by an authority competent to decide on supernatural matters. That a man may justly neglect the duties of one state for the sake of applying himself to

those of a higher state, all are obliged to concede, for the thing takes place every day, and society could not go on if it did not. Reason can say nothing against the principle of the religious orders, which is, that it is lawful under certain circumstances for a man to leave a less perfect, and consecrate himself by solemn vows to the duties of a more perfect state. No man is bound to marry against his will, and therefore, if free, one may, for the sake of God and the attainment of Christian perfection, vow to preserve his chastity, and to live unmarried. So of the other vows. But the individual in these matters must act under authority, and be guided not by his own will or judgment alone. The whole question, therefore, of religious orders must depend for its solution on the fact whether the church is or is not a divinely constituted corporation, with authority to say when one is free to take the religious vows, and to what rule, if he does take them, he must or must not, may or may not, be subjected. Supposing the church to be what she professes to be, religious orders are defensible, the vows are proper; but if she is not what she professes to be, we have nothing to say in their defence, because confessedly all are not free to take these vows, and aside from the church we have no authority to say who are or are not free to take them, or to say what is or is not a higher state. All we say here is, that the vows which are taken are taken voluntarily, and the church never commands or urges any one to take them, though she often prohibits persons desirous of taking them from taking them. All vows must be voluntary; the church simply decides when and on what conditions they may be taken, and requires them when lawfully taken to be kept inviolate. The right of a man, supposing him to have contracted no obligations except those imposed by the law of nature, to consecrate himself to God in a religious order approved by a competent authority, cannot be questioned, and it is only such as these that the church ever permits to enter into a religious order.

The prohibition of the clergy to marry proves nothing to the author's purpose, because the church compels no one to be a priest. She has the right to prescribe the conditions on which she will admit a candidate to the priesthood, as much so as the state has to prescribe the conditions on which its offices may be held; and if she judges it wise and proper to prescribe the vow of chastity as one of these conditions, nothing forbids her to do so. She violates in so

doing no right of the priest, for no one can claim admission to the priesthood as a right, and she compels no one to be a priest. She says to him before ordaining him, You are free to remain in society, and to marry, if such be your wish, and you are under no obligation to bind yourself by the vow of celibacy, unless you choose; but if it is your free choice to become a priest, you must take that vow, and will be compelled to keep it. All this is fair. If he takes the vow, he takes it freely, with his eyes open; and as it is a lawful vow, and as he takes it voluntarily, there is no hardship in requiring him to keep it. As for the clergy being bondslaves to the church, what the author says is simply nonsense. The priest is simply bound to conform to the canons, or to the law of his office, and we suppose every officer in church or state is bound in like manner. The office of a priest has certain well-known and prescribed duties, and these he is bound to perform, in subordination to the supreme authority. You may call him a bondslave, if you please, and so you may call the deputy-sheriff or the sheriff himself a bondslave. Every man, in that he is a man, has certain duties which he is bound to perform, and in this sense is a bondslave, and just as much so as the priest. St. Paul calls himself the slave of Jesus Christ, and subjection to the church, whether of clergy or laity, is only subjection to Jesus Christ, who teaches and governs through her, and subjection to him is the most perfect freedom conceivable.

The right of the individual judgment in matters of faith being only an imaginary right, we need not stop to defend the church for denying it. That she denies it in the author's sense is true, and when he adduces any evidence that in this she does wrong, we will consider what is to be said. Individual judgment in matters of faith has unsettled every thing in the Protestant world, and resulted in general unbelief or demon-worship, and therefore it has no great attraction for us. We would rather rely on an infallible teacher, and instead of finding it a hardship, we find it a blessed privilege. Do not ask us to abandon an infallible church for an exceedingly fallible private judgment in matters so important as those of faith, on which depends our eternal salvation. We know from forty years' experience as a Protestant what private judgment is worth, and, thank God, we know too, by experience, the freedom of mind and joy of heart there are in feeling that we have a teacher

on whom we can rely, who cannot deceive us, and who will lead us in the way we should go.

The author says, that "nothing can be more certain than that no such corporation was contemplated by Christ in the establishment of his church." That is possibly his opinion, but it is not ours. "Not only was freedom of action broken down under the colossal organization of the Romish Church, but freedom of mind and thought was crushed under the same overpowering weight." Indeed! where did you learn that? Nevertheless, as this is no more true of the church now than when, according to you, she was "the best friend humanity ever had"; when she "renovated the whole face of the civilized world," was "the pioneer in all generous enterprises for the amelioration of the condition of the human race," and "a patient laborer in the great field of human improvement,"—we shall endeavor to console ourselves as well as we can, till you bring forward some better friend, a more generous pioneer, or a more patient laborer. "Had a creed been necessary, it is to be supposed that Christ would have prescribed one to his church." How do you know that he did not? If a creed is not necessary, why did the Unitarians in our goodly city of Boston last May draw up and vote one? It was a very meagre creed, it is true, "a very little one," as said Jack Easy's wet nurse, but nevertheless it was a creed, designed to define, if not all that one is required to believe, at least what one cannot deny and be a Christian. If no creed is necessary, nothing is necessary to be believed, and then you either deny that our Lord revealed any thing, or else hold that you may, without ceasing to be his followers, deny his revelation. Why then complain of Parker, to cut off whom you drew up your little creed?

"By thus adopting a stringent and unchangeable organization, the Catholic Church has numbered itself among the things which are destined to be outgrown." Do you perhaps know, dear Doctor, when that will happen? Will you not tell us what will outgrow her? "It has allied itself with the monarchies and despotisms of the old world, and is bound to share their fate." And pray what is that fate to be? But when did the church form the alliance you speak of? What proof have you of it? Will you favor us with a sight of the documents? But all this is nonsense. The church forms no alliance with monarchy or with republicanism; she leaves to each nation the political constitution which God

in his providence gives it, and requires all her children to submit to it in all things not repugnant to the law of God. Where monarchy is the historical right, she sustains it, where republicanism is the historical right, she sustains republicanism, as we have told you till we are weary of repeating it. "The tendency of this age is to freedom and individualism, and whatever will not go along with it is destined to be left behind." All cant, dear Doctor. The tendency of this age seems to us to be to socialism and despotism. Are you not yourself a little behind the age? But be it the tendency is to freedom and individualism, that is, to license and anarchy, is it not possible that the church may resist that tendency, and recall the age to law and order? It is not certain that in the long run the age will prove stronger than the church. If again the age happens to be wrong, as it does, whether its tendency is as you think or as we think, would you have the church go on with it? Or do you deny that the tendency of an age can be wrong, and therefore claim for each age the infallibility we claim for the church? But enough of this. The author may think that he means well and talks good sense, but he should remember that it is possible for people in esteeming themselves wise to become fools; and, without positively classing him with these, we cannot forbear telling him that he says he knows not what, and imples principles the baseness of which, could he see them in their nakedness, would shock even himself.

3. The third and last fundamental error alleged against the church is her "unfriendliness to the diffusion of the Sacred Scriptures." "This is the crowning error—may I not say, sin?—of the Roman polity. He who shuts up the Bible from the masses puts out the moral light of the world."

That last sentence, Doctor, would do to deliver at an Anniversary Meeting of the American Bible Society. It is upon the whole rather a good sentence, and well sounding. But that word *masses*, however, is not well chosen, because it conveys the notion of brute matter, and one is a little troubled to understand what moral light could be derived from the Bible or any other book by human beings so little elevated as to be designated after brute matter. Nineteen-twentieths of the human race, it is estimated, and therefore of "the masses," are unable to read. Now will the good doctor explain what moral light would be put out for them by shutting up the Bible? Does the Bible operate upon "the

masses" as a charm or amulet, and of itself enlighten such as cannot read it, and who, if they could read it, could not understand it? "The Bible is the mightiest moral agent that has ever wrought upon our earth." What does this mean? Is it the Bible as a book that is such a moral agent? Or is it the doctrine the Bible contains and the grace of God which operates with it? If you say the book as a book, and nothing else, you utter an absurd falsehood. If you say the doctrine, you condemn yourself, for you hold that it makes no difference what doctrines a man believes if he lives a good life, and he can, you hold, lead a good life in any belief, and besides say nothing to your purpose, for then the shutting the Bible from the masses would put out no light, unless the doctrine was shut also.

"The Bible is the best theological manual for the busy, toiling masses of mankind." Do you really believe so? What will your brother Parker or your brother Pusey say to that? What do you conceive to be the object of a theological manual? Is it not to give a clear, distinct, and brief summary of what men are to believe respecting God, his providence, and his works, and of our relations to God, the duties we owe him, the way and manner of performing them, and the consequences of performing or not performing them? Do you really mean that this object is better accomplished for the busy, toiling multitude by the Bible than by any other manual? If so, you are a very strange man, and past the reach of argument. We speak not lightly of the Bible, for it has been written, though you doubt it, by the inspiration of Almighty God, dictated by the Holy Ghost himself, and we hold its words in a veneration wholly foreign from the Protestant heart; but we do not believe, by any means, that it is the best theological manual that can be put into the hands of "the busy, toiling masses," for the great bulk of them cannot read it, a large portion of those who can read it will not, and few of those who can and do read it, unless they have previously been taught the faith, can understand it, or draw any consistent meaning from it. You know this is the literal fact, and therefore you must consult, in what you say, what has a fine sound, rather than what is true. The learned themselves, applying their whole lives to the study of the Bible, cannot agree at all among themselves as to its meaning; how much less, then, the unlearned, who have no time and none of the necessary aids for its study!

"The Bible is the grand educator of the conscience."

"The Bible is the true confessional." "The Bible is the chief source of that purity of sentiment and refinement of manners, which distinguish modern society from the coarseness and sensuality of heathen antiquity." How the Bible can be the true confessional is to us a puzzle. That it should, when properly understood, convict us of sin and send us to the confessional, we can very well understand; but how it can be itself the confessional, is too transcendental for our comprehension. In what else the author here says of the Bible he must be understood as using a figure of rhetoric, such as taking the vase for the liquor, and as really meaning, not the Bible, as a book and nothing else, but the contents of the Bible, that is, the Christian faith. In simple justice to him, we must presume this to be his meaning, and then all he says amounts to nothing against us.

"The Church of Rome, then, as it seems to me, cannot commit a greater error, than to permit her conflict with Protestantism to engender any real hostility to the circulation of the Sacred Scriptures." That is to say, an error in policy. The Bible is such a good book, and has rendered such important services to the human race, that any unfriendliness on the part of the church to its circulation will give Protestants a great advantage over her. So the church is not so worldly-wise as sometimes represented, and her crowning error, perhaps her sin, is a blunder in mere human policy! Really, the old church comes off pretty well after all, and we are quite willing to concede that she is rather a sad politician, and has never been remarkable for her worldly wisdom, any more than her Master was.

"The time has been when the Catholic Church was friendly to the circulation of the Scriptures. But it was when she reigned alone, when her unity was unbroken, and the whole Christian world was of one language and one speech. She was put in a false position in relation to the Scriptures, by the breaking out of the reformation. The Bible was the magazine from which the reformers drew their most effective weapons," and "it was natural that the church should feel a hostility to a book which gave it so much annoyance." Were these weapons really in the Bible, and were they honestly drawn from it by the reformers against the church? If so, how do you account for the fact that she had not discovered them, or foreseen the mischief they might do, and guarded against them by prohibiting the circulation of the Scriptures. The author deviates very materially from the

common Protestant story. He concludes that prior to the reformation the church was friendly to the circulation of the Scriptures; Protestants generally maintain the contrary, and that she had been able to corrupt the faith only through concealing the Bible, and it was only by accidentally discovering one day in the library of his convent at Erfurt a stray copy of the Bible, that Luther learned her gross impositions. It was, however, not so, and her present unfriendliness to the circulation of the Scriptures began with the reformation, and was caused by it. This is some advance towards the truth, and perhaps ere long our Protestant friends will learn and confess the whole truth. The fact that the church down to the reformation was friendly to the circulation of the Scriptures proves at least this much,—that in her estimation there is no discrepancy between her teaching and the Scriptures; and furthermore, that if she is not equally friendly to their circulation now, it is not because she dreads any testimony they may bear against her, but because she would guard against their being abused. The author is mistaken in supposing that the church became hostile to the Bible in consequence of the annoyance she received from its use or abuse by the reformers, and equally so in saying that Balmes concedes it. The fact that the reformers abused the Scriptures to attack the faith and pervert the minds of the faithful induced her to place some restrictions on the promiscuous reading of the Scriptures, in the vernacular tongues and unauthorized versions, but did not of course alter her feelings or her position in regard to the Scriptures themselves.

The author says, the church "was put into a false position in relation to the Scriptures, by the breaking out of the reformation." The church by that event was forced to change in some respects her discipline in regard to the reading of them, but to say that she was put into a *false* position in regard to them is a mere begging of the question. The church is the guardian of the Scriptures and of the faith of her children, and it is her right and her duty to protect the faithful from the dangers to which they are exposed. If in order to protect them she is obliged to restrict the reading of the Scriptures in the vulgar tongues to those who are not likely to wrest them to their own destruction, she assumes no false position in regard to them, and the falsity is on the part of those who force her to take such a step. If the pastor is obliged for their protection to restrict the range of the sheep when wolves abound, and to allow them

less freedom than when no wolves are to be feared, the fault is not his, but that of the wolves, and the blame, if blame there be in the case, attaches not to him, who only does his duty, but to those who render the restriction necessary.

But after all, is the fact alleged true, or is it a fact that the church is unfriendly to the diffusion of the sacred Scriptures? Of course not. The author asserts it, says it can be proved, but, as usual with him, offers no proof of it. There is not, so far as we are aware, and never has been, any restriction placed by the church on the circulation or reading of the Scriptures in the learned languages, especially, the authorized version in the Latin language, commonly called the Vulgate. In all Catholic countries, at least until quite recently, when the knowledge of Latin is less general than it was prior to modern revolutionism, this brought the Scriptures within the reach of nearly all who could read them with much profit, and gave the learned free access to them, —the very class from whom the church would be the most anxious to conceal them, if she regarded them as teaching any thing at variance with her doctrines and practices. The restrictions she has placed on the circulation of the Scriptures in the vulgar tongues have been directed solely against unauthorized and corrupt versions, such as Luther's version in German, Diodati's in Italian, and King James's in English. The circulation and reading of such versions is strictly prohibited to all Catholics, and it is because the Bible Society circulates only such versions that its publications are prohibited. But there is no prohibition in any Catholic country, or among the faithful in any country, to circulate the Scriptures in an approved version, even in the vernacular language. There is then no unfriendliness on the part of the church to the diffusion of the sacred Scriptures; there is only unfriendliness to their circulation in a corrupt form. The reading of the Scriptures in the vernacular tongue, if the version be approved, is free to all Catholics, and we are aware of no canon prohibiting it to any one. The pastors, indeed, advise such, if such there be, who give reason to fear that they will wrest them to their own destruction, not to read them, and in some cases it is possible the confessor may forbid the reading to his penitent. This is the very course every prudent father pursues, that of advising his children not to read, and in some instances positively forbidding them to read, that from which it is evident that they can only receive harm. The church

goes no further than this, and if she goes thus far, we shall not undertake to defend her, for she does only her duty, and needs no defence.

Everybody knows, or might know, that Protestants generally, and Unitarians particularly, have no genuine belief in the Scriptures, or respect for them, although they may sometimes believe that they believe and respect them, and that their great zeal for the Bible and its circulation is all affected, for the purpose of decrying and injuring the church. It is proverbial among them, that the Bible is like a fiddle, on which a skilful performer may play any tune he pleases. And we have never yet met the decided Protestant who respected the Bible enough to bow to its authority, when its authority was shown to be clearly against him. Here is Dr. Burnap, a Unitarian minister, praising the Bible, and greatly scandalized, as he would have us believe, because the church, as he alleges, is unfriendly to its circulation, yet he himself by no means believes in its plenary inspiration, and he would shrink from calling it the word of God. He has very little respect for the Old Testament, and he will tell you that St. Paul was far from having a correct understanding of the Gospel, and that he even began the corruption of the simple religion of Jesus; and if, in the parts to which he accords a *quasi*-inspiration, he finds a passage which he cannot explain in accordance with his notions, he will term it an Eastern hyperbole, or suggest that the sacred writer was most likely warped by his Jewish prejudices. And yet he has the effrontery to come forward and read us Catholics a lecture on our pretended hostility to the Bible! This is a little too bad, since, of all who are called Christians, we alone retain, believe, and venerate the whole Bible as the word of God.

The clamor Protestants set up about the Scriptures, there can be no doubt, arises not from friendliness to the Bible, but from hostility to the church. They know that Catholics believe the Bible to be the word of God, and reverence it as such. They know that to Catholics the whole Bible is inspired and authoritative, and that they believe whatever is really repugnant to it to be false; hence they seek to induce Catholics to read *Protestant versions* of the Scriptures, hoping through the corrupt rendering of certain passages and the adroit insinuations of Bible readers, trained to insinuate a Protestant sense, to excite suspicions in the minds of simple Catholics that there is a discrepancy between the

Bible, the word of God, and the teaching of their church, and thus prepare the way for their perversion. Their object is to make the simple faithful believe that the church is opposed to the circulation of the Scriptures, and opposed to them because the Scriptures are opposed to her, and convict her of departing from the truth, corrupting the faith, and practising gross imposition upon the ignorant and confiding. They seek to do this for the purpose of inducing them to abandon the church, and to join the ranks of non-Catholics.

Now this whole course of proceeding is based on the supposition that Catholics really believe the Bible to be the word of God, and hold themselves bound to receive its authority as final. Such, unquestionably, is the fact, and a man who has been brought up a Protestant on coming among Catholics is perfectly astonished at their high veneration for the Bible, and their profound deference to its authority. But whence have Catholics derived this firm belief that the Bible is the word of God, this profound respect for its authority, and this high veneration for all its words? Most assuredly from the teaching of their church, and from no other source. Now here is a fact worth looking at. Nobody can deny that the church knows as well as Protestants do or can whether there be or be not any discrepancy between her teaching and the Bible. If, then, as Protestants pretend, the Bible condemns the church, how is it that she teaches her children to believe the Bible to be the word of God, and inspires them with this profound reverence for it? If such were the fact, she would have gradually taught them differently, and little by little have induced them to regard the Bible very much as Protestants, especially Unitarians, regard it. This very fact that she has not done so is a full and triumphant answer to the Protestant slander that the church supersedes the word of God, and that Catholics place the church above the Bible. It proves that the church holds the Bible to be the word of God, and teaches her children to reverence and obey it as such, and therefore neither dreads it nor is hostile to it. Let us then hear no more about the church setting aside the Bible, and making naught of the word of God; the very charge, as addressed to Catholics, refutes itself, because if it were a fact, the argument would have no force or meaning to a Catholic.

But we have said enough. Dr. Burnap in some instances has shown more candor than is usual with an American

Protestant, and is misled, when misled, more by his ignorance of Catholicity and his own absurd theories, than by his passions, which do not seem to be very strong or violent, or his malignant feelings towards the church. His ignorance is sometimes marvellous, as for instance in regard to the confessional, where he mistakes certain accessories of the sacrament for the sacrament itself. A visit once, as an humble penitent, to the confessional, would teach him that

> "There are more things in heaven and earth,
> Than are dreamt of in his philosophy."

But we will part with him in civility. We only regret that he has not treated the subject from a higher point of view and with more learning and ability, so that we could have gained some honor for our religion in refuting him. But Protestantism no longer produces any worthy champions, with whom it is an honor to contend. She has no longer any confidence in herself, and no longer dares engage in a regular battle with the Catholic. She carries on only a partisan warfare, which, though it may enable her to annoy Catholics, can never win for her any real advantage over them. But it is idle to complain. We must take such opponents as present themselves, and if they are unworthy, let the disgrace rest on those who send them, and have no better to send.

DERBY'S LETTERS TO HIS SON.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for 1856-7.]

ARTICLE I.

Mr. E. H. Derby is a lawyer in Boston, and a respectable man, but better known as a railroad financier than as a theologian. What is his religion we do not know, and perhaps he does not know himself, any further than that it is not Catholic. The occasion of writing his Letters, he explains in his Introduction, which we copy entire.

"These letters were written by a member of the legal profession, in active practice, to a young kinsman.

"This youth at the age of seventeen, after evincing much industry and talent as a student, had become deeply interested in religious subjects. Misled by the statements in Milner's End of Controversy and other Roman Catholic works, he suddenly conceived the idea that the church of Rome was the only primitive, apostolic, and Catholic church, and apprised the author that he should, in his next vacation apply to a Roman Catholic Bishop for baptism. As the case required prompt action, the author immediately wrote a series of letters to dissuade him from his purpose.

"He resorted not to modern casuists, but to the fountainheads, and tested the claims and faith of the church of Rome, not by the writings of its opponents, but by those authorities on which that church relies, namely, those early saints, fathers, and popes, Augustine, Clement, Irenæus, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Eusebius, Jerome, Athanasius, Leo, and others revered by the church itself, and, in many instances, inscribed on its tree of saints and martyrs. He also drew his illustrations from scripture, history, and books of travels.

"The letters having convinced his kinsman, he has been led by the solicitation of friends and clergymen, to complete the series of letters and to place them before the public."

The young kinsman, a youth of seventeen, to whom these letters were addressed, was the author's own son; and if these Letters had any influence in deterring him from join-

**The Catholic. Letters addressed by a Jurist to a Young Kinsman proposing to join the Church of Rome.* By E. H. Derby. Boston: 1856.

ing the Catholic Church, they owed it to his love and respect for his father, rather than to any force of truth or reason which they contain. There is nothing in them likely to impress favorably an ingenuous youth who has as much knowledge of Catholicity as one ought to have who has read Milner's *End of Controversy*.

Mr. Derby professes to have gone to the "fountainheads," and to have tested the claims of the church, not by the writings of her opponents, but of those early saints, fathers, and popes, Augustine, Clement, Irenæus, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Eusebius, Jerome, Athanasius, Leo, and others, on whom she herself relies as authorities. This has an appearance of fairness; but as we proceed, we shall be forced to doubt, if he has read the works of a single one of the authors whose names he mentions. His citations from the fathers, we suspect, are for the most part, made at second hand, and chiefly from such Protestant authors as Jewell and Barrow. His fairness is apparent, not real, and he in fact is only repeating stale objections which have been refuted a thousand times over.

But be this as it may, the author concedes that the fathers whose names he cites were not opponents of the Catholic Church; then they did not oppose her. Now, will he tell us how in writers who do not oppose her he expects to find authorities to upset her? He says the church counts many of them among her saints, and relies on them as authorities. Does he suppose that the church has had among her doctors and divines so little patristic learning that she has relied securely for ages on authorities which may be turned against her? Does he suppose that the great St. Leo, that model of a pope, one of the most eminent men that have ever filled the Chair of Peter, and who asserted the papal prerogatives with as much distinctness and energy as has any one of his successors, was nevertheless such a blunderhead that he left in his writings authorities which can fairly and honestly be turned against the power he both claimed and exercised? We pass over Eusebius, as he was neither a pope nor as aint, and moreover, was a courtier, and Arian in his tendencies. But does the author, however distinguished as a jurist or a railroad financier, suppose that he is capable of detecting in writings he has certainly never read, what has escaped the thousands of acute and learned Catholic scholars, as familiar with them at least as he is with his Coke upon Littleton, his Kent, or his Blackstone? Does he not see that the presumptions are decidedly against him?

Mr. Derby must permit us to say that he has very imperfectly studied his brief, and has but a confused perception of what he must prove or disprove in order to make out his case. We could in most cases demur to his allegations, and run no risk. He may be an able financier, but he is no theological doctor, and appears to great disadvantage when he attempts to cite authorities. He commits on every page mistakes analogous to those which conceited clients ignorant of law commit, in consulting Law Reports. He does not appear to understand the principles of evidence, or to have ever reflected that error cannot be refuted by error, and can be refuted only by opposing to it the truth. A conclusion drawn from doubtful premises is itself doubtful; yet at best he reasons from doubtful premises, and more frequently from no premises at all, except his presumption or his prejudices. To make a solid argument against a doctrine, it is a great convenience to have some knowledge and understanding of it; yet Mr. Derby has, if his Letters to his son are a true index to his mind, literally no knowledge or understanding of Catholicity. All he has been able in these letters to do is to repeat in a diluted form the weakest objections of the weakest of writers against the church, and had we not a high regard for him personally, we should be unable to excuse ourselves for bestowing on them a moment's attention.

But it is time to approach the Letters themselves. In the First Letter, the author addressing his son, remarks, "The law which intrusts to me your guidance, the public sentiment which expects me to instruct you, and thus qualify you for the duties and conflicts of life, confide to me, as a correlative privilege, the guidance of your religious sentiments." The law,—if you mean the civil law,—and public sentiment confide to you, permit us to say, no such thing, for they have no authority in regard to religious matters. Neither can give you any right or impose upon you any duty in regard to the religious sentiments or belief of your son. The law of God, however, which governs the parental and filial relations, imposes upon you the duty of instructing and bringing up your children in the belief and practice of the true religion, whatever that religion may be. This duty you cannot shake off. It is not the duty to train them up in your opinions or your prejudices, but in the true religion, the truth as God has revealed it. But so long as you are yourself doubtful as to the truth or ignorant

of the true religion, how are you to discharge this duty? How can you know that you are not leading your son into error, and directing him in the way of dèstruction.

We make no false assumption as to the learned jurist. "Having," he says, "a respect for *all* denominations of Christians, and having been compelled by circumstances to worship with *several*, I have wished not to press the subject of religion upon you with too much zeal, but to place you under the care of our own clergyman, and give you the opportunity, without undue coercion, to avail yourself of his guidance, and gradually mature your religious opinions." The man who can respect *all* denominations of Christians, of course, believes in none, and he who suffers himself to be compelled by any circumstances, to worship with any body of people which he does not believe to be the church of God is a time-server or a moral coward. The liberality Mr. Derby professes is simply religious indifference, and indifference and faith do not and cannot coexist in the same mind. We say truly then, if he does justice to himself, that he has no faith, and is himself doubtful as to what is the true religion. How then can he discharge his duty to his son? He did not wish to press the subject of religion upon his son with too much zeal. Could a father who believed religion and held it necessary to the salvation of the soul, feel it safe to suffer his son to grow up without faith and proper religious instruction? He would "place you under the care of *our* own clergyman." All very well, if "our own clergyman" be of the true religion; but how does this unhappy father know that his clergyman is one sent by God, or one who runs without being sent? What assurance has he that he will not guide his son into the path not of truth, but of error?

But mark, "our own clergyman" is not to teach the son; the son is simply to avail himself of his guidance, and gradually by his assistance to mature his own religious opinions. There is nothing pressing, nothing urgent, no necessity of religion for the moral life of the youth. The jurist looks upon mature religious opinions,—faith as we should say,—as a convenience or a luxury, not as a necessity. He does not see that religious truth is not merely a thing to be attained to at the end of one's career, but a thing needed in the outset, to start with, if one is to live a true life. He is in no haste to have his son know his relation and duty to his Maker, and is satisfied, if when he has come to maturity

or is an old man he attains to some settled opinions on the subject. As much as to say, religion is a speculation, not a thing of practice, which one should begin to practise at the first dawn of reason. Mr. Derby has no conception of faith, and speaks only of gradually maturing "religious opinions." Does he regard religion, revelation, the truth and grace of God as an *opinion?* Does he talk about his right to guide the *opinions* of his son? And reducing all religion to an *opinion*, does he think his Letters against the Church of Rome, can have the least conceivable value? You cannot refute opinion by opinion. You dischurch the Church of Rome only by opposing to her the true church. If you oppose to her only no-church, you oppose to her only a negation, that is, nothing at all, and nothing refutes nothing.

It appears that the son in writing to his mother, had said, "Catholic means universal, and Episcopalianism exists only in England, and a small part of America, and if you can point me to a place in the world (where men have any idea of the Christian religion) where Roman Catholicism does not exist, then I will turn Protestant." This assertion the author thinks betrays a strange want of information, and proceeds to inform the young student—

"Now Europe, the most civilized part of the world, contains *three millions seven hundred thousand square miles*, and *in two-thirds of it* the Roman Catholic Church has virtually *no existence*, namely, in

Russia, containing	2,000,000	square miles.*
Sweden and Norway	291,000	"
Turkey	210,000	"
Total,	2,501,000	"

"The Roman Catholic Church holds a divided empire over one million two hundred thousand miles only, and does not embrace half the people of Europe. The Greek Church has nearly as many worshippers in Europe as the Roman, and controls *exclusively* more than half the territory of Europe, and about all the Christian churches of *Asia*. The Roman Church is in a minority also in *Africa* and *America*."

But the son did not mean to say that there was no spot of land on the earth where Catholicity is not held and professed. He simply meant that there is no country where men profess the Christian religion in which the Catholic religion is not embraced. This is true, for the Catholic

*"Except the Polish Province."

Church, though persecuted, does exist in Russia, Sweden, and Turkey. There is a Catholic Church at St. Petersburgh, also at Stockholm, and there are Catholics even in Norway. There is a Catholic Patriarch at Constantinople, and more than a million of Catholics in the Turkish Empire. The father, it seems to us, has a stranger want of information than the son. Besides, all these countries were Christianized by Catholics, and they have ceased to be Catholic only by the tyranny of the temporal authorities. The civil government in them all except Turkey, prohibits the making of converts to the church, and the return of individuals to Catholicity under severe civil pains and penalties. It is somewhat edifying to find our author virtually recognizing Turkey as a Christian country.

"Again you say, that 'it is universally conceded that no Protestants, that is, dissenting or protesting from the authority of the Pope, existed before the time of Luther, consequently you are not apostolical.' Have you never read of *this same Greek church* which claims to be apostolic, and was established at Byzantium; have you not heard of Wickliffe, of the Waldenses, and Albigenses, or to go back further, are you not aware that St. Augustine of the fifth century, from whom the *Augustines* take their name, a man whose writings are preserved and treated as authorities by the Roman See, authorities they cannot and dare not reject, was *Calvinistic* in *his doctrines* now *extant?* Was he an adorer of the *Virgin Mary?*"—p. 3.

That St. Augustine was a Calvinist or Calvin an Augustinian is not true, and Catholics both dare deny and do deny that the doctrines extant in St. Augustine's writings are Calvinistic. He of course was not an *adorer* of the Virgin Mary as God, or a Divinity, nor is any Catholic, yet he was a devout worshipper of her as the immaculate mother of God as are all good Catholics. In other respects the father's answer to the rash assertion of the son may pass, although the Albigenses were more properly pagans than dissenting or protesting Christians. We have met similar statements to that of the son in some Catholic writers, but always with pain. There are ignorant men even amongst Catholics who occasionally make assertions which the better informed regret. There was before Luther no class of heretics called Protestants, but heretics have always abounded in every age of the church from St. Peter down to our own times, and it is not true that till Luther there were no dissenters or protestors against the authority of the pope. Luther broached no novelty, and Protestantism is not and never has

been a more formidable enemy to the church than was Arianism.

The learned jurist contends that St. Paul visited England and founded the English Church. We have seen no conclusive evidence of this visit; but if he did visit England, it is not likely he founded a church there different from that founded at Rome by St. Peter and himself. If the Church of England could justly claim St. Paul for its founder we, do not see what that would avail it, for the apostles all worked in unity, and St. Paul himself in his Epistle to the Corinthians rebukes those who say, "I am for Paul, I for Apollos, and I for Cephas." St. Paul would be the first to disown those who would seek to use his name as a justification for their schism. But the English Church everybody knows does not derive from the old British Church which existed in England prior to the Saxon invasion, but from the church founded by St. Austin, sent with his forty monks by Pope St. Gregory I. to convert the pagan Saxons and Angles, for whose conversion the old British Christians refused to labor.

"We learn, at all events, from Lingard, the *Roman Catholic* historian of England; who cites the venerable Bede, that when Pope Gregory, in the seventh century, sent Austin to England to convert the Saxons, he found Christian churches which had been established there for centuries, entirely unknown to the Bishop of Rome, who punned upon the Angles as 'angels,' and upon Deira their home as 'Dei Ira.'"—p. 4.

Lingard does not say that St. Austin found "churches which had been established for centuries entirely unknown to the Bishop of Rome," and that they were not unknown to St. Gregory is evident from the fact that he gave St. Austin a mission to them, and them an order to co-operate with him in the conversion of the Anglo-Saxons. The pretence that there was a church in England independent of the Church of Rome, always persisting down to the reformation, and from which the present Anglican Church, if church it can be called, is derived, is simply moonshine, and if it were founded, it would only prove all the more conclusively that the present establishment is separated from the apostolical communion.

"The English church would not allow the Pope to appoint bishops, or consecrate them at Rome, but merely to send the *Pallium* or Vesture; it refused Peter Pence, and in other respects questioned the Papal supremacy, and washed itself from abuses that had crept in, at the Reformation. You ask where were the Protestants for many centuries

after our Saviour? The reply doubtless is, they were gradually giving way to the abuses, and encroachments, and grasping policy of the Roman See, ever extending its arms; or I might add, the subject is forcibly if not elegantly illustrated, by the answer of the English boy to the Irish. The latter asked, What was the condition of your church before the Reformation? The English boy replies. In the same condition you were in before your face was washed this morning."*—pp. 4, 5.

The author confounds the church in England with the English government. The church in England never refused to allow the pope to appoint bishops or to consecrate them at Rome; whether the English monarch or government did or did not, is nothing to the purpose. The church is a spiritual kingdom, and princes, as such, have no rightful authority in or over it. The cant about the grasping policy of the Holy See, is quite out of date in this nineteenth century. The "grasping," it is well known, was on the side of the temporal power, till finally Henry the wife-slayer grasped the whole spiritual authority and compelled a timid and venal clergy, and a still more venal parliament to declare him, *ex officio*, the supreme head of the Church of England, in spirituals as well as in temporals, and reduced the English church to a mere function of the state, and its prelates to simple police officers. The witty anecdote originally from that model Protestant John Wilkes, if we may credit Mr. Derby's note, may pass for what it is worth. Yet a church with a dirty face it strikes us is as good as no church at all, for it must needs lack the essential note of sanctity.

"You speak of 'the unity of the Roman Catholic Church for fourteen centuries.' Where was that unity when the Roman Catholic Church and the Greek Church separated?" Where the unity of Great Britain was, when the British colonies, now the United States, renounced their allegiance to the British crown, and proclaimed their independence. The Greeks in separating from the Holy See lost unity, but the Holy See remained in its unity and integrity, but those separated from it became schismatics, severed from the central fountain of ecclesiastical life and authority. If South Carolina or any other state should secede from the Union it would lose its federal unity, but the federal government would not lose its unity.

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* "'This striking illustration originated with the celebrated John Wilkes. When asked by a Roman Catholic, 'Where was your church before Luther?' he inquired, 'Did you wash your face this morning?' 'Yes,' was the response, and then came the significant reply, 'Where was your face before it was washed?'"

"Where was its unity when St. Augustine, still a calendar saint, preached *Calvinistic* sermons?" We cannot tell, for the excellent reason, that St. Augustine never preached such sermons. "Where was its unity when the Franciscans and the Dominicans professing different doctrines, divided the church, and anathematized each other?" When was that time? We never heard of it before. The Franciscans and Dominicans may have differed on some open questions, and disputed with more or less warmth, but they never professed different *doctrines*. They held and preached the same faith. "Where was its unity in the great struggle of the iconoclasts and image-worshippers, which divided the church?" Where it was before and is now. The struggle did not divide the church; it simply separated the iconoclasts from the church. The struggle of the church with the iconoclasts no more broke her unity than her struggle with Arians, Mahometans, or pagans. In it men broke away from unity, placed themselves out of unity, as the English did under Henry VIII. and his amiable daughter Elizabeth; but they did not break the unity of the church herself, for that always subsisted in the unity of her doctrine and authority.

"Are you not aware that the great Roman Catholic articles of faith, transubstantiation, indulgences, and purgatory, are of modern introduction into the Roman Catholic Creed?" No, nor you either, most learned jurist, but unlearned theologian. "And that the adoration and prayers to the Virgin, are long subsequent to St. Augustine?" No, we are aware of no such thing. But are you not aware, dear sir, that all these assumptions of yours are as groundless as your claims to have gone to the "fountain-heads?" Why, sir, you are by no means well posted up in the controversy in which paternal affection has prompted you so rashly to engage. Learned Protestants, who do know something of the present state of that controversy, will only laugh at you or pity you. Your assumptions have been refuted so often that intelligent Protestants would be ashamed to repeat them. You are some two centuries or more behind the age, and seem to have picked up your erudition from shallow anti-popery lectures and pamphleteers.

"Have you never read of the great division of the Roman Catholics between Jesuits and Jansenists, and the more recent division between the Montane and Transmontane

parties?" We presume Master Derby has never read of any thing of the sort, except in the work of some blundering Protestant writing about what he does not understand. Bless your soul, dear Derby, the Jesuits are an order, not a sect, and the Jansenists are not Catholics at all, but heretics anathematized by the church. You might as well talk of Catholics being divided between Jesuits and Episcopalians, Unitarians, or Anabaptists, as to talk of their being divided between Jesuits and Jansenists. As to *Montane* and *Transmontane* parties in the church, we know nothing of them. In the time of the French revolution there was a party called the Mountain, and, if we recollect aright, there was also a Mountain party in ancient Athens; but we never before heard of Catholics being divided into the dwellers on the mountain, and the dwellers on the *other* side of the mountain. Pray are the Montanes the Swiss, the Savoyards, or the Green Mountain Boys? *Which* side of the mountain, whatever mountain is intended, dwell the Transmontanes? The author, we presume, has reference to what in France are called Gallicans and ultramontanes, and in Rome, Romans and ultramontanes or Gallicans. Undoubtedly there are Catholics who speculatively deny that the papal definitions are irreformable before they are expressly or tacitly accepted by the church; but they never divide the church into two parties, because the dispute is not concerning a matter defined to be of faith. Catholic unity implies unity in faith, in charity, in the sacraments, and in submission to one and the same authority; but no Catholic ever pretended that it implies unity in matters of opinion, or that no difference of opinion is allowed as to questions not of faith. There are Catholics who are monarchists, and warmly support Louis Napoleon; there are others, who, like ourselves, are stanch republicans, and devoted heart and soul to the American constitution; yet we are both united in this, that the Catholic must loyally obey the legitimate government or the legally existing political order of his country. So we may prefer roast beef and our neighbour a boiled leg of mutton for dinner, without breaking Catholic unity. All, whether Gallicans or ultramontanes, must obey the pope in all spiritual matters, and the difference of opinion between them does not break the unity of faith or of charity. "And are not the differences between those parties altogether more serious than those between High and Low Church?"—that is, high and low church

among Episcopalians. Certainly not: for the differences between high and low church touch the very foundation of the church. High church asserts the divine institution of bishops, and maintains *sine episcopo, sine ecclesia*; low church denies the divine institution of bishops, or at least, that bishops are essential to the *being* of the church, and therefore concludes that the Presbyterian Church may be really a church, and have all that is essential to its existence as the church of Christ. Gallicans and other Catholics agree in asserting the divine institution of the papacy, and the authority of the pope as the supreme pastor and governor of the church, and differ simply as to the reformability or non-reformability of the papal definitions prior to the assent of the church, and some questions touching the regalia or the temporalities of the church.

"And when you speak of miracles, do you believe in the holy coat of Treves, and in the tears which flow from the eyes of statues in whose hollow heads fishes are swimming."—p. 6.

What connection is there between miracles and the Holy Coat or Tunic, said to be of our Lord, preserved at Treves? Nobody pretends, so far as we are aware, that the sacred relic is preserved by a miracle. Its genuineness is a simple question of historical evidence, as much so as the question of the genuineness of the coat or sword of Washington preserved at the seat of our federal government. No man has the right to deny its genuineness till he has investigated the evidence in the case, and no man is bound to believe its genuineness unless he finds the historical evidence sufficient. Its genuineness is not a Catholic dogma.

As to tears which flow from the eyes of statues, &c., we have never met with them, and confess that we have never heard of statues in whose hollow heads fishes are swimming. The existence of none such have ever been proposed, to our belief, as matters of Catholic faith. Faith requires us to believe that miracles continue in the church, but not that we believe this or that particular miracle, unless it is established by sufficient testimony. We are bound in reason and common sense to believe any facts, however extraordinary, if adequately proved, and we are required by our religion to believe no other. We do not, for instance, deny the appearance of our Lady to shepherd children of La Sallette, because such appearance is possible, and not *a priori* incredible; but we do not believe it, because the evidence published in the case does not appear to us sufficient to prove it.

"You speak of chasing out *devils*. It seems to me that too much *presumption* and self-*confidence* without knowledge, are the modern and most dangerous devils, and the true mode to cast them out, is to approach this great subject of religion with humility and diffidence, to pay some respect to the experience of those who have lived twenty or thirty years longer than yourself, and then to investigate the great question of religion coolly, cautiously, prayerfully, and thoroughly, and not decide first and learn afterwards."—p. 6.

We fear the learned jurist must have, if his doctrine is correct, two very big devils in him, for he has as much presumption and self-confidence as any man we have ever met with. We think it would have been well if he himself had approached this great question of religion with something of the diffidence and humility which he recommends to his son. Yet there is nothing incredible in supposing that devils possess people at the present day as well as in the time of our Lord and his apostles, or that the church has power to exorcise them or cast them out. Mr. Derby, we believe, hails originally from Salem, Massachusetts, and should speak with modesty on the subject of demonology. He has his office in Boston, and he should take care not to disturb the ghost of the venerable Cotton Mather, one of the greatest glories of Puritan New England. Did not the devil, in open day, from the doctor's very pulpit, and before the whole godly assembly, take the good preacher's sermon, or a leaf from the sermon, he was preaching, and fly away with it out of the window? And has not the learned doctor recorded it and other more wonderful pranks of the devil in his renowned *Magnalia?* Do not blame your son, a child of Salem, for wishing to find a church that has the power to cast out devils. Such a church is much needed by both him and yourself.

II. But let us pass to the second Letter. The first thing we remark in this is the author's method of going to "the fountainheads." He says to his son:—

"You do not appear to be familiar with the early fathers and writers, who are recognized as high authorities by the Catholic church, and are deferred to by both Greek, Romish, and Protestant churches. I mean the great men who wrote in the first four centuries before the dark ages, namely, Cyprian, Jerome, Origen, Augustine, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Gregory, Eusebius, and Tertullian; but as I happen to have in my possession one of the books of St. Augustine, and copious extracts from the others, made by Jewell, the learned bishop of Salisbury, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, with full reference to book and page, I shall quote them in discussion.

"The Augustine I cited, and propose to cite, is not Jansen, who signs himself *Augustinus*, because he adopts the views of St. Augustine, but the old saint himself, whom you mention "as the clearest of witnesses," although I can find no proof in his writings that he was, as you seem to suppose, a devout worshipper, in the Romish sense, of the blessed Virgin Mary."—pp. 8, 9.

Here we are told that the learned jurist really has in his possession one of St. Augustine's books;—why could he not have told us which one? He has also copious extracts from others,—whether the other books of St. Augustine, or the other writers he names, he does not inform us,—made by the Anglican Jewell, one of Queen Elizabeth's bishops. In this and these "copious extracts" he is unable to find that St. Augustine worshipped, in the Catholic sense, the blessed Virgin Mary. Very likely; and therefore it is very certain that this great saint did not venerate the mother of God! But what an example does this anti-Catholic jurist set to his son! He tells him he has gone to "the fountainheads," and tested the claims of the church, not by the writings of her opponents, but by those writers she herself appeals to as authorities, and yet he has gone, with the exception of a single book of St. Augustine, only to such fierce anti-Catholic authors as Jewell and Barrow. Is this the example of truth and honesty a father owes his children? Who does not know that Anglican divines are by no means trustworthy in their citations from the fathers? And can a man pretend that he draws from the "fountainheads," when he has consulted them only in the one-sided and garbled extracts made by unscrupulous controversialists? Certainly Mr. Derby was right when he told us that he wrote these Letters for a special purpose, namely, to prevent his son from joining the Catholic Church. He evidently never wrote them for the purpose of enlightening his son's mind, or of serving the cause of truth and honesty.

"And first, let me draw your attention to the argument against the Romish church being the true one, derived from history and travels. You will find the *current* of *evidence* nearly irresistible, that in those countries where it has prevailed, *progress* and *civilization* have been retarded, and the condition of the people sadly depressed. Compare England since the Reformation for three centuries, with England for three centuries before, and see what a stride she has made, from a poor and obscure island, with her land engrossed by monasteries and nunneries, and her people depressed, degraded, and ignorant. Look at the leap she has made since she shook off these incumbrances. Look at the progress of population,

wealth, industry, and art, at the islands and territories she has subdued and settled, at her mastery of the seas, and the diffusion of her race, language, and religion throughout the world. At the present rate of progress *in one century more, the Protestants* speaking the English tongue will exceed three hundred millions, and outnumber the present members of both Greek and Romish churches; and what is *one* century compared with the *eighteen* preceding centuries? Again, compare Italy, the ancient seat of *arts* and *power*, depressed and degraded and impoverished under the Papal see for twelve centuries, with the Protestant States of Holland, won from the sea, Germany, England, and the United States, in which last the Protestants stand as ten to one compared with the Roman Catholics. Compare Spain, broken down by the inquisition and absorption of land by the priesthood and by Romish observances, with England and Holland, and mark the progress of France since the estates of the church were alienated, and recur to the losses both France and Spain sustained, the former by the massacre of the Protestants and the expulsion of the survivors, and the latter by the expulsion of the Moors, who were so long the depositaries of learning, and that barbarous interdict upon all freedom of thought, the inquisition. But I thank God, even the Romish church is now abandoning the *auto da fe* and the grand inquisitor."—pp. 9, 10.

Argal, as Shakspeare says, the Catholic Church is false, and *argal*, again, we may add, Christianity is a delusion, for there are more pagans in China than Christians in the whole world, notwithstanding Christianity has been preached for eighteen centuries. Nay, there are more pagans and Mahometans in the British empire than Christians, and more Catholics than Protestants. Moreover, how knows our fierce anti-Catholic author that these three hundred millions of English-speaking people, who are to exist a century hence, will not be all good Catholics, and devout children of Mary? What conclusion can be drawn from a future contingent event, which may never happen? Would not Mr. Derby do well to remember the fable of the milk-maid, which he and we both read when we were boys, and not count his chickens before they are hatched?

The comparison of England for three centuries since the reformation with England for three centuries before that event is one from which no Catholic will shrink. Relatively to the Continental powers, England to-day is not greater than she was in the time of the Black Prince, Henry V., or Henry VII.; and if she were, it would not follow that the cause is Protestantism. The argument, *post hoc, ergo proter hoc*, is not usually regarded as valid. England was not a poor and obscure island prior to the reformation. Her land

to a considerable extent, was engrossed by monasteries and nunneries, if you please, but monasteries and nunneries are superior at the very worst to gin-shops and work-houses. The church lands were the best cultivated lands in the kingdom, and the church vassals were far better off than those of lay lords. The lands were put to a good use, and yielded as good a return as any others, and the monks and nuns did not spend more on themselves, and were not, under any point of view, more useless to the community than the present Anglican prelates and parsons. In some sense, the people may have been depressed, ignorant, degraded, but not peculiarly so on church lands, nor so much so as the mass of them are at present. Mr. Derby is a celebrated railroad financier, and, of course, finds it difficult to appreciate any but material goods. Business is his religion, and money his god. We cannot, therefore, expect him to rise in his conceptions above trade and industry. He measures the well-being of a state by the amount of business it transacts, and can conceive no more worthy object for a people than the development of its material resources. His very spiritualism is materialistic, and hence as Great Britain is remarkable for her business operations, he supposes her the divinest nation on earth. But "What doth it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?"

We are, as our readers know, far enough from maintaining the perfection of mediæval society, and far enough, too, from thinking lightly of political and social well-being; but we know no more immoral or deleterious system than the commercial and industrial system at the head of which stands Great Britain, and which is rapidly enlacing the whole civilized world in its meshes. We know the system is, for the present, all-powerful, and it is useless to attempt to subvert it. It must have its day, and no doubt Providence will bring good out of it, or make it the occasion of something better than itself. But we do not suffer ourselves to be deceived by it. We know its hollowness, and its corrupting influences. It builds up a hard-hearted, purse-proud, vain, ignorant, and luxurious middle class, but adds nothing to the amenities of social life, or to the enjoyments, the independence, and contentment of the laboring classes. The acquisition of California by the United States and the discovery of the California gold mines have given an immense activity to trade and speculation, but the gain has not yet equalled the loss. California probably has not yet re-

turned to the older states as much as it has taken from them, and were the balance struck, we doubt not she would be found largely in their debt. The premature loss of life in the settlement of that state and the working of its mines would surpass that of the Allies in their recent war with Russia. The luxurious habits created by the additional stimulus given to trade are as destructive to human life in our country as would be a permanent state of war with a first-class power, and the vice and immorality, the dishonesty, and recklessness, in business transactions, growing out of it, are far greater than war generates, and without any of those high and chivalrous qualities which war usually develops. Men cannot give themselves up, body and soul, to mammon-worship without paying dear for it. We are purchasing our material prosperity at an exorbitant cost, and our railroads are built at a waste of human life not less than was occasioned by the siege of Sebastopol. The average working life of the Irish laborers on our public works was, a few years ago, only about four years, and we are not aware that there has been much improvement since. The case stands no better with Great Britain. She has sunk more capital in her railways than in the Crimean war. The mass of her laborers are sustained only just above the starving point, and the total failure of our cotton crop for a single year, and the loss of her trade with us for the same length of time, would reduce her to as low a state as France was placed in by the battle of Agincourt, or that of Waterloo.

In the industrial order England has developed energies which we admire, but we do not stand much in awe of England's greatness, or see in her any thing to commend Protestantism to our love or respect. Politically, England deservedly stands high, but in all that pertains to civil administration she stands lowest on the scale of European nations. We do not like the political constitution of France, but the civil administration is admirable. Great Britain has advanced in the material order while Spain, Portugal, and the Italian republics have declined; but religion has had nothing to do with it. Spain and Portugal, when in the zenith of their power and glory, were far more Catholic than they are now. The Italian republics, when they were the leading commercial and industrial states of the world, were Catholic, more thoroughly Catholic than they are in our days. The changes which have placed Great Britain

at the head of the industrial and trading world have been effected by changes in the course of trade, and whether good or bad say nothing for or against Catholicity. A ship canal across the Isthmus of Suez, would make the Mediterranean a French lake, and secure the commercial supremacy to France, while it would raise up Greece, and revive Italy. A ship canal across the Isthmus in Central America, perhaps a railroad through our own territory to the Pacific Ocean, would transfer the seat of empire from the Old World to the New. Let Mr. Derby look into matters like these, which come more in his line than ours, and he may explain the contrasts he talks about, without raising any theological question.

We have always been struck with the remark of a learned and eloquent friend of ours,* made in a public lecture, that the Protestant argument against Catholicity derived from the superior material prosperity of Protestant to Catholic nations, proves too much, if any thing; for in material prosperity no modern nation has equalled several of the great pagan nations of antiquity. The argument, if it proves any thing, proves that Christianity is false, not merely that Catholicity is not true Christianity. But we have no space to continue this subject further at present. We will simply add that the philosophic student of history, though he will find much in Catholic, or so-called Catholic states, which he cannot but censure, will attribute whatever is objectionable in these states to causes operating independently of religion, and hold the secular community, instead of the church, responsible for them. We do not recognize all we meet with in these states as Catholic, and Catholics are not bound to defend all that is done in them even by churchmen. The conduct of ecclesiastics acting as statesmen or politicians is to be judged precisely as if they were laymen. The church is not responsible for their conduct as statesmen of a Cardinal Beaufort, a Cardinal Wolsey, a Cardinal Richelieu, a Cardinal Dubois, or a Cardinal Fleury. It would be well if Mr. Derby and other Protestants would understand this, and learn to distinguish between the church as a corporation, and individual members of the church acting on their own responsibility. Mr. Derby in his connection with railway corporations, has had, we presume, frequent occasion to make an analogous dis-

* Rev. Ambrose Manahan, D. D.

tinction, and he would think it very hard if the courts were to hold the corporation responsible for its servants, when disregarding its instructions, and acting without its orders. When the accident is occasioned by the sole fault of the servant not in the line of his duty, the corporation cannot be bound, at least so Mr. Derby understands the law. Let him apply the same principle in judging the conduct of Catholic states and statesmen, and the difficulty he conjures up will vanish.

ARTICLE II.

We concluded our first article devoted to the dissection of Mr. Derby's Letters to his Son, by some remarks on the comparison he suggests between Catholic and Protestant nations, under the point of view of civilization. We have something more to say on that subject. His argument is the one just now chiefly relied on by English and American Protestants. He says, in summing up his argument:

"Now I submit this argument as to the Romish faith being a departure from the Gospel, that the true design of Christianity was to refine, improve, and civilize, not debase the world; and if we find a system has departed from the simplicity of the Gospel, and has been attended by debasement and degradation, while the Reformation has been attended with different results, that system cannot be true."—pp. 10, 11.

If it were a fact that Catholicity *morally* or *spiritually* debases and degrades the nations that embrace and faithfully follow it, we should argue, not that it is a departure from the Gospel, but that it is from Satan; for no man can distinguish between the Gospel and Catholicity. But the fact is not, and cannot be proved. If on the other hand, it were proved, that Protestant nations are superior to Catholic nations under the point of view of material civilization, in trade, industry, agriculture, wealth, physical power, all that may be included under the head of the good things of this world, we should not infer that it is Christianity, or true religion, for we have seen a more advanced civilization of that sort than any Protestant nation can boast, obtain among the more renowned nations of antiquity, and because to that sort of civilization nothing distinctively Christian is needed. Great Britain, we take it, is the greatest and most prosperous of all Protestant nations; and yet Great Britain is less advanced in material or natural civilization than were

pagan Greece and Rome, Tyre and Zidon, Egypt and Assyria. If she can claim any superiority over any of them, it is in her moral civilization, which she owes not to her Protestantism, but to Christianity, for which, as far as Christianity she has, she is indebted to the Catholic Church. Protestantism has no doubt aided her material progress, by loosening her from the moral and spiritual restraints imposed by Catholicity, and leaving her free to devote her genius, her skill, and her energy, to the production, exchange, or accumulation of the good things of this world. This is the real sense of the English Protestant's boast, and more than this no Protestant can seriously claim for the reformation in England. But in this the service rendered by Protestantism is not a service rendered by presenting, but by removing Christianity, and assimilating the nation to a heathen nation, free to devote herself body and soul to the material order. She has needed for her material progress, no distinctively Christian principle, no supernatural religion, nothing, in fact, but her own natural powers.

Great Britain, if she surpasses contemporary Catholic nations, surpasses them only under the point of view of material civilization. Now, if we analyze her alleged superiority, we shall find that it lies in the natural order, and depends on nature alone. The virtues in which she is supposed to excel are the natural virtues, not the peculiarly Christian virtues, unattainable without supernatural revelation, and the infused habit of divine grace. We say not by this that they are not virtues, that in their own order they are not good; we only say that they are not Christian virtues, virtues impossible without Christianity. The English are a brave and hardy people, and as a military and naval power Great Britain is unsurpassed by any modern nation,—as a naval power equalled by none. But what has Christianity to do with this? Does Christianity, nay, does Protestantism, regarded as a religion, teach and strengthen her to raise, discipline, and marshal troops, to construct ships, man and manœuvre fleets? The ancients did these things on as grand a scale as she does them, and did so without Christianity. Alexander, Hannibal, Julius Cæsar, rank heathens, were as great generals, as perfect masters of tactics or strategetics, as Marlborough, Wellington, or my Lord Raglan, and won as remarkable victories as those of Blenheim, Waterloo, or the Alma. We are aware of nothing in the science or the art of war, whether on the sea or the land, that demands

the supernatural aid of Christianity, that transcends the natural powers of man, or that has been supplied supernaturally through the Gospel. Gunpowder was a human invention, not a divine revelation, and human genius sufficed to invent Colt's Revolver, and the Minié Rifle. Nelson manœuvred his fleet in the Nile, at Copenhagen, and at Trafalgar, as a man, as a brave man and a good sailor,—not as a Christian, and proceeded on principles learned by human genius, not on principles revealed in the Gospel. We do not say that England owes her military and naval greatness to the violation of Christian principles, or that she has attained it without the concurrence of divine Providence, but we do say that she has attained it by natural powers,—powers which she derives not from Christianity, but from nature, and holds, in common with the ancient heathen as well as with modern unchristian nations. Whether she has attained to it by a just or an unjust exercise of these powers is not now the question. Some may say that she has attained to it only by exercising them unjustly, and, that, if she had been more observant of the Christian law, she would never have attained to her present military and naval superiority. They may be right; on that point we express no opinion; but what we insist upon is, that she owes it not to religion, but to nature,—to the exercise of her natural powers, not to her natural powers supernaturalized by grace. Therefore, her greatness is natural greatness, as was that of Greece and Rome, and says nothing in favor of Protestantism as Christianity. It is no argument in favor of her Protestantism as a supernatural religion. It says no more for Protestantism than the military success of Miltiades, Themistocles, Cyrus, Sesostris, Alexander, Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, or Julius Cæsar says for ancient Greek, Persian, Egyptian, Phœnician, or Roman paganism. We might as well draw an argument in favor of Mahometanism, from the military greatness of the caliphs, or of the Turkish sultans, as from the military and naval greatness of Great Britain in favor of Protestantism.

The next thing that strikes us in Great Britain is her commercial and industrial greatness; but what has Christianity to do with this? Did the English learn from the Christian revelation, or from the Church of England, as by law established, to build ships, to navigate the ocean, to buy cheap and sell dear? Did they derive from divine revelation the steam engine, the spinning jenny, and the power loom?

Great Britain's trade and industry, commerce and manufactures, depend on her natural genius, skill, and enterprise, to which her Protestantism adds nothing. If these are due to her Protestantism, how do you explain the commercial and industrial greatness of the Phœnicians, the Greeks, and the Carthaginians, in the ancient world, and of the Italian republics, Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, in the middle ages? or that of Portugal in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and of the Hanseatic Towns, and the Low Countries long before Satan taught Luther that private masses are sinful, or Luther himself symbolized the rehabilitation of the flesh by espousing the nun, Catherine Bora? These things do not depend on religion, but on the natural order, the natural genius, powers, habits, tendencies, and opportunities of individuals or of nations. Great Britain has availed herself of her natural powers, of her geographical position, and of the natural genius of her people, and is to-day the first commercial and industrial nation of the world. All you can say of her Protestantism is, that it has left her free to do so. It has not turned her attention to spiritual and heavenly things; it has not restrained her by directing her efforts to the achievement of greatness in the order of sanctity, and impressing upon her heart the comparative worthlessness of all she lives and labors for. In this way it has no doubt favored her growth in material wealth, but it has done so, not by virtue of what it gives, but by virtue of what it removes, not by the supernatural aid it brings to our natural powers, but by the freedom it leaves to our worldly and selfish instincts and tendencies.

The last thing we mention in which a certain superiority is claimed for Great Britain is her political constitution. She boasts of her freedom, civil and religious. As to her political and civil constitution, she owes it in great part to Catholic times, and any improvements she has made since the reformation she has required nothing more to effect them than natural religion, restored by Christianity, and kept alive even in non-Catholic countries by the presence in the world of the Catholic Church. As to religious liberty, the less said the better. She does not recognize it anywhere in the United Kingdom. Her own church, the Church of England, is bound hand and foot, is the slave of the state, and has not the least autonomy. It is part and parcel of the political and civil constitution of the kingdom. No modern state has been so cruel and unrelenting a persecutor as

England. After two hundred years and more of cruel persecution she has during the last half century been trying the policy, not of religious liberty, but of religious toleration,—a policy which she seems half inclined to abandon. Her civil liberty is maintained not by her Protestantism, but in spite of it, for it cannot be forgotten that it was English Protestantism that sustained the absolutist pretensions of the Tudors and the Stuarts, and taught the doctrine of the divine right of kings, passive obedience, and the irresponsibility of power. Whatever ameliorations we note in the English government, whether in relation to civil or religious liberty, we find they have been effected, not by English Protestantism, but chiefly in spite of it, in opposition to it, by men who have a natural sense of justice, but very little belief in any revealed religion. If the truth must be told, the progress of religious toleration in Great Britain and of religious liberty in this country during the last and present centuries, is due far more to the great infidel writers and statesmen of the time than to Protestants or Protestantism, that is, due far more to men who recognize the natural order, and rely on natural reason and virtue, than to those Protestants who still adhere to Protestantism as a supernatural religion,—to the men who, weary of theological discussions, have discarded all belief in the supernatural, who are indifferent, and, like Gallio, care for none of these things.

In any point of view, then, in which we may consider the greatness of the British nation, we must ascribe it first to the Catholic traditions which she has not wholly rejected, and secondly to her natural virtues, as we ascribe the greatness of pagan Rome to her bravery, fortitude, prudence, and energy. It all lies in the natural order, and requires only the natural powers of man to produce it, as was the case with the greatness of ancient pagan nations. However much superior the material civilization of Great Britain may be to that of any Catholic nation, it affords and can afford no argument to prove that Protestantism is Christianity; for if any thing be certain, it is that Christianity was not given to promote material civilization, and that that civilization is easily explained without it, on simple natural principles. It contains nothing which excelled the natural powers of man.

"The true design of Christianity," says Mr. Derby, "was to refine, improve, and civilize, not debase the world." "Not debase the world," we agree; but that its true de-

sign, the end for which it was given, was to refine, improve, and civilize the world, if you understand material civilization, we deny That Christianity does refine, improve, and civilize the world, in a moral and spiritual sense, is certainly true; but its true design is to redeem men from sin, to sanctify them, and elevate them to union with God in the beatific vision; and it regards this world only as it may be made subservient to that design,—this life only in its relation to that which is to come—the life after death. Its direct object is the glory of God in the salvation and everlasting happiness of men hereafter. It is in this world, but it operates always and everywhere in relation to another, and affects the condition of men in this world, and in relation to this life, only incidentally, indirectly, or as a means to an end. It does not come into the world as a political or social reformer, a merchant, a manufacturer, a broker, or a railroad financier; and has nothing to do with them, further than to tell them it profits a man nothing, if he gains the whole world and loses his own soul; and to impress upon them their obligations to maintain justice and honesty in all their transactions. Christianity, Mr. Derby himself will concede, if he reflects a moment, is a spiritual kingdom, the kingdom of God on earth,—instituted for the direction and government of men in this world indeed, but not for this world; and the goods it proposes, and commands and aids us to seek are not the goods of this earthly life, but the goods of the life to come. Its mission is not to make us rich in this world's wealth, but to make us godly. Hence our Lord bids us seek, not the goods of this life, for that is what the heathen do, but the kingdom of God and his justice,—to set our affections on things above, to labor not for the meat that perisheth, but for that which endureth unto everlasting life; and says, "Lay not up for yourselves treasures on earth; where the rust and the moth consume, and thieves dig through and steal; but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither the rust nor the moth doth consume, and where thieves neither dig through nor steal." This is undeniably the teaching of Christianity, and its influence is undoubtedly to make us prefer spiritual to material goods, to detach us from this world, and moderate our desires for the much boasted material civilization of our age. It is true, our Lord says, "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and *all these things*—the goods of this life—*shall be added unto you.*" But the *adjicienda* are

not proposed as the end, or as the reason why we are to seek the kingdom of God and his justice. They are not offered as the prize to run after, and are not added because sought, but because they are not sought. No doubt the Christian is a happier man in this world than the non-Christian, but he is so precisely because he lives not for this world, is above it while in it, and has in living for another world, a never-failing source of internal joy and consolation which this world can neither give nor take away. In teaching and aiding men to live for truth and justice, for God and heaven, in filling their hearts with Christian love and humility, in moderating their worldly desires, and in subduing their passions, it undoubtedly refines, improves, and civilizes the world, as an incidental or indirect effect, so that human society even in this world is in fact a great gainer by Christianity. But this is not its direct aim, its direct end, the end for which our Lord came into the world, instituted and sustains his religion. To suppose it, were to suppose Christians had no higher aim than had the heathen, and to fall into the error of the old carnal Jews, who applied the prophecies to this life, expected in the Messias a temporal prince, and rejected our Lord because he came only as a spiritual prince, teaching self-denial and detachment from the world, and promising his followers, not temporal greatness and prosperity as their reward, but eternal life in the world to come.

If this be so, the Christian criterion for judging the respective merits of Catholic and Protestant countries is not that which our jurist and railroad financier has chosen, nay, not that which is chosen by most of the enemies of the church in Great Britain and the United States. The Christian test is not and cannot be that of material civilization. Be it true, if you will, that Protestant nations surpass in material greatness and prosperity Catholic nations, it does not move us. The question turns not on that civilization, for that is in the natural order, and not in the Christian order, even when not opposed to it; but it turns on the moral and spiritual virtues of Catholics and Protestants respectively. In examining a Catholic country we are to form our judgment from the moral and spiritual virtues, the sanctity, the heavenly tone and temper, the pure and elevated spirit of the individuals who belong to the Catholic communion, and who believe firmly what the church teaches and observe faithfully whatever she directs or commands. If we find in her

communion a single saint made so by believing her doctrines and obedience to her precepts and her counsels, she must be accepted as the Christian church, for the forming of one saint is, in the Christian judgment, a greater work of God than all his other works besides. Now take this criterion, a criterion, which not even Mr. Derby will dare refuse to accept, and we shall find that the assumption that Catholicity is attended by debasement and degradation, and Protestantism by the reverse, or by different results, is rashly made, and is wholly unwarranted by the facts in the case.

We do not suppose that Mr. Derby consciously holds that material civilization is the real end of Christianity, or the supreme good of man or of society. No man born and bred in a community once christianized can believe any such thing. He no doubt holds that the moral is above the material, and the eternal above the temporal. But somehow or other he blends the two together, and regards them either as inseparably connected, or one as uniformly the measure of the other. His difficulty is to separate worldly prosperity and material greatness from Christian sanctity, and poverty from degradation, vice, and crime. He is unable to separate thrift and godliness, and to comprehend that godliness is itself a great gain. He cannot grasp the radical distinction between Christianity and Judaism as a national institution. The Jew was promised a temporal reward for his fidelity to the law given by Moses, and Mr. Derby has a confused thought that it must be the same with the Christian; that he too is promised temporal prosperity as his reward for fidelity to the law of Christ. The Mosaic law was a temporary and a temporal institution, and therefore obedience to it was rewarded by temporal prosperity, and disobedience by temporal adversity; but Christianity is spiritual, and the rewards and punishments it contemplates are like itself spiritual and eternal. Under the Christian law men are judged for what they are in themselves, not by their worldly position or possessions. Our Lord nowhere connects poverty with vice or disgrace, or riches with sanctity and honor. He judges not as the world judges. There was a certain man whose grounds brought forth abundantly, and who had to enlarge his barns and storehouses. Having filled them, he said to himself, Soul, eat, drink, and enjoy thyself, for thou hast goods laid up for these many years. Thou fool, said our Lord, this night shall God demand thy

soul. Here, what the world calls wisdom God calls folly. Let us understand that the Gospel neither proposes, encourages, nor smiles upon this material civilization, and never confounds it or inseparably connects it with moral and spiritual civilization,—that practice of justice and charity, that love of truth and sanctity which characterizes the truly Christian nation. Let us understand this. Christianity judges not the eternal by the temporal, but the temporal by the eternal, the seen by the unseen, the human by the divine, and counts a thing good or evil as it does or does not contribute to the ultimate end of man, union with God in the beatific vision. In the judgment of the true Christian, that social or civilized state will rank highest which offers fewest obstacles to the growth of individuals in the peculiarly Christian virtues, and that nation will stand highest in which these virtues are most abundant, although it may be lowest in regard to trade, manufactures, agriculture, the mechanic arts, and military power. That poor beggar woman who truly loves her God, and lives the life of faith and hope, stands infinitely above that proud lordling, rolling in wealth and thinking only of his own gratifications. Lazarus was infinitely above the rich man at whose gate he lay, and with the crumbs from whose table he begged to be fed. This is a solemn truth, if there be any truth in Christianity. Mr. Derby does not, perhaps, any more than thousands of others, lay this to heart, and he may be unconsciously regarding his worldly prosperity as the measure of his growth in sanctity; but even he dare not deny the superiority in the sight of God of Lazarus whose sores the dogs came and licked, to the rich man who fared sumptuously every day, and who when he died went to hell. Like too many of his countrymen, he no doubt associates poverty and sin, and wealth and virtue, but he knows that in doing so he is not judging as a Christian, hardly as a man of natural good sense.

Now let us as Christians compare Catholic and non-Catholic nations. Mr. Derby asserts that the Catholic system has been attended by debasement and degradation, and that the reformation has been attended with different results. Is this the fact? We will take a case the most favorable to the Protestant and the least favorable to the Catholic, that can be selected. We will take Protestant England and Catholic Ireland. England is the country of all others in which Protestantism has had the fairest scope for its devel-

opment, and where it has been best able during three hundred years to prove its capabilities. Catholic Ireland is the country of all others where Catholicity has labored under the greatest worldly disadvantages. Catholic Ireland has been governed as a conquered country, and governed too by Protestants. The government for three hundred years has been Protestant, and till within the last quarter of a century has done all in its power to trammel the Catholic religion, and to debase and degrade the Catholic population. It deprived Catholics of all political power; it robbed them of all their churches, schools, and seminaries, outlawed their religion, hunted down their clergy as wild beasts, and prohibited, by heavy penalties, all education by Catholics, even the teaching of letters to his child by a Catholic father. It seized all the revenues of the church, confiscated the estates of Catholic proprietors, even prohibited Catholics from acquiring landed property, or of owning a horse of more than five pounds value. In a word, the Protestant government aided by a Protestant faction in Ireland, far worse than the government itself, has during three hundred years done all in its power to impoverish, to debase, and brutalize the Catholic population. Well, compare Catholic Ireland and Protestant England as we find them to-day, and say which stands highest, judged by the Christian standard? We deny not that there are many Irishmen at home and abroad who are no credit to their religion; we deny not that there are many Irishisms which are not to our taste, and that sometimes annoy us; but no man competent to judge can for one moment hesitate to assert that in a moral and religious point of view, in moral dignity of character, and in the peculiar Christian virtues, those which have the promise of eternal life, the pre-eminence belongs unmistakably to the Catholic Irish. Catholic Ireland is far more moral than Protestant England, has absolutely and relatively fewer crimes, fewer vices, and far less intemperance. You look in vain for that moral debasement and degradation among the Irish peasantry that you meet at every step in the English peasantry, operatives, and miners. Your humblest Irishman who has not lost his religion, has a self-respect, a politeness, an elevation of feeling, a true manliness, a moral perception, a nobility of sentiment, that an Englishman of the same rank in life, not only has not, but is usually unable even to conceive. In all Catholic countries you cannot fail to remark in the lower classes, if they retain their faith,

that they are never so low as the corresponding classes in other countries. They never feel that because they are poor they cease to be human, or that they are of a different nature from the rich.

Catholic Ireland, we concede, is not as rich as Protestant England; but when you take into consideration the circumstances in which the Catholic Irish have been placed, the legislation that for so long a time rendered their property, if they had any, insecure, and operated to prevent them from acquiring property, you must concede that in true industry and thrift, those cardinal virtues in the estimation of New Englanders, they have proved themselves in no sense inferior to the English. We are more struck by the fact that they have been able to live, have contrived to keep soul and body together, than we are by the immense accumulations of Protestant England. In strength of body, in physical courage, in all manly exercises, in ingenuity, in all that tries or develops one's manhood, the Irishman is at least equal to the Englishman of the same class. The English are superior to the Irish, only in the genius of organization,—a natural, not an acquired superiority. The Irish genius, like that of all the Celtic tribes, is disintegrating, and in politics yields to the English, as the old Gallic tribes yielded to the Romans, although surpassing them in numbers, and equalling them in courage and military ardor. The reason of this difference we cannot explain, but it is not owing to difference of religion, for it was as striking when England and Ireland were both Catholic as it is now. This genius of organization, which makes a people a king-people, and fits it to be a robber as well as a moral people, and its material conquests and accumulations, with the physical power growing out of them, are all that Protestant England can boast over Catholic Ireland. In all else, the Catholic Irish, allowance made for the oppression they have suffered from power in the hands of Protestants, are far above the Protestant English. The Protestant Englishman is prouder; does not doubt that he is a greater and a better man; he walks the earth with a sturdier step, and speaks in a louder and a gruffer tone; but he will be found on examination to be inferior to the Catholic Irishman in mental quickness and activity, in intelligence, wisdom, virtue, politeness, and grace.

But this is not all, nor the most. We would ask Mr. Derby to tell us what has during these three hundred years

sustained the Catholic Irish, and saved them from utter moral debasement and degradation. The high moral character, the deep sense of religion, the stern virtues, the noble sentiments which mark the majority of the Catholic Irish, must be conceded; but how have they maintained them in spite of the efforts made for three hundred years to brutalize them, and to crush the life out of them? How have they been able to preserve one of the finest national characters in the world, and to give to the humblest shealing a dignity and moral grandeur and beauty which not one of England's proudest palaces can surpass? No man can for one moment doubt that it has been the Catholic religion, the Catholic faith, the Catholic Church. A Protestant people under similar circumstances, would have sunk to a condition but one remove from that of the brute creation. That it is Catholicity which has sustained the Irish in their virtues and noble sentiments is evident from the fact that the Irishman loses them the moment he loses his religion, or turns his back upon the old church. The Protestant Irish have no superiority over the Protestant English. If, as is undeniable, the Catholic Irish are not utterly debased and degraded, and if it is due to the Catholic religion that they are not, how can Mr. Derby pretend that debasement and degradation necessarily attend the Catholic system? He would have a good case, if the facts did not happen to be dead against him. As long as stands Catholic Ireland, so long he must concede that a Catholic people cannot by all the arts and contrivances, by all the malice and force of earth and hell, be utterly debased and degraded. Catholic Ireland, say what you will of her, stands there a living answer to the proud conceited Protestant's charge that Catholicity is unfavorable to the refinement, the improvement, the civilization of the world, and we ask no other answer to Mr. Derby's ill-considered and ill-chosen argument against our religion.

We are far from pretending that all in Catholic states satisfies us, and have no disposition to deny to Protestant states any thing good which they can claim as their own; but we tell Mr. Derby that if he speaks as a Christian, the refining, civilizing effects of the reformation he assumes exist only in his imagination, or the exigencies of his argument. They are nowhere to be seen. In Protestant countries you find in the middle classes a certain rough energy, a certain barbaric pride, which talks large, and

which owing to its devotion to the world commands a certain measure of material success, not ordinarily to be met with in Catholics devoted to their religion, but in the arts, graces, refinements, and charms of civilized life, the latter are everywhere in advance of the former. A careful comparison of the two will establish the fact that in material civilization, in the purely material order, in which infidels and Christians stand on the same footing, Protestants take the precedence, though still behind the more advanced heathen nations of antiquity; but in that higher civilization which regards the heart and soul, and demands for its attainment and maintenance the Christian virtues, temper, and spirit, the only civilization the Christian prizes, Catholics take the precedence, in reality stand alone We conclude, therefore, that the reformation, while it gives free scope to the material splendor and aggrandizement of a nation, tends directly to its moral debasement and degradation, and that Catholicity, while it detaches men from the world, moderates the desire for worldly goods, and therefore in some measure checks the growth of a rank and poisonous material civilization, fosters the spiritual, ennobles the soul, purifies the affections, elevates the sentiments, and renders man a higher and a more dignified being, and society more simple, just, and humane, in which moral worth is held in higher honor, and the poor and unfortunate are treated with more consideration, gentleness, and affection, nay, respect.

We have treated this argument at greater length than its intrinsic importance demands, because it contains the only objection to Catholicity that has much practical weight with our non-Catholic countrymen, and because we have wished to show that it is at bottom, so far as it is an argument at all, an argument against Christianity itself, and based upon principles which every one who believes in the Gospel does and must reject. Mr. Derby does not see this, because he does not see any difficulty in serving, at the same time, both God and mammon, or very clearly distinguish the worship of mammon from the worship of God. Yet nothing is more certain than that this devotion to the world, to the development and advancement of material civilization, which leads us to estimate nations and individuals by their wealth and worldly greatness, which treats the poor as vicious or criminal, and regards them as the curse and opprobrium of a country, which even our Protestant

ministers eulogize from the pulpit, the press, and the rostrum, as an evidence of our enlightenment and true wisdom, is incompatible with the spirit of the Gospel, offensive to God, and injurious to society itself. It implies a forgetfulness of God, and the nations that forget God must sooner or later experience the fate of all the great nations of pagan antiquity. The men who live for this world, in the long run, lose this world and that which is to come; and all experience proves that you can never increase a man's happiness by enlarging his material possessions. One of our old New England worthies, who amassed a large estate, and was a man of note in his day, used to say that he and his wife when married were both poor, that he told her he wished to be rich, but she told him she did not wish to be rich, she only wished to be comfortable. "I have," he would add, "long since had my wish, but she has not yet had hers." He was a wiser man than Mr. Derby who said, "If you would enrich a man, study not to increase his possessions, but to moderate his desires." The contented poor man is richer than he whom the world calls rich, is in fact more independent, and can do more as he likes. Our desires increase with the increase of our riches, riches bring cares and responsibilities which render them a snare to the bad man, and a burden to the good man.

But enough of this. We must proceed in our dissection to other, though hardly graver matters.

"Again, let me recur to the origin of the Romish Church. Its basis should be the Gospel. Here we have a safe starting-point. All denominations recognize the mission of our Saviour, and the authority of the Gospels, Acts, and Epistles. Now how far do these sacred books establish the faith, doctrines, and usages of the Romish Church? First, the Church of Rome relies upon the sixteenth chapter of St. Matthew, eighteenth verse, in which our Saviour says, 'Thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my Church.' But we must remember that in the same chapter, verse twenty-third, our Saviour *rebukes* Peter in terms stronger than he used to any apostle, save Judas, who betrayed him, saying, 'Get thee behind me, Satan, thou art an offence unto me.' And we must not forget that in the hour of trial Peter faltered, that he thrice denied our Lord, and, drawing a sword against the wishes of our Saviour, wounded a servant of the high-priest, because he stated the truth." —p. 11.

Mr. Derby would do well to remember that Catholics hold that our Lord himself founded the church, not that men have founded it, whether on the Gospel or any thing

else. In the mind of the Catholic the church is Christ's own institution of the Gospel, and it is the Gospel instituted as a living kingdom, not as an abstract idea, or a dead book, that we embrace and hold to be authoritative. Out of the church, and distinguished from her, there is no Gospel for men to appeal to, or to recognize as authority. The Gospel is what the church teaches and administers. The written word can be cited against her only for the purpose of convicting her of contradicting herself. For such a purpose you may cite it against her, but for no other. Mr. Derby is a lawyer, and should understand this. She is the court, and he must dispossess her before he can make her amenable to his reading of the law. But this by the way.

Where our Lord says to Peter, "Thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my church," he does not mean, Mr. Derby thinks, what he says, because he subsequently rebukes Peter in severer terms than he used to any other disciple save Judas. But did not our Lord know very well when he said, "Blessed art thou, Simon, son of Jonas, and I say unto thee, thou art Peter and upon this rock will I build my church," that he would also have occasion very soon to say unto him, "Go behind me, Satan?" Whence then does it follow from the rebuke that the promise so formally made was not made, or that it was to be of none effect? Mr. Derby must concede that, notwithstanding the rebuke, Peter remained one of the twelve, and was commissioned and sent forth as an inspired apostle, and, it seems to us, that if his reasoning is good against the primacy, it is equally good against the apostleship of Peter. Peter denied his Lord thrice, and even cursed and swore. In that he proved himself as unworthy of being an apostle even as of being the prince of the apostles. Yet our Lord did not exclude him from the apostolic college. The learned jurist forgets that our Lord in the promise spoke in the future, and that it was not till converted that Peter was to confirm his brethren. It was possible for Peter, through divine grace, to repent, and we have never heard it maintained that our Lord chose Peter because he was naturally a perfect character. "Ye have not chosen me," said our Lord to all his apostles, "but I have chosen you." Their apostleship stood not in human virtue, but in divine appointment, divine grace, and the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. So also the primacy of Peter, and whatever the natural imperfections of Peter's character, we suppose it lay

in our Lord's power to qualify him for the office to which he designated him, whether that office was the primacy or some other.

There is something hard-hearted and unchristian in our Protestant jurist. We fear he has never learned to temper justice with mercy, and is very far from duly appreciating the infinite tenderness of the Gospel, or from sounding the depth of the riches of divine grace. He sees in our Lord's severe language only an evidence of his anger to Peter, and concludes that our Lord could not have rebuked him without withdrawing the blessing he had pronounced upon him. He cannot understand that our Lord may rebuke in love, and chastise without anger. He will allow no space for repentance, no scope for mercy and forgiveness. He would have been greatly scandalized had he been present when our Lord dined with the Pharisee, and had seen him permit, while he sat at table, Mary Magdalen, the woman who had been a sinner, to wash his feet with her tears and wipe them with her hair. He most likely would have called for the police to transport her to the House of Correction. Alas! the smile of innocence can no longer light up any of our faces, but the tears of penitence may stream from the eyes of us all, and dear are these tears to our Lord, who came to call not the just, but sinners to repentance, and who while we were yet sinners died for us, and opens his arms and his heart to the very chiefest of sinners, if he repents. He did not spurn the penitent Magdalen, but received her homage, bestowed on her the riches of his grace, and made her as conspicuous for her burning charity as she had been for her disorderly love. Mr. Derby, ourselves, and thousands of others need this example of the Magdalen, this assurance that the tears of the penitent sinner can cleanse, through grace, the soul from its pollutions, and open to us the doors of Paradise, to save us from despair, and to permit us to feel that, if, like her, we repent and bedew the feet of our Lord with our tears, he will not spurn us, but enrich us with his love.

It is true, our Lord reproved Peter after he had blessed him and given him the promise; but not angrily, as if Peter had done something to forfeit his love. When our Lord said to his disciples that he "must go to Jerusalem, and suffer many things from the ancients and the scribes and the chief priests, and be put to death, and the third day rise again," Peter rebuked him, and said, Lord, be it far

from thee; this shall not be unto thee. But Peter said this, no doubt, as not understanding, at that time, that Christ must needs suffer, and from a tender love and respect to his Master. The reply of our Lord need not be taken in a harsh sense, and necessarily means no more than, Nay, Peter, in wishing these things not to befall me, thou savorest the things that be of men, not the things that be of God, and art opposed to me. These things must be, and instead of wishing to avert them, prepare to follow me, and suffer after my example. But be this as it may, why may it not be that our Lord chose Peter to be the prince of the apostles, and the rock on which he would build his church, because he was not free from human weakness, because he needed at times repentance and pardon, so that his elevation should not seem to be awarded to his natural virtues, so that he should find in it no temptation against humility, and so that it should be seen that his church does not stand in human sagacity, wisdom, strength, or virtue, but in divine grace, and the supernatural assistance of the Holy Ghost?

"Again, the Romish Church adverts to the gift of keys and relics on the nineteenth verse of the same chapter, but the ancient fathers attached little importance to this verse which so closely precedes the rebuke. Tertullian, of Carthage, who flourished in the next century after the apostles, says, 'Clavem interpretationem legis.' Chrysostom, bishop of Constantinople, says, 'Clavis est scientia scripturarum per quam aperitur janua veritatis.' Chrysostom lived in 393. Eusebius, who lived in 290, born in Palestine in 265, an able and voluminous writer, calls the keys 'the word of God.' These seem to be the earliest and most authentic of ancient expositors, and I can refer you to these passages and all others I may cite. What becomes, then, of the express delegation to St. Peter, claimed by the Romanists, of the exclusive custody of the gates of heaven."—pp. 11, 12.

Suppose this were so, what then? Tertullian and Eusebius were no saints; the former lapsed into the Montanist heresy, and the latter was affected by Arianism. Whether they say what Mr. Derby alleges, we are unable to say, as he gives no reference, and we have not deemed it worth our while to search through their voluminous works to see if we could find the alleged passages. According to Mr. Derby, or rather the Anglican divine from whom he cites him, Tertullian says, the "key is the interpretation of the Law." This, if it means any thing, must mean that the key is that which unlocks, or discloses the sense or true meaning of the law. If then Tertullian refers to the keys

which our Lord said he would give to Peter, he must mean that our Lord gave to Peter the power to interpret and declare the true sense of the law, that is, constituted him the judge of the law, as all Catholics hold. If Tertullian says what is alleged, he says nothing against the Catholic interpretation of the power of the keys. Eusebius, we are told, calls the keys "the word of God." This hardly agrees with what Tertullian says, for the interpretation of the word, and the word of God itself, are not precisely the same; but, suppose Eusebius does so call the keys, and that the keys are the word of God, it follows that as they were given to Peter, Peter received the word of God, and is constituted its keeper and interpreter. We see nothing in this inconsistent with the Catholic interpretation of the text.

We have not been able to verify the alleged citation from St. Chrysostom, and therefore know not, if he says it, whether he is speaking of the keys given to Peter, or of some other key. He might very well say what is alleged, for the science of the Scriptures must have been included in the gift of the keys; but St. Chrysostom repeatedly calls St. Peter the "Mouth of the Disciples," the "Prince of the Apostles," the "Foundation of the Church," and distinctly asserts his primacy. In his third Homily on Penance, he says, "Petrus ille apostolorum *princeps*, in Ecclesia *primus*, amicus Christi, qui revelationem ab hominibus non accepit, sed a Patre . . . . hic Petrus (Petrum cum dico, *Petram* nomino *infragilem*, *crepidinem immobilem*, apostolum magnum, primum discipulorum, primum vocatum, et primum obedientem): ille non parvum facinus admisit, sed maximum, qui Dominum negavit: hoc dico, non justum accusans, sed tibi pœnitentiæ præbens occasionem, &c." * St. Chrysostom says, also, what is very much to our purpose, in his seventh Oration, *Adversus Judæos*, "Petrus itaque post gravem illam negationem, quoniam celeriter suum ipsius peccatum recordatus est, nulloque accusante dixit peccatum, flevitque amare; sic abluit illam abnegationem, ut etiam *primus* apostolorum fuerit factus, *eique totus terrarum orbis commissus fuerit*." † Again, arguing against the Anomæans and Arians, the holy doctor says,

* Tom. II. p. 353. Ed. Gaume. Paris: 1839. We cite the Latin, after Mr. Derby's example, and not the Greek.

† Tom. I, pp. 828, 829.

"Nam Pater revelationem Filii Petro dedit. Filius vero et Patris et suam revelationem per totum orbem disseminavit, *ac mortali homini omnem in cælo potestatem dedit, dum claves illi tradidit.*" "He gave to mortal man all power in heaven, when he delivered to him (Peter) the keys."* This is sufficient to show how St. Chrysostom understood the keys, and the primacy of Peter, and as Mr. Derby concedes his authority, we hope he will be satisfied. It is a good thing to go to the "fountainheads," and perhaps had Mr. Derby gone there, he would not have written his Letters. But there was no need of citing the fathers on this question. Everybody knows that to deliver to one the keys, is symbolical of conferring power, and what power our Lord conferred on Peter under the emblem of the keys is manifest from his own words: "And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven." This needs no comment. It is the unlimited power of binding and loosing, and that is all that we have ever understood the church to mean by the power of the keys.

The assertion of Mr. Derby that the fathers do not seem to attach much importance to the text in question, may go for what it is worth. A gratuitous assertion requires no refutation. In the early ages of the church, it was not necessary to defend the primacy of Peter, or of the apostolic see, for it was not disputed, and hence St. Augustine says, "Rome has spoken, sentence is pronounced, the cause is finished." The tradition was too fresh in men's minds to be questioned, and we should naturally expect to find little in the early fathers in defence of it. The church teaches orally, and her doctors do not ordinarily write in defence of her doctrines unless they are misapprehended or controverted. But the primacy of Peter never rested on this text alone, and the fathers may have found other arguments more to their purpose, and even though they understood this as the church now understands it, they may, without meaning to question or to obscure that understanding, have, as they have so many other texts, accommodated it to other senses.

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* *In Matthæum*, Homil. LIV, al. LV., Tom. VII. p. 617. See, also, p. 616.

"Again, the Romish Church relies on the words spoken to St. Peter, 'feed my sheep, feed my lambs,' the words of our Saviour. But our Saviour said to all his apostles, indifferently, 'feed ye,' 'go into the whole world,' 'teach ye the gospel.' Whatever power was given to St. Peter was not delegated to his successors by any words I find in the gospel. The Romish Church look principally to St. Peter, but it appears by holy writ that St. Paul was the *great apostle to the Gentiles*, and the principal if not the sole founder of the Church of Rome."—p. 12.

Suppose Mr. Derby is not able to find any words in the Gospel which prove that the power, whatever it was, given to Peter was delegated to his successors, what does that prove? The church is older than the Gospels, and was as completely constituted in all that is essential to her before a single one of the Gospels was written as she is now. If there is any truth at all in the Catholic Church, she receives her doctrine, her constitution, her laws, and her powers immediately from God, not through the medium of any written word whatever. This is her profession at any rate, and it is this profession you have to combat. The church claims to have *received* the written word, but she must have existed before she received it, or else she could not have been its recipient. She does not concede that she has been created or constituted by the written word, as Mahometanism was instituted by the Koran. Our Lord, according to Catholics, founded a church, instead of writing a book as the Arabian impostor did, and as Protestants, against all the reasons and facts in the case, pretend. Our learned jurist misconceives the case, and his evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible. Nothing can be concluded against the church from the silence of the Gospels. If Mr. Derby could find in them any text that expressly, or by implication, denies that the power given to Peter descended to his successors, it would be to his purpose; for it would convict the church of contradicting herself, since she teaches that the Gospels were given by divine inspiration. But their silence proves nothing, any more than a witness testifying that he did not see the accused commit a certain crime, proves that he did not commit it. Yet we do not concede that the Gospels are absolutely silent on the point. The words of our Lord, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it," plainly imply the continuance of Peter as its foundation. And how was he to continue, but in his successors?

The author promised to "test the claims and faith of the church by those authorities on which the church herself relies, the early saints, fathers, and popes, such as Augustine, Clement, Irenæus, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Eusebius, Jerome, Athanasius, Leo, and others, whom the church reveres." From these he was to draw his proofs, and only his *illustrations* from the Scriptures. That is, he undertook to refute the claims and faith of the church by those whom we regard as Catholic writers, and recognize as authorities in argument. Has he done it? Has he cited a single authority to the effect that the church falsely claims that the power given to Peter as the prince of the apostles, as the primate and visible head of the church, descends to his successors? Not as we have seen. It is evident to common sense, if such primacy was necessary to the church in the time of Peter, when the apostles were all living, all directed by the Holy Ghost, and all clothed with apostolical authority in the whole church, it was far more necessary after their death, and there remained, aside from the apostolic see, no apostolic power, as distinguished from the ordinary episcopal power. The bishops succeed to the apostles in the episcopacy, in so far as the apostles were bishops, but not in the apostleship, in so far as they were apostles; they succeed to the episcopal, but not to the apostolic power, and unless the successors of Peter succeed to him in his apostleship and primacy, the primacy and apostleship expired with him and the rest of the apostles, and no apostolic power remains in the church. The reason for continuing the primacy of Peter after his death was far stronger than the reason for instituting it in his person. Hence, we find all the fathers asserting its continuance in Peter's successors. Thus St. Chrysostom, speaking of our Lord, says, "Cur sanguinem effudit? Ut has emeret oves, quas Petro et successoribus ejus tradidit."* "Manet," says St. Leo Magnus, as cited by Father Cercia, "dispositio veritatis, et beatus Petrus in accepta fortitudine petræ perseverans, suscepta Ecclesiæ gubernacula non reliquit: perseverat videlicet Petrus et vivit in successoribus suis."†

That the bishops of Rome are the legitimate successors of Peter, and that he lives and speaks in them with the pleni-

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**De Sacerdotio*, Lib. II., Tom. 1, p. 454.

† *Sermo. II., de Anniv. Assumpt. suæ*, Tract. de Romano Pontifice, Sect. 1, Lect. XI. Neapoli: 1850.

tude of the apostolic authority, is the uniform tradition of the church. To this fact may be cited St. Irenæus, Tertullian, St. Cyprian, Eusebius, St. Athanasius, Sozomen, Eulogius Alexandrinus, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, Prudentius, St. Prosper, Sulpitius, Theodoret, Isidore, Freculphus, Ado Viennensis, the Popes Damasus, Innocent I., Leo the Great, Gelasius, John III., Gregory the Great, Adrian I., Nicholas I., indeed all the popes who have written any thing touching the question, for they all with one accord claim to be successors of St. Peter, and to hold their authority on the ground of their being the occupants of his see. And to these we may add the testimony of the first five councils, which comprise together more than twelve hundred ancient bishops, the great majority of whom were Greeks.* This is enough to satisfy any reasonable man acquainted with the subject, and a sufficient answer to Mr. Derby on his own grounds, for he promised to prove his case from our own witnesses.

Mr. Derby pretends that whatever power was given to Peter, the same power was given to all the apostles alike, because he said to all indifferently, "feed ye," "go into all the world," "teach the Gospel." But he forgets that our Lord did not say to all indifferently, "feed my lambs," "feed my sheep," but to Peter only. He said, indeed, to them all, go into all the world and teach the Gospel, and thus gave them apostolic power, but to none of them save Peter did he deliver the keys, to none of them save Peter did he say, "when thou art converted confirm thy brethren," to no other did he give the special charge of his lambs, his sheep, his whole flock; and therefore St. Chrysostom, who probably understood the Scriptures and traditions of the church as well as our New England jurist, calls Peter the Coryphæus of the apostles, and the head and mouth, *caput et os*, of the apostolic body.

Mr. Derby, furthermore, thinks that Paul, not Peter, planted the church of Rome, and the primacy, if affirmed of any one should be affirmed of Paul and not of Peter. "The Romish Church [why could he not have written

* See Father Cercia's work, just referred to, Sect. II., Lect. I., where the testimony of all these is cited at length, and which we would also give at length did our limits permit; and most of whom we shall have, perhaps, occasion to cite, as we proceed. On this whole question we refer Mr. Derby to the work we have cited, and also to the learned work on *The Primacy of the Apostolic See*, by Archbishop Kenrick. 4th edition, Baltimore: 1855.

Roman, and thus have written good English?] look principally to Peter, but it appears from Holy Writ that St. Paul was the great apostle of the gentiles, and the principal, if not the sole founder of the church of Rome." He labors in the remainder of this second letter to prove this. We cite his proofs at length.

"It is true the Lord appeared in a vision to St. Peter, to dispel his impressions as to the impurity of the Gentiles, but it does not appear that St. Peter, for many years, went out of Asia, while St. Paul, enlightened by a heavenly vision, and highly educated, having been reared at Tarsus, distinguished for its schools, and at the feet of Gamaliel, a learned and leading Pharisee, and being born a Roman citizen, was converted to the faith, and sent forth the eloquent expounder of Christianity, and endowed also with the power of miracles. Refer to the Acts and Epistles. Who was the principal actor and author? St. Paul. How often did he visit Rome, and how long did he reside there? He was there twice or thrice and for years. His epistles most of them bear date from *Rome*. Look at their conclusion. Read them all, and you will find he was in Asia, Egypt, Arabia, Thrace, Greece, Macedonia, Italy, Spain, and many other regions, founding churches and preaching the Gospel. Examine his Epistle to the Galatians from Rome, chapters one and two, from the fourteenth verse of the first, to the sixteenth verse of the second chapter, and note his remarkable narrative of the heavenly vision, and his mission to the Gentiles. How it was three years after he commenced that mission, before he visited the disciples in Jerusalem, where he conferred with Peter and *James* (the first bishop of Jerusalem,), the Lord's brother, and after a visit of but fifteen days to Peter, left Judea for Cilicia and Syria; how he traveled on his mission for fourteen years, and then returned to Jerusalem where he found James and John, as well as Cephas, 'pillars of the Church,' and Peter performing his mission to the *circumcised*; how he met Peter at Antioch; how Peter at first associated with the Gentiles at meals, and when the Jews appeared withdrew, and how severely Paul reproved him for this *tergiversation*, 'and withstood him to the face because he was to be blamed.' See Galatians ii. 11, and note that he afterwards returned to Rome, and thence addressed his apostolic letters to the *bishops* of various churches. Does all this show *any supremacy* or *infallibility* on the part of St. Peter in the days of the apostles? He may have subsequently visited Rome, and his martyrdom may have occurred there, and his blood have cemented the foundations of the church which St. Paul had reared there, but St. Paul was the bold, learned, eloquent, and effective preacher of the Gospel to the heathen, and at least co-ordinate with St. Peter, the oldest and probably least instructed of the disciples, who must have been an old man when he reached Rome more than eighteen years after the death of our Saviour."—pp. 12—14.

Is it not a little singular, if our jurist is right, that the church of Rome never thought of claiming the primacy for St. Paul instead of St. Peter? She must have known, if such was the fact, that St. Paul was her founder and first bishop; how do you account, then, for her fixing upon Peter, according to Mr. Derby, a far less worthy character, and altogether inferior as a man and a scholar? How do you account for the uniform tradition of the church throughout the whole world, a tradition never questioned, so far as known, before the heretic Marsilius of Padua, in the fourteenth century, that Peter was the first bishop of Rome? How account for the fact that, with such preponderating evidence as Mr. Derby supposes, in favor of St. Paul, there is not a vestige of proof that any one ever thought of calling the See of Rome Paul's See? Is it not the most rational solution of the difficulty, after all, to conclude that the church of Rome had no option in the case, that she called the Roman See Peter's See, simply because it was his see,—a fact about which she could no more be mistaken than we about the fact who is at this moment archbishop of New York. Perhaps the early Christians were not such blunderheads as Mr. Derby would have us believe. The heretics of the early ages, like heretics in all ages, were an ignorant, blundering set, no doubt, and the remains we have of their writings and speculations indicate, as Clement of Alexandria said of the Greeks, that "they could believe any thing save the truth"; but all the remains we have of the early orthodox Christians, prove that they had, with the poor, the simple, the oppressed, the best talent of the age on their side. We do great injustice to the men who immediately succeeded the apostles, if we suppose there were among them none who were men of enlarged and cultivated minds, of liberal education, and who were inferior to none in their times, or even in succeeding times. The fragments of their works which have escaped the wreck of time prove it. The second century was almost ushered in before the last of the apostles, St. John, departed this life, and the men who were formed in that century, and wrote in it, or at the opening of the third, were men of learning, ability, and some of them of vast attainments. These were all men of whom the Christian world even to-day might be proud. When we come down later to the last half of the third century and to the fourth we find the Christian writers were the great men in genius, in talent, in learning, in philosophy,

and eloquence of their age, and of an age by no means sunk in gross ignorance and enveloped in thick darkness. Mr. Derby forgets that the Christian church was founded in the most enlightened and cultivated epoch of antiquity, and was established in the most enlightened centres of the Roman empire, amidst the most violent opposition of the heathen world. If her first apostles were chosen from the humbler classes of Judea, we must remember that they were supernaturally endowed, and not presume on their ignorance or that of the primitive believers. The Acts of the early martyrs and confessors betray no such ignorance or credulity as is often supposed. Numerous councils had been held by the Christians prior to Constantine, and we find that when the bishops from all parts of the world assembled at Nice in the beginning of the fourth century, they were all well aware of the faith and discipline of the church, and that the church herself was as thoroughly organized, had as regular an order, whether as to her government, her liturgy, or her modes of conducting her affairs, as at any subsequent period. Never was there a theory invented less necessary to explain the phenomena of church history than the theory of development.

Does Mr. Derby doubt that Luther performed as to the reformation the part usually ascribed to him? Does he consider it uncertain whether Luther did or did not publish his theses at Wittenberg, in 1517, and that he burnt at the same place the papal bull condemning his heresies? Which was the greater event, the acts of Luther or the establishing of the Chair of Peter at Rome, the founding of the church in the capital of heathenism? What was to prevent St. Cyprian, St. Chrysostom, or St. Ambrose from being as well informed of the latter as Mr. Derby is of the former? They were nearer in space and time to the event than he is to Luther. They lived in one and the same empire, under one and the same government, and the means of communication of all parts of the empire with Rome, prior to the irruption of the barbarians, were neither few nor difficult, nor even dilatory. Just suppose, what is very supposable, that the early Christians of the empire took a deep interest in their religion, and that they knew as well what they were about as Mr. Derby knows what he is about, and the tradition that the See of Rome was Peter's See becomes conclusive, and can be questioned by no honest man capable of reasoning on such subjects.

Mr. Derby concludes that St. Peter did not, and that St. Paul did, plant the church of Rome. But he adduces no evidence that St. Paul was ever bishop of Rome, or that St. Peter was not the first bishop, and therefore the founder of the see. To establish the claims of Peter it is not necessary to suppose that he was the first who proclaimed the Gospel in the city of Rome, or that when he transferred his chair from Antioch to Rome, there were no Christian converts there. It is only necessary to prove that he established his see there. Certain it is that St. Paul was not the first to plant the Christian faith in the Eternal City; for we learn from his Epistle to the Romans, written before he had visited Rome, that there were Christians and converts both from the Jews and gentiles there, whose faith was spoken of in all the world. St. Paul, indeed, resided some time at Rome, and labored as an apostle there, but that does not prove that he was or that St. Peter was not the bishop, any more than the labors of Archbishop Bedini as secretary of the Propaganada prove that he is and that Pius IX. is not the supreme pontiff. St. Paul was the apostle of the gentiles, but that does not make him the primate of the church, or make it not true that our Lord committed to Peter the care of the whole flock, both Jews and gentiles. That he labored with Peter in founding the church of Rome we do not deny, and therefore to this day Rome honors him as one of the patrons of her see, and the popes in their official documents invoke him along with St. Peter.

That St. Peter was guilty of "tergiversation" at Antioch and that St. Paul withstood him to the face is not certain, and till its certainty is established we cannot be called upon to respond to the allegation. It is not certain that the Cephas spoken of in the text was Peter the Apostle, and if he was, it does not follow that Paul reprehended him otherwise than as an inferior may reprehend a superior. We know elsewhere that St. Peter and St. Paul agreed as to the binding nature of the Jewish law, and the dispute between them at Antioch, if dispute there was, did not concern doctrine, but the propriety or impropriety of Peter's avoiding, in the presence of the Jews, eating with the gentiles. The very worst that can be said is that the conduct of Cephas was reprehensible. Even if this Cephas was Peter the Apostle, it proves nothing against his *infallibility*, and at most would only prove that he was not *impeccable*. Now no man, however strongly he asserts the infallibility of the pope in teaching, maintains

that he is impeccable in his personal conduct. Popes go to confession, and to simple priests, as the rest of us. But Mr. Derby forgets that St. Peter was an inspired apostle, and that therefore his teaching was infallible, even on Protestant principles. If he believes the apostles were inspired by the Holy Ghost and divinely assisted to teach, he must take care how he impugns Peter's infallibility.

We have dwelt at great length upon the second letter of Mr. Derby, because we have wished to meet fairly and to the advantage of our readers the points he has made. Nearly all the important matter of his whole book he touches upon in this Letter. We shall pass more lightly and more rapidly over the rest. But our readers must have patience with us, for we write not solely for Mr. Derby's special benefit, or for the sole purpose of refuting his assertions in the respect that they are his. In refuting him, we refute the whole class of popular anti-popery writers, and perform a disagreeable, though perhaps not a useless task.

ARTICLE III.

We resume our dissection of Mr. Derby's Letters. The learned jurist opens his third letter by assuring his young kinsman that:—

"In my last letter I showed you that Peter, in the days of our Saviour and the Apostles, was not superior to his associates; that the "keys" are the "Word of God" given to all the disciples; that James became the first bishop of Jerusalem to the exclusion of Peter; that Paul, after his heavenly vision, without taking counsel of the disciples, began his mission to the heathen, and became the builder of that church of which Christ himself was the chief corner-stone; that Paul planted the great churches in Ephesus, Smyrna, and Rome, chief cities of the Roman Empire, and in tracing the progress of the bishops of Rome, we must remember that Rome was the seat of empire, the mistress of the world, and it was to be expected that her bishops should be aspiring, that they should feel, like the Romish bishop of New York, the metropolis of our country, disposed to outrank their fellows and enlarge their jurisdiction. It was natural that they should struggle for supremacy, and by no means surprising they should attain to power. *Six centuries*, however, expired before they acquired a positive ascendency, as appears by the concurrent testimony of the *fathers* and *historians* both of *church* and *state*. Bishops were placed over hundreds of churches in Europe, Asia, and Africa, who for six centuries exercised the power of the apostles, met in council, and by discussion and by concurrent votes regulated the *faith* and directed the *worship* of the Catholic Church."—pp. 15, 16.

That St. James was the first bishop of Jerusalem is conceded; but how does that prove that St. Peter was not the first bishop of Rome, or that the primacy was not given to him or to his successors in that see? Whence has the learned jurist obtained his information that St. Paul "began his mission to the heathen without taking counsel of the disciples," or without the authorization of Peter as head of the apostolic college? St. Paul himself tells him nothing of the sort; we know he was with the disciples at Damascus; he tells us that he "went up to Jerusalem to see Peter, and abode with him fifteen days," and there is no evidence that he had commenced his mission to the heathen prior to that interview with the prince of the apostles. That St. Paul alone planted the church of Rome, Mr. Derby fails to prove, and that it was planted by him and St. Peter all Catholics assert. Ephesus and Smyrna ranked in the Roman Empire below Antioch and Alexandria.

What authority has Mr. Derby for asserting that the "Romish" bishop of New York feels disposed to "outrank his fellows and enlarge his jurisdiction"? Has our archbishop confided to him his feelings? Has he learned it from those "fellows"? Is he aware of a single fact which indicates such a disposition? Of course not, for no such fact exists; and the whole church in the country would treat with derision any attempt on the part of any bishop to extend his jurisdiction or to claim precedency of his brother bishops, on the ground of the political, civil, or commercial importance of his see. If the learned jurist err so ridiculously with regard to the archbishop of New York, his contemporary, and his own metropolitan, what confidence can he expect us to place in his unsupported assertions with regard to the early bishops of Rome, so much more distant from him in both place and time?

"Rome was the seat of empire, the mistress of the world, and it was to be expected that her bishops would be aspiring and. . . .feel disposed to outrank their fellows, and enlarge their jurisdiction." *Expected*,—by whom? "It was natural." *Natural*,—to whom? To a Christian bishop who knew that his authority depended on his divine commission, was derived from God, and in no sense from the political or civil power, and who found in that power not a friend, but a bitter enemy and ruthless persecutor? Mr. Derby may think it would have been natural to him had he been in the place of those early bishops; but *Argumentum a genere ad*

genus non valet, say the logicians. Between a railroad financier and an early bishop of Rome there is a disparity which vitiates all reasoning from the one to the other.

"Six centuries, however, expired before they acquired any positive ascendency." That is, the bishops of Rome had no positive ascendency in the church till nearly three hundred years after Rome had ceased to be the residence of the emperors and the seat of empire, and till a century and over after the barbarians had overthrown the empire of the West and seated themselves on its ruins. Six centuries bring us to the opening of the seventh century, when the city of Rome had lost all her political importance, and yet her bishops owed their ascendency in the church to the political supremacy of their see! Decidedly, our illustrious jurist has a rare genius for the philosophy of history.

"Bishops were placed over hundreds of churches in Europe, Asia, and Africa." No doubt of it. But who placed them over those churches, confirmed them in their sees, and defined their jurisdiction? "Exercised the power of the apostles." In communion with the bishop of Rome their head, certainly; without him? That is the point for Mr. Derby to prove, which he has not yet done. "Met in council." By the authority or consent of the bishop of Rome, agreed; without that authority or consent, denied; for a meeting of bishops without the consent of the apostolic see, is no more a council, than with us a political caucus is a legislature. "By discussion and by concurrent votes regulated the faith and directed the worship of the Catholic Church." We do not know precisely what the jurist means by *regulating* faith and *directing* worship; but if he means defining the faith and regulating the worship, we accept the statement. They did so, and do so still; but without the assent and approbation of the bishop of Rome, were their definitions and canons binding on the faithful? This is the point Mr. Derby must prove in order to prove any thing to his purpose, and this he does not even attempt to prove, while we could easily, if it accorded with our present purpose, prove the contrary. There is no council without the apostolic power, and there is, since the death of the apostles, no apostolic power, but in the apostolic see, for bishops in their own right have no authority out of their own sees. At least such is the present constitution of the Catholic Church, and if Mr. Derby asserts that it was different in the early ages, it is for him to prove it. Thus far, we may say, the learned jurist either

proves nothing at all, or nothing to his purpose, and we are forced to conclude that, lawyer as he is, he is not aware that an allegation counts for nothing till it is substantiated by evidence, and evidence pertinent to the case. We hope he manages better in court than he does in his letters. If not, we pity his clients.

"The first authority on whom the Romish church places any reliance is Irenæus, who lived about the year 170, and was a friend of Polycarp, the disciple of St. John. He wrote a treatise against the Gnostics, who claimed to know certain *mysteries* which the apostles disclosed only to the perfect. In arguing against these heretics in his essay (L. 3, c. 3.), he says, if the apostles had known any such mysteries, they would have intrusted them to those to whom they intrusted the apostolic churches they founded, and to confute the Gnostics cites the doctrines and faith derived from the apostles by a succession of bishops in the great, most ancient, and universally known church, founded at Rome by the glorious apostles Peter and Paul, in which the faithful around it have always preserved the apostolic doctrine, and adds, that not only Polycarp taught by the apostles, and by them constituted bishop of Smyrna, but also the church of Ephesus, founded by Paul, but in which John remained until the time of Trajan, are *true witnesses* of the faith transmitted by the apostles.

"Irenæus gives to the church of Rome the prominence she deserves from her position, size, importance, and founders, but brings in also the churches of Smyrna and Ephesus, as alike true witnesses against the heretics he is confuting, thus placing them on the same footing."—p. 16.

St. Irenæus is not our earliest witness after the Holy Scriptures. St. Ignatius, bishop of Antioch, on his way to martyrdom, in 107, addressed a letter to the Roman church, in which he styles it the church which *presides*, that is, the governing or ruling church. The learned jurist, by *not* going to the fountain-heads, as he would have us believe he has done, has been deceived as to the testimony of St. Irenæus, for we cannot suppose that he would wilfully misrepresent it. St. Irenæus does not place the churches of Ephesus and Smyrna,—the two pet churches of our author, —on the same footing with the church of Rome. He is arguing against the Gnostics, and other heretics of his time, from the tradition of the church. He says all who wish to see the truth, may see in the entire church throughout the world the apostolic tradition. But there is no need of consulting all the churches to collect it; it suffices to confound all heretics to appeal to the greatest of the apostolic churches, the church of Rome, founded by Peter and Paul, because "with that church, on account of the prim-

acy,—*propter potiorem principalitatem*, every church, that is, all the faithful everywhere must agree."* This is the testimony of St. Irenæus, the holy bishop of Lyons, who suffered martyrdom in 202, and who had known St. Polycarp, the disciple of St. John, and the attempt to weaken its force by applying the pre-eminence he asserts for the *church* of Rome to the *city* of Rome, then a pagan city, hostile to the Gospel, and without consideration in the kingdom of Christ, is too obviously absurd to require refutation.

The next witness whose testimony Mr. Derby seeks to explain away is Tertullian.

"Tertullian, one century afterwards, in his essay against Marcion, refers his opponent to his standard authorities against him, saying, 'Run over the apostolic churches in which the apostles' chairs are still continued, in which their authentic letters are recited, sounding out the voice and representing the face of each one of them. In Achaia, nearest to you, you have Corinth. If you be not far from Macedonia, you have the Philippians and Thessalonians. If you can go to Asia, you have Ephesus. If you border on Italy, you have Rome, whence we also (namely, the Africans) can have authority.'

"Thus the ancient fathers taught the people to reform their doctrine, not only by the church of Rome, but also by other notable apostolic churches."—pp. 16, 17.

The learned jurist again proves the vanity of his assertion that he has gone to "the fountainheads." The work from which the passage he cites is taken is not from Tertullian's "Essay against Marcion," but his admirable work entitled *De Præscriptionibus adversus Hæreticos*, a work our author would do well to read and digest. Tertullian uses against heretics the argument from prescription. He confounds them by showing that Catholics were in possession before them, and had been in possession from the beginning. Heretics are new comers, and can show no titles. They have no ancestry, and cannot make out their descent from the apostles or from apostolic churches, and therefore are not to be listened to. Consult any of these churches nearest at hand and it will condemn you. His purpose was not to assert the equality of other churches with the church of Rome, or to deny the church of Rome to be the mother and

*Ad hanc enim ecclesiam propter potiorem principalitatem necesse est omnem convenire ecclesiam, hoc est, eos qui sunt undique fideles, in qua semper ab his, qui sunt undique, conservata est ea quæ est ab apostolis traditio. S. Iren. *Contra Hæres.* Lib. III., c. 3.

mistress of all the churches, but to direct the heretic to the apostolic tradition preserved by the churches founded by apostles, and in the one that happens to be nearest him, as sufficient to confound him. We infer this from the fact that he actually asserts the supremacy of Rome. "Latuit aliquid Petrum," he asks, "ædificandæ Ecclesiæ Petram dictum (Matt. xvi. 18, 19), claves regni cælorum consecutum et solvendi et alligandi in cœlis, et in terris potestatem?"*

"The ancient fathers taught the people to reform their doctrine not only by the church of Rome, but also by other notable apostolic churches." The statement would have been more conformable to what he proves, if Mr. Derby had said that St. Irenæus and Tertullian confound heretics by appealing to tradition as preserved in any of the churches founded by apostles, and especially the church of Rome. This is all that he can pretend to have proved, and this is nothing to his purpose, or against the claims or the faith of the Catholic Church at the present time. None of the "notable" apostolic churches, when St. Irenæus and Tertullian wrote, had fallen from the faith or ceased to be in communion with Rome. The apostolic tradition was still living, fresh and vigorous, and the same in them all, as it is even now in all the churches, by whomsoever founded, in communion with the apostolic see. What was to confound the heretic was the doctrine delivered by the apostles and deposited with the churches they founded, and that in the time of Tertullian, was sufficient, as found in any of them, for that purpose.

"Again, the blessed martyr, Cyprian, bishop of Carthage, under the emperor Decius, A. D. 249, in his treatise of 'Cyprianus de simplicitate Prælatorum,' says, 'All the apostles were of *like* power among themselves, and the rest were the *same* that *Peter* was' and adds, 'there is but *one bishopric* and a piece thereof is holden by each particular bishop.' What paramount power does this saint of the church accord to the church of Rome?"—p. 17.

St. Cyprian did not suffer martyrdom in the Decian persecution of 249. His martyrdom did not take place till 258. The work of St. Cyprian, from which the first passage is cited, or something like it, is his excellent tract *de Unitate Ecclesiæ*, rarely called *de Simplicitate Prælatorum*. It is mutilated and, as given, entirely perverts the meaning

De Praescript. cxxii.

of the author. It is found near the conclusion of a passage in which St. Cyprian asserts in the most clear and explicit manner the primacy of Peter and his chair. "Et quamvis," he says, "apostolis omnibus post resurrectionem suam parem potestatem tribuat et dicat; *sicut misit me pater, et ego mitto vos; Accipite Spiritum sanctum: si cujus remiseritis peccata, remittentur illi; si cujus tenueritis, tenebuntur:* tamen, ut unitatem manifestaret, unam cathedram constituit, unitatis ejusdem originem, ab uno incipientem, sua auctoritate disposuit. Hoc erant utique et cæteri apostoli quod fuit Petrus, pari consortio prædíti et honoris et potestatis, sed exordium ab unitate profisciscitur, et primatus Petro datur, ut una Christi ecclesia et una cathedra monstretur." The equality of the apostles with one another, and their equal participation in honor and power with Peter, must therefore be understood so as not to exclude the primacy given to Peter, which is the origin of unity, the centre whence the unity of the church starts, and is manifested. We must reconcile the equality asserted with the primacy, not the primacy with the equality, because the primacy is what the saint is establishing as the origin, the beginning, the centre of unity. This can easily be done. All the apostles were equal as bishops, all were equal as apostles, equally endowed with both the episcopal and apostolic honor and power, but not therefore did they share equally the honor and power of the primacy. That was given, as the saint had just asserted and proved, to Peter alone. The rest of the apostles were equal in apostolic dignity and power to Peter, for they were apostles as well as Peter, and they received their apostolate not from Peter, but immediately from Jesus Christ himself. In this way we must understand St. Cyprian, unless we would make him contradict himself, or make him deny the primacy of Peter, which he asserts, and asserts as something which exists, notwithstanding (*quamvis*) the other apostles were in a certain sense equals, and what Peter was.

Our readers may see in this citation from St. Cyprian, by Mr. Derby, a fair specimen of the way in which Anglicans and other Protestants usually deal with the fathers. The words taken alone sustain them, taken as they stand in the father with their context they contradict them. It is from some of these controversialists, no doubt, that Mr. Derby has obtained the citation, for we will not do him the injustice to believe that he himself is capable of making so dis-

honest a quotation, or that if he had himself read and understood St. Cyprian, he could have tried to persuade his son that this great saint does not recognize the primacy of Peter and the supremacy of the See of Rome.

But St. Cyprian, Mr. Derby tells us, adds, "there is but one bishopric, and a piece thereof is held by particular bishops." The passage to which he probably refers is, "Episcopatus unus est, cujus a singulis in solidum pars tenetur," which we translate, The episcopate is one, and a part thereof is held by individuals *in solido*. That is, the saint asserts the unity of the episcopate, and the solidarity of bishops, which follows necessarily from his doctrine of the unity of the church beginning from the primacy of Peter. *In solido* or *in solidum*, Mr. Derby hardly need be informed, is a law phrase that designates those obligations in which all are bound for each, and each for each and for all. It is from this phrase that is derived, through the French, the term *solidarity*, used so frequently by Kossuth in his speeches, and which, we believe, we were ourselves the first to give in an English dress, and to use as an English word. The passage, as given by Mr. Derby, makes nonsense, or at least no sense to his purpose. If there is but one bishopric, there can be but one bishop; and if those he calls particular bishops hold each only a piece of it, then each particular bishop is only the piece of a bishop, and we run the risk of having no integral bishop at all. Did the learned jurist stop to ask what was the real meaning of the passage he lends to St. Cyprian? But in any case, what has the assertion that "there is only one bishopric and a piece thereof is held by particular bishops," to do with the author's doctrine of the equality and independence of bishops against the primacy of Peter, or of Peter's see?

It is not our present purpose to prove the claims or the faith of the church of Rome against Mr. Derby; we cannot do him that honor. We are only dissecting his reasons for rejecting them; otherwise we would bring from St. Cyprian alone ample testimony to prove that this saint accepted them both. Mr. Derby's allusion to St. Cyprian has set us to studying the writings of that great saint and martyr more attentively than we had before done, and we have been surprised at the barefaced impudence of Protestants, even knowing them as well as we do, in pretending to find in him a witness against the papacy. He is as decidedly papal in his doctrine as Ballarmine, and as for his

practice, we know not enough of if to say that it was not Catholic. On the question of baptism by heretics it is evident he erred, if the Letters on that subject ascribed to him, are genuine; of which, however, St. Augustine doubted, and we too may be permitted to doubt. The Donatists had an interest in ascribing them to him, and we have no reason to suppose them incapable of doing so falsely. But we must return to Mr. Derby.

"The blessed Jerome, Hieronymus, born A. D. 331, in his 'Litera ad Evagrium,' speaking of the usage and order of the church of Rome, says, 'Why allegest thou to me the usage of one city?' Again, he says, 'not only the bishops of one city, (that is, Rome,) but the bishops of all the world err.' Surely, then, the bishop of Rome had no *infinite* or *universal* power. The church was then governed by councils, and heretics were put down by general councils, and heretics were then numerous. St. Augustine enumerates more than eighty varieties, and at one time the *Arians*, favored by an emperor, were supposed to be in the ascendant. The first *general council* was called by Constantine, the emperor, at Nice. Three hundred and eighteen bishops attended to put down the Arian heresy. It is intimated both by St. Jerome and St. Augustine that Liberius, bishop or pope of Rome, took part with the Arians. St. Jerome states this in his treatise, and Cardinal Casanus, a Romish writer, in the first half of the fifteenth century, a favored friend of Pope Eugenius IV., and legate under several pontiffs, represents St. Augustine to have said that 'Pope Liberius gave his hand and consent to the Arians.' But the great Council of Nice put down the Arians, and with them condemned virtually Liberius, the heretic pope, and the other bishops who favored them. An eminent Roman Catholic writer is here our authority. When councils thus condemn the Roman bishop, or pope, where was his infallibility, and how was it manifested to the world? Further, by the sixth canon of the first Council of Nice, the whole of Christendom was divided into four patriarchships, whereof the first was Rome, the second Alexandria, the third Antioch, the fourth Jerusalem; each was limited, and Rome was confined to Italy and the West. Neither had power over the other, and down to a much later period, the *idea* of a *universal* Bishop was scouted by the bishops of Rome as well as others. Gregory I., a bishop of Rome, and a saint of the Romish Church, says, 'He is antichrist that shall claim to be called universal bishop, or chief of the priests.' The emperor Gratian did the same, and allowed the Bishop of Rome to be called no more than bishop of the first seat."—pp. 17–19.

What in the world is one to say to this string of assertions without proof, without principle, and bearing upon no point but a foregone conclusion? We really can-

not follow Mr. Derby in all his pretended authorities. He evidently knows nothing of the fathers but what he has picked up from the hasty perusal of some anti-Catholic writers, and in no instance in which we have attempted to verify his quotations have we found them trustworthy. We have either not been able to verify them at all or have found them unfair, dishonest, and mere perversions of the real sense of the father quoted. What are we to think of a writer who has the audacity to cite St. Jerome, himself the secretary of a pope, and cardinal of the Holy Catholic Apostolic Church, against the primacy of St. Peter, which he asserts in the most positive terms? Suppose that St. Jerome did assert that the bishop of Rome had erred, what then? Who claims infallibility for the pope as 'a private doctor, or as the bishop of the particular diocese of Rome?' What Catholics claim for the pope is infallibility, by virtue of the supernatural assistance of the Holy Ghost, in deciding questions of faith and morals for the whole church. When you cite a passage from St. Jerome asserting that the pope has erred in some such question, we will then consider it, and give you an answer.

"Surely then the bishop of Rome had no *infinite* or *universal* power." Whoever said he had? Pray, do not call refuting your own ignorance or misrepresentation refuting us. The pope is not God, and only God has or can have infinite or universal power. We should suppose even Protestants could understand that. If they can, why not we? "The church was then governed by councils, and heretics were put down by general councils, and heretics were then numerous." Indeed? So they are now, and so they were before, and so, we presume, they will be to the end of the world. What do you conclude from all that? Pray how was the church governed before the first council, which according to you was that of Nice, and which, if we recollect aright, was not celebrated till the early part of the fourth century?

"The Arians, favored by an emperor, were supposed to be in the ascendant." *Were supposed*, by whom? Were in *the ascendant*, in the state or the church? If in the state, it is nothing to the purpose, for paganism up to the time of Constantine had been in the ascendency in the state, and was so even after him, and favored, too, by an emperor, Julian the Apostate; if you mean in the church, we deny it; for the Arians were condemned as heretics by

the Council of Nice, and by their refusal to subscribe the Nicene creed were excluded from the church, and therefore could not be in the ascendant in it. It was not the church, but the empire, that, St. Jerome says, was astonished to find itself Arian.

Liberius did not take part with the Arians, but resisted them, and condemned the bishops who, at Rimini, so far yielded to threats and persecutions as to subscribe a Semi-arian formula. He was accused, not in his lifetime, by the Arians, of having also yielded, but his whole conduct after his return from exile, as well as the joy of the Roman people who were devoted to the Nicene creed, refutes the calumny. He was sent into exile because he would not commune with Arian bishops, and because he firmly and perseveringly refused his assent to the condemnation of St. Athanasius. Both before and after his exile he was firm in his orthodoxy, and most decided against the Arians, proving as clearly and as conclusively as man can prove any thing that he had no Arian tendencies or sympathies. It has been, indeed, thought by some Catholics, like Baronius, Bossuet, Cardinal Cusanus, and others, that worn out by the fatigues of his exile, and overcome by violence, he so far yielded as to subscribe a formula orthodox on its face but susceptible of an Arian interpretation; yet of this there is no evidence but an accusation first made, nobody knows by whom, long after his death. The charge rested on authorities now proved to have been forged, and after a passably thorough investigation of the question, we are satisfied for ourselves that the charge is simply an Arian fabrication.

The Council of Nice did not divide the world into four great patriarchates, it was so divided before the celebration of that council. It only regulated and defined the powers of the patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem; "The patriarchate of Rome was confined to Italy and the West," if you please; but what if it was? The diocese of Rome was confined to the city of Rome. But the question is not of the powers of the bishop of Rome as bishop, or as patriarch, but as pope. The council did not attempt to take away the primacy, to give it to another, or to restrict it, and it could not confer it, for that had already been done by our Lord himself. As patriarch, he was not superior to the patriarchs of the East, but as pope, or primate of the whole church, he was their superior, and could and did en-

tertain appeals from them, could and did judge them, as we may see in the case of St. Athanasius, Patriarch of Alexandria, judged, but acquitted by Liberius. "Neither had power over the other." As patriarchs—granted; but the pope had power to judge the patriarchs of the East, or else the lawyers of those times were far inferior even to ours.

St. Gregory I., as his immediate predecessor, Pelagius II., scouted, if you will, the title of "universal bishop," which the author's friends, the patriarchs of Constantinople, began to give themselves, and it is certainly true, that no bishop of Rome, down to that time, had ever assumed or borne it; but it is equally true, that no one has ever assumed or borne it since. The pope is not universal bishop, or bishop of bishops; he is simply bishop of Rome. To call him universal bishop would be to assume that there is only one diocese, and only one bishop in the whole Catholic world, the doctrine Mr. Derby makes St. Cyprian teach in opposition to the papacy. It would deny the other bishops to be bishops, and make them simply the vicars of the bishop of Rome, which is not and never has been the doctrine of the Catholic Church, or the pretension of the sovereign pontiff. "The idea of a universal bishop was scouted by the bishops of Rome, as well as by others." Certainly, and even more so; we have never found an instance in which a pope has entertained it.

Mr. Derby cites St. John to prove that "the number of the beast is 666," and St. Irenæus to prove that "the name of Antichrist is expressed by a number *Λατεινος*, equivalent to Latinus. The Greek letters indicate 666." Well, what then? Is Latinus the name of the pope? or are we to assume that he is Antichrist, because he speaks or writes Latin? Pastorini finds the number 666 in Luterus, the Latinized name of Luther, originally Luder, from the same root as our word *lewd;* shall we therefore conclude that Luther was Antichrist, *in propria persona?* It is time to have done with this nonsense.

"Early in the seventh century, John, bishop of Constantinople, claimed from the emperor Maurice, the title of 'universal bishop,' and Gregory objected. Soon after Maurice, with his family, was murdered by the centurian Phocas, who was raised by the soldiery to the imperial throne. At the instance of Boniface II., bishop of Rome, a successor of Gregory, the usurper Phocas conferred this 'ungodly name,' as it was termed by Gregory, on Boniface. Building on this frail title, derived

not from St. Peter, but from the *felon* and *usurper* Phocas, the popes soon enlarged their power, so that in another century pope Boniface VIII. announced, 'that every creature must submit itself to the bishop of Rome, upon the pain of everlasting damnation.' So much for the origin and foundations of the papal power in the church of Rome. In another letter I shall point out its departure from the teachings of our Saviour." —pp. 19, 20.

We know not on what authority the learned jurist puts forth this precious piece of scandal, but so far as it affects the popes it is wholly unfounded. Phocas could not have conferred the "ungodly name" at the instance of Boniface II. for that pope died in 532, and Phocas was not elected emperor till seventy years afterwards. Mr. Derby means Boniface III. It is said that he obtained from Phocas a decree conferring on the bishop of Rome the title in question, but on no adequate authority. Such a title had been offered to Leo Magnus, who rejected it, as St. Gregory relates, and all we can find is that Boniface III. obtained from Phocas a decree recognizing the see of Peter as the head of all the churches. Anastasius, the Librarian, in his Life of Boniface III., says: "Hic obtinuit apud Phocam principem, ut sedes apostolica beati Petri Apostoli caput esset omnium ecclesiarum, id est, ecclesia Romana, quia ecclesia Constantinopolitana primam se omnium ecclesiarum scribebat." Paulus Diaconus says the same. There was nothing objectionable in this. The patriarchs of Constantinople, John and Cyriacus, arrogated to themselves the title of "Œcumenical Bishop or Patriarch," to the great scandal of the church, with the sanction or connivance of the Emperor Maurice; and neither Pelagius nor Gregory was able to induce Maurice to recognize its injustice. Boniface, whom Gregory had sent as his nuncio and commended to Phocas, obtained, on becoming pope, from that emperor, a decree, not conferring a title which his predecessors had rejected and no pope assumes or bears, but *recognizing*, against the pretensions of the patriarchs of Constantinople, the Roman Church as *caput omnium ecclesiarum*, or head of all the churches, as had been always asserted, and especially by Pelagius II. and St. Gregory I. It was simply a legal recognition of the fact of the supremacy, in ecclesiastical causes, of the see of Peter, not an act conferring that supremacy. Phocas appears to have been a bad man, and a bad emperor, but he was emperor *de facto*, and all he did was to confirm a previous edict of Justinian to the same effect, or to confirm

what was already the law of the empire, and necessary to enable the pope to take cognizance of the causes which by the canons of the church were reserved to the papal chair. To pretend that the bishops of Rome built upon that edict of a bad emperor the whole fabric of their power is to betray great want of honesty or of knowledge of history, for the claims of the popes, whether well or ill founded, had been put forth as distinctly as they are now, and admitted and acted on centuries before Phocas became emperor.

But it is time to pass to the author's *fourth* Letter, in which he attempts to set up a theory of his own, safer and solider than that of Rome.

"I propose now to consider the '*means*' which Christ provided for the guidance of his church in after ages, which 'have not fallen short' of the object, or failed, when properly used, to preserve the church from error. Those means were the four Gospels, the authentic record of Christ's mission, faith, and precepts, and the Acts and Epistles of his chosen disciples, confided to the bishops of the apostolic churches. These bishops met in council from time to time, to put down heresy by the authority of Holy Writ, when individuals yielded to error. This was a safe and reliable system, and the same standards, the Gospels, Epistles, and Acts, are transmitted to us."—p. 22.

Here is a new serving up of the old dish of Protestant cant and nonsense, so often brought upon the table as to be nauseating to the strongest stomachs. But does the author really believe what he says? or does he simply bring it forward, because he must bring forward something, and he knows not what else to bring? "These bishops met in council from time to time and put down heresy by authority of Holy Writ." Who authorized them to do so? who convokes the council, presides over its deliberations, confirms and promulgates its acts? Is every assembly of bishops a council? If not, how distinguish the assembly that is a council from one that is not? Why has one assembly of bishops at Ephesus been called an œcumenical council, and another, a *Latrocinium*, or den of thieves? What constitutes the assembly a council, and renders its acts legal and binding?

Then how does the council put down heresy by the authority of Holy Writ? By simply asserting the authority of Holy Writ, or defining and applying that authority to the question before it? Does it put its own construction on Holy Writ, and condemn that put upon it by heretics? or

does it recognize the right of every one to construe the Scriptures for himself, in his own way? If Mr. Derby says the former, he rejects his Protestantism; if the latter, he makes the action of the council a farce, for all heretics recognize, or profess to recognize, the authority of Holy Writ as they understand it, as General Jackson said of the constitution. The dispute is as to what Holy Writ really teaches on a given question. Mr. Derby may, though it is hardly supposable, believe that Holy Writ authorizes his Protestantism. We believe with all our soul that it does no such thing, but condemns it. Which of us is the heretic? Suppose a council of bishops is called to settle the question. It meets; is organized, and ready for action. The question comes before it, is argued *pro* and *con*, each bishop gives his opinion or does not give it, the president collects the suffrages, and with solemn gravity declares as the decision of the council that Mr. Derby and Mr. Brownson must submit to the authority of Holy Writ, and if either will not, let him be anathema. Who sees not that this decision would touch no matter in dispute? Mr. Derby is a lawyer, he calls himself a jurist; what, then, would he think, were he to bring or defend an action in a court of law, if the court should, after hearing the evidence and the arguments on both sides, gravely deliver its opinion that the case is determined by the law, and judgment must be rendered against the party that has not the authority of law on his side, without defining the law or applying it to the case, and leaving both parties free, each to construe the law for himself?

The council must, therefore, define the sense of Holy Writ, and apply it to the case before it; that is, it must define and declare what it is, on the point raised, the Scriptures really teach, otherwise it can do nothing to put down heresy. But in defining, declaring, and applying the sense of Holy Writ, is the council fallible or infallible? Mr. Derby, as a Protestant, cannot admit the infallibility of councils, for that would be to admit an infallible church. He must, then, hold that the council is fallible. Then it may err, and condemn the truth, the orthodox faith, while professing to condemn heresy. How, then, can he pretend that the system he alleges Christ has provided is a "safe and reliable system?"

Let us take a case in point. The assembly of bishops, called by Protestant writers, the second Council of Ephesus,

sustained Eutyches and the Monophysite theory; the Council of Chalcedon, two years after, condemned Eutyches, and anathematized his doctrine as a heresy. Here "these bishops" decided both ways on the same question. Ephesus says Eutyches is right, pronounces his doctrine orthodox, and falls upon St. Flavian and beats him nearly to death; Chalcedon says Eutyches is wrong, judges his doctrine a damnable heresy, and drives out Dioscorus and his faction who sustained it. Now, dear Derby, which side will you take? Which is the orthodox doctrine? Here is a difficult question for you, who maintain that all bishops have apostolic authority, and deny that one has it more than another. To us the question presents no difficulty; for we recognize an apostolic authority present in the acts of Chalcedon, which was wanting in those of Ephesus. You had the episcopal authority at Ephesus as fully as you had at Chalcedon, and at Chalcedon as fully as you had at Ephesus, and if, as you allege, the episcopal authority is the highest authority Christ has instituted, you have and can have no reason for following one of those assemblies of bishops in preference to the other. Before them you must be in the predicament of the famous scholastic ass between two equal bundles of hay. Your system, then, with your leave, is impracticable, and neither safe nor "reliable." But we hold that our Lord founded his church on the apostles, not simply on the bishops, and that he continues in Peter, through his successors, the apostolic power in the see of Rome. Hence, we call that see the apostolic see, and the church in communion with it the apostolic church, not simply episcopal, after the manner of the Anglicans, who, having cast off the authority of the apostolic see, confess by the very name they give themselves that their church is not apostolic. There is a philosophy in names, Mr. Derby, which you would do well to study. The episcopal power, *minus* the apostolic, is not competent to define the faith or to establish canons for the government of the faithful. They are teachers and legislators only by virtue of their communion with the apostolic power in the successors of Peter. Hence, there is no council general, plenary, or provincial, without the pope. Now, we reject the acts of Ephesus, because they were not approved by the pope, and we accept those of Chalcedon, because they were so approved. St. Leo condemned the former, and approved the latter, with the exception of the twenty-eighth canon,

which we do not accept, and by approving, gave them the apostolic sanction and authority.

But there is even another difficulty for Mr. Derby's theory. The government of the church was not, during the first two centuries and a half, by the system of councils. The earliest council, after that held at Jerusalem by the apostles themselves, of which we have any record, was the first held at Carthage under St. Cyprian, about the middle of the third century, and the first general council was that of Nicæa in 325. Yet there were many heresies to be put down before either of these. Moreover, Mr. Derby is a Protestant of some sort, and must hold to the sufficiency of the Scriptures. Now, so far as we recollect, there is nothing at all in the Scriptures about governing by councils, and we do not recollect that they give any rules about convoking councils, or for determining their organization, their legitimacy, or the legality of their acts. How will Mr. Derby get over this difficulty?

Mr. Derby proceeds to cite various authorities, as he alleges, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and other fathers, to show that great importance in early times was attached to the Holy Scriptures. He might have spared himself all labor of this sort. These authorities are not to his purpose, for the church reverences and teaches her children to reverence the Holy Scriptures as the inspired word of God. Nay, more; she says to him, and to all like him, "Search the Scriptures, for they testify of *me*. You pretend that you have eternal life in them, and make a tremendous fuss about reading them. Do be so good as really to read them, believe them, and understand them, and you will believe me, for they speak of me, and bear witness for me that I am the spouse of Him who died to redeem the world." But let us hear this learned pundit, who really at times seems to forget for which side he is retained, or what will prove or disprove his case:

"But the *Romish Church* drives the people from these Scriptures, as something dangerous, and has dared to style them 'a *bare letter*, *uncertain*, *unprofitable*, *killing*, and *dead*.' How much more reliable was the *interpretation* of a *traitor*, a *profligate*, a *heretic*, the *tool* of an *usurper*, or the '*godless*' man, whom a *Roman Pontiff* designates as *antichrist* himself?

"The Romish Church has withdrawn the Holy Scriptures as far as possible from the people. Witness the late acts of the Pope, and the recent prosecutions in Tuscany and Piedmont, and refer to the history

of Europe for the last twelve centuries. Even while I write, the evening papers inform me that within the last thirty days the Romish Priests have *imprisoned* a whole *family* in Piedmont, for presuming to read the translated Scriptures, and even our national flag has been lately violated by the seizure of the Bibles in an American ship in Sicily."—pp. 25, 26.

The church, no doubt, forbids the indiscriminate reading of mutilated copies and dishonest versions of the Scriptures made from a corrupt text, like those circulated by the Bible societies, and condemns the cant and hypocrisy or superstition and idolatry of the Bible, which meet us at every step among Protestants; but she has never withdrawn, and does not withdraw the Scriptures from any who show a disposition to use without misusing them. It is the misuse of the Scriptures by Protestants that has led to the adoption of some restrictions on the reading of them by persons who certainly would not and could not profit by them. The imprisonment of a family in Tuscany for simply reading the Scriptures, reported by the newspapers, is not true, if, as we suppose, the allusion is to the Madiai family. The less Mr. Derby stirs that question the more discretion he will show. But why strain at a gnat and swallow a camel? How long is it since Catholic priests were hung, drawn, and quartered by Protestants for saying mass? Nay, let him look at the statutes of England to-day, he will find that the law forbids the exercise of the Catholic religion in the land of our ancestors, although the penalty of death for saying mass has been repealed. There is not a country in the world where the government professes to be Protestant in which our religion is free. With regard to the violation of the American flag, we suppose it is only a fair offset to the attempt of the Bible Society, or some of its agents, to violate, under its cover, the laws of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

"For the first two centuries before the decree of the usurper Phocas, the primitive and universal usage of the Catholic Church was the stated reading of the Scriptures in public worship." p. 26. Not only for the first two, but the first five, and is so still. The reading of the Scriptures always has been, and is a part of the public worship of the church in communion with the See of Rome.

"Origen says, Would to God, we would all do according as it is written, Search the Scriptures." p. 27. Therefore it is doubtful whether Peter had any thing to do with founding the church of Rome, and that church is false and cor-

rupt! This is the reasoning of a Boston jurist to his son. Really does the man know what he is talking about? Does Mr. Derby really believe that the Catholic Church objects to the very reasonable wish he ascribes to Origen? Why did not the learned jurist take the pains to learn what that church really teaches before undertaking to prove her corrupt, and imposing upon the ingenuousness, and perilling the soul of his son? Mr. Derby is not only free, but is in duty bound to search the Scriptures till he finds the church to which they were given, and of which they testify. So is every Protestant and every non-Catholic. The Scriptures testify of the church, and confirm the Catholic faith she teaches. To pretend that the church is opposed to the Scriptures or fears them, is sheer nonsense. Who has preserved the Scriptures? Who still labors to preserve them in their purity and integrity, and secure for them the reverence due to the word of God? Who but that very church which you would persuade your son, against fact and reason, withdraws them from the people, and treats them with contempt? If the Scriptures are against her, she must know it as well as the Massachusetts railroad financier, and if she knows them to be against her, why does she preserve them with such pious care, and teach all her children to reverence them as written by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost? The Holy Scriptures, about which Protestants talk so much and which they read so little, or which, if they read, it is not to find the truth contained in them, but support for their preconceived opinions, have been preserved by the church you revile, and you have them, or know them only through her. What base ingratitude and brazen-faced impudence to pretend that she is hostile to them, and treats them as worthless!

In his *fifth* Letter Mr. Derby proceeds to consider some of the doctrines and practices of the church which he alleges prove her a corrupt church. He must pardon us, but he appears alike ignorant of his own meaning and that of the authorities he cites. He complains that the cup is withheld from the laity, and that the people at private masses are excluded even from the bread, which last is news to us, as it will be to all Catholics. But why does he complain? He denies the Real Presence, denies Transubstantiation, and contends that in Holy Communion nothing is really given or received, but literal bread and wine, which might, for aught we can see, be served up to him by his

cook and butler at home as well as by the minister in the meeting-house. If he believed in the Real Presence he would not complain, for he would understand that, as the flesh and blood of our Lord are no longer separate, the whole sacrament is received entire under either species, and that they who receive under the species of bread alone receive all they would were they to receive the cup also. If after consecration the elements remain bread and wine, as before, there is simply no sacrament in the case, and Mr. Derby is making a great ado about nothing. If they are by the words of consecration transubstantiated into the body and blood of our Lord, no harm is done to the laity in withholding from them the cup, for they receive as much as the priest himself who receives under both species.

Suppose that in the early ages the cup was given to the laity, that the church has changed the original discipline on that point, what then? The church has therefore erred, or usurped powers not given her by our Lord? Before you can be entitled to that conclusion, you must first determine that no such power was given her, or that the discipline, which you say was the original, was intended by our Lord to be unalterable,—a thing you have by no means done as yet.

The author complains as if he really believed in the sacrament of the Altar; but it is no such thing. With an inconsistency, which is as inexcusable as it is laughable, after having complained of the great wrong done to the laity by withholding from them the cup, and excluding them, as he says, though falsely, at private masses from the bread, he proceeds to deny the sacrament, itself, by attempting to disprove Transubstantiation and the Real Presence. He has a long string of authorities, as he would persuade us, from the fathers, asserting that the bread and the wine remain unchanged, simple bread and wine after consecration as before, without perceiving that if no change takes place in the symbols there is simply no sacrament. These pretended authorities, as far as we have been able to verify them are, when not for us, invariably miscited or misapplied, so as completely to pervert the obvious sense of the father quoted. Some of them are nothing to his purpose, and those apparently most to his purpose we have been unable to find in the authors referred to. The dishonesty of these citations is all but incredible. Mr. Derby is personally a total stranger to the general sense and spirit of the fathers he

pretends to quote; he has neither read the fathers for himself nor, as a general thing, verified the passages he pretends to cite from them, and therefore we do not charge him so much with dishonesty as with a too easy confidence in the honesty and morality of the Anglican controversialists from whom he takes them at second or third hand, and unscrupulousness in telling his son that he has gone to the "fountain-heads," when the slightest perusal of his work proves that the nearest approach he has made to them is Hopkins, Barrow, and Jewell. We have seen what work he has made of St. Cyprian on the Primacy; perhaps then our readers may believe that he has the temerity to cite Theodoret, Origen, Tertullian, St. Cyprian, St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. Leo I., and St. Augustine to disprove Transubstantiation.

"St. Ambrose denies the doctrine in his treatise.

"Gelasius, bishop of Rome, A. D. 492, says, 'Neither the substance of the bread, nor the nature of the wine ceases to be'; conclusive evidence from Rome herself, and yet she rejects the testimony and authority of her *infallible* pontiff.

"Theodoret, bishop of Cyricus, in Syria, A. D. 420, uses this clear and strong language: 'After the consecration, the mystical signs do not cast off their own proper nature, for they remain still in their former *substance, nature,* and *kind.*'

"Origen confirms this view in his Commentaries on Matthew, c. 15.

"The eloquent and learned Tertullian, in his article, De Resurrectione, says: 'Christ is to be received in the cause of life; to be devoured by hearing; to be ruminated upon by the mind, and digested by faith.'

"Saint Cyprian (de Cœna Domini) says: 'Faith is for the soul the same that food is for the flesh.'

"Saint Cyril, bishop of Alexandria from A. D. 412 to A. D. 444, writes as follows: 'Dost thou say our sacrament is the *eating of a man,* and dost thou irreverently force the mind of the faithful into gross cogitations, and goest thou about with natural imaginations, to deal with those things that are to be received by only pure and perfect faith.'

"Leo, bishop of Rome, A. D. 440–461, says: 'About this body gather eagles, which fly with spiritual wings, the wings of faith.'

"To finish this point, let us consult Augustine that saint of the Romish calendar, a devout man and a clear witness, as *you* describe him. He tells us, 'What we see is bread; what the eyes present to us is the cup; but that which faith would teach is, that the bread is the body of Christ, and the cup his blood.' And again he says, 'Christ has lifted up his body into heaven, from which he shall come to judge the quick and the dead. There he is now sitting at the right hand of the Father. How then is the bread his body, and the cup, or what is in the cup, how is it his blood?' Again, 'We have no special regard to the bread, wine, or water, for they

are *creatures corruptible,* as well after consecration as they were before, but we direct our faith only unto the very body of Christ, not as being there really and fleshly present, but as sitting in heaven at the right of God the Father.'"—pp. 31, 32.

Turn now to the work of St. Ambrose cited, and what do we find? The denial of the doctrine of Transubstantiation? By no means; but such expressions as these: "Panis iste, panis est ante verba sacramentorum; ubi accesserit consecratio de pane fit caro Christi." "Quomodo potest qui panis est, esse corpus Christi? Consecratione." "Ergo, tibi ut respondeam, non erat corpus Christi ante consecrationem; sed post consecrationem, dico tibi quod jam corpus est Christi." Here is an express assertion of the very contrary of what Mr. Derby alleges,—as clear and as explicit a statement as can be made in language, that what was bread is by the words of consecration, not by the faith of the recipient, changed into the body of Christ.

The work from which the passage ascribed to Pope St. Gelasius is taken, is not the work of that illustrious pontiff, but of Gelasius Cyzicenus; and it is enough to say that the terms *natura ac substantia* are used by the writer not to express the essence of the thing, but, after the manner of the Greeks, to designate its natural sensible qualities or properties, which, as all Catholics hold, remain unchanged after consecration.

The passage cited from Theodoret is both miscited and misapplied. Theodoret does not use the words *nature* and *kind,* but *figura* et *forma.* Besides, his purpose is not to deny Transubstantiation, but to refute the argument his Eutychian opponent draws from it in favor of the Monophysite heresy. The passage referred to occurs in his second Dialogue, where he is reasoning against the Eutychians. The dialogue is between a Catholic, Orthodoxus, and a Eutychian, Eranistes. Eranistes asks of his opponent: Quomodo post sanctificationem symbola appellentur? Orthodoxus replies: Corpus Christi et sanguis Christi. Eranistes: Et credis te corpus Christi et sanguinem percipere? Orthodoxus: Ita credo. Eranistes: Sicut ergo symbola Dominici corporis et sanguinis, alia sunt ante sacerdotis invocationem, vero mutantur, et alia fiunt, ita Dominicum corpus post ascensionem in divinam substantiam mutatum est. Orthodoxus: Retibus quæ ipse texuisti captus es. Neque enim symbola mystica post sanctificationem recedunt a sua natura; manent enim in priore substantia et figura et forma, et

videri tangique possunt, sicut et prius: intelliguntur autem ea esse quæ facta sunt, et creduntur, et adorantur, ut quæ illa sunt quæ creduntur. Confer igitur imaginem cum archetypo, et videbis similitudinem. Oportet enim figuram similem esse veritati. Illud enim corpus habet priorem figuram et circumscriptionem, et semel dicam, corporis substantiam: immortale autem post resurrectionem, et immune a corruptione factum est, sedemque a dextris adeptum, et ab omni creatura adoratur, quia Domini naturæ corpus appellatur." The Eutychian argues from the fact of the conversion of the bread and wine into the very body and blood of Christ after the invocation of the priest, which both admitted, that the body of Christ after his ascension is converted into the divine substance; but the Catholic tells him the analogy from which he reasons is against him; for as the mystical symbols, though changed into the body and blood of Christ, do not lose their natural properties of bread and wine, but retain their proper figure and form, whatever is visible and palpable, and what is worshipped in them is not what is sensible, seen and touched, but those things which are understood and which faith teaches they are made, so the body of Christ after the resurrection, though made immortal and fortified against corruption, retains its prior form and circumscription, its natural properties of body, and is to be adored by every creature because it is called the Lord's body, or by virtue of the hypostatic union. The whole point in the Eutychian's argument and in the Catholic's retort would be lost if we supposed Theodoret denied the substantial conversion of the symbols into the body and blood of our Lord. Theodoret does not deny the conversion, but assumes it, and argues from it against his Eutychian opponent; what he denies is, that in the conversion there is any conversion of the natural properties, or sensible qualities of the bread and wine, and that we all deny. We are forced to this interpretation, unless we would make Theodoret contradict himself, for he expressly asserts the doctrine as we hold it, in his commentary on 1 Cor. xi., where he says, that not only the Eleven received the precious body of our Lord, but also the traitor Judas.

Mr. Derby refers to Origen, but he makes no quotation from his works. Origen is one of our witnesses, and a strong one in our favor. The words ascribed to Tertullian make nothing to the purpose, for the reception he asserts does not exclude the sacramental reception asserted by the

church. The same may be said of the passage alleged from St. Cyprian, "What food is to the body faith is to the soul." Who denies it? St. Cyril of Alexandria maintains the doctrine as we hold it. The passage alleged from him is not to Mr. Derby's purpose, for it is evident on its face, that what it condemns is what every Catholic condemns, the gross notion of the unbelieving Jews, that the eating of the flesh and drinking of the blood of our Lord is to be understood in a carnal, not a sacramental sense, as we eat flesh bought in the market. Dr. Kenrick cites, in his *Theologia Dogmatica*, St. Cyril as saying: Ne horreremus carnem et sanguinem apposita sacris altaribus, condescendens Deus nostris fragilitatibus, influit oblatis vim vitæ, *convertens ea in veritatem propriæ carnis*, ut corpus vitæ, quasi quoddam semen, inveniatur in nobis. The passage ascribed to St. Leo I. says nothing against Transubstantiation.

The first authority from St. Augustine is decidedly in our favor, and against Mr. Derby. The saint is instructing children in regard to the sacrament of the altar. "Hoc quod," he says, "videtis in altari Dei, etiam transacta nocte vidistis; sed quid esset, quid sibi vellet, quam magnæ rei sacramentum contineret, nondum audistis. Quod ergo videtis, panis est et calix; quod vobis etiam oculi vestri renuntiant: quod autem fides vestra postulat instruenda, panis est corpus Christi, et calix sanguis Christi." What you see, what your eyes announce to you, is the bread and the cup; what your faith needs to be instructed in, is, that the bread is the body of Christ, and the cup is the blood of Christ, precisely what Mr. Derby himself needs to be taught. The saint continues, "Breviter quidem hoc dictum est, quod fidei forte sufficiat; sed fides instructionem desiderat. Dicit enim propheta: *nisi credideritis, non intelligetis*. Potestis enim modo dicere mihi; præcepisti ut credamus, expone ut intelligamus. Potest enim in animo cujusquam cogitatio talis suboriri: Dominus noster Jesus Christus, novimus unde acceperit carnem; de virgine Maria. Infans lactatus est, nutritus est, crevit, ad juvenilem ætatem perductus est, a Judæis persecutionem passus est, ligno suspensus est, in ligno interfectus est, de ligno depositus est, sepultus est, tertia die resurrexit, quo die voluit, in cœlum ascendit, illuc levavit corpus suum; inde est venturus ut judicet vivos et mortuos; ibi est modo sedens ad dexteram Patris: Quomodo est panis corpus ejus? et calix, vel quod habet calix, quomodo est sanguis ejus?" Here are the questions Mr. Derby cites, and which he would have us

believe the saint regarded as unanswerable. But St. Augustine replies to these questions immediately; "Ista, fratres, ideo sacramenta, quia in eis aliud videtur, aliud intelligitur."*

The other passage ascribed to St. Augustine we have not found. Mr. Derby's reference, *In Genes. Hom.* 24, is to a work we do not find enumerated among those of St. Augustine. The passage, however, offers no difficulty, even supposing it to be St. Augustine's, and fairly given. In the sacrament, we of course pay no especial regard to the bread, the wine, or the water, for they are corruptible creatures after consecration as before, and what we adore is not their species, or what in the sacrament is visible, but we direct our attention from that which is seen to that which is understood, that is, we direct our faith only unto the very body and blood of Christ, not as really and fleshly present, not present with the real and natural properties of his body, as he walked the earth, but as he is in heaven, sitting at the right hand of his Father. We must understand the passage of the species of the bread and the wine, and of the presence of Christ in the sacrament with the natural, sensible properties or species of his body, or else we shall make St. Augustine contradict himself. What the author of the passage would warn us against is that the species, the sensible qualities of the symbols are the object of our attention or our adoration, and the gross conception that Christ is carnally present in the sacrament, and that his body and blood are there with their natural properties. Thus he says in treating the text, "The flesh profiteth nothing." O, Domine, magister bone, quomodo *caro non prodest quidquam*, cum tu dixeris, *Nisi quis manducaverit carnem meam, et biberit sanguinem meum, non habebit in se vitam?* An vita non prodest quidquam? et propter quid sumus quod sumus, nisi ut habeamus vitam æternam, quam tua carne promittis? quid est ergo, non prodest quidquam caro? Non prodest quidquam, *sed quomodo illi intellexerunt: carnem quippe sic intellexerunt, quomodo in cadavere dilaniatur, aut in macello venditur*, non quomodo spiritu vegetatur. Proinde sic dictum est. *Caro non prodest quidquam:* quomodo dictum est: *Scientia inflat.* Jam ergo debemus odisse scientiam? Absit. Et quid est, *Scientia inflat?* Sola, sine charitate: ideo adjunxit, *Charitas vero ædificat.* Adde ergo scientiæ charitatem, et utilis erit scientia; non per se, sed per charitatem. Sic etiam

Ad Infantes; de Sacramento. Serm. cclxxii.

nunc, *caro non prodest quidquam*, sed sola caro; accedat spiritus ad carnem, quomodo accedit charitas ad scientiam, et prodest plurimum. Nam si caro nihil prodesset, Verbum caro non fieret, ut inhabitaret in nobis. Si per carnem nobis multum profuit Christus, quomodo caro nihil prodest? Sed per carnem Spiritus aliquid pro salute nostra egit. Caro vas fuit; quod habebat attende, non quod erat.*

St. Augustine in the Sermon before cited and elsewhere teaches that the sacraments consist of two things, one visible, and present to the senses, the other invisible, not seen or touched, but understood. "In eis aliud videtur, aliud intelligitur." The visible part of the sacrament of the altar is the species of bread and wine; the invisible part, the noetic part, understood, not seen, is the body and blood of our Lord, yet not with the species, the natural, sensible properties of his body. "Quod videtur speciem habet corporalem, quod intelligitur, fructum habet spiritualem." The corporal St. Augustine restricts to the visible species, to what we call the sensible, and hence the presence of the body and blood of our Lord, as the invisible part of the sacrament, is not their corporal or sensible presence, but their intelligible or sacramental presence, which, as we understand it, is strictly the doctrine of the church.

Mr. Derby's difficulty, as well as that of many others, in understanding certain expressions of the fathers, grows out of their misunderstanding of the Catholic dogma, and their failure to appreciate the profound philosophy of the early Christian doctors. In the earliest ages, we know the mystery of the Blessed Eucharist was placed under the *disciplina arcani*, and was clearly and distinctly expounded only to the initiated, in order to save it from being profaned by the heathen; but enough is said in the earliest writers who touch the subject to satisfy any fair-minded reader, who knows the doctrine as it is taught by the church, that they held it as the church now holds it. But one who does not know the doctrine as really taught now, who conceives that we assert a sensible presence of the body and blood of our Lord in the sacrament, finds various expressions in the fathers which do really deny the dogma in that sense. But the church does not teach, and never has taught, that there is any conversion of the species or sensible properties or qualities of the bread and wine. These retain their original natural

**In Joan Tract.* xxvii., No. 5.

character unaffected by the words of consecration. The church has never taught, and does not teach, that our Lord is corporally present, that is, present with the natural, sensible qualities or properties of his body, or the body which he carried with him to heaven, and which is seated at the right hand of the Father. His body is present spiritually or intelligibly, not corporally, as St. Augustine would say, that is, sacramentally, not visibly, that is, again, present to the intellect, not to the senses. This distinction between the *visibilia* and *intelligibilia*, between the *νόηματα* and *αἰσθήματα*, in one and the same body, common to the great fathers of the church, belongs to a philosophy a little too profound for the modern non-Catholic mind, and it is unable to conceive it possible for a body to be intelligibly present and not also sensibly present. The reason of this is that modern non-Catholics place the whole body, its very substance or essence, in the sensible species, and do not admit an intelligible substance distinguishable from the sensible. When they hear us affirm the Real Presence of the body and blood of our Lord in the sacrament, they immediately understand us to assert a sensible presence. Therefore when they find a father or doctor of the church denying the sensible presence, they conclude at once that he denies the real substantial or essential presence, and is a witness against us. A profounder philosophy would teach these gentlemen that the essence or substance even of material things is immaterial, non-sensible, and to be ranked with the *intelligibilia*. Hence we may say with strict propriety of language that the very body and blood of our Lord are substantially present in the sacrament of the altar, and yet not sensibly or even materially present. The intelligible, not the sensible, body is present. So in the consecration of the bread and the wine there is a conversion of the substance, the essence, the *intelligibilia* of the bread and the wine, but no conversion, in the language of the schoolmen, of the species or accidents, that is, of what in the bread and wine is sensible. Hence we may, referring to the sensible qualities of the bread and wine, call them bread and wine even after consecration, and speak of them as "creatures corruptible." So also we may deny that Christ is corporally, that is, sensibly, present in the sacrament, and assert that in that sense he is in heaven only.

If this distinction were attended to, the alleged difficulties of the fathers would vanish at once, for the fathers always imply it, though they do not always express it. It would

also relieve many honest people of the trouble they find in conceiving it possible for the body of Christ to be in heaven and whole and entire on a thousand altars on earth at once. The intelligible is not subject to the laws of sensible space. The *Where* belongs to the sensible, not to the intelligible order, which is inextended. Nobody pretends that Christ's body is sensibly present in heaven and at the same time sensibly present on our altars. He is sensibly present in heaven, if you will, as Theodoret teaches, but simply intelligibly present in the sacrament of the Blessed Eucharist. Attention to this same distinction would help us to understand what the fathers say about the presence of the Lord's body by faith, and its reception by faith. Faith in this as in all the sacraments performs the office of sensible intuition. The substantial presence is not in the natural order, and can be intuitively apprehended neither by sense nor by intellect, and we intellectually apprehend that the body and blood of our Lord are substantially present only by faith. Faith alone presents them to the understanding, and by faith alone do we know that we receive them, and it is through faith as well as love that we receive, not the sacrament, but the fruit of the sacrament. Certainly the power of the sacrament is not derived from the virtue of the recipient, but it is necessary to its practical effect that we interpose no obstruction to the inflowing of its grace. The doctrine, however, that Mr. Derby's friends hold, that the body and blood of our Lord are received only by faith and the faithful, or that the communion of our Lord's body and blood is only a spiritual communion, finds no countenance either in the Scriptures or the fathers and doctors of the church. Passages enough may be cited to prove the necessity of faith to a good communion, enough to prove that the reception of the body and blood of our Lord is a spiritual or sacramental reception, as distinguished from the gross carnal reception understood by the unbelieving Jews, or the reception with their natural species or sensible properties; but these passages are in strict accordance with the Catholic faith, and teach only what the church teaches and always has taught.

From Transubstantiation the learned jurist passes to the consideration of purgatory:

"This brings me to another usurpation, the strange doctrine of purgatory. Until the Council of Trent, three centuries since, a Roman Catholic was not required to receive it as an article of faith, but the sale of masses, pardons, and indulgences, to raise funds for Rome, had been so

extensive that the Church of Rome was then compelled, under the pressure of the reformers, to endeavor to sustain itself by adopting purgatory as an article of faith.

"You rest purgatory on St. Peter's 1st Epistle, in substance as follows: 'That Christ died for our sins, but enlivened in the spirit, *preached to those spirits that were in prison.*' To my mind this verse is made clear by the verse which follows, in which 'spirits' are spoken of as disobedient in the time of Noah, in consequence of which only eight souls were saved. St. Peter speaks, also, in his second Epistle, of 'being in this tabernacle,' of 'putting off this tabernacle himself, as his Lord Jesus had shown him.' He speaks of those 'who walk after the flesh, in the lust of uncleanness, as servants of corruption, for of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage.' The exposition of the verses you cite, is, to my mind, perfectly easy. In the time of Noah, those spirits imprisoned in the flesh, were disobedient, and all perished, except the eight souls saved with Noah. But in the days of the apostles, our Saviour having put off the flesh, appeared in his spiritual nature to his disciples, who were spirits still in the prison of the flesh, and preached to them in their prison, and by his baptism, previously conferred, and his resurrection and ascent into heaven, where he has power over all, saved them as God saved Noah and his associates in the ark.

"This is my exposition as a jurist, and I expound the passage as I would a deed, by the context, and other deeds of the grantor."—pp. 33, 34.

The assertion that no Roman Catholic was obliged to believe the doctrine of purgatory prior to the Council of Trent is simply false, as is also that about the sale of masses, pardons, indulgences, &c. No such sale was ever authorized by the church, or could be effected without the grossest violation of her doctrine and discipline. If individuals without and against her doctrine and authority had done it, she would not be responsible, but there is not a particle of evidence that any one ever has done so. We make this statement with a full knowledge of the charge brought by Luther and his adherents against Tetzel; but that charge did not go to the extent of Mr. Derby's, and besides, it was never proved, and never at any time rested on any better authority than that of Luther himself, which is none at all. Indeed it is worse than none, for the fact that Dr. Martin Luther makes a charge is *prima facie* evidence that it is false. To any man who knows the Catholic doctrine of pardons and indulgences the charge is ridiculous and absurd. The learned jurist puts the cart before the horse, in supposing the doctrine of purgatory was adopted in order to justify the practice of granting indulgences. The practice pre-

supposes the doctrine and never could have obtained without it.

Mr. Derby says he gives his exposition of 1 Pet. iii. 18, 19, "as a jurist," and that he expounds it as he would a deed. If so, we shall beg to be excused, if we have a deed to be expounded, from employing him to expound it. We have known all along that he was a poor theologian, and we begin now to suspect that he is hardly a better jurist. In our Protestant days we understood the text as we do now, and the doctrine of purgatory always seemed to us, supposing the truth of Christianity, a very reasonable and necessary doctrine. If it comes to private interpretation we shall not yield to Mr. Derby, since for nearly twenty years we were a Protestant minister, and he even in the estimation of Protestants is only a layman.

Mr. Derby tells us (p. 34), that the Greek or Eastern church, meaning the schismatic or non-united Christians of the Greek rite, does not believe the doctrine of purgatory. This is about as true as his statement that that church is established in Austria. There are schismatists of the Greek rite in Austria, no doubt, and there may be Greek schismatists who do not believe the doctrine of purgatory; but we know the Greeks believed it in the fifteenth century and subscribed to the definition of it by the Council of Florence in the Act of Union. Difference on that subject has never been one of the causes of separation or one of the obstacles to re-union.

Mr. Derby tells us again (*ibid.*), "that Eastern and Western bishops differed principally, if not entirely, on the question of Easter day, when the two churches separated." Does he mean the principal, if not the entire difference between the East and the West, at the time of the separation, was on the question of Easter day? Or does he mean they differed at that time almost entirely on that question? Let him mean either, his statement is untrue, for whether he speaks of the earliest, of the latest, or an intermediate separation, there was no difference on the question as to the time of keeping Easter. Pope St. Victor, near the close of the second century, excommunicated certain Asiatic bishops, or at least threatened to do so, but the Eastern church was never at war with the Western on that question. There is even now no difference between the East and the West as to the time when Easter ought to be kept, there is only a difference as to the manner of computing the time. This

difference has been occasioned by the introduction, long since the last separation, into the West of the Gregorian Calendar or New Style, which the East has hitherto refused to adopt, preferring, as some one says, "rather to disagree with the stars than to agree with the pope." Mr. Derby does not seem to be better as a historian than he is as a logician, theologian, or jurist.

"You think," he says to his son (*ibid.*), "that purgatory has been admitted by the fathers. If so, when and where?" Is Mr. Derby really so ignorant of the subject on which he speaks with so much confidence, as actually to imagine that his demand cannot be answered? Were we proving the doctrines of the church we would bring forward authorities enough to the contrary of his assertion to make even him blush for his ignorance and recklessness.

"St. Augustine certainly knew of no such admission, and could not convince himself of its truth; he says, 'that such a thing may be after this life, is not incredible.' 'But what means this,' he adds, 'and what sins be there which so prevent men from coming into the kingdom of God that they may notwithstanding obtain pardon by the merits of holy friends, it is very hard to find, and very dangerous to determine. Certainly, I myself, notwithstanding great study and travail in that behalf, could never attain to the knowledge of it.' Again, he says, 'For such as every man in this day shall die, even such on that day shall he be judged.'

"And to this effect elsewhere."*—pp. 34, 35

Mr. Derby is unfortunate in his references. St. Augustine wrote no work entitled, *De Comitate Dei.* The work intended is, most likely, *De Civitate Dei*, but we do not find in that the alleged passages. *Epistolæ* 80, if it means *Epistola* 80, does not contain them. *Hom.* 11, *in Apocalyps*, refers to a work not by St. Augustine. So also does *Ad Petrum*, Cap. 3. *In Johan.* 49, contains nothing bearing on the question. The first two passages are the only ones of importance, and these we do not recollect in our reading of the works of the saint, and we are unable to find them by means of the very full index of the Benedictines. Something the saint may have said has most probably, by miscitation, misapplication, or mistranslation, or all these at once, been worked up into them, but that they express as they stand his doctrine on the subject is absolutely

* De comitate Dei, Epistolæ 80, Hom. 11, In apocalyps. Ad Petrum, Cap. 3, In Johan. Tract. 49.

impossible, for that St. Augustine held the doctrine of purgatory, and held it too as a tradition of the fathers, is undeniable. Mr. Derby's mistake, whether original with him or copied by him from some of his Protestant friends, has probably been occasioned by the fact that St. Augustine denies that *all* punishments after death are purgatorial, or that faith alone, prayers of the saints, and almsdeeds can avail those who have died in sin. This he may have understood, *more Anglicano*, to be the denial of purgatory; but the saint himself did not so understand it. After telling us that prayers for the devil and his angels, or for those who have died infidels and impious, will not be heard, he adds, "pro defunctis quibusdam, vel ipsius ecclesiæ, vel quorumdam piorum exauditur oratio; sed pro his, quorum in Christo regeneratorum, nec usque adeo vita in corpore male gesta est, ut tali misericordia judicentur digni non esse; nec usque adeo bene ut talem misericordiam reperiantur necessariam non habere. . . . . Neque enim quibusdam veraciter diceretur, quod non eis remittatur neque in hoc sæculo, neque in futuro, nisi essent quibus, etsi non in isto, tamen, remittetur in futuro."* This is sufficient to prove that St. Augustine held the doctrine of purgatory. But he says again, "Non sunt prætermittendæ supplicationes pro spiritibus mortuorum; quas faciendas pro omnibus in Christiana et Catholica societate defunctis etiam tacitis nominibus quorumcumque sub generali commemoratione suscepit ecclesia."† He says this in answer to those who thought it a damage to the dead not to have known sepulchres, on the ground that it might prevent prayers from being offered for the repose of their souls.

To the same effect, he says in another place,‡ "Proinde pompæ funeris, agmina exsequiarum, sumptuosa diligentia sepulturæ, monumentorum opulenta constructio, vivorum sunt qualiacumque solatia, non adjutoria mortuorum. Orationibus vero sanctæ ecclesiæ, et sacrificio salutari, et eleemosynis, quæ pro eorum spiritibus erogantur, non est dubitandum mortuos adjuvari; ut cum eis misericordius agatur a Domino, quam eorum peccata meruerunt. Hoc enim a patribus traditum universa observat ecclesia, ut pro eis qui in corporis et sanguinis Christi communione defuncti sunt, cum ad ipsum sacrificium loco suo commemo-

* *De Civitat. Dei*, Lib. xxi., cap. 24. † *De Cura pro Mortuis*, cap. iv.
‡ Serm. clxxii. *de Verbis Apostoli.*

rantur, oretur, ac pro illis quoque id offerri commemoretur. Cum vero eorum commendandorum causa opera misericordiæ celebrantur, quis eis dubitat suffragari pro quibus orationes Deo non inaniter allegantur? Non omnino ambigendum est ista prodesse defunctis, sed talibus qui ita vixerint ante mortem, ut possint eis hæc utilia esse post mortem."

What could Mr. Derby have known of the matter, when he represented St. Augustine as doubtful and unable to convince himself of the truth of the doctrine of purgatory? These extracts are decisive, and we could adduce several more equally express to our purpose. They prove that he held, without any doubt, that the souls of the dead, who have died, as we say, in a state of grace, are aided by the prayers of the church and those of the pious, by the sacrifice of the altar, that is, masses, and by almsdeeds, and surely this involves the whole doctrine of purgatory. Never was a more rash or a more unfounded assertion than that which Mr. Derby makes to his son, and no language of ours would be strong enough to describe his turpitude, if he had, as he falsely asserts, gone to the "fountainheads." He has, with an inexcusable weakness and credulity, relied on mere hearsay, and introduced what, if he knows any thing of the legal profession, he knows is neither competent nor credible evidence. It is the one standing complaint against him. His report of the fathers, as they say of railroad reports, has been "cooked," though we willingly acquit him of having been personally the cook.

Mr. Derby begins his sixth Letter by summing up what he professes to have proved in the fifth, of which, we have shown, he has proved nothing But assuming with admirable self-complacency that he has proved that our church has erred in withholding the cup from the laity, and in making purgatory an article of faith,—doctrines, he says, of which St. Augustine knew nothing, he proceeds to "consider the supremacy and infallibility claimed for the Pope." Very well; but what has Mr. Derby to say against them?

"The man who joins the Roman Catholic Church is obliged publicly to repeat and certify his assent to its creed without qualification or restriction." p. 31. Mr. Derby quotes as his authority Dr. Hopkins, Protestant *Episcopal* Bishop of Vermont. Is Dr. Hopkins one of "those early saints, fathers, and popes, revered by the church itself?" and one of those "authorities on which the church of Rome

relies?" Did you not tell us in your Introduction that you had not resorted to the "writings of the opponents" of that church? And yet did you not tell us that when you knew you had confined yourself all but exclusively to the writings of her opponents? What are we to think of a man so reckless in his assertions? Why, we fear we must think that he has in very deed been taking lessons in the school of the Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Vermont, that rare compound of pretension, arrogance, self-complacency, ignorance, vanity, and unscrupulousness as a scholar. We are loath to believe that even Mr. Derby, in his hatred of Catholicity, or rather in his devotion to "Respectability," or as Carlyle has it, "Gigmanity," could descend so low as to take lessons of Dr. Hopkins.

But "the man who joins the Roman Catholic Church is obliged publicly to repeat and certify his assent to its creed, without qualification and restriction." Well, what if he is? Would you have a man join a church without a creed, or if the church he joins has a creed, join it without believing its creed—thus act a lie? Every man who joins a church that has a creed, by the very act of joining certifies his assent to its creed without qualification or restriction. When a man joins a church he either believes it is God's church with authority to teach what he is and what he is not to believe, or he does not. If he does not, what business has he to join it? Such a church is no church at all; it may be a voluntary association, a parliamentary or royal establishment, a conventicle of fanatics, or a synagogue of Satan, but church in the good sense of the word, it is not. If he believes it to be God's church, where is the hardship in his being required to certify his assent to whatever she teaches? For any Protestant church to require such a certification, would be intolerable, and yet the Presbyterian Church does it, and the Protestant Episcopal Church, we presume, would, if it had any creed, or any teaching faculty. But if the church really be the church of God, really be commissioned by him to teach, what impropriety is there in her demanding the unqualified and unreserved assent of the man who joins her to the creed she believes? We joined the Catholic Church because we had the highest reason possible in any case whatever to believe her God's church, authorized by him to teach us, and assisted by him to teach us the truth, and incapable of teaching us any thing but the truth. We could, therefore, with the greatest propriety

in the world certify our assent to all she teaches, nay, swear to believe it without qualification or restriction. We believed her totally different in origin, nature, character, and powers, from any and all of your Protestant establishments, sects, or conventicles, or we should never have joined her. Prove, if you can, that she is not God's church, but do not think to prove it by proving that she does things which would be improper, if she were a Protestant sect, but perfectly proper on the supposition that she is God's church.

"Pius V. by a bull issued under his plenary power undertook to depose Elizabeth and absolve her subjects." p. 37. What if he did? Did not the American congress in 1776, so far as respected the American colonies, do the same to George III.? If he did so, what can you say against him, if he had plenary power? Elizabeth professed to be a Catholic, ascended the English throne as a Catholic, was crowned and took her coronation oath as a Catholic, and the pope as the visible head of the Catholic church, of which she professed herself a member, and which she had solemnly sworn to protect, had the right to depose her for her perjury, her persecution of Catholics, and her murder of Mary Queen of Scots. Elizabeth was a perjurer, a murderer, a relentless persecutor of Catholics, and richly deserved deposition, and you must prove that the pope had no right to depose her, before you can conclude from his deposition of her, that the power claimed for the pope by the Transalpine party, as you term them, is odious, or not given him by Jesus Christ, who is King of kings, and Lord of lords.

Mr. Derby (p. 33) pretends to cite a Catholic writer who declares the authority of the pope to be greater than that of the Scriptures. This is malice without sense. No Catholic writer ever said any thing of the kind. The authority of the pope in defining the sense of the Scriptures is greater than yours or mine; but it is never greater than the authority of Scripture, when you once have it and know authoritatively that you have it.

But we must stop for the present number. We have dissected the jurist's statements thus far as thoroughly as they deserved. We shall continue to do so yet longer, but, we confess, the game is hardly worth the candle, and our stock of patience is beginning to run low. We wish we could find some man among our Protestant brethren, who would really make himself master of the subject, and dis-

cuss it with solid learning, manly thought, and fair argument, so that one could reply without feeling himself humiliated in his own eyes. How happens it that the discussion of the great question between Catholics and Protestants falls on the Protestant side into the hands of men of very moderate abilities and still more moderate attainments, men without solid learning, without ordinary fairness, without—we must say it—ordinary honesty, men whose whole strength lies in the recklessness of their statements, the audacity of their falsehoods, and the low pettifogging skill with which they can appeal to the passions and prejudices of the ignorant but conceited vulgar. We have not thus far found in Mr. Derby an honest quotation, a candid statement, a true assertion, or a respectable argument. Is it not lamentable to have to deal with such men, men whom with the best dispositions in the world you cannot treat as gentlemen, or as fair-minded and honorable opponents, and with whom it is impossible to maintain dignified and profitable controversy?

Yet it is works like the one before us, works which are but a tissue of falsification, falsehoods, and miserable sophistries, chicaneries from beginning to end, that perpetuate the anti-Catholic prejudices in the community, render the people ready to join the No-popery cry, and break out in open acts of violence, or to form in secret Know-Nothing lodges, conspiracies against peaceable and unoffending Catholics. It is degrading to one's manhood to find that men can be found base enough to write such books; it is mortifying to one's patriotism to know that there are masses of his countrymen capable of being influenced by them. What strange infatuation has come over the Protestant world that they are able to regard themselves as the enlightened portion of mankind! Their controversial literature is marked by the most deplorable ignorance, and yet it is popular. It bears falsehood and absurdity stamped on every page, and yet there are whole multitudes of Protestants who read and devour it as if it were all Gospel truth. Is it possible to reach these people, to make them see themselves as they are, to persuade them to get wisdom, and with all their getting to get understanding? With God it is possible, with men it is impossible. "Though thou shouldst bray a fool in a mortar, yet will not his folly depart from him." Yet we suffer not ourselves to despond. These people who can believe any thing but the truth are,

after all, not the whole non-Catholic world, and there are not a few in the Protestant ranks who are beginning to be disgusted with the sort of books we refer to. They doubt the honesty, the sincerity, as well as the learning and ability, of the writers against the church, and in the end distrust of the popular anti-Catholic literature will spread far and wide in the Protestant ranks.

Meanwhile, though they are not worth it, these books must be refuted, and their real character shown up. It is a fatiguing and a disgusting labor to do it, but possibly some good may come of it. One good result we have already obtained from it, that is, a clearer view of the Catholic character of the fathers than we before had. We knew before that the fathers were on our side, but we had no adequate conception before the examination Mr. Derby's book has led us to make of them, of the barefaced impudence and dishonesty of those writers who read them and undertake to press them into the service of Protestantism. The Catholicity as held by the church is not only in here and there a passage, but it pervades them, and is their very spirit and essence. Catholicity, as we understand it, is the life and soul of the great fathers and doctors, the atmosphere in which they lived, moved, and breathed. Talk of *Romish* corruptions and innovations, it is miserable cant and dishonesty. The fact is, they were more Catholic, if any thing, than we, and it is necessary for us to return often to them to refresh ourselves, and to find an antidote to the prevailing Protestantism of the age and country.

ARTICLE IV.

We have in fact dissected in our three articles already published, only a small portion of Mr. Derby's volume; but we have commented on nearly every point of much importance it raises. The bulk of the volume only repeats, with variations and further developments, the objections to Catholicity contained in the first five or six letters, and in continuing our review we can do little else than go over ground we have already travelled. Yet we suppose the learned jurist will pretend that we have failed to give his book the thorough dissection we promised, if we fail to repeat our refutation as often as he repeats his objection. We shall therefore continue our remarks, and we pray those of our friends who are disposed to blame us for expending so

much powder on an author comparatively so obscure, to bear in mind that in replying to him we are replying to the whole mass of popular objections to our religion urged by the "No Popery" ranters and declaimers of the day. We have said enough to show the futility of the author's attempt to disprove the primacy of Peter and his successors in the see of Rome. We will therefore pass to another of his objections.

"Let us now glance at some of the abuses which the usurper has sanctioned in his path to power. Let us consider the worship of the Virgin Mary, of saints, images, relics, and shrines.

"St. Paul, in Holy Writ, gives the assurance that 'Neither have we any other Mediator and Intercessor by whom we may have access to God the Father, but only Jesus Christ; in whose name only all things are obtained at his Father's hands.'

"But the Church of Rome worships the Virgin Mary, and allows such *adoration* to be offered to her as follows:—

"'Holy Mother of God, who hast worthily merited to conceive him whom the whole world could not comprehend, by thy *pious intervention*, wash away our sins, that so being *redeemed by thee* we may be able to ascend to the seat of everlasting glory, where thou abidest with thy son for ever.'*

"And again a similar worship and prayer:—

"'Let our voice *first* celebrate Mary, through whom the rewards of life are given unto us. O *queen*, thou who art a mother and yet a chaste virgin, *pardon* our sins through thy son.'† Even Cardinal Bembus, the Pope's secretary, in an official letter to Charles V., the great Emperor of Spain and Germany,‡ calls the virgin 'our lady and goddess.' And the seaman when he commenced his voyage, the palmer when he began his pilgrimage, and the knight when he went forth to fight the Saracen, were sent to pay their orisons at her shrine, and to bow before her image.

"Again the churches have been filled with her pictures and statues, and with images of saints. A patron saint has been found for nearly every Roman Catholic village, and saints have been recognized for various diseases, to whom sufferers are encouraged to address *prayers*, and to make votive offerings if relief be obtained. The images of the virgin, and saints with their shrines, like the statues of the heathen divinities, and like the shrine of the chaste goddess Diana at Ephesus, against which St. Paul bore witness, have been fashioned from precious metals, and decorated with gold, silver, and jewels.

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*See Collect in Hor. Paris, Fol. 4.

†Ibid. Fol. 80.

‡Bembus, in Epist. ad Carol. V.

"Statues and images are borne in solemn procession through churches and streets, with pomp, ceremony, and display. Waxen candles have been burned before them, while salt, oil, legends, and relics, real or pretended, have been, and are still used with imposing ceremonies, to impress the ignorant and superstitious.

"Now let me ask you, because the Holy Virgin is said in Holy Writ to be blessed among women, and is called blessed in our prayer-book and in the writings of St. Augustine, does it follow, as a necessary consequence, that she is to be made the *queen* of heaven, created a *deity* and a *goddess*, endowed with the power of pardoning sins, and that the follower of Christ must bow his knee before her image and shrine, enriched with gold and jewels, like those of the Virgin Diana of the Ephesians, and is he to present his gifts at her altar, and offer up his adoration to her image or herself?

"If this homage was sanctioned by our Saviour or his apostles, or authorized by the councils of the Catholic church during the first two centuries, refer me to the authorities. As respects the use of images in churches, not only is it against the language of Scripture, but the Council convened at Grenada, Spain, about A. D. 300, and still held in high respect, condemn the practice. The blessed Augustine, Tertullian, with Theodorus, bishop of Ancyra, join in the condemnation of such a usage; and Epiphanius, bishop of Salamis, in Cyprus, where St. Paul planted a church, who died about the age of seventy, A. D. 403, on his return from Constantinople, writes as follows: 'My children, be mindful that ye bring no images into the churches, and that ye erect none in the cemeteries of the saints, but evermore carry God in your hearts. Nay, suffer not images to be; no not in your private houses, for it is not lawful to lead a Christian man by his eyes, but rather by the study and exercise of his mind.'"*—pp. 44–47.

The author began his letters by assuring us that he had gone to the "fountainheads," and had cited only such authors as the church approves. Yet the fountainhead here, by his own confession, is the Protestant bishop Jewell. We have shown that the jurist is so uniformly untrustworthy in his citations and translations of Catholic authorities, that we must be excused from the unnecessary labor of continuing to point out his inaccuracies. The fact that he alleges an authority apparently against some Catholic doctrine or practice, is *prima facie* evidence that it is substantially a forgery, at best a total misapplication of it. In this extract, it will be seen that the author calls the pope a usurper; but he has no right to call him so, till he has proved that the pope claims and exercises an authority not conferred on him

*Epiphanius, cited in Jewell's Apology, page 150.

by our Lord. Our Lord had all power in heaven and in earth as invisible Head of the church, and could confer on his vicar as much power as he pleased. The jurist must prove that our Lord did not confer on him the power he claims and exercises, before he can call him a usurper for claiming and exercising it. He is not at liberty to make a charge and then conclude from it as a fact. Between making an accusation and sustaining it, a jurist ought to know there is a distance.

The author alleges that the church of Rome authorizes the worship of the Virgin Mary, of saints, images, relics, and shrines, and thence concludes against her. His conclusion is valid only on the condition that the worship of the sort which she authorizes, is wrong in itself or forbidden by the positive law of God,—a thing for him to prove. We agree that idolatry is forbidden both by the natural law and the revealed law, and is a sin of the deepest dye. But what is idolatry? It is offering the worship due to God alone to that which is not God, or failing to render due worship to God, and rendering an undue worship to creatures, whether living or dead, whether real or imaginary. He who renders due worship to God, and no undue worship to creatures, is free from the sin of idolatry. In the worship of Mary, the veneration and invocation of saints, and respect for images, relics, and shrines, do we withhold from God what is his due, and do we offer them any thing more than their due, they being what they are? If not, we are not idolators; and the fact that the church authorizes it, is an argument in her favor, not an argument against her; for the eternal law of justice bids us give to every one his due, that is to say, to render unto every one his own.

Mr. Derby's pretence is, that the worship we render to our Lady and to the saints is taken from the worship due to God alone. But this he does not prove. He is so habitually inaccurate that he cannot even quote the Scriptures correctly. St. Paul says, indeed, that there is one *Mediator* between God and men, the man Christ Jesus; but he nowhere says that he is our only *intercessor* with the Father. "There is but one mediator." Who denies it? "Christ maketh intercession for us." Who denies it? We do not regard the saints as mediators in the theological sense of the term between God and us, but we do call upon them, in virtue of the merits of Jesus Christ, to intercede for us, and this we may do, as every one must conclude who be-

lieves it proper for one man to pray for another. When a priest or a minister prays for his congregation, he makes intercession for them, but he can lawfully do it only in the name of Christ, through whose merits alone the intercession can be efficacious. So with the saints. They intercede for us by their prayers, on the same principle on which we pray for one another in the church on earth. And why should the prayers and intercessions of the saints in heaven rob Christ of his mediatorial glory any more than the prayers and intercessions of Christians for one another in this life? The objection of the learned jurist, if addmitted, would condemn all prayers and intercessions of the church for kings and magistrates, for persons in authority, for the faithful, for the sick, the poor, and the afflicted; for the conversion of unbelievers, and for peace and concord throughout the earth.

We worship the Blessed Virgin, mother of God, we concede, with an inferior worship; but the jurist must not suppose us stupid enough to worship her as a goddess, or to offer her that worship which is due to God alone. Even Protestants, we presume, are in most cases able to distinguish between the creature and the Creator, between God and the work of his hands; and if they can, then, *a fortiori*, Catholics can. *To worship* means literally to recognize and honor worth, and worth has the right to be recognized and honored wherever it is. The supreme worth is in God alone, but all creatures in their several degrees participate in the divine worth, inasmuch as they have their being in him, and it is in him, and by him, that they live and move. Worship, then, in some sense, is due to the universal creation of God, to creatures as well as to the Creator; and hence St. Paul, speaking by the Holy Ghost, bids us "Honor,—that is, *worship*,—all men." The only thing to be guarded against is giving an undue honor or worship to creatures, or that honor or worship which is due only to God, and giving them honor or worship for their own sake alone, regarded as independently existing beings, and not as the creatures of God, as did the heathen to their inferior deities. The heathen never lost entirely the conception of one supreme God, or denied the obligation to worship him; nor did they deny that the supreme worship was due to him alone, or assert that more than an inferior worship was due to their inferior gods, or demigods. Their hero-worship contained a reminiscence of the truth, but became idolatrous

and sinful, because it was given to the hero, the demigod, or inferior god, for his supposed independent worth or divinity; not to him as a creature owing in the last analysis all his worth to the supreme God, and entitled to worship on his own account only as dependent for his worth on the worth or excellence of the Creator. The creature is nothing in himself alone, and has no separate or independent worth; but as the creature of God, and partaking, in his degree, of the divine being and excellence, he can have worth, and be entitled to worship. Of the creatures of God the saints are the most worthy, for they participate not only in the divine worth in the natural order as manifested by creation, but also in the supernatural order as manifested by grace. To offer a special worship to saints, is to recognize and honor God in his works of creation, redemption, and sanctification, and to refuse to do it is to offer an indignity to him both as author of nature and grace. What greater indignity can you offer to the workman than to refuse to honor his work? If you honor not the saints for what they are, you cannot honor God as the author either of nature or grace, and therefore do not give him the worship that is his due. You might as well pretend to love God while you hated your brother. How can you love him who begat, if you love not him who is begotten?

The worship we render to the saints is honoring in them the worth they possess, first, as creatures of God, and second, as his friends and servants in the order of grace. They really have such worth; and worth, wherever exhibited, is entitled to recognition and honor. It is impossible for us to pay it more honor than it deserves so long as we regard it not as an independent or self-subsistent worth in the creature, but as derived from the supreme worth of God, and subsisting only by union with him. The special worship we pay to the saint, as distinguished from that which we pay to all creatures, is the honor we pay to the worth created in them by the operations of divine grace and their concurrence therewith. Grace was purchased for us by our Lord, and we are indebted for it solely to his merits. So this special worship of the saints is a recognition and worship of the Word made flesh, through whom the grace which has sanctified the saint comes. If the jurist can understand this, he will see that not only is this worship not idolatry, but that it is a worship really due to our Lord in his saints, and that we cannot duly honor him without hon-

oring them. So far from tending to make us forget Christ as our sole Mediator, it necessarily compels us to recognize and honor him in that relation, by being in itself a recognition and worship of what in that relation he has effected. This much of the *cultus sanctorum* in general.

Mr. Derby is, of course, wrong in asserting that the church ascribes our redemption to Mary, and in pretending that we worship her as a goddess. We have never met with such a prayer addressed by the church to Mary as the one he pretends to cite, and he will find, if he goes to the "fountain-head," that the prayer in question, if not a forgery, is addressed, not to Mary, but to God, and that the petition is, O God, through the pious intercession of her who has worthily merited to conceive him whom the whole world could not comprehend, wash away our sins, so that *redeemed by* thee, that is, the Word made flesh, &c.* As it stands it certainly is not genuine, and we have been able to find nothing like it in the *Missale Romanum*, or in any of the liturgical books of the church we are acquainted with; we have not examined the work the author refers to in his foot note, for we do not understand his reference, or what work he means. Mary has not redeemed us herself, but she is intimately connected with our redemption, inasmuch as she is the mother of Him, who, through the flesh taken from her chaste womb, has redeemed us.

Mary is entitled to worship as a saint, on the same principle that the saints are entitled to worship. But she has another and higher claim founded on her relation to the Word made flesh, and the very ground of this claim is such as to preclude the possibility of our falling into the gross error of regarding her as a goddess, or other than a creature. Cardinal Bembo, on some occasion, used in speaking of her the term *dea*, for which he was severely rebuked, but the church never approved or adopted the term, and the poor cardinal, we suppose, adopted it, not for the purpose of representing our Lady as other than a creature, but for the purpose of writing what he took to be classical Latin. He was governed by philological not theological reasons, as he was when he used in a dispatch to the Venetian court, the expression, *per deos immortales*, or as those are who apply the term *divus* instead of *sanctus* to a saint canonized by the

*Every one who is acquainted with the collects used in the church knows that they are all addressed to God, and never is one addressed to a saint, not even to the Blessed Virgin.—Ed.

church. The special worship we pay to Mary is founded on her connection with the Incarnation, through which alone we hope for salvation; and the least as well as the best instructed Catholic knows enough to know that it would be a denial of the Incarnation itself, of the reality of the flesh assumed by the Word, to deny that Mary is a creature, or to regard her as a divinity, as we should do, if we offered her divine honors, or paid her the supreme worship due to God alone. All the special honor we pay her, all the lofty epithets we apply to her, have reference to the Incarnation, and her relation to the incarnate Word. We are redeemed, sanctified, finally saved, by the Word made flesh, and this flesh the Word, with her free consent, assumed in her womb. She redeems us only in the sense of consenting to be the mother of him who redeems us. It was from her flesh the Word took the redeeming flesh, and from that flesh she can never be separated; and it is her connection with it that forms the ground of the worship we render her. It is clear, then, that the worship we render her, presupposes her to be a creature, and therefore cannot be in principle, or in fact, the supreme worship due only to God. We honor her as the mother of the incarnate Word, and if not flesh, and therefore a creature, she could not have been that mother.

Mr. Derby errs grievously when he asserts that we pray to Mary to pardon our sins. We do no such thing; we simply ask her to obtain our pardon by her intercession with her divine Son, who hath power to pardon, and with whom her prayers and intercessions, since they are always in accordance with his will, must be all-powerful. Mr. Derby ought to recollect that though Protestantism is incoherent and self-contradictory, Catholicity is not. Whether true or false, Catholicity, so to speak, hangs together, is always logical, always coherent, and always consistent with itself. You will never find it at one time asserting a principle which at another it denies.

The author and Protestants generally find grave difficulties in understanding and appreciating the worship Catholics pay to our Lady, because they have ceased to believe in the Incarnation, and have lost the sense of the mystery of the Word made flesh. They do not understand that it is God made man, and therefore God in his human nature, that redeems and saves us. They see no necessary connection between the Incarnation and the final beatitude of man; they see not that the whole redemption and all the rewards in

heaven depend on our Lord in his human nature, not on him regarded solely in his distinctively divine nature. They are, almost without exception, Nestorians or Eutychians, and either give to the flesh assumed a human subsistence or personality distinct from the divine, which is virtual Unitarianism, or they deny to the divine personality two for ever distinct natures, the one divine, the other human, and thus adopt the Monophysite theory. They fail utterly to recognize the indissoluble union of two for ever distinct natures in one divine person. Hence, while they are willing enough to say that Mary is the mother of Christ, they shrink from saying that she is the mother of God. They cannot bring themselves to say that God was born of woman, or that he had or has a mother. Thus they dissolve Christ, deny virtually that the Word was made flesh, and that since the Incarnation, human nature is, truly, and as substantially, the nature of God as the divine nature itself. The Word, since the Incarnation or hypostatic union, has a twofold nature, the one human and the other divine, and the one therefore is as much and as truly his nature as the other. Hence the term God applies to him as properly in his human as in his divine nature, in which he is one with the Father and the Holy Ghost. This is the meaning of the assertion that the Word was made flesh,— *Verbum caro factum est.*

God in his divine nature, as the Divinity, was not, indeed, born of Mary, any more than he died, on the cross, for in that nature he is eternal and immortal,—can neither be born nor die; but God in his human nature was born of Mary, and therefore what was born of her was not simple humanity, that is, a man adopted and united by the Word to himself, but God himself in his humanity or human nature. Therefore, as by the Incarnation human nature becomes really and substantially the nature of God, Mary was as truly the mother of God as any mother is or can be the mother of her own son. The relation of mother and son, by virtue of the hypostatic union, really and truly subsists between God and Mary, and must for ever exist. We must say this or deny the Incarnation.

This granted, Mary necessarily holds to God a peculiar relation, a superior and more intimate relation than is or can be held by any other woman or by any other creature. It is not possible to assign her in creation a rank above her real rank. She holds and will always hold the relation of mother of God, and, as her Son is universal King, of uni-

versal Queen-Mother. She is by the very fact of that relation placed above every other creature, above all the sons and daughters of men, above all the choirs, thrones, dominions, angels and archangels of heaven, and can be below none but God himself. This is no exaggeration, but sober reason and literal truth, when once it is conceded that the "Word was made flesh." Weak men and sciolists, wicked men and devils, may rage or cavil at it, but so it is, and so it cannot *not* be. Exclaim as you will against it, nothing can alter it; nothing can prevent it from being true that eternal justice imposes upon us the duty of recognizing that relation, of acknowledging her exalted rank, and of rendering her the honor, the love, and the veneration due to it. Fine Christians we should be, if we refused her the honor that is her due, and great honor and respect should we show to him who has given her that exalted rank above every creature in heaven, on earth, and under the earth! It is not Catholics worshipping Mary as the mother of God and queen of heaven, who need to defend themselves, but Protestants who refuse her the honor that is her due, and will not conform to the real relations which God himself has established between Mary and her Son,—Protestants, who think they maintain truth by rejecting it, and that they show their respect for the Son by refusing to honor his mother for what she is, and he by being born of her has made her. Let them defend themselves, if they can, but forbear to accuse us.

Protestants for the most part, at the present day at least, fail to recognize the office of the sacred Flesh in our redemption and salvation. In losing the sense of the mystery of the Incarnation they have lost the sense of salvation by an incarnate God. The redemption in which as Christians we believe is not merely satisfaction made by the incarnate God for our sins, original or actual, and the purification of the soul or spirit, but also a redemption and sanctification of the flesh. The Word was made flesh, *Verbum caro factum est*, and it was not merely the spirit, the soul, or immortal part of man that God assumed to be his nature, but also the flesh, the body no less than the soul of man. It was our nature, and our whole nature,—"perfect man"—that he assumed, and made his nature; and the flesh as well as the soul is elevated to union with God, in the Incarnation, deified, or made the nature of God. Here opens a view we all too seldom appreciate. The heathen believed in the immortality of the soul, and the return of the spirit to God who

gave it, but they had no conception of the resurrection or future life of the flesh. The distinctive doctrine preached by the apostles was not the immortality of the soul, as some sectarians contend, but the *resurrection* of the dead, therefore, the resurrection of the flesh, for only the flesh dies. Yet we apprehend that the Protestant world has virtually lost or is rapidly losing all belief in the resurrection of the flesh—*carnis resurrectionem*—and confound belief in the natural immortality of the soul, with belief in the resurrection of the body. Hence, placing no belief in the resurrection, or attaching no importance to the resurrection of the flesh, they fail to perceive the significance of the mystery of the Word made flesh.

But whoever reflects a moment will see that the redemption of the flesh and its elevation to union with God, could by no possibility be effected, save by the Incarnation of the Word; and as its redemption and elevation were in the design of God from all eternity, theologians of no mean repute maintain that the Word would have been incarnated, even if man had not sinned. But be this as it may, certain it is, that where sin abounded, grace superabounded, and that the Word was made flesh, not merely to repair the damage done by sin, as Protestantism would fain have us believe, but over and above repairing that damage, to elevate us to a union by nature with God himself, and therefore of making man in both soul and body one with God. Hence the reason why the Word assumed our nature. Had he assumed the nature of animals he would not have redeemed us or elevated us, for we are above them; had he assumed the nature of angels he would not have redeemed or elevated the flesh, since that enters not into the nature of angels; or if he had assumed our nature only in its angelic or spiritual part. But by assuming flesh, and becoming perfect man as he was perfect God, he elevated our whole nature to himself, and made it his nature. As the human nature he assumed was complete human nature, soul and body,—for man is not soul alone, or body alone, but the union of the two,—and identical with our nature, he elevates us by nature, soul and body, to the nature of God. Our nature, if we may use the expression of St. Leo, is by the Incarnation deified, made as truly the nature of God as the divine nature itself. As this includes the flesh as well as the soul, it is evident that the Catholic doctrine of fasts, mortifications, and chastisements of the flesh, has its foun-

dation in the mystery of the Incarnation. They are not merely lacerations of the flesh for the good of the soul, but are chastisements of the flesh for its own good, to fit it to be the temple of the Holy Ghost. The flesh itself is to live for ever, and its discipline is as necessary to prepare it for practical union with God hereafter as the discipline of the soul. In the redemption and elevation of man, soul and body, the whole lower creation is also redeemed and elevated, for man is, as the ancients said, a microcosm, and contains in himself the several natures of all the orders below him, and in fact, in his intelligent part, the elements of the angelic nature, which is above him.

Now when we take this view of the redemption and elevation of created nature through the Incarnation, we can easily perceive that the rank of Mary must be the highest under God. That rank is determined by her relation to the sacred flesh of our Lord, through which and which alone he effects this universal redemption and elevation. The Sacred Flesh was taken in her womb, and was flesh of her flesh; her relation to it must necessarily be more intimate than that of any other creature, and as it was not taken by violence, but by her free consent, she necessarily participates in its glory, in a sense in which no other creature does or can participate. As mother of that sacred Flesh born of her, she is the mother of God, and as it is only through it we are redeemed and sanctified in our flesh, she is the mother of our redemption and sanctification. As we by redemption and sanctification become united in our flesh to the sacred flesh of Christ, she is, in the order of redemption and sanctification, literally our mother, and as truly the mother of redeemed and glorified humanity, as Eve was the mother of natural humanity, or the human race in the natural order. These considerations, to those who are capable of understanding them, will show that what Protestants should object to in us, is our belief in the Incarnation and the resurrection and future glory of the flesh, not the worship we pay to our Lady; for if the Word was made flesh, the strongest language the church has ever authorized, and the warmest affection, the tenderest love, and the deepest devotion of Catholics to the mother of God, are fully warranted. The whole *cultus* of Mary flows from the profound mystery of the Incarnation; and the belief in that mystery, and what Protestants so injuriously call our "Mariolatry," do and must stand or fall together. It may be that popular

Catholic writers, writing for Catholics alone, and even some popular controversialists, who have more piety than thought, and more erudition than philosophy, have not taken sufficient pains to show the connection between the Incarnation and the worship of Mary, and the future resurrection and glorification of the body, but that connection exists, and it is impossible on any rational grounds to deny the consequences which flow from it. If we look into history, we shall find those who believe the most firmly and vividly in the Incarnation are the most devout worshippers of Mary; and we seldom find our worship offending any except those who lack faith in the mystery of the Word made flesh, and who resolve Christianity into pure materialism, or a pure spiritualism which regards man as all soul, and denies the resurrection of the flesh.

The jurist affects to be scandalized at what he calls our worship of images. We have images of our Lady, and of the saints in our churches, and carry them in processions, &c. But what if we do? Is it a fault? Wherefore? He knows, or ought to know, that not simply the making, keeping, or worship of images, but the making, keeping, or worship of images as idols or gods, is what is forbidden in the first commandment of the Decalogue, otherwise painting and sculpture would be forbidden, indeed all the imitative arts, and no man could lawfully keep and respect a picture of his mother, or a statue of his father. Puritan Massachusetts would, in such case, be bound to remove the carved image of a codfish, which is now suspended in the Representatives' Hall of her State House. We have while writing an image of our Lady before us, and we kneel before it when we say our prayers, but we do not pray to it. We pray to God before the image of his mother or we pray to his mother herself, to intercede for us with him, and obtain for us the graces and benefits we most stand in need of. What harm can you detect in that? And yet here is all the worship of images Catholics practise. Here is no idolatry. We honor the image for the sake of the original, but we are not quite so stupid as to suppose it is a god. We should suppose even the most stupid Protestant could distinguish between praying before an image of our Lady and praying to it, and between the worship we pay to our Lady herself and that which the Ephesians paid to their goddess Diana; but it seems that Mr. Derby cannot, and that he imagines his young kinsman cannot. Surely, the power of

discrimination in our Protestant friends must, if they do not slander themselves, be exceedingly weak and dull.

It seems that we keep and treat with respect the relics of saints, and such is really the fact. There is no denying it. Our good Protestant mother showed us one day the writing-book of our long-departed father, which she had affectionately preserved; she also showed us a pattern of the last dress she had seen her own mother wear, and even a lock of our own and our twin sister's hair, taken from our heads when we were little children, and which nothing could induce her to part with. 'The lover preserves with pious care the picture of his mistress, or any thing he possesses that was hers, which she had looked upon, which she had touched, or which she had loved. These things are dear to us, not for their own sake, but for the sake of those we love and who are absent from us. So it is with Catholics in regard to the relics of the saints; we keep them, we venerate them, we cherish them for the sake of the saint whose relics they are.

But there is a higher and a holier reason for the veneration of the relics of saints. Protestants have the feelings of heathens towards dead bodies and dead men's bones. These things are repulsive to them, disgusting, and they hasten to burn them, or to bury them from their sight, because they have never fairly grasped the meaning or any portion of the meaning of the Incarnation, because they have never believed or understood the redemption of the body, and the sanctification of matter. The Catholic looks upon the relics of the body of the saint, as redeemed and ennobled by the Word made flesh. The sanctity of the saint was not confined to the soul alone, but overflowed and permeated more or less his body, his fleshly tabernacle. When the Catholic touches the relics of a saint, he feels that he touches what is holy, and he looks forward to the resurrection, when this blood, this flesh, and these bones, will be reunited to the soul, and be fashioned anew after Christ's glorious body, and enter into glory. The flesh of the saint is redeemed, and is of the same nature with the flesh assumed by the Word. It is, therefore, a sacred thing, and as such we treat it. Catholics are not Gnostics or Manicheans. They do not regard matter any more than spirit as intrinsically evil. As the work of God it is good, as redeemed by Christ it is sacred, and as pertaining to one who loved God, who conformed to the divine will, and is now enjoying the beatific

vision, who was pleasant in life, beautiful in death, and now glorious in immortality, it is precious. It is precious, too, because it has been chastened by divine grace, and nourished with the Blessed Sacrament, the precious body and blood of our Lord himself, and made the very temple and dwelling-place of the Holy Ghost. Here are reasons enough to prove the propriety of our worship of relics and shrines. There is a deep philosophy, a lofty morality, and a tender piety in this worship, which they who are not Catholics lack, and cannot have, for with them this worship, so pure, so true, so elevating, and so consoling with us, were they to attempt it, would degenerate into a gross idolatry, or a debasing superstition. Yet the honor we pay to relics is not to them as mere flesh and bones, but to the saint whose they were, and through the saint to the Word made flesh, whence all redemption and sanctity, whether of soul or body, have their source. We cherish them as sacred through the holiness of the saint, and the redemption of the flesh by its assumption by the Word; but we do not pray to them, or reverence them as living things. We love them for what they are, not for what they are not, and to regard them as they are and to honor them for what they are is a simple duty. We must tell the learned jurist, then, that his flippancy is in bad taste. There is in these Catholic practices a beauty he does not see, a fitness he is unable with his cold, sneering temper to appreciate, a deeper significance, as in all Catholic things, than he has dreamed of. His objections betray his ignorance, not his science,—his shallowness, not his depth,—his coldness, not his warmth,—his indifference, not his love to the Word made flesh. Let him lay aside his self-conceit, his false assumption that he knows something of the Gospel, open his heart to the inspirations of grace, as the sun-flower opens her bosom to the rays of the sun; let him sit down at the feet of God's minister, as Mary Magdalen sat at the feet of Jesus, and be content, before criticising, to learn with the docility of the child, and our word for it, he will soon love what he now hates, and see a truth, a beauty, an excellence, in what he now fancies is mere craft, imposture, falsehood, and superstition. Let him meditate seriously, and with open heart, on that mystery of mysteries, the Incarnation, which even his church professes to believe, and he will see Catholics are alone in giving it significance, in regarding it as a living truth, and in making it the basis of their religious life and practices.

But we have dwelt too long for our space on this topic, and must hurry on to another.

"I pass to the next important topic, the celibacy of the Roman Catholic clergy. We had the authority of Holy Writ for the fact that St. Peter, the alleged founder and *first prelate* of the church of Rome, was himself a *married man*, for we find that when Jesus was come unto Peter's house, 'He saw his *wife's* mother laid and sick of a fever, and he touched her hand and the fever left her, and she arose and ministered unto them.' He mentions also his *son* Marcus. This, however, may have been Mark, the apostle. St. Peter, also, speaks of the marriage state as honorable, for he names, among the holy women of old who trusted in the Lord, Sarah, who obeyed her husband Abraham, God's chosen prophet and minister. He directs wives to be chaste and gentle, to obey their husbands and thus win them to the truth, and to seek the ornament of a meek and quiet spirit, a priceless jewel in the sight of God, preferable to plaiting the hair, or wearing of gold or apparel. He counsels husbands to *honor* and *dwell* with their wives as common heirs of the grace of life, so that their prayers be not hindered, and counsels all he addresses 'to be ready to give an answer to every one that asketh them for the hope that is in them.' And St. Paul, addressing Timothy in one of the Eastern churches, whose observances the Greek church now follows, writes, 'A bishop then must be blameless, the husband of one wife.' The early historians of the Church, Sozomen and Theophylactus, commend the marriage of the clergy, and two of the earliest provincial councils held at Ancyra and Gangra in Paphlagonia, the latter A. D. 360; and some of the earliest canons of the Eastern churches authorize the marriage of men in holy orders. Some learned doctors among the Roman Catholics admit that the marriage of the clergy was lawful until the era of Pope Siricius, bishop of Rome, A. D. 385.

"The blessed Chrysostom, who lived twenty years after this period, expressly says, that 'It is an honest and lawful thing for a man living in matrimony, to take upon him therewith the dignity of a bishop.' Chrysostom was himself a presbyter of Antioch, one of the most ancient seats of Christianity, and subsequently bishop of Constantinople, the seat of empire.

"I find by reference to the standard work of McCulloch, that in Russia, which A. D. 1838 contained fifty-nine millions of people, more than fifty millions were of the Greek church, and the residue either Lutherans, Mahometans, or Pagans, with some Catholics, principally in the provinces last conquered. I find it there stated, under the head of religion, that the uniform practice in the Greek church, is for those taking holy orders to marry. Indeed, the canon law is so imperative, that no priest or bishop is allowed to officiate until he enters the holy state of marriage; and upon the death of his wife, is suspended until he marries again. The church is guided by a patriarch, whose predecessor

removed to Russia from Constantinople upon the fall of the Greek empire. And it is well understood that the female members of the Greek church stand higher with respect to chastity than females in Roman Catholic countries. If, then, the theory of the Romish church should be assumed to be true, that our Saviour selected Peter to be the future ruler of his church, and intrusted to him the gates of heaven, he selected for the first prelate a married man, one who approved of marriage in the clergy, for he refers to Abraham, God's chosen prophet and minister, who was ready to sacrifice his son Isaac upon the altar, and refers also to Sarah, his holy wife, and bids the husbands to 'honor and dwell with their wives the coheirs of salvation.'

"Does not Peter, by his example, his *citation*, and his *precepts*, clearly show that bishops and priests may marry; and are his successors holier than their alleged first bishop, the first and oldest apostle of our Saviour, or more deserving of respect than the holy fathers who lived before the inroads of barbarism, and were accustomed to visit the churches planted by the apostles?

"Again, let us recur to the fact, that Greek and Romish churches were governed by the same councils and rules, until they separated upon the mere question of Easter-day. In the words of the blessed Jerome, 'Gaul and Britain and Africa, the East, and India, and all the barbarous nations, adored *one Christ*, and observed *one rule* of truth in the early ages of Christianity,' and you observe he includes 'the British almost severed from the world.' In the Greek church the marriage of the clergy is not only authorized, but absolutely required. Now, if we find that the marriage of the clergy has been found conducive to virtue, and a check to profligacy; if we see a precedent for it in the party alleged to be the first primate of Rome, and in the precepts of St. Peter; if we find, further, that the bishops of the Greek churches, the modern representative of the Eastern, uniformly adhere to the ancient usage, have we not an accumulation of evidence that the Romish church has departed from the truth?

"And whether you ascribe it to the ascetic rules of monks, who aspired to unusual sanctity in the dark ages, to a desire to sink all worldly and carnal thoughts in a devotion to God, or, what may well be argued from established facts, to a deep design on the part of the Roman pontiffs to secure a devotion to the advancement of their power, the constrained celibacy of the clergy has no sanction in the early church. Indeed, such departures from the truth are predicted by the great Apostle to the Gentiles, inspired by a heavenly vision, who foretells 'That in the latter days some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits, forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats, which God has created to be received with thanksgiving of them which believe and know the truth.'"—pp. 48–52.

We pass over the author's citations of authorities, taken

from untrustworthy Anglican anti-popery writers,—authorities in every instance miscited, misapprehended, misapplied, or irrelevant. The church of Rome does not dishonor marriage; she treats it as a sacrament, declares it to be always a sacred thing, and gives it her benediction. If she insists on the celibacy of the clergy, it is not because she regards marriage as dishonorable, or unclean, but for other reasons, which will readily occur to those who properly understand the office and duties of the Catholic priesthood. Mr. Derby argues that the celibacy of the clergy is not an apostolic institution, because Peter was a married man; but that Peter had a wife living and that he lived with her as a married man, after he was called to be an apostle, the only thing to be proved to his purpose, he does not, and cannot prove. There have been several popes, and innumerable bishops and priests in the Roman church, who have been married men; and one of the most distinguished and worthy priests of this diocese was a widower, and had a family of children, when he received Holy Orders. Proof, therefore, that a pope, a bishop, a priest in early times, or even an apostle, had been married, is no proof that the celibacy of the clergy was not the discipline of the church.

We are not particularly informed as to the discipline of the Russian schismatic church in respect to the marriage of the clergy, but in the schismatic, as in the united Greek Church, no one in Holy Orders is allowed to marry, but those who were married before receiving Holy Orders are allowed to retain their wives, though no married priest can be consecrated a bishop, and hence, bishops are taken generally from the monastic orders. This is what we have always understood to be the discipline of the Greek Church, and we suppose it to be also that of the Russian. We place no reliance on Mr. Derby's statement to the contrary, for he evidently has no exact information on the subject, since he says the Russian church is guided by a patriarch, which is notoriously untrue, for it is guided by a synod with a lay president, the patriarchate having been suppressed, if we recollect aright, by Peter the Great. That the Russian clergy generally marry before receiving Holy Orders, we believe is the fact, but that a priest or bishop is suspended from his functions when his wife dies till he gets a new wife, is pure fiction. Whether the morality of the women stands higher in countries under the Greek Church than it does in those under the Roman Catholic Church, is a question we shall

not discuss; but he who can believe it, is, in our opinion, prepared, as Clemens Alexandrinus said of the Greeks of his day, to believe any thing, except the truth. However this may be, we advise him to institute no comparison in respect of purity of life and manners between *Protestant countries* and Catholic countries—a comparison which would be much more to the purpose.

The jurist alleges that St. John Chrysostom says that "it is an honest and lawful thing for a man living in matrimony to take upon him therewith the dignity of a bishop," but he fails to tell us where St. John Chrysostom says this, and surely he cannot expect us to read through thirteen huge folio volumes in order to determine whether he says it or not. We recollect no such passage in the writings of this holy doctor of the church. He certainly defends the Catholic doctrine of marriage, against the Manicheans and others who forbid people to marry, on the ground that it is impure, and incompatible with the sanctity of life,—a notion founded on the false doctrine of the essential impurity or intrinsic evil of matter; but we do not find that he defends the marriage of bishops. In the East the discipline that was established from the earliest times in the West, never universally obtained; there the clergy of the second order were allowed to have wives; this discipline obtains now in all the Oriental rites, alike among those in communion with the Holy See, and those in schism. Yet the laws of the church alike in the East and the West, still adhered to by the schismatic Greeks, forbid marriage contracted after the reception of Holy Orders, that is, bishops, presbyters, deacons and subdeacons, have never been allowed to marry. Even to-day the clergy of the United Greeks, that is, Christians of the Greek rite in communion with the Apostolic See, if married before ordination, may retain, and do retain, their wives after ordination, though they rarely hear confessions.

To contend that a church which makes marriage a sacrament, which declares it honorable, holy even, and gives it her benediction, falls into the category of those the apostle speaks of who declare marriage in itself impure, and therefore forbid to marry, because she forbids those whom she ordains to minister at her altars to marry, is to reason about as wisely as honest Fluellin, who likened the Prince of Wales to Alexander the Great, because there was a river in Wales, and also a river in Macedon. If the learned jurist will pay a little attention to what we have said of the redemption

and sanctification of matter by the assumption of flesh by the Word, he will see that it is absolutely impossible for the church with her own fundamental doctrines to fall into the errors censured by the apostle in the text cited at the close of the extract we have made. The jurist judges without understanding either the law or the facts of the case, and on the hypothesis that the church has as little understanding of what she does as he has of the matters on which he writes. There is no doubt that the chastity the church requires of her clergy is above nature, and can be preserved only by supernatural grace; but this is no more than is to be said of the chastity or continence demanded of the spouses in Christian marriage, as the experience of our non-Catholic world is at this moment proclaiming in tones not to be mistaken; and we know no reason why the grace needed may not be given in the one case as well as in the other; yet all experience proves that even naturally continence is more easily maintained by the celibate than by the married, as total abstinence is less difficult than temperance. Whoever will consult the records of our criminal courts will find that in proportion to their numbers the Protestant clergy furnish more instances of conjugal infidelity than any other class of society. At least so tells us a Protestant lawyer who is well qualified to judge. Almost all the instances that come to light in which Protestant ministers have fallen, the minister has been a married man, with an interesting wife and children. We are not surprised at this. When we consider the temptations, even seductions, to which a popular and fascinating Protestant minister is exposed on every hand, and the fact that he lacks the grace of the sacrament of marriage to sustain him, we rather marvel that comparatively so few, not that so many fall. We touch here a subject of great delicacy, and which some day must be thoroughly discussed. Christian marriage, or the morality of the Gospel in relation to marriage, is above the strength of nature alone. Our Lord knew it, and therefore raised marriage under the New Law to the dignity of a sacrament, and assigned it a special grace, which those who enter into marriage with proper motives and dispositions receive, and may, if they will, always preserve. But we must say that the Protestant experiment of trying to maintain Christian marriage, without the sacramental grace, has proved, and is every day proving a failure. It would not be amiss for wordly-minded and indifferent Catholics themselves to pay

some attention to this fact, lest even they fail to escape the general corruption of manners with which our land bids fair to be deluged. But we leave this topic and follow our author in his givings out on another.

"I acknowledge your several letters of February 14th, 19th, and 24th, to which I propose to reply *seriatim*, after disposing of all that remains of your letter of the 4th current, in which you advance the following bold propositions, namely, that the Church of Rome is

"1. The only universal or Catholic church.

"2. The only apostolic or primitive church.

"3. The only church which has preserved its unity.

"4. That no dissenters from the authority of the pope existed before the time of Luther.

"5. That the Catholic church has not varied one iota in the faith from the time of the apostles.

"6. That if you can be shown one place (where men have any idea of the Christian religion) where Roman Catholicism does not exist, you will be a Protestant.

"7. That the Episcopal church has neither unity, catholicity, nor apostolicity, and is of course heretical.

"8. You ask where is he to whom the keys of heaven and hell are given, and the church to which God has promised the gates of hell shall not prevail against it, and without doubt refer to St. Peter and the Church of Rome."—p. 53.

The questions here raised were disposed of in our first article on Mr. Derby's book. Points 4 and 6 assumed by Mr. Derby's son, are untenable, and he betrayed his ignorance in assuming them. We have known some ignorant or unreflecting Catholics rashly assert in their arguments with Protestants that there were no separatists from the church prior to Luther. Such assertions are inexcusable, and do harm. They are easily refuted, and our opponents are ready to swear that, if they have refuted some unimportant statement made in the heat of argument by an individual Catholic, they have refuted the claims of the church herself. There were heretics even in the apostolic age, and we know no age since in which the church has not been afflicted with heresies. The middle ages bristled with heresies, and we have never been able to find that Luther originated any new heresy. The popes, from the division of the Roman Empire into the Empire of the West and the Empire of the East, had had as bitter enemies as Luther to contend with, and the defection in the East prior to Luther was greater than any defection there ever has been in the

West. These are facts, and it is a short-sighted policy that seeks to conceal them. If the claims of the church are irreconcilable with the facts of history, they cannot be sustained, for facts are not rendered no-facts by being concealed or denied. There have always been heretics and schismatics, and no doubt there always will be to the end of the world; but this is a fact which proves rather than disproves the church, for if there were no church, one and Catholic, there could be no schismatics or heretics, as there could be no counterfeit, if there were no genuine coin. Mr. Derby, however, does not understand this.

"Let me now recur to the points you have advanced. First, I have shown that the Church of Rome does not pervade the world. I have shown the Greek church engrosses a large part of Russia, Turkey, Greece and Germany, while the Protestant faith is gradually overspreading the globe. I will concede to you, that at the close of the third century the true church of Christ was established and pervaded the world, but it does not follow therefrom that the Church of Rome is the same at this moment, or has the same universality.

"Christianity made rapid progress under the teaching of the apostles. It had to encounter in the Roman Empire, which then embraced the civilized world, a state religion, venerable for its antiquity, its mythology, and its association with both poetry and history. It had its oracles and temples, its sacred fountains and groves, its statues of gods, goddesses, and deified heroes. Its votaries from childhood bowed down to them, and offered worship and sacrifices, and when their religion was assailed, exclaimed, Great is Jupiter, great is Apollo, great is Diana of the Ephesians. Even St. Paul's, in London, occupies the site of the temple of the Virgin Diana.

"This religion was sustained by the love of people and princes, by *antiquity*, *universality*, and general *consent*, but in less than four centuries it yielded to the apostles of the Gentiles.

"At the close of the second century, Irenæus speaks of the prevalence of the gospel among 'the Germans and Celts, the Egyptians, Libyans, and Orientals.'

"The eloquent Tertullian, A. D. 198, recites: 'We are but of yesterday, yet we have filled your empire, your cities, your islands, your castles, your corporate towns, your assemblies, your very camps, your tribes, your companies; your palaces and your temples alone are left to you.' And again, 'The Parthians, Medes, Persians, the inhabitants of Mesopotamia, Armenia, Phrygia, Cappadocia, Pontus, Egypt, and parts beyond Cyrene, the Romans, tribes of the Getuli, many in the extreme parts of Mauritania and Spain, many nations in Gaul and places in Britain inaccessible to the Roman arms, have been subdued to Christ. The Sarmatians, Dacians, Germans, Scythians, and many other nations,

provinces, and islands to us unknown, are subject to Christ's dominion,' and this was at least a century before the accession of the first Christian emperor, and during the reign of Severus. After the victory of Constantine, A. D. 306, under the luminous cross, with its inscription, 'conquer by this,' Christianity still advanced, and before the middle of the fifth century, about the time of St. Augustine, attained its greatest power under Valentinian and Theodosius. Bishop Hopkins* proves by various authors, that at this early period, long before the Roman prelate had claimed the supremacy, or wore the title of universal bishop, and when he certainly was not ruler of the world, that the Christian world contained two thousand bishoprics. Records are now remaining of at least

566	dioceses in Africa,	estimated to contain	55,000,000	souls.
50	" " Persia, Asia,	" " "	2,500,000	"
48	" the patriarchate of Jerusalem, Asia,		5,000,000	"
164	" " " " Antioch, "		33,000,000	"
400	" " " " Constantinople"		80,000,000	"
200	" " " " " Europe,		40,000,000	"
300	" Italy "			
117	" France,			
38	" Ireland,		25,250,000	"
50	" Britain, Germany, and other places, estimated.			

"Some of the bishoprics were very large and populous. That of Carthage contained five hundred presbyters. That of Cyrus consisted of eight hundred parishes and sixty thousand farms. The diocese of Cæsarea, over which St. Basil presided, covered an area of ten thousand square miles, and he had under him fifty assistant bishops. The aggregate of each district gives us more than two hundred and forty millions of Christians, more Christians than the entire world now contains. But little more than a century after this, the bishop of Rome usurped the powers of the church, and claimed supremacy. The Greek church seceded. In the year A. D. 622, the baneful crescent rose in the East. Mahomet, with his false faith, invaded a divided empire, and swept before him the churches, people, and civilization of Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. The ages of ignorance and superstition followed, and when the Church of Rome insists to-day that she has been since the time of the apostles, universal, catholic, and apostolic, may we not ask, What has she done with those vast and fertile regions, the garden of the world, the seats of arts, commerce, and literature, in which the church was first planted? Where are the five hundred and sixty-six dioceses of Africa, the six hundred and sixty-two dioceses of Asia, and the two hundred bishoprics of Eastern Europe, and the two hundred millions of Christians they contained? Has she not severed herself from them by her ambition? Did she not leave them to perish? Have they not been trodden down by the infidel, and what remains of them but a remnant of Greeks, Maronites, and Nestorians? If the Church of Rome has any existence in these regions, or in the Northern and Eastern provinces

*In his treatise on the Primitive Church, p. 402.

of Norway, Sweden, and Russia, it must be in the shape of some feeble missionary or wandering friar. I will not pretend to prove a negative to the claim that a Roman Catholic there exists, but must ask you to prove that he does exist there, and if he does, that he preaches to any purpose.

"And in this connection let me ask, in what part of our own State, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Connecticut, did the Church of Rome exist for the first century after our forefathers landed, for I find no records of its existence.

"If your theory is, that a solitary priest, perhaps travelling in disguise, is proof that a religion exists in a country, and is sufficient to prove it universal, then glance at the missions which the Protestants of England, Germany, and the United States have planted throughout the world. Her morning gun and her banner salute the sun as he rises in every portion of the globe, and the chant of the Episcopal church, or the prayer of the Protestant missionary, ascends from nearly every point touched by the commerce, or reached by the energy of the Anglo-Saxon. Upon your theory, the faith of the Protestant is more diffused and more universal than that of the Church of Rome."—pp. 54–58.

No Catholic pretends that all the world is converted to the Catholic church, and that there is no spot on the globe where she is not physically present. We are aware, indeed, of no nation, in which the Christian religion is professed, where there are no catholics; but there are tribes which so far as we know no catholic missionary has visited, and large tracts of country where there is no Catholic church or Catholic priest. But to argue from this against the Catholicity of the church would be to argue against the Catholicity of Christianity itself, for not half of the human race now on the globe are even so much as nominal Christians. It would also be to deny that the church of the apostles was Catholic, when it went forth from Jerusalem to convert the world, and thus deny to the Christian church, whichever it be, the note of catholicity, a thing Mr. Derby himself cannot do, since he undertakes to prove the unity, catholicity, and apostolicity of Anglicanism. The church is catholic because she teaches all ages, all nations, and all truth. She is catholic as opposed to particular or national churches, catholic in that she subsists without interruption from the apostles, in opposition to sects of later origin, and because she teaches the whole truth in opposition to the sects who mutilate it, and teach only some fragments of it. The work of conversion is a work of time, and goes on successively, and the catholicity of the church does not therefore depend on her actually teaching all nations at once from the first moment

of her existence and through every instant of succeeding time. It is enough that she is constituted alike for all, and in proportion as she effects their conversion unites all in the same faith, in the participation of the same sacraments, under the same regimen, with one and the same visible head.

That there were more Christians in the world in the fourth century than there are now, we are disposed to doubt, since it is asserted on the authority of Bishop Hopkins. The Roman Empire, beyond which the Gospel had not penetrated far, was even in the fifth century far from being wholly Christian, and the pagans were still numerous enough to treat Christians with contempt, and to entertain strong hopes of being able by the help of the unconverted barbarians to restore the old gods to their temples and niches. But be this as it may, certain it is that the Christians in the fifth century, with the exception of acknowledged heretics and schismatics, were in communion with the apostolic see, and were therefore Roman Catholics. The argument of Mr. Derby is therefore a *Derbyish* argument, that is, an argument which, as far as it goes, proves the reverse of what was intended. The attempt to make a distinction between the church in the primitive ages and the church in later times, is idle; and moreover, if successful would be as fatal to Mr. Derby's cause as to ours; for he as well as we asserts the catholicity of the church of Christ, and the church to be catholic must be so in time as well as space, and therefore must exist without interruption or alteration as one and the same identical body from the time of the apostles down to the end of the world.

That there have been defections by heresy and schism, as well as accessions by conversions, in every age from the apostles down, is undoubtedly true; but whence follows it that the exclusion from the communion of the church of heretics and schismatics, who by their heresy and schism separate themselves from it, impairs her catholicity? The apostles themselves cut off persons from the communion of the church; did the church by that cease to be catholic? If excommunication does not in itself impair catholicity, the number, whether greater or less, excommunicated cannot do it. The defections alleged no more impaired the integrity of the church than the defection of Judas impaired the integrity of the apostolic college. Mr. Derby forgets that heresy and schism are deadly sins, and that

they who commit them are condemned by their own judgment. The losses he speaks of were due to heresy and schism on the part of those lost, and the responsibility rests on them, not on the church, or the pope. It is nothing to the author's purpose to prove that there have been heresies and schisms, or that whole nations or quarters of the globe have lapsed into them. What he needs to prove, in order to make out his case against the catholicity of the church, is that the see of Rome has herself fallen into heresy or schism, or given to the one or the other her sanction.

Mr. Derby pretends that the losses he speaks of were occasioned by the usurpation in the sixth century by the pope of the powers of the church. The Oriental and African Christians were cut off and abandoned because they would not submit to the usurpation. But he, as we have seen, fails to prove that the pope ever usurped any powers, or has ever claimed or exercised any powers not given by our Lord to Peter and his successors. It is possible, and till the contrary is proved, the legal presumption is, that they were cut off because they refused the obedience they owed to the vicar of Christ. Rebels are not always in the right, and resistance to the pope is not *prima facie* obedience to God. The wrong may have been on the side of those who resisted the pope, and they may have become powerless and their fertile regions become a prey to the barbarians and the seat of barbarism, because they cut themselves off from the centre and source of the Christian life.

The Greek schism in the seventh century was only temporary. It was not fully effected till the eleventh century, and was abjured by the Greeks themselves in the Council of Florence, under Eugenius IV. in the fifteenth. The foundation of that schism was laid not in the claim of any new or extraordinary powers by the Roman pontiff, but in the division of the Roman Empire into the Empire of the East, and the Empire of the West, under the sons of Theodosius the Great, and the subsequent conquest of the Western Empire by the barbarians, which gave the immense superiority in arts, science, learning, civilization, to the Eastern. Greek pride revolted at the idea of submitting to the pontiff whose see was no longer the seat of the first empire of the world. The pope was not responsible for the schism, but we will not say that no responsibility attaches to the Western secular powers, especially the Frank and German emperors. They did not always treat the Greek em-

perors with justice, and in the religious crisis, they took care to arouse the national pride, and to embitter the national feeling of the more highly cultivated, but less vigorous East. We have no doubt that the East had legitimate causes of complaint against the West, not against the see of Rome, but against those who claimed to be the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire, and who did to a certain extent defend the Holy See in her Western relations.

But we must proceed to other matters.

"You urge that the Church of Rome is the only apostolic and primitive church. In my previous letters I have pointed out to you its numerous departures from the divine word, the rules of the apostles, and ancient usages. Let me draw your attention to a few others. The pope of Rome claims to unite spiritual and temporal power, but St. Paul, in his directions to Timothy, an early bishop, expressly charges him to be the soldier of Christ, and not to entangle himself with the affairs of this life. The apostolic canons, which contain the rules by which the church was governed in the second and third centuries, expressly provide, 'Let not a bishop, or a priest, or a deacon, undertake temporal office, but if he should, let him be expelled.' How can you reconcile with this *rule*, the triple crown worn by the bishop of Rome, when he assumes the office of a temporal prince at his coronation? How can you reconcile the various and discordant practices of the monks and the monastic life, with the teaching of our Saviour or his apostles, or the earliest usages of the primitive church? Where do you find in Holy Writ directions to found monasteries, or directions to one class of monks or friars to eat fish, and to another to eat herbs on certain days, or imperative orders to some to use sandals, to others to go barefoot, to some to wear woolens, to others to dress in linen, to one set to put on white and another black apparel, or prescribing a broad tonsure to some, and a narrow tonsure to others. I am well aware there were enthusiasts and devotees in the first three centuries, that even devout and pious men sought retirement, and even St. John, in his old age (and he lived nearly a century), fled from persecution to the Isle of Patmos, where he had heavenly visions, but I can find no early authority for monasteries and monastic rules. On the contrary, St. Augustine expressly condemns the idle monks who made their appearance in his day, and lived upon others. 'We cannot tell (he observes) whether they became monks to serve God, or being weary of a life of poverty and want, were desirous to be fed and clothed in indolence.' Again he remarks, 'they serve not God, but their own low appetites,' and calls the alms they obtain, 'the gains of a lucrative poverty, the reward of a *pretended holiness*.' And Theodoret, A. D. 420, speaks of *monasteries* as dens of thieves, and commends bishop Letoius because he had 'chased the wolves from the fold,'

when he overthrew and burned the Thessalian monasteries. And again, Cardinal Pole, reporting to Pope Paul III., Pope of Rome, A. D. 1534, under a commission to view the disorders and deformities of the church, remarks, 'Another abuse there is to be reformed in the orders of monks and friars, for many of them are so vile that they are a shame unto the seculars, and with their example do much ill; as for conventual orders we think it good they should be *all abolished.*' Remember, this is the *official testimony* of an eminent Roman Catholic to the pope, of the vices and impurity of hosts of monks and friars. The church you consider *apostolic*, then overflowed with such *pretended holiness.*"—pp. 59–61.

We have already shown that Mr. Derby has proved nothing of what he here alleges. The canons he cites, bating his accustomed inaccuracy of transcription and translation, are in force now in the Roman Catholic Church. Yet these canons were never understood as prohibiting bishops from looking after the temporalities of the church. The states governed by the pope in their temporalities are the states of the church, the patrimony of St. Peter, and as such naturally and legitimately fall under the government of the visible head of the church, the successor of Peter. To object to this is to object to the church having any temporalities, any revenues, an objection which, we suspect, the author's dear friends, the Anglican bishops, will reluctantly sustain. The government of the temporalities of the church belongs to the ecclesiastical authority, and the church in apostolic times administered her own goods, and for this purpose appointed proper officers of her own.

The jurist is a queer reasoner. Some monks wear a white habit, some black, some gray, some woolen, and some linen, therefore the church of Rome is neither primitive nor apostolic. There is no refuting such a reasoner. He says he cannot find any early authority for monastic rules, therefore he concludes the church of Rome has departed from the word of God, is condemned by Holy Writ, and is not the primitive or apostolic church. "St. Augustine condemned idle monks." Very likely, and yet St. Augustine lived according to a monastic rule, and founded a monastic order which still subsists. Suppose Cardinal Pole did recommend the abolition of all the monastic orders; he was not pope, and the pope does not appear to have approved his recommendation. Because there were idle or vicious monks, therefore the church of Rome is not apostolic. Because Judas Iscariot betrayed our Lord, therefore our Lord was not the Son of God and the true Messiah, is an argu-

ment equally conclusive. Have there been no unholy bishops or ministers in the Anglican establishment? The church is responsible for those only who obey her laws and follow her precepts.

"But let us glance for a moment at auricular confession. I do not mean to argue that our Saviour and his apostles did not direct us to confess our sins, but where do you find in the gospels, acts, and letters of the apostles, or apostolic canons, a rule for females to confess in private to the priest, their sins, in thought, word, or deed? And permit me to ask, whether, down to A. D. 1560, it was not a question in the Church of Rome, on what authority rested auricular confession, the *canonists* saying it was appointed 'by the positive law of man,' and the *schoolmen* urging it was appointed by the law of God. Has not the practice been shamefully abused by dissolute priests and friars, and when we find the doctors of the Church of Rome disagree as to the sanction for such a practice, and gross abuses attendant, are we not safe in its rejection?"—p. 61.

We do not accept Mr. Derby as the expounder of the rules and canons of the church. It seems he does not like auricular confession. He is not alone in that. Even many Catholics have a very great repugnance to it, so strong a repugnance that we are sure that if it had not been established by divine authority it never could have been established at all. The author is very much disturbed at the idea of females confessing in private to a priest. We did not know that they did confess in private, and certain we are that there is no canon requiring them to do so. The confession is private of course, but not therefore must they be in private when they make it. Private confession has been abused, says the author, and we know few good things that have not been or may not be abused. But how does he explain a well-known fact that those Catholic mothers who frequent the confessional themselves, and are the most anxious to preserve the purity of their daughters, are precisely those who are the most anxious to send their daughters to confession? There is, no doubt, corruption in many Catholics, but it is precisely the greatest among those Catholics who the most neglect confession. There is, however, little propriety in a New England Protestant jurist talking about the corrupting influence of the confessional. Within the memory of persons now living, grown-up men and women wishing to join the Congregational churches were required to walk up the broad aisle, and make a public confession before the whole congregation, of the sins of

impurity they had committed, and their confession was entered upon the church records, and preserved in its archives. These old church records of New England tell some queer tales, and prove, with regard to our Puritan ancestors, that all is not gold that glisters, and that nature revenged herself not unfrequently for the outrages she received. The Gospel morality is impracticable without the grace of the sacraments.

"Did our Saviour or his apostles or their successors, the earliest bishops, or the canons of the primitive church, for centuries, require the applicant for baptism, as a condition precedent, to swear obedience to a temporal prince?"—(p. 61.) Most likely not, for nothing of the sort is required of an applicant for baptism now. "Or to the bishops of Rome?" No oath of the sort is exacted now, except in the case of adults who have grown up in heresy or unbelief; yet we suppose in the earliest ages as now the candidate for baptism, either personally or through his sponsors, was required to profess the Catholic faith, to renounce the devil, and promise to keep the commandments of God; and obedience to the pope, as visible head of the church, is included in those commandments he promises to keep. If no special promise of obedience to the successor of Peter was exacted of adults, it was because no one in those early ages doubted the primacy of Peter, or questioned the authority of his successor. But did the early church impose on the Christian the oath of supremacy imposed now in England upon Anglicans? What is there more improper in taking an oath to obey in spiritual matters the spiritual head of the church, than in taking the oath which Mr. Derby himself as a lawyer has taken of fidelity to the constitution of the United States and to that of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts?

"With these prefatory remarks, cited from standard Catholic authorities, I recur to your two positions: that the Church of Rome has always preserved her unity, and that there were no dissenters from her authority before the time of Luther.

"If the church claims a derivation from the primitive church, was not that unity broken, by her abandonment of her Eastern churches, with at least two-thirds of all the bishops, churches, presbyters, and Christians, to which I have already referred? Is there any unity between the Greek and Roman churches at the present moment? Is there any unity between the Church of Rome and the Maronites, Nestorians, Armenians, or Abyssinian churches, which *have* existed for more than ten centuries? I would refer you also to Gibbon, where he shows the prevalence of the

Arian doctrines in the churches of the Roman Empire at the accession of Theodosius, 'who claimed the merit of subduing the Arian heresy, and was in fact the first emperor baptized in the faith of the trinity.' When he ascended the throne, A. D. 379, just after the death of Athanasius, the Arians, encouraged by the Emperor Valens, himself an Arian, held all the churches of Constantinople, more than one hundred in number."—pp. 63, 64,

That there were dissenters from the Catholic church before Luther, we have conceded, and we have very little patience with those silly Catholics who now and then assere the contrary. There are, no doubt, even Catholics who have a zeal for the church, which is not according to knowledge, and our task of defending the church would have been much lighter, if all who have undertaken that defence had been even moderately qualified to do it. Heresies there have been from the very times of the apostles, and we know no age which has been free from them. Luther was not the first to deny the authority of the pope as supreme governor and ruler of the church. So we let pass what the author says on that point,—a point no intelligent Catholic assumes.

The other point, that the church of Rome has preserved her unity, stands firm, notwithstanding all the learned jurist alleges. That the church of Rome has not maintained unity among all who have called themselves Christians, we of course concede, for otherwise we should be obliged to maintain that there have been and are no heresies and schisms in the nominally Christian world. But heretics and schismatics do not break the unity of the church, save in respect to themselves. They cease from the moment of becoming schismatics and heretics, to be members of the church, or of Christ's body, and they go out from the apostles as not of them. There were Arians in the empire, but not Arians in the church, as we have already shown in a former article. There is unity between the church of Rome and the Maronites, for the Maronites are Catholics in communion with the apostolic see. There is unity between Rome and a large portion of the Chaldean Christians, commonly called Nestorians, but none between her and those who adhere to the heresy of Nestorius, for they are not in her communion. The Armenians are in part Catholics and in part schismatics. A large portion of the nation is in communion with the see of Rome, and all acknowledge the primacy of Peter, and his successor, the bishop of Rome; but the schismatic portion allege that the pope gave the plenary authority for

their government to Gregory the Illuminator, and therefore that they are not now dependent on Rome. There is no unity of course between Rome and the schismatic Armenians, and none between her and the greater part of the Abyssinian churches. But what has this to do with the unity of the church of Rome? Her unity is preserved in the unity of the apostolic doctrine and apostolic authority, which she has maintained intact from the first. The Emperor Valens had no authority in the church, and she is not responsible for his acts.

Mr. Derby, in his tenth Letter, returns to his theory of an independent British church, founded by St. Paul, and continued by the present Anglican establishment. We cite his argument at length:—

"We derive this church from the English, which traces its bishops in direct succession from the apostles, and it will be my effort to prove that the Church of England was planted in Britain in the first century by St. Paul, or his immediate converts, and was for centuries entirely independent of Rome, governed by its own bishops and archbishops; that it has through every age struggled to preserve its independence, and in a greater or less degree opposed the errors of Rome, and now, purged of its errors, claims to be the true apostolic and Catholic Church. But before I trace the history and succession of this Church, let me briefly advert to its articles of faith and form of government. Its faith is founded on Holy Writ, the apostolic canons, and in part on the decisions of the earliest councils, including the great Council of Nice. If it has deviated materially from this primitive standard, point out the discrepancy. As respects the form of government, it is overlooked and guided by bishops, who trace their succession from the apostles. During feudal times, some of these were lords temporal in England. But no American bishop wields any temporal power, he bears here only the spiritual sword. As respects the office of bishop, the apostles at first appointed presbyters and deacons to direct the church under their guidance. This was in the infancy of the church. As the disciples increased, and the apostles pursued their mission in different regions, the more distinguished presbyters were selected as 'angeli or episcopi,' legates or bishops. James, supposed to be the brother of our Lord, presided at the first council at Jerusalem, and pronounced the decree, 'I judge,' &c., which was confirmed by his associates; and during the lifetime of St. John, in apostolic days, numerous bishops were appointed, for he addresses his Revelation from Patmos to the seven angels or bishops of the churches of Asia, namely, Ephesus, Smyrna, Pergamos, Thyatira, Sardis, Philadelphia, and Laodicea. The English bishops claim a succession from St. John, through Polycarp his disciple, bishop of Smyrna, and the great historian Eusebius, who had access to the early church records, has

preserved the succession of the bishops of Jerusalem, Rome, Alexandria, and Antioch, from the apostolic period down to A. D. 305, fifteen years before the Council of Nice, when he wrote his history. In his list, Linus, a friend of St. Paul, a *married man*, a prince of Britain, appears as *first* bishop of Rome, Amianus as first of Alexandria, James, presumed to be the brother of our Lord, as first of Jerusalem, and Evodius as first of Antioch; and by the same authority, Linus, bishop of Rome, presided over the church of that city from A. D. 67 to A. D. 79, when he was succeeded by Anacletus, and on his death, A. D. 91, by Clement. The liturgy of the Episcopal Church corresponds closely with that early used in the Church of Ephesus, ascribed by early history to St. John, and is traced from Britain to Lyons, and thence through Bishop Paulinus, a disciple of Polycarp, the pupil of St. John, to Smyrna and Ephesus, the seat of the favored apostle of our Lord.

"Let me invite your attention to the historical evidence that St. Paul first planted the Church in Britain. From those valuable documents, the Triads, preserved in the Welsh monasteries, it appears that about A. D. 52, Caradoc, a British prince, his son Brennus, and grandson Linus, were carried to Rome, and detained seven years in bondage. While in Rome they became converts to Christianity. At the end of seven years Brennus returned to Britain with Aristobulus, whose household St. Paul salutes in his Epistle to the Romans.

"This account is supported by Gildas, a British historian, A. D. 560, who affirms in the evidence of ancient records, that Christianity was introduced into Britain about the time of the revolt and overthrow of Boadicea, A. D. 61. Linus, the son of Brennus, of Britain, was probably ordained by St. Paul, first Bishop of Rome, and appears to have been his convert and particular friend, for he refers to him in his second Epistle to Timothy. Clement, another disciple of St. Paul, and *third bishop of Rome*, commended by that apostle in his Epistle to the Corinthians, A. D. 87, states, that St. Paul, in preaching the Gospel, 'went to the utmost bounds of the West,' which not only includes Britain, but is the very expression by which Britain was then described. Eusebius, A. D. 305, says, 'one of the apostles visited the British Isles,' and Theodoret, A. D. 415, mentions the Britons and Cimbrians as nations who had received laws from the apostles; and we are not to forget that St. Paul himself proposed to make a visit to Spain, a point still more remote.

"Were further confirmation wanting, the old writer Dorotheus mentions the fact that Aristobulus, the friend of St. Paul, was one of the first bishops of the British church, made many converts, ordained priests and deacons and bishops, and died in Britain. Aristobulus being a Greek, would of course carry with him the Eastern ritual, and this may explain the agreement between the Greek and British ritual, and the variance from the Roman. We may then safely infer, from the evidence of history, that St. Paul planted the Church in Britain between

A. D. 60 and A. D. 67, when he was beheaded at Rome, under the Emperor Nero. The Triads further prove that Lucius, a *grandson of Linus*, the first bishop of Rome, was permitted by the Romans to reign over part of Britain, and exerted himself to promote Christianity in Britain. The venerable Bede, the favorite author of King Alfred, records a severe persecution (A. D. 303) of the Christians in Britain, and the names of the first martyrs, Verolamus, Aaron, and Julius, the last of Legion, or Cair Leon, in Wales."—pp. 70–74.

The learned jurist appears to have two theories, which do not precisely harmonize. The one theory is, that the British church was founded by St. Paul, who it will be, recollected, our jurist maintains was the principal, if not sole, founder of the church of Rome; the other is, that it derived from St. John through the church of Ephesus in Asia. We hope in the second edition of his Letters, he will decide which of these two theories he will abide by, for we shall not allow him to hold both. With regard to the important historical documents he speaks of, all we have to say is, that the Welsh Triads have about as much historical authority as the romances of Arthur and his Knights of the Round Table, or of Charlemagne and his Twelve Paladins. There is not the slightest historical authority for supposing St. Paul ever visited Great Britain, and certain it is the British church was never reckoned among the churches founded by an apostle. The pretence that the church in Britain was derived from the Apostle St. John, through the church of Ephesus, has no foundation, except that there was, down to the time of Pope St. Victor, a difference as to the time of keeping Easter between certain churches of Asia Minor and the church of Rome, and there was also a difference in the sixth century on the same subject, between Rome and the British churches. But though there was a difference, it was not the same difference. The British Christians differed as much from Ephesus as they did from Rome. St. Linus was an Etruscan, the son of Herculanus, not a Welshman and grandson of Caradoc,—at least such is the best historical account of him extant. Whether St. Linus was a married man or not, does not disturb us, unless it be proved that he had a wife and lived with her as his wife while he was pope.

The controversy the learned jurist opens as to the original establishment of the church in Great Britain has a certain antiquarian interest, but it is not of the slightest importance in the question before us. St. Paul could not

have founded in Britain a church not one with the church Mr. Derby contends he founded in Rome. The church is a polity, a kingdom, and therefore must be, wherever it is, under one and the same regimen. It is only on this ground that there can be such a sin as schism. The supposition that the church in Britain was an independent church, complete in itself, would imply that it was different from the church in other countries, and therefore deny the unity of the church. But even suppose the British churches were independent of the apostolic see, that would not help the present Anglican establishment, for this establishment derives no apostolic succession from them, since they had, at the time it was founded, no apostolic succession, as they had no apostolic character, except what they had derived from communion with the see of Rome. If they had ever existed as distinct and independent churches, they had for ages ceased to exist as such. The Welsh prelates had, to say the least, for nearly a thousand years, maintained their apostolic succession only through the see of Peter, and any other channel through which it could be derived, if other channel there was, had long since ceased to exist for them. Even if the present Anglican establishment, which is not the fact, derived from them, as both they and it rejected the succession through Rome, it would not and could not have contained the original British churches, and through them have reached the apostles, and maintained an unbroken succession. The supposed or alleged British succession had been abandoned or lost, if it ever existed, by the connection with Rome and recognized dependence on the papal see. Independence of the papal see did not revive that succession, which had not merely been in abeyance, but had wholly lapsed. Supposing, then, the original British church was founded by St. Paul, and was independent of Rome, the Anglican establishment did not enter into the rights of that church with which it had never been connected, and from which it was separated by a distance of a thousand years. This fact alone would be fatal to the church claims of the establishment. During the period of its union with the see of Peter, it was catholic, or it was not. If it was, it is not now, because it has separated from that see; if it was not, it also is not now, because during all that period it wanted the apostolic succession, and as it was united with no other see, that by another channel connects with the apostles, it is not catholic, for the church must be catholic

in time as well as space, and it can be catholic in time only by means of an unbroken apostolic succession.

Mr. Derby proceeds on the false assumption, that bishops, if validly consecrated, can transmit the apostolic succession, thus resolving the apostolic succession into simple episcopal succession. There is no doubt that the episcopal succession, although it has not been in the so-called church of England, may be kept in heresy or schism. Heretical or schismatical bishops may be validly consecrated, and may confer valid orders, and if orders were what is meant by apostolic succession, that succession might be claimed by heretics and schismatics. Indeed, no one validly ordained could be regarded as a schismatic or a heretic,—certainly not as a schismatic. But the succession essential to the church is not simply the *episcopal* succession, but the *apostolic* succession, and this is not simply a succession of orders, but also a succession of authority. Orders carry with them a character, and an indelible character, but they do not carry with them jurisdiction, or the authority to exercise episcopal functions. The church of Christ is apostolic, not simply episcopal, and bishops are successors of the apostles only in the respect that the apostles were bishops, and can transmit only the episcopal, not the apostolic succession. Take the case of the British bishops, as Mr. Derby presents it; they could have transmitted only the episcopal succession, for that was all they had; but the episcopal succession is simply a succession of orders, not of authority or jurisdiction. This would have given to the establishment no apostolic character, and no participation in the apostolate which our Lord established. The apostolate is above the episcopate, and is under God the origin and source of all authority in the church. Our Lord placed, as St. Paul tells us, apostles first, that is, made the apostolic authority the supreme authority in his church. Bishops, by the simple fact that they are bishops, do not participate in this authority, for if they did no bishop could be deprived, even for schism or heresy, since the episcopal as the sacerdotal character is indelible. The episcopal character of itself carries with it no jurisdiction, no authority whatever, and the bishop can licitly perform no episcopal function till authorized or assigned his jurisdiction by the apostolic authority. The Greek schismatic bishops have orders, and are real bishops, but they have no rightful jurisdiction, have no authority to govern the faithful, and no voice in defining the faith,

simply because they have not the apostolic succession, or have interrupted it, by breaking away from the apostolic see. The church must be apostolic as well as episcopal, as even Anglicans themselves virtually concede in asserting, though falsely, for themselves the apostolic succession.

That orders do not of themselves carry with them apostolic authority, or jurisdiction, even Anglicans must and do admit. Their bishops receive the episcopal character from their brother bishops, but not their jurisdiction, or authority to exercise their episcopal functions. That they receive from the crown or civil power, which, though it preserves for them a civil, can hardly be said to preserve for them the apostolic succession. Anglicans were more consequent than are our American episcopalians. They saw clearly enough that episcopacy was not in itself a governing authority, and having resolved to reject all ecclesiastical authority above bishops, they transferred the governing authority, hitherto exercised in the church, from the papacy to the crown, and as they were aware that with bishops alone they could not retain the church, they merged it in the state, and made the bishops simply civil functionaries. The archbishop of Canterbury may be a prelate, but he is a civil not an ecclesiastical prelate. The episcopalians with us, having no civil power to govern them, no king or queen to be their head and governor, are acephalous, and without authority of any kind. They have bishops in name, but no authority to assign them a diocese, and authorize them to exercise their episcopal functions. Their convention is a self-constituted body, and is a ridiculous attempt to extract something from nothing. The bishops distributively have no power to confer jurisdiction, how can they then collectively? Can the whole be more than the sum of the parts?

But passing over this; it is clear that what Mr. Derby calls the church of England has and can have neither catholicity nor apostolicity, both of which even he concedes to be essential marks of the true church. It is not catholic, for it is national, and there is a period of nearly a thousand years when it had no existence; and it is not apostolic, because, in the first place, it neither, in itself alone, nor by any other communion with which it is united, extends back to the time of the apostles, and because, in the second place, it has no apostolic succession, without which it is idle to pretend to apostolicity. The apostolic

succession is not simply the succession of orders and doctrine, neither of which, by the way, has the Church of England, but also, and chiefly, the succession of the apostolic authority. If any thing is certain, it is that our Lord established the apostolate in his church as well as the episcopate, and that, if the apostolate, as distinguished from the episcopate, survives at all, it survives in the see of St. Peter, the Roman see, or, as we Catholics say, the apostolic see. No other see can pretend to it. Whether it survives in that see or not, we do not at present inquire; we only say that it survives there or nowhere, and no church not in communion with it can be apostolic, or any thing more than episcopal. But the Anglican church has no communion with the Roman see, and, therefore, is certainly not apostolic, and in fact it does not in reality profess to be apostolic, at least in this country, for here it calls itself the Protestant *Episcopal* Church. The attempt of the author to prove it catholic and apostolic, is as miserable a failure as his attempt to prove the papacy a usurpation.

The author makes, as he proceeds, various historical statements, which prove him as indifferent a historian as he is a theologian or a jurist. He is in general not better versed in history than he is in patrology, and cites historians almost as inaccurately as he does the fathers. We cannot take up and correct all his misstatements, for to do so would compel us to cite nearly his whole volume, and that is more than we dare inflict on our readers; we must however make one extract more, *apropos* of the church of England.

"Between the visit of Austin, A. D. 603, and the Norman conquest, A. D. 1066, various councils of bishops were held in England, and repeated efforts made to establish the power of the pope, but there was not at any one of them a recognition of his authority, although he was permitted to introduce monks and monasteries. Both the British and Saxon churches remained independent until the invasion of the Duke of Normandy, when they were merged in one, entirely independent of Papal authority. Under the Norman kings the pope of Rome resumed his efforts for supremacy in Britain, and sent a legate to that country. William II. made Anselm Archbishop of Canterbury, and he acknowledged the authority of Pope Urban, and for this the whole body of bishops at Rockingham *renounced* their allegiance to Anselm, and after this he was not permitted to convene councils or fill up vacant dioceses.

"Henry I. allowed no appeals to the pope without license from the king, and required the bishops to attend the councils of the nation. He maintained his ground against all opposition. Under the degenerate Stephen, papal encroachments were made, but his successor, Henry II.,

called a council at *Clarendon*, A. D. 1164, composed of archbishops, bishops, abbots, lords, and barons, which enacted sixteen canons that gave a most effectual check to the influence of the pope for several centuries. These canons provided among other things that the clergy should be amenable to the secular power, should not leave the realm without the king's consent, and have no right to appeal to the pope; that the election of bishops should be invalid until confirmed by the king, and that no freeholder should be laid under interdict without the consent of the king or his chief justice. These canons were condemned and revoked by Pope Alexander, but notwithstanding this, were confirmed by kings, lords, and clergy, at a council held at Northampton, A. D. 1176, in the presence of the pope's legate, were long enforced, and for centuries formed the bulwark of the Church of England. During the reign of Richard I., who died A. D. 1199, these canons were strictly observed, but under the pusillanimous John, renewed efforts were made by the pope to subject England to his sway, and that imbecile monarch swore fealty to him, and allowed Peter pence to be collected. His successor, Henry III., acquiesced in silence, but the opposition of the clergy was aroused, they complained to the king, and appealed from the pope to a general council for redress.

"The three Edwards, who reigned from the death of Henry III., A.D. 1272 to 1377, held the reins with a firmer hand than the two weak kings who preceded them, and during their reigns the pretensions of the pope were successfully resisted. By a series of statutes the king was empowered to reverse sentences of excommunication, the donation of John to the pope declared invalid, the remittance of funds to Rome strictly prohibited, parties appealing to Rome declared traitors and outlaws, taxes were levied on the clergy, and when Boniface VIII., by his bull, A. D. 1296, forbid the clergy to pay such taxes, and excommunicated those who laid them, the king, by a decree of *outlawry*, sanctioned by the lay peers, enforced submission.

"From the death of Edward III., A. D. 1377, until A. D. 1422, under Henry IV. and V., other restrictive statutes were passed, forbidding the sale of indulgences, and prohibiting aliens from holding benefices in England, except priors, who were required to find sureties for their compliance with the laws of the realm, for which see the statutes of England."—pp. 75–77.

It is not true, that, from the time of St. Austin to the Norman conquest, both the British and Saxon churches were independent of Rome. The British prelates may have, during a part of that period, objected to the authority of the Anglo-Saxon metropolitans, but they acknowledged the authority of the papal see. The Anglo-Saxon church was founded by missionaries sent by Pope St. Gregory I., and of all the national churches in the world the most devoted

to the apostolic see, and in which the successor of Peter found the least resistance to his authority. It was precisely during this period that England was called by the pope, *Insula Sanctorum*, Island of Saints. The papal legate was received, and in general his authority was recognized by the government. Even the outlines of the English constitution were transmitted by Pope Adrian I. through his legate to England, and adopted on his presentation by the bishops, the prince, and the nobility; and it was precisely after the Danish invasions, and at the period of the Norman conquest, that systematic resistance on the part of the king and his courtiers, lay and cleric, to the pope began. Almost the reverse of what Mr. Derby pretends is the case. To be satisfied of this one needs but read the letters of St. Gregory VII. to William the Conqueror.

"Under the Norman kings the pope of Rome resumed his efforts for supremacy in Britain, and sent a legate to that country." Just as if he never sent a legate to that country before. The pope resumed no efforts for supremacy in Britain, which the church in England had always acknowledged. His efforts were to make the Norman kings respect what had been always the rights of the church. The bishops did not renounce St. Anselm, because he acknowledged the papal authority, for the question did not turn on the authority of the pope; but ostensibly because he acknowledged Urban II. to be the legitimate pope, in a case of disputed succession, before the church in England had done so; yet really because he had fallen under the displeasure of that monster William Rufus. It was not bishops that originated the difficultes that St. Anselm had to encounter, but the king who wished to enslave the church, and secure to himself her revenues. Lingard, in the place cited by Mr. Derby, as was to be suspected, does not sustain the author's statement.

"Henry I. allowed no appeals to the pope without license from the king." What then? Does Mr. Derby expect us to take the oppressive acts of a civil tyrant as ecclesiastical authority? We know very well that the Norman kings undertook to destroy the papal authority in the English church, and with but too much success. A movement was commenced against the papacy by William the Conqueror, which on the part of the civil power was continued down to Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Elizabeth. As far as the kings and courtiers could render the church in England independent of the pope, they did it, and in doing it,

were too often aided by unworthy bishops; but kings, though they may oppress the church, have no authority in the church, and it is a little too bad to hold her responsible for the acts of which she is the victim. What should we think of a writer who should argue that the Catholic hierarchy in England now, at the head of which is his Eminence, Cardinal Wiseman, is independent of Rome, because the English government passed against it The Ecclesiastical Titles Act? Yet he would only argue as does our learned jurist. The acts against appeals to Rome, the Clarendon constitutions, the law of *Præmunire*, and all others which show that the sovereign wished to trammel the exercise of the papal power in England, cited by Mr. Derby, prove, if you will, that the kings were anti-papal, and oppressed the church, but they do not prove that the church did not recognize her dependence on the papal see. They prove, so far as they prove any thing, that she did, and that the civil tyrants wished to break that dependence, and render her solely dependent on themselves, so as to be able to despoil her and tyrannize, more at their ease.

Mr. Derby is a degenerate Puritan, and forgets the principle on which his ancestors separated from the Anglican establishment. They denied, in their stern way, the authority of the state in spirituals, and asserted, in principle, the independence of the church. They erred in doctrine, they erred as to the constitution of the church, but they would have been hung, drawn, and quartered, sooner than have admitted the civil power had any authority in the church. Mr. Derby, as a true Anglican, knows no distinction between church and state, and takes the action of the state in a given country as the exponent of the faith, and discipline of the church in that country. The Roman emperors at one time favored Arianism, exiled Catholic bishops, and intruded Arians into their sees, and hence he concludes that the church then was Arian. In England, he finds on the part of the king and parliament, a long series of acts hostile to the spiritual supremacy of the Holy See, and hence concludes that the church in England was independent of the apostolic see, anti-papal, and that the papal authority, opposed by the civil power, was illegitimate, a usurpation. The civil power with him is always right, and the ecclesiastical always wrong; kings are infallible and impeccable, but the popes are always fallible and peccable. Kings are never ambitious or grasping when they war against the popes; popes are

always insolent, grasping, ambitious, tyrannical, when they oppose kings and defend the rights of religion. The man really does not seem to know that he talks like a simpleton or a madman. For our part we believe that God is King of kings, and Lord of lords, that the pope is his vicegerent on earth, and that when pope and Cæsar are in conflict, Cæsar is in the wrong. Religion is the supreme law, and its representative is to be obeyed in preference to Cæsar, who represents only the state. We give to Cæsar what belongs to him, but we do not make him the arbiter of our faith, or the keeper of our conscience. We acknowledge in him no spiritual competency.

The jurist, no doubt, wishes us as well as others to regard him as an intelligent and fair-minded man, and we suppose he would feel insulted were we to call him a pettifogger; but, although he is only a fair sample of anti-popery writers, we can conceive nothing more unjust or unfair than his whole line of argument from beginning to end. Our readers know that we make it a point of honor and of conscience to represent the views and arguments of our opponents fairly, and to reply to them in the same manner. Many a man may find in our pages his objections to our views put in a clearer and stronger light than he had himself put them. We make it a rule to meet an opponent in his strength, not in his weakness, and answer his objections in their real meaning, without any chicanery, or the substitution of any false or collateral issue. We write never to win a victory, but always to elicit, defend, or recommend the truth, and we cannot understand how a Christian or even a man who respects himself can do otherwise, and yet we have rarely met a man who, in arguing against Catholicity, consents to meet the question on its merits. There is less both of candor and clear sharp intelligence in popular writers, and even writers of reputation, than is commonly supposed. Some of the criticisms of our own religious friends, as well as enemies, confirm us in this. There are few men who can write without prejudice, fewer still, perhaps, who can go at once to the heart of a question, and seize vividly and firmly the principle on which it hinges.

Mr. Derby is not a great man, is not really a learned man, but he is, as the world goes, a man of more than average abilities and attainments; yet his line of argument against Catholicity proves that he writes without conviction, and without reflection. It is clear from his pages that he has

never inquired what is the truth in the case, but simply asked what he can say against the church that may appear plausible to those who know nothing of the subject, or that will require time and labor on the part of Catholics to refute. Thus, wishing to disprove the unity of the church of Rome, he proves that there have been in all ages heretics and schismatics, or persons who have denied her doctrines and her authority. He alleges what nobody denies, and which has nothing to do with the question. What he proves would be to his purpose, only on condition that instead of anathematizing the heresies he enumerates, she had adopted them, and had herself authorized the schisms alleged. He wishes to deny the church's claim to catholicity, and alleges to sustain his denial that there are sects, and nations even, that reject her, forgetting that his objection could have been urged with far greater force against Christianity itself in the days of the apostles than it can be against the church now. Why does he not argue that our Lord did not die for all men, because there are millions who do not own him, and will never accept his offers of pardon, and salvation. He wishes to prove that the papal power is a usurpation, and that the pope has no right to govern the church, and he quotes the acts of kings, parliaments, courtiers, and worldly churchmen, resisting the papal authority as his proof, just as if these acts were the acts of the church herself, or as if kings, parliaments, courtiers, jurisconsults and false-hearted prelates, who side with power in order to save their heads or their revenues, were the authoritative expounders of God's law. Has the jurist ever studied a single Treatise on Evidence, or attained to any comprehension of what is or is not pertinent evidence in a case? We fear not; if he has, he certainly has profited little by it. Yet, in reading what he has alleged in his effort to prove the church in England was always independent of Rome, we cannot help feeling that much of the heresy and schism which now afflict the world, is owing to a grave neglect in the middle ages on the part of pastors to instruct sufficiently the mass of the faithful in the true papal character of the church. There were not sufficient pains taken to make the people understand that the church is built by our Lord on Peter, and that where Peter is, there is the church. The papal supremacy was never palatable to the human nature which even bishops to some extent retain, and was always offensive to Cæsar. Hence in every nation there was and is strong temptation to diminish rather than enlarge the papal

prerogatives, and to make as little depend on the papacy as possible. Millions of Catholics in the middle ages lived and died without any explicit understanding of the real office and significance of the papacy. Hence, Cæsar was able to command the support even of good Catholics against the sovereign pontiff. Godfrey of Bouillon fought in the army of Henry, king of the Germans, after that monster had been excommunicated and deposed by Pope St. Gregory VII.

Happily in our times a better spirit prevails, and Catholics generally turn with affection, devotion, and reverence to the see of Peter. They very generally regard the church now as essentially papal, not merely episcopal as Cæsar would have them regard her. Cæsar has lost the greater part of his influence in spirituals, and there probably has never, since the downfall of the Western Roman Empire, been a more cordial submission of the prelates, and the great body of the faithful, to the successor of Peter than now. The palmy days of Anglicanism, Gallicanism, and Josephism are past, as the unanimity and joy with which the whole Catholic world has received the papal definition, declaring the Immaculate Conception of our Lady to be of faith, has been received, abundantly proves. The papal triumph is complete, and a glorious future opens before the Church.

ARTICLE V.

In our previous articles on Mr. Derby's book we have disposed of his first ten letters, which in reality cover the whole ground occupied by the author. His eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth chapters are taken up with further attempts to disprove the papacy from the Scriptures and the fathers, and to set aside the arguments usually adduced by Catholics in support of the primacy of Peter. We do not perceive that he has added any thing of importance to what he had advanced in his previous letters, and which have been already sufficiently answered. A few general remarks will close all we choose to say. Mr. Derby commits the grave mistake of supposing that he can conclude against the papacy and the primacy of Peter from the silence of the Scriptures and of particular fathers. He proceeds on the assumption that the Scriptures are the charter of the church, and that nothing can be affirmed of her that cannot be deduced by strict construction from the letter of the charter. He even gives his son to understand that in this both Catholics

and Protestants agree; but this is a great mistake. Whether his assumption of the Bible as the charter of the church be well-founded or not, he has no right in an argument against Catholics to make it, for they deny it, and he must, if he would conclude any thing against them, prove it, before undertaking to found an argument on it.

According to Catholic doctrine, the Bible, though the inspired and authoritative word of God, is not the charter or act of incorporation of the church; for the church existed prior to the written word. It is historically certain that the church existed with all her rights and powers before one line of the New Testament was written. It is evident, from the very face of the New Testament, that its books and epistles were written after the institution of the church, and addressed to the church as already existing. This much is undeniable. Catholics therefore deny that the church was founded by the Scriptures, or that she is obliged to consult them as her act of incorporation. They hold that the church was founded immediately by our Lord in person, that her charter is in the commission or authority which he gave to the apostles, and which derives from his continued presence with her all days to the consummation of the world. The church, in their view, is the body of Christ, as St. Augustine says, is Christ, and the body of believers in union with him are the whole Christ, *totus Christus*, as the soul and body united in their living union are the total man. The charter of the church is in her internal constitution and life, as the living body of our Lord, and her rights and powers are in and from him living in her, and speaking and operating in and through her as his own body, or the visible continuation or representation on earth of the Incarnation. We say his *own* body; for the church is not a foreign body, having relation with him only through the medium of an external commission, or, if Mr. Derby pleases, a written power of attorney. She is his spouse, flesh of his flesh and one with him, having her personality in his divine person. She has no more need on her own account of appealing to the Bible to prove that she is God's church than a man has of appealing to an external authority to prove to himself that he is a man, not an ox or a horse. The evidence is in her own intimate consciousness, for she is the living impersonation on earth of the incarnate Word, and can no more mistake her rights and powers than he can mistake his.

The question at present is not whether this view of the

church be true or not, for it is no part of our present purpose to prove the truth of Catholicity. We are simply showing that Mr. Derby's reasons, addressed to his son to dissuade him from joining our church, are not good reasons. It is sufficient for this purpose, that the view we have given is the Catholic view,—is the Catholic doctrine, and therefore, in an argument against Catholics, a doctrine the Protestant must recognize as their doctrine, and as one which he must disprove before he can assume, even if he can then assume, that the Bible is the charter of the church, and can have no rights or powers not deducible by strict construction from its letter. The consideration is of high importance, and intimately affects the principle of interpretation. On the Protestant hypothesis the church is nothing, has no rights or powers not positively affirmed in the Scriptures; on the Catholic doctrine, she must be conceded to be and to possess all she claims, unless expressly, or by necessary implication, denied or forbidden in the written word.

On this point, Protestants fall, consciously or unconsciously, into a miserable sophism. The Catholic asserts, the church has always asserted, the divine inspiration and authority of the written word, and with a distinctness and emphasis that no Protestant sect does or can. Therefore, says the Protestant, the Catholic does and must found the church on the Bible. Not at all. If both the church and the Bible are from God, there can, of course, be no discrepancy between them, as there can be none between revelation and reason; but it no more follows from this that the Bible is the foundation of the church, than it does that reason is the basis of revelation. Revelation is made to reason and presupposes it; the written word is addressed or communicated to the church, and presupposes her existence and constitution. If the church did or could teach any thing contrary to the written word, her claims would, indeed, be refuted; not because the authority of the written word is greater than hers, but because she would thus be convicted of contradicting herself, since she herself declares the written word to be the word of God, and therefore infallibly true. But on her principle nothing can be concluded against her from the silence of Scripture. So long as there is no positive contradiction in Scripture of her teaching, her claims stand good. By declaring the written word to be the word of God, she necessarily includes its teaching in hers, and if she teaches elsewhere any thing

incompatible with what she teaches in it, she of course contradicts herself, and must be rejected; but no argument can be framed against her, from the fact that she teaches things not in the written word, so long as these things are in harmony or capable of being harmonized with it; for it may well be that the whole doctrine of Christ is not contained in the Scriptures, that all was not written, and that even what was written, can be properly understood only through the light of the fuller, more explicit, and more complete revelation made primarily to the church, without any written medium.

On Catholic principles, it is not necessary to prove from the Scriptures that our Lord conferred the primacy on Peter and established the papacy in his successors in the see of Rome. The uniform teaching and tradition of the church suffices for that, in case the contrary cannot be shown from the written word. This rule applies to tradition universally. In no case are we required to prove the tradition from the Bible, and all we can be required to do is to show that the Bible does not contradict it, or necessarily exclude it. The same principle must be adopted in interpreting the texts of Scripture adduced in favor or against any particular doctrine or claim of the church. The presumption, in law, Mr. Derby must be jurist enough to be aware, is on the side of the church. Suppose a text is adduced, which may without violence to the letter be understood either against or in favor of the church; in which sense must it be taken? The Protestant assumes, against the church, and he might not be wrong, if the Protestant rule that the Bible is the charter of the church were once solidly established; but till then, it must be understood in favor of the church. She has the right to claim as not against her every text which can without violence be explained in a manner compatible with her claims, and also as decidedly for her every text which can without violence be explained in her favor. Suppose that the Protestant succeeds in showing that one of our proof texts is susceptible of a sense which does not prove our doctrine; he does nothing to his purpose, if we are able at the same time to show that it is fairly susceptible of a meaning in favor of the church. The presumption being on our side, and against the Protestant, determines the text in favor of the Catholic.

Mr. Derby goes into an examination of the texts usually cited by Catholics from the New Testament, to prove that

our Lord did confer the primacy of order and jurisdiction on Peter, and shows, or thinks he shows, that they do not of themselves necessarily prove it. We are far from conceding that he succeeds in this; but even supposing he does, he has effected nothing, because he has done it only by virtue of his Protestant assumption, that nothing can be affirmed of the church not positively affirmed in Scripture, and because there is no question that these same texts may easily and naturally be understood in the Catholic sense. He also alleges other passages, which he regards as contradicting the claims of the church. But all of these may be explained easily and naturally in accordance with those claims, and therefore prove nothing against us, even supposing they could without violence be understood, as he professes to understand them. So in explaining the fathers. Nothing can be alleged against us from a particular father, that is susceptible of a sense compatible with Catholic doctrine, and every thing must be taken as for us that is susceptible of being explained in our favor.

We do not deny that this rule gives apparently the advantage to the Catholic, and denies that in the use of Scripture and tradition he and the Protestant stand on an equal footing. The reason is, because the church is in possession, and the presumption is in her favor. Protestants and Catholics stand on equal footing only when they reason from a common principle; but they do not reason from a common principle when Mr. Derby assumes that the church derives her authority from God through the medium of the written word, for the Catholic asserts that she derives it immediately from our Lord in person, who continues with her all days to the end of the world. Mr. Derby, as seeking to disprove the church, can avail himself of no presumption against her, while she having from time immemorial asserted what she now asserts, and had her assertion admitted, has the right to every presumption, and to throw the *onus probandi* on every one who rises up to contradict her claims, and oust her from her possession. The Protestant can restore equality in interpreting the testimony of Scripture and tradition only either by positively disproving her existence and constitution in the sense she alleges, or by positively establishing his rule that the church is founded not on Christ and his apostles, but on the written word. In not doing either, Mr. Derby labors, no doubt, under grave disadvantages. Till then he does nothing by means of texts

or authorities which *may* be understood in a sense against us, or by showing that our texts and authorities *may* be understood in a sense which does not support us. In both cases it is incumbent on him to show that they *must*, not merely *may* be understood in the sense he alleges.

We have dwelt at length on this point, because Protestant controversialists, so far as our experience extends, invariably overlook it. They forget that the Catholic maintains that our Lord founded his religion through the institution of the church, and would persuade us that he only inspired certain holy men in divers places and times to write a series of books, which collected and bound in a single volume we call the Bible, or the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. Because we assert the divine origin, constitution, and authority of the church, as the living depositary and teacher of the faith, they run away with the notion that we are at least wanting in proper reverence for the written word of God, when, in fact, we are the only people on earth who really believe the Scriptures to be that written word, who recognize their divine authority, and treat the sacred text with the reverence due to it. Because we deny that the Scriptures are, ever were, or were ever intended to be the charter of the church, it by no means follows that we do not hold them to be really and truly God's word, and reverence their authority as such. Because we believe our Lord makes his revelation primarily to the church without any written medium, and that the Holy Ghost is always present in her to bring all his words to her remembrance, and to assist her to preserve, to understand, and to teach it infallibly, it does not follow that we do not recognize the authority of the same revelation in the written word, in so far as the written word contains it. It is very possible to believe truly and firmly that the Scriptures are the word of God, authentic and authoritative, without holding the Protestant notion that the church derives her authority from God through them. The Scriptures addressed to the church, may be good evidence of her constitution and authority, without being her charter or act of incorporation. They may be, too, a record made by the hand of the Almighty of the principal doctrines he has communicated to her, and teaches through her, and as such of priceless value, without thereby diminishing her authority, or casting the slightest suspicion on the fulness and integrity of the revelation made to her.

The great difficulty with the Protestant is, that he does not believe in the church, the Holy Catholic Church, of the creed, as a real and truly divine institution; and he lacks all conception of her as a living organism with its own unity and central life. To whatever sect he belongs, the Protestant is essentially a Nestorian, and fails to recognize in our Lord the two for ever distinct natures in one person. He dissolves Christ, and regards the human and the divine simply as associated in a common work, each with its own proper personality, not as united in the one divine person by a hypostatic union. Hence he fails to regard the church as a person, and having her personality in the divine person of our Lord. In his mind the church is not the living body of Christ, living his life, and one in the unity of his person, but separate from him, a mass of individuals aggregated around a doctrine, a discipline, or a form of worship. He has no conception of the church as the mystic body of Christ; mystically, indeed, but really united to him as the body to the head, so that each sympathizes with the other, the body with the head, the head with the body, and each member with the whole, and the whole and each with each. Neither his philosophy nor his theology rises to the conception of that solidarity of Christian life, so distinctly and so energetically asserted by the great apostle of the gentiles, "As in a body we have many members, ... so we being many are one body in Christ, and each one, members of one another."—(Rom. xii. 4, 5.) "As the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of the body being one, are nevertheless one body, so also Christ. . . If one member suffer any thing, all the members suffer it; or if one member glory, all the members rejoice with it. *Now ye are the body of Christ and member of member.*"—(1 Cor. xii., 12, 26, 27.) Therefore, as the same apostle tells us elsewhere, the church is "one body with one spirit." These pregnant passages really mean nothing to the Protestant. His views are external, formal, cold, lifeless. To his mind the church is wholly outward, material, a body without a soul, without interior unity or life. Her authority, if authority she has, in his view, must come from abroad, through an external medium, not from within, from her own interior life, light, and ability, by virtue of the indwelling Christ, whose body she is. To his conception Christ is not in her, but apart from her, and her light and ability are only the light and ability of the individuals

aggregated, and her authority only that conveyed in the written power of attorney formally executed by our Lord in her behalf.

The fact is, our Protestant friends have lost the sense of the deeper significance of the church, and with it the scriptural sense of the Christian order. They have become strangers to the profound Christian philosophy, as set forth in the Epistles of St. Paul, and in the writings of the great Christian fathers and Catholic doctors, and they see no more in the Christian church, than the carnal Jews saw in Jesus of Nazareth, whom they crucified between two thieves. To these Jews our Lord was only a man, claiming to be the Son of God. They saw only the humanity, and suspected not that in the form of the son of the humble Mary there was, as well as the perfect man, the eternal and ever-living God, the Creator of heaven and earth, and all things visible and invisible. So in the church, Protestants see only the human element, only an aggregation of individuals, differing very slightly, if at all, from any other aggregation of individuals. They see not, suspect not, in the human form visible to their senses, the living presence of the incarnate God, who is himself the truth, the way, and the life. The Catholic believes the Incarnation, and sees, as it were, its visible continuance in the church, the living presence of Christ himself, as God-man. In his view the church has an interior life, lives the revelation of God, and knows and declares the truth, so to speak, from her own life and consciousness. Her doctors teach with a delegated authority; the pope teaches and governs as the vicar of Christ, but the church herself teaches and governs with no authority externally delegated, but with the inward authority of her Lord, who dwells in her, and is her life, her unity, her personality.

Now all the Catholic has any need to have proved to him is the fact of the existence of the church; and this fact is proved to him by his own union with her and participation in her life. He must lose all sense of what she really is before he can doubt any thing she says. He goes to the Scriptures indeed, to learn what she believes and teaches, but not to find a criterion by which to judge what she believes and teaches. His own mind is at rest, knowing that the same God who inspired the written word, lives and teaches in and through her, and can no more deceive or be deceived in his teaching in and through her than in his teaching in and through the

written word itself. This for himself as a Catholic, in the respect that by the gift of faith he is united in the one divine-human life of the church. When he appeals to the written word for proofs, either of the truth of what the church teaches, or of her authority to teach, it is not for himself, but for unbelievers, who, notwithstanding their unbelief, acknowledge the divine authority of the written word. He himself would believe the church, though he had no Scriptures at all, and he even believes them only because he believes her. The texts he cites from them to serve his purpose, do not need to be in all cases explicit and direct. It is enough, if by an unforced and natural interpretation they are in favor of the claims of the church, in the sense we have explained, that is, the sense which connects her existence and character intimately and really with the Incarnation, the assumption of flesh by the Word, without which the church can have no significance, and the whole Catholic Church system would fall to the ground. Let the Protestant once understand the relation of the church to the Incarnation, that mystery of mysteries, and in the Catholic sense, a church without the Incarnation would be a solecism, and his own good sense will show him that all his reasoning against Catholicity proceeds on a gratuitous assumption, and is irrelevant and wholly inconclusive.

If the Protestant could for a moment place himself at the Catholic point of view, and take in the Catholic conception of the church, or regard her as the visible continuation on earth, through her sacraments, of the incarnate life of Christ, or representation of the Incarnation in the visible order, he would soon perceive the logical necessity of asserting the papacy. The church is, we have said, a person, and her person, in the interior sense, is the person of Christ; but this person must be represented in the visible order, or else the church fails to represent in the visible order what she is in the invisible order. Being external as well as internal, visible as well as invisible, body as well as soul, without the pope the church would and could be no visible person, and would and could have no visible centre of unity. The church regarded as the visible Christian order, would not be an organism, would be only a collection of members without a body, without any bond of corporal unity, and the truth which the church lives, and the authority which derives from the indwelling Christ, the Holy Ghost, or the Spirit of Truth,

would have no visible organ through which it could teach and govern the church as one body. The very conception of the church as the visible continuation or representation of the Incarnation on earth, necessarily implies the pope as the visible representation of the divine personality of the church, the visible centre and focus of her authority, from which all radiates through the whole body, imparting light and life to all the members in the visible order, corresponding to the light and life of the invisible. This creates, to say the least, a presumption in favor of the papacy, and if from the beginning the papacy has been asserted by the church, and if we find in the New Testament passages which, by an easy and natural interpretation, assert that our Lord did establish the primacy of Peter, the presumption is converted into certainty.

Mr. Derby undertakes to disprove both suppositions, which is fair enough; but he overlooks the legal presumption in the case. As to the New Testament, the most he can pretend to have done, is to show that some of our proof texts may, but not that they *must* be taken in a sense which does not assert the primacy of Peter, and this is all that he can pretend to have done with regard to the fathers. Moreover, he does even this much, if at all, only by mistaking the quality of the power Catholics hold was conferred on Peter. He starts with the assumption that Catholics hold that the sovereign dominion is given to the pope, and that the pope is authorized by our Lord to rule with that sort of authority claimed by princes of the gentiles, and not finding any texts of the New Testament that speak of such authority, nay, finding several texts which clearly forbid the apostles or any one of them to claim or exercise it, he concludes, not illogically, that no such power was ever conferred, and therefore that the pope in claiming it is a usurper. If the pope did claim it, or set himself up as our sovereign lord and master in the sense in which the absolute monarch claims to be our sovereign lord and master, we too should pronounce him a usurper, and refuse to obey him. But such is not the fact. So far from claiming such authority for themselves, the popes, as well as other doctors of the church, deny that such power is given even to temporal princes. St. Augustine says: "Imperant enim qui consulunt: sicut vir uxori, parentes filiis, domini servis. Obediunt autem quibus consulitur: sicut mulieres maritis, filii parentibus, servi dominis. Sed in domo justi viventis ex fide, et adhuc ab illa cœlesti civitate pere-

grinantis, etiam qui imperant serviunt eis, quibus videntur imperare, neque enim dominandi cupiditate imperant, sed officio consulendi; nec principandi superbia, sed providendi misericordia. Hoc naturalis ordo præscribit: ita Deus hominem condidit. Nam, *Dominetur*, inquit, *piscium maris, et volatilium cœli, et omnium repentium quæ repunt super terram.* Rationalem factum ad imaginem suam noluit nisi irrationabilibus dominari: non hominem homini, sed hominem pecori. Inde primi justi, pastores pecorum magis quam reges hominum constituti sunt."* He had previously given us to understand that the king is more properly said to rule than to reign. Speaking of the Romans, who expelled their kings because they converted their power into a regal domination, he says: "Hinc est quod regalem dominationem non ferentes, annua imperia binosque imperatores sibi fecerunt, qui consules appellati sunt a consulendo, non reges aut domini a regnando atque dominando: cum et reges utique a regendo dicti melius videantur, ut regnum a regibus, reges autem, ut dictum est, a regendo; sed fastus regius non disciplina putata est regentis, vel benevolentia consulentis, sed superbia dominantis."† According to St. Augustine, the subjection of man to man, the domination of the prince and the servitude of the people, as the relation of master and slave, have their origin in sin, and are permitted by Almighty God only as its chastisement.

St. Gregory the Great, pope and doctor, speaks to the same purpose: "Potentibus viris magna est virtus humilitatis, considerata æqualitas conditionis. Omnes namque homines natura æquales sumus; sed accessit dispensatorio ordine, ut quibusdam prælati videamur. Si igitur hoc a mente deprimimus quod temporaliter accessit, invenimus citius quod naturaliter sumus. . . . Nam, ut præfati sumus, omnes homines natura æquales genuit, sed variante meritorum ordine, alios aliis dispensatio occulta postponit. Ipsa autem diversitas, quæ accessit ex vitio, recte est divinis judiciis ordinata, ut quia omnis homo iter vitæ æque non graditur, alter ab altero regatur. Sancti autem viri cum præsunt, non in se potestatem ordinis, sed æqualitatem conditionis attendunt, nec præesse gaudent hominibus, sed prodesse. Sciunt enim quod antiqui patres nostri, non tam reges hominum quam pastores pecorum fuisse memorantur. Et cum Noe Dominus filiisque

**De Civitat. Dei.* Lib. XIX., cc. 14, 15.

†*Ibid,* Lib. V., c. 12.

ejus diceret: *Crescite et multiplicamini et implete terram*, subdit, *Et terror vester ac tremor sit super cuncta animalia terræ.* Non enim ait: Sit super homines, qui futuri sunt, sed, *Sit super cuncta animalia terræ.* . . Homo quippe animalibus irrationabilibus, non autem cæteris hominibus natura prælatus est."*

Pope St. Gregory VII. holds the same doctrine, and follows St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great. "Quis nesciat," he asks, "reges et duces ab iis habuisse principium, qui, Deum ignorantes, superbia, rapinis, perfidia, homicidiis, postremo universis pene sceleribus, mundi principe diabolo videlicet agitante, super pares, scilicet homines, dominari cæca cupiditate et intolerabili præsumptione affectaverunt?"† He also cites with approbation, in the same letter, the following passage from St. Augustine: "Cum vero etiam eis qui sibi naturaliter pares sunt, hoc est hominibus, dominari affectat, intolerabilis omnino superbia est."‡

These authorities, which might be multiplied to almost any extent, prove that the church denies that even temporal princes can rightly claim the supreme dominion of their subjects, and that in her view they are more properly pastors of flocks than kings of men, and rectors rather than lords [*domini*]. They, indeed, have authority to govern the people committed to their charge for their good; but they are not their possessors, or proprietors, with the right to govern them according to their own will and pleasure. It would be folly to pretend that the popes claim for themselves a power which they have uniformly disclaimed, and which they have never ceased to brand as the offspring of pride and presumption. Undoubtedly the popes have always asserted that the priestly or sacerdotal office is above the regal, and that priests are by virtue of their office superior to kings and Cæsars, for kings and Cæsars are members of their flocks, and as much under their charge as the humblest individuals in private life; but they have always denied that man has rightfully dominion of man, and represented the sacerdotal as a pastoral office. The church calls her spiritual princes pastors, and gives to the pastor or bishop the shepherd's crook as the symbol of his authority. Her bishops are pastors, and not of their own flocks, but of the flock of Christ. The pope is

* *Moral.* Lib. XXI., c. xv.

† Lib. VIII., Epist. 21, *Ad Herimannum, Episc. Metensem.*

‡ *De Doctrina Christiana*, Lib. I., c. xxiii.

chief pastor, under Christ, of the Christian flock, which flock is committed to his charge, not as his property, to be appropriated to his own use or pleasure, but to be fed, protected, guided, and defended for his and their master's honor and glory.

Understanding the papal authority as pastoral, not as lordly, as a charge, not as a dominion, Mr. Derby may find the texts we cite to prove the primacy was conferred on Peter, are very much to our purpose. Our Lord said to Peter, "Lovest thou me more than these?" Then, "feed my lambs, feed my sheep," and elsewhere, "when thou art converted confirm thy brethren." These words do not, certainly, constitute Peter a sovereign prince, in the sense of a gentile prince, who claims the right to lord it over his subjects, nor do they make over the flock to him as his property, for our Lord says, "Feed *my* lambs, feed *my* sheep," by which he intimates that he himself retains the proprietorship of the flock; but they do confer on Peter the supreme pastoral office under Christ, and that is all we need, for it is all we assert. No words could be chosen more appropriate than these, to confer the chief pastoral authority, and at the same time to distinguish the nature and quality of that authority from the dominion claimed by the princes of the gentiles. If Mr. Derby had adverted to the nature and quality of the authority, he would hardly have found any inconsistency between its possession by Peter and the lessons of humility which our Lord gave to him as well as to all the apostles.

"When the mother of James and John desired the highest place for her sons, and the other apostles were moved with indignation, 'Jesus called them to him and said, You know that the princes of the gentiles lord it over them, and they that are the greater exercise power upon them. It shall not be so among you; but whosoever will be the greater among you let him be your minister, and he who would be first among you shall be your servant.' Again, our Saviour, warning his disciples against the love of rank and power, says: 'Be ye not called Rabbi, for one is your master, and all ye are brethren.' We read in Luke, also, 'He that is least among you shall be the greatest.' And again, when there was a strife among them which of them should be accounted the greatest, our Lord, after saying, 'let the leader be as him that serveth,' adds, 'I appoint to you as my Father has appointed to me, a kingdom, that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and may sit upon thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel.' Now all these lessons of *humility* and *equality*, were given by our Saviour after the gift of the keys to St. Peter, and after the promise that the church should be built

on the rock, to which you refer, when pressing his claim to supremacy. And if Peter was constituted prince of the apostles, and invested with 'superior jurisdiction,' and 'a special dignity,' by the figurative words of our Lord, is it consistent therewith that he should afterwards have inculcated such lessons of humility and equality? Would he not have told them, bow with deference to Peter, for after I leave you, he is to be your sovereign pope and judge ?"

These texts, if against us, are equally against Mr. Derby, for he assumes the position of an episcopalian, and the papacy is no more repugnant to their spirit than the episcopacy. If the power Mr. Derby claims for bishops is compatible with these texts, nothing hinders the papacy from being equally compatible with them. If no one is to be called master, because one is our Master in heaven, and we all are brethren, by what right is one man invested with the authority of a bishop, a presbyter, or even a deacon ? Certainly our Lord in these texts forbids his disciples to claim or exercise the power claimed and exercised by the princes of the gentiles, whether in church or state, that is, he forbids them to lord it over their brethren. He certainly did not confer on Peter or on any one else the mastership, or the lordship. The words and symbols used convey only a pastoral or parental authority, and the prelates of the church from the pope down, never claim to be masters or lords. The title, his Lordship, or his Grace, given to a bishop or an archbishop, in Great Britain, Ireland, the British colonies, and sometimes even in our own country, is no ecclesiastical title, and is nowhere in the English speaking world, a proper title to be given to Catholic prelates. It is a civil title, and originally given to Catholic prelates, not because they were prelates of the church, but because they were made, by the constitution of the state, *ex-officio* members of the House of Lords. It can be given to Catholic prelates in Great Britain and America now only by courtesy, and a courtesy prohibited, we believe, in this country, by one of the councils of Baltimore. Be this, however, as it may, the title of Lord or Grace is not and never was an ecclesiastical title. The church has never conferred it, and in her official correspondence never uses it.

Unquestionably, the texts cited assert that Christians are brethren, are equals, and that their only Master is Christ. But this militates in nothing against either the episcopacy or the papacy. Christ is our only master, and the bishop's or the pope's master as much as he is ours. The elevation of a Christian believer to the episcopal throne or to the papal

throne does not break the original equality or make him the master or lord of his brethren, as even our own American republicanism might teach the learned jurist. Our republicanism asserts that all men by nature are equal, and no man has, or can have, rightfully, the dominion of another; and yet we do not regard it as any inconsistency to have magistrates, governors and presidents, legislators and judges, because these are all held to exercise their power in the name of the people, and for the good of the people, and therefore are servants, not masters or lords. This is wherefore we are accounted a free people, though our government is as imperative in its voice, when it speaks, as any royal or imperial government on earth. The freedom of the people remains intact, because it is they who govern in the government. We have applied,—and this is our glory,—to the political order the principle laid down in the texts which Mr. Derby cites, and if that principle is compatible in the political order with the full authority of legislators, magistrates, governors, presidents, why should it be incompatible with that of priests, bishops, popes? If the presidency does not break the equality of men as citizens, why should the papacy break their equality, or fraternity, as Christians?. If the clothing of individuals with power to govern in the name of the people and for the people, does not break the sovereignty of the people, why should the investing by our Lord of individuals with authority to govern the faithful in his name and for him, as his vicars, break his sovereignty, or negative his declaration, "One is your Master in heaven, and ye are brethren?"

The pope is selected from his brethren to perform, in the name of his and their Master, the chief pastoral functions for the good of the church and the honor and glory of Christ. He is not the master, but the Master's vicar, not the master of the flock but its servant, and hence his usual style is that of servant of servants, the servant of those who serve God. We are unable to see how in this there is any thing inconsistent with the lessons of humility addressed by our Lord to Peter or to the other apostles. The princes of the gentiles are proud, and have a ground of pride in their assumption that their power is their own, and that they may use it for themselves as they please, that it elevates them as men above their fellow-men, and confers on them in their own right a superior jurisdiction, or a special dignity; but what ground there is for pride in being elevated to the pa-

pacy, to the chief pastorship of the church, under strict accountability, for the purpose of serving at the bidding of the Master in heaven, the servants of God, we are unable to understand.

But a closer inspection of the texts Mr. Derby cites would, we think, convince even him, that he has been too hasty in his conclusion. What is it our Lord condemns? The claiming or exercising of power by his apostles? Not at all, "Ye know that the princes of the gentiles lord it over them; and they that are greater exercise power upon them. *It shall not be so among you*," that is, ye shall not lord it over your brethren, or regard the power as yours or as a mark of your personal greatness, or superiority. "But whosoever would be greater among you, let him be your minister; and he who would be *first* among you shall be your servant." Here it is clear that superiority of office, nay, the primacy was contemplated by our Lord, for he speaks of the "greater," and "the first;" but the point to be considered is that the power to be recognized in the church was to be founded in humility, not in pride and ambition,—to be the power that serves, not the power that dominates, or domineers. The primate is to be not the lord of the flock, but the first servant, after the example of our Lord, who came to minister, not to be ministered unto. "He that is least among you shall be the greatest." But how, if there be no greatest, no primate? "Let the *leader* be as he that serveth." How if there is to be no leader? All these texts show simply that the power our Lord establishes, or with which he invests men, is a sacred trust held from him for his service, the good of the body governed, or his glory in its government, and therefore they who hold the trust are to hold and exercise it in humility, not in pride, and to count themselves ministers, servants, not lords or masters. But it is equally clear that, if our Lord contemplated the establishment of no power, no official dignity or distinction, among his followers or in his church, all these lessons of humility would have been misplaced, and without the slightest appropriateness. Why impress upon his disciples lessons of humility and equality, or give directions as to the exercise of power, if there was to be among them no one with superior jurisdiction, or special official dignity? The texts read precisely as if addressed to persons already selected for high official dignity and authority, and intended to instruct them as to the nature of their authority, the spirit in which, and the end for which they were to exercise it.

It is, no doubt, because Peter and his successors, the bishops of Rome, observed the humility enjoined by our Lord and were studiously careful not to obtrude their authority, or to assume airs of superiority over their brethren in Christ, and who were their inferiors only in official dignity, that has given occasion to men like our learned jurist, whose ideas of power are those of the gentiles, not those of Christians, to call in question the fact of their primacy. These men find it difficult to understand how so much modesty, so much humility, such a studious avoidance of all arrogance or assertion of power, can be reconciled with the conscious possession of the high authority claimed for the pope. This is because they do not understand the Christian doctrine of power, or the spirit of the Catholic pontiff. The popes did not wish to parade their power, nor to boast their high official station. As St. Gregory the Great tells us, they thought more of the original equality of all men by nature, than of their official dignity, and felt more deeply their duties as servants, than their possession of authority to govern. If in later times the supreme pontiffs have seemed to assert more distinctly, and with more emphasis, their authority as vicars of Christ, to feed, guide, protect, defend, and govern the flock of Christ, it has been because that authority has been questioned, or denied, by such men as Mr. Derby, and those he follows; and fidelity to their Master, and the service of the flock committed to their charge, made it their duty. A little attention to the humility of Peter, and his care to exercise his authority as an equal rather than as a superior, will explain the difficulty Mr. Derby feels in reconciling Peter's conduct at the Council of Jerusalem with his possession of the primacy.

Mr. Derby clearly mistakes the real issue; and he finds difficulties where none exist, in consequence of not understanding the doctrine he professes to oppose.

"Again, if the promise of the keys, and of power to bind and to loose, was given *exclusively* to St. Peter, how do you reconcile the fact, recorded in St. John's gospel, 20: 22, that our Lord after his ascension came to the room where *all* his disciples were assembled, and addressing himself to all alike, said, 'Peace be unto you; as the Father hath sent me, I also send you; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them, and whose you shall retain, they are retained?' Does not this gift include St. Peter and his associates, without distinction or degree? Do they not hold under one and the same commission?

"If St. Peter was usually named first, is not the solution easy? He

was the first called, and was probably the oldest and most energetic of the disciples. This would account for his prominence on many occasions, but not for the fact to which you also advert, as a proof of his supremacy, that our Lord thrice asked him after his resurrection, 'Lovest thou me?' and thrice repeated the charge to him to feed his sheep and lambs. Does not this repetition make against him? We read, that when our Lord said to him the third time, 'Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me? Peter was grieved.' And why did he grieve? Did not these repeated inquiries imply doubt and distrust? Had he not promised, 'Lord, I will lay down my life for thy sake?' Had he not said, 'Though all men shall be offended because of thee, yet will I not be offended?' Had he not assured our Saviour, 'I am ready to go with thee even to prison and to death,' and confidently declared, 'If I should die with thee I will not deny thee?' Melancholy exemplar of human frailty! Did he not that selfsame night thrice deny his Lord, draw his sword upon an innocent witness, and after deserting and denying his master, begin to curse and to swear, and to confirm his denial by an oath? After all this, might not our Saviour single him out from his fellows, and repeat in a tone of reproof as often as he had denied him, 'Lovest thou me? then feed my lambs and sheep,' without thereby giving him supremacy? And when enthusiasts cite the visit of our Saviour, first made to Peter's ship, and the miraculous draught of fishes, as proofs of superiority, are you not reminded how his heart failed him when he tried to walk upon the waters, and our Lord addressed him, 'O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt?' How is it, again, that you find no proofs of Peter's supremacy in the apostolic canons still extant, which define the positions of bishop, presbyter, and deacon, but do not advert to the supremacy of Peter? On the contrary, the thirty-third canon prescribes a metropolitan for each nation, whom his associates should 'esteem as their head, and should do nothing of difficulty or great moment, without his opinion. But neither should this primate do any thing without the opinion of all, for thus shall concord continue.' The Council of Nice and the council of Ephesus followed these canons, and decreed that every bishop should acknowledge his metropolitan; but in neither canons nor councils is there any allusion to a sovereign prince, or tiara-wearing prelate.

"If St. Peter was the rock on which alone the church was founded, and he alone held the keys of heaven; if he alone could loose and unloose, allow me to ask, how could St. Paul perform his mission to the heathen for three years, without once conferring with St. Peter, or receiving from him some portion of his gifts? And yet the mission of St. Paul was eminently successful. But how did the ancient fathers, still honored by Rome, construe these passages? Did they give the exposition now claimed by the Roman see? The golden-mouthed St. Chrysostom, translated for his eloquence and learning from the see of Antioch to that of Constantinople, reads it thus: 'Christ founded and fortified his church upon his (i. e. Peter's) *confession*, so that no danger, nor even death itself,

could overcome it.' And commenting on the very words of our Saviour, 'And I say unto thee that thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my church,' St. Chrysostom says, 'That is, upon the *faith* of his *confession*.' Is not this express and definite?"

Our Lord gave to Peter alone the keys or symbol of power; and as St. Cyprian says, gave him the primacy; but all the apostles were apostles, and possessed apostolic powers. The point of most importance for us, is not how much superior Peter's power was to that of the other apostles, but where is continued now in the church the apostolic power which our Lord instituted, and which is always to be distinguished from the episcopal power. Even if the apostles were all equal, and in a certain sense they certainly were, that would not negative the claims of the bishop of Rome as the inheritor from Peter of the apostolic authority. The point Mr. Derby should consider is, whether there be any apostolic authority in the church now or not. He must concede that our Lord founded his church for all coming time, and that he placed in it apostles, and therefore established for its government an apostolic authority, an authority which we have heretofore proved is distinct from and superior to the episcopal authority. Does that apostolic authority continue, or does it not? If it does, where but in the bishop of Rome, the successor of St. Peter, are we to look for it?

The fathers usually consider the fact, that St. Peter is in every list of the apostles named first, as a proof of his primacy; Catholics have always done so, and Mr. Derby must concede that they have at least as much authority as scriptural interpreters as he has. His attempt to disprove the primacy of Peter by proving that Peter denied his Master, and showed a certain degree of weakness before his conversion, or before he was filled with the Holy Ghost, has been sufficiently met in our second Article on his book.

What Mr. Derby says of the apostolic canons and of the Councils of Nicæa and Ephesus, we let pass for what it is worth, without disputing or conceding its accuracy. The papacy, in the belief of Catholics, was instituted immediately by our Lord himself, and the pope derives his authority immediately from him, and not mediately through the church, whether dispersed or congregated in council, and therefore can neither be given nor regulated by canons. Mr. Derby alleges nothing that negatives the papacy. We should expect no allusion to the pope as sovereign prince, for sovereign prince, in Mr. Derby's sense, the pope is not. That there is no allusion

to a tiara-wearing prelate, may be a matter of regret, but we do not find in the same councils any allusion to coronet-wearing prelates, as are the Greek bishops, or to apron-wearing prelates, as are the Anglican bishops, both pets of the learned jurist. However, it suffices for us, that these councils were convoked by the authority of the pope, presided over by his legates, and none of their acts were of any authority without his approbation. No acts of a council have any force, save as they are acts of the pope, or rendered his by his approval, for the council derives its apostolical authority from Christ through his vicar, and there is no council conceivable without him. The speculations of certain doctors and prelates at the time of the great Western schism, who supposed it would be necessary to assert the subordination of the pope to the council, in order to extinguish the scandal of three rival claimants of the papacy at the same time, are no part of Catholic doctrine, and are excusable only in men who are distracted by the evils of the times, and forget that the Lord never fails to save his church without violence to her constitution. The power to enact canons is an apostolic power, and therefore vested in the pope, who may enact them without a council, as he judges wisest and best; his power is regulated by the law of Christ alone. It will be time enough to answer Mr. Derby's question, how St. Paul could perform his mission for three years to the heathen, without authority from Peter, when he shall have proved that St. Paul did so.

Mr. Derby speaks of the golden-mouthed St. *Chrysostom*. We suspect his Greek is a little rusty, and he is not aware of the tautology. Let it be that St. John Chrysostom interprets the rock, as do several of the fathers, of the faith of Peter, or the truth Peter professed, it makes nothing against the other interpretation given by Catholics. In arguing against the Arians, or persons who deny the divinity of our Lord, we should ourselves interpret it as does St. John Chrysostom, but in arguing against those who deny the primacy, we should interpret it of Peter himself. Both interpretations are admissible, and neither excludes the other. But we have in a previous Article sufficiently discussed this question.

The fathers cited in the following pages of the eleventh letter to negative the primacy of Peter, all assert it, and the passages quoted from them are easily explained in accordance with it. The same may be said of the citations in his

two following letters. In his fourteenth letter Mr. Derby refers to the recently discovered work, entitled *Philosophumena*, and ascribes it without hesitation, on the worthless authority of Chevalier Bunsen, to St. Hippolytus, Bishop of Porto. The book was published a few years ago as the work of Origen. It has since been ascribed to a Roman priest named Caius, to Tertullian, to St. Hippolytus, to another Hippolytus, but the learned have as yet settled nothing as to its authorship, and the only reason for ascribing it to any of the persons named, is, that if some one of them did not write it, it cannot be conjectured who did. All that is certain is, that it was found in a Greek monastery, in a manuscript supposed to be of the fourteenth century; that it was written by a heretic and schismatist of the Novatian stamp, who appears to have lived in Rome in the early part of the third century, under the pontificates of St. Zepherinus and St. Callistus, against whom it contains a most bitter diatribe. The work is not of the slightest authority for Mr. Derby, but is of some importance to us as the testimony of an enemy. It contains clear and unequivocal testimony to the fact, that the bishop of Rome, within a century after the death of the last of the apostles, claimed and exercised the papal authority, or the authority of the supreme pastor of the universal church, for it denounces him in most outrageous terms for doing it. It is a bad witness for Mr. Derby, who seems to think the papacy sprung up only after St. Gregory I., since he claims St. Gregory I. as one of his authorities against the papacy, as a sort of archbishop of Canterbury.

In dismissing this subject, we must ask Mr. Derby again, denying as he does the primacy of Peter, and the papacy, how he explains the universal tradition of the church from the earliest times, that the primacy was given to Peter, and that the apostolic power survived in his successor, the bishop of Rome? That such is the universal tradition it is idle to dispute; you cannot name a writer in any age or country that has occasion to touch the question, whether for or against, that does not bear witness to it as an existing fact. None of the fathers received as such by the church deny it, and we are aware of no one that does not either expressly assert, or at least imply it. Now give us, Mr. Derby, we pray you, a reasonable explanation of this fact, on your hypothesis that the papacy is a usurpation? How do you, maintaining as you do that the primacy not only was not conferred on Peter, but that it was never even instituted,

explain the fact that from the first clear historical view we get of the subject, we find the bishop of Rome the first acknowledged chief pastor of the church, and in the full exercise of all the authority Catholics claim for him to-day? It is idle to dispute the fact; not one of the fathers you cite, fairly interpreted, but bears witness to it. The effort you make to the contrary, is nothing but the chicanery of the pettifogger, unworthy of the large and liberal mind of a jurist. The passages you quote serve your purpose, because you have detached them from their context, and have read them in the light, or rather darkness, of your Protestantism; not in the light and spirit of their authors. We have not found you just to the spirit and scope of a single father you cite, and we cannot believe that you have ever read an entire work of any one of them. The works of the fathers are penetrated, saturated with the Catholic spirit, and no man of a fair or unprejudiced mind can read them, especially those you cite, without feeling they were as *Romish*, to use a Protestant term, as Bellarmine, as Perrone, Cardinal Wiseman, or Pius IX. There is no Catholic of to-day who would not find his heart warmed, his soul expanded, his fervor increased, and his faith enlightened and confirmed by an assiduous study of the fathers as well as of the Scriptures. In addition to this you must concede that all the worldly passions of other bishops, their pride and ambition, as well as the pride and ambition of the temporal lords, kings, and Cæsars, must from the first have been opposed to the supremacy of the bishop of Rome, or to the bishop of any other see. Be so good, then, as to explain how the bishop of Rome has been able to grasp the supremacy, to force the whole church to recognize it, to submit to it, and to retain it down to our own times?

But here we close. Mr. Derby, barring a few stale slanders, a thousand times refuted, in the remainder of his book only repeats what he has equally well said in the portion of his volume we have specially dissected. Whatever he advances in the remaining letters depends for its force on what we have examined and refuted. It would be an inexcusable waste of time on our part and that of our readers to occupy ourselves with it. Nobody pretends that all Catholics are perfect, that no scandals have ever occurred, or that every pope has been personally a saint. But scandals our Lord said would come, and it is not a weak proof of the divine origin of the church and that a divine hand has sus-

tained her, that in spite of all the scandals that have occurred, she still exists, as fresh, vigorous, as blooming in the nineteenth century as in the first. The hard things said against her are arguments in her favor. They called our Lord a glutton and a drunkard, a friend of publicans and sinners; they accused him of sedition, and crucified him between two thieves as a blasphemer and an enemy to Cæsar. Worse they cannot say of the church, or do to her.

SPIRITUAL DESPOTISM.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1857.]

We find in the January number of the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, an article headed *Spiritual Despotism*, which we are disposed to make the subject of a few comments. The *Quarterly* named is the organ of the Methodists, and while under the editorial supervision of Dr. M'Clintock, was conducted with spirit and ability. It is now under the editorial charge of Dr. Whedon, of whom we know nothing; but judging from the number before us, we think he is likely to sustain its former character. In learning it must yield to the *Bibliotheca Sacra* published at Andover; in classical taste and finish it is far inferior to the *Christian Examiner*, the organ of the New England Unitarians; in manly thought, independence of spirit, and theological science, it is not to be named on the same day with the *Mercersburg Review*, but with these exceptions, it compares, we believe, not unfavorably with the ablest of our Protestant religious periodicals. It is, as a matter of course, strongly anti-Catholic, violently "No-Popery," but we do not object to a good hater, and rather like to see a man who is not ashamed to express his wrath and prejudices in good round terms. It shows that he has some stuff in him, though not well worked up.

The article we have designated, is rather too declamatory for our taste, and better adapted to produce a catalepsy in its

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**Spiritual Despotism.* Methodist Quarterly Review. New York: January, 1857.

readers than to give them any valuable or trustworthy information on the subject discussed, but it is in its way thoroughgoing and outspoken. The writer is embarrassed by no facts opposed to his theory, but marches on in spite of both fact and reason with a free step to the end he proposes,—the assertion of Protestantism as the representative of all that is good, and Catholicity as the synonyme of all that is bad. In this he commands our esteem. The two systems certainly stand opposed to one another throughout, and if the one is good, the other certainly is bad, if the one be from God, the other is from the devil. The writer is not one to halt between two opinions. If Baal be God, he would say, serve Baal; if the Lord be God, then serve the Lord; and having made up his mind that Baal is God, he very consistently devotes himself to his service, heart and soul, body and mind. But we must let him speak for himself and define his own position.

"The sacred right of individual free opinion in matters of conscience is the principle on which Luther fought the Reformation. This right, so natural, and with us so indefeasible, was then denied. The pope claimed absolute sovereignty in the world of opinion. The temporal powers aimed also to control both the thought and action of the subject. Conformity to the views of the monarch, not only in matters of state policy, but even in religion, was enforced upon the people as coming within the prerogatives of the *jus divinum*. But the successful assertion by Luther of the rights of conscience in opposition to this, broke not alone the religious thraldom of the age. Both philosophy and science felt the liberating spell. Mind in general was emancipated. From that single act went forth an impulse whose wave is still in vigorous motion, and the productive results of which, upon the world's development and progress, no human mind can yet foretell. New ideas in faith, philosophy, popular rights, government, and progress in general, at once sprang forth. It was the torch of Prometheus, or rather, it was more. That gave life to a statue; this to an age. The dead forms of social, political, and religious life at once felt the inspiration. It was the inauguration of the modern era of civil and religious liberty.

"From that day, Protestant Christianity has been the representative of freedom, freedom first in the domain of conscience, and then, consequently, in philosophy, art, science, Church, and State. In a word, it reared the throne of reason upon the broken power of bigotry and intolerance, and supported it by order, justice, and truth. It is now more than three hundred years that Protestant liberty has been working out its results, The nations are witnesses, and the scale of operation has been of sufficient magnitude to make the experiment a fair one. What now are the results which so abundantly declare themselves? Let his-

tory answer. Let the superior commercial and political condition of the Protestant states of Europe and America answer. Where are prosperity and progress? where security of life and property? where liberty of speech and opinion combined with reverence for law and a steady support of public order? where are schools, Bibles, an unfettered press, and general education? where the highest tone of morality and the purest form of Christianity which the world has yet seen? All these things are patent to observation, and of a kind so calculated to catch the attention, that sophistry must be artful, and judgment perverse, if the mind fails to be convinced.

"Opposed to this principle, is Spiritual Despotism in deadly conflict with Protestant freedom, and rallying for the most part under the standard of the pope. Poorly disguised under the mask of Christianity, the Roman Catholic hierarchy stands demonstrated by its history, its principles and assumptions to be a grand consolidated conspiracy against both religion and liberty. It is worldly, ungodly *ambition*, covered with the mere *skin* of piety, a system defiant of God, and the most deadly enemy of man. There is no study more profound, or worthy the attention of philosophic minds, than the progressive and insidious development of this politico-spiritual system. In the name of Christ, it has remorselessly grasped power which Christ refused. Claiming to be his vicegerent on earth, it has proclaimed doctrines which Christ never taught, and sanctioned enormities which drew forth his severest invectives. In the name of a religion which was designed to bring relief to oppressed and down-trodden humanity, it has imposed upon it burdens intolerable to be borne. Instead of peace, it has brought the sword. Instead of consolation, wretchedness and despair. And yet its pernicious errors are so artfully interwoven with the truth, and its monstrous usurpations so covered with the sacred form of Christ, that the eyes of a large proportion of Christendom are still held that they see not its true character.

"The battle of these contending systems hitherto has been waged at a distance from us. Confidence in our own safety, and belief in the impossibility of disturbing the strong foundations on which our religious liberties rest, have made us in a measure indifferent to the struggles of liberty abroad. We have not forgotten, too, that our fathers suffered. We do not see with our own eyes the streaming blood or the burning fagot. History, it is true, tells something of the past; but the voice of receding centuries, like the sound of receding footsteps, becomes fainter and fainter, as time and distance separate us from danger. Remote from the scenes of danger, we have looked on with the calmness of philosophy, rather than the stirring interest of battle when it is pushed even to our own gates."—pp. 34–36.

Our readers will not fail to perceive the *Baalic* character of the writer's theory, and the truth of what we so often

assert, that Protestantism has lapsed into carnal Judaism or heathenism, and really objects to the church because she seeks rather to secure a paradise for the soul hereafter than to create a paradise for the body on the earth, because she is spiritual, not carnal, and places the eternal above the temporal. Our Lord said, "Be not anxious for what ye shall eat, for what ye shall drink, or wherewithal ye shall be clothed; for after all these things do the heathen seek." He admonished his disciples to be not like the heathen, not to labor for the meat that perisheth, but to seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, to lay up treasures in heaven, and to strive after spiritual perfection. Protestantism reverses all this, and bids us to be like the heathen, and pronounces a system of religion true or false as it does or as it does not promote the earthly prosperity of men, and assure them the goods of this life. Undoubtedly Protestants use at times Christian language, and even urge Christian principles, when they forget their Protestantism and speak according to Christian tradition preserved by the church; but when they turn their arms against Catholicity, and seek to vindicate their Protestantism, they take their stand on heathen ground, and reproduce against the church the arguments of the unbelieving Jews against our Lord, and crucify him afresh. "If we let this man go on the Romans will come and take away our name and nation," and so they crucified him between two thieves, yet they did not save their nation. The Romans, notwithstanding, came and took it away.

If we analyze the extract we have made, we shall find the writer is a devout worshipper of Baal, that is, of a false god, or the god of falsehood. It contains scarcely a single statement that is true, and the whole theory put forth is in the face and eyes of well-known facts. The writer labors under a strange hallucination, and sees what is not and is struck blind to what is. "The sacred right of individual free opinion in matters of conscience is the principle on which Luther fought the reformation." Strictly construed this asserts that conscience itself is a matter of opinion, and that every man has the sacred right to follow his opinion in all things, and consequently, that there is for man no right independent of his opinion to which he is bound to conform his conscience, and from which he cannot deviate without sin, unless excused by invincible ignorance. This strikes at the foundation of all religion and all morals, by virtually

denying all law, and all objective distinction between right and wrong, virtue and vice. But understanding it more liberally, as meaning the freedom of conscience before all human authority, or the incompetency of all mere human authority in spirituals, everybody knows that it is not true. Liberty of conscience in this sense was not "the principle on which Luther fought the reformation," or defended his rebellion. He never asserted the unrestricted right of private judgment. He asserted *his* right to resist the authority of the pope and councils, and the right of others to agree with him, Martin Luther, and to take him for their pope and leader; but I do not recollect that he ever asserted or recognized the rights of others to differ from him in any matter which he declared to be of faith. Did he not persecute Carlostadt? Did he not denounce in the most savage manner Zuinglius and Œcolampadius? Did he not thunder his anathemas against the Anabaptists, and call upon the princes to arm and put them down, nay, exterminate them?

None of the reformers asserted the principle in question. John Calvin exercised the most oppressive tyranny over conscience, caused Michael Servetus to be burned at Geneva over a fire made of green wood, and afterwards wrote a book in defence of burning heretics. Henry VIII. of England put to death both Catholics and Lutherans for their religion, and James I. in his famous speech in the Star Chamber, orders the judges to punish Protestant dissenters from the royal church without mercy, and to hang Catholic priests, if they escape from prison. Our Puritan fathers in the Massachusetts colony hung Quakers, banished Baptists, and bored the ears and tongues of dissenters from their colonial church. Protestant Maryland and Episcopalian Virginia enacted the most stringent laws against Catholics, and almost in the memory of persons still living, priests were hunted in the Old Dominion as wild beasts.

The principle of religious liberty asserted by the reviewer is as applicable to Catholics as to Protestants. If the right of conscience is sacred, my right to be a Catholic is as sacred as yours to be a Protestant. Conscience is, to say the least, as good a plea for me as for you, and you violate the liberty you assert when you persecute me for being a Catholic as much as I should were I to persecute you for being a Protestant. Yet the reformers never respected, they never acknowledged, in principle or in fact, the freedom of

the Catholic conscience. Wherever Protestants gained the civil power they used it to enact laws prohibiting the free exercise of the Catholic religion. They dispossessed Catholics of their churches, their colleges, their hospitals, their foundations for the poor, robbed them of all their church property, outlawed them, and massacred them by thousands and tens of thousands. In every country in which Protestantism in the sixteenth century gained an establishment, it gained it by violence, by plundering and oppressing, fining, imprisoning, exiling, hanging, or massacring Catholics, in many cases by a cruelty hardly matched by the Arian conquerors of Africa, or the Mussulman devastators of the East. And what is more to the purpose, there is not a country even to-day whose government professes to be Protestant, or to adhere to the glorious reformation, that recognizes and guaranties full and entire religious equality for Catholics with Protestants before the state. A few weeks since the diet of Sweden, influenced by the Protestant clergy, refused to repeal the old laws against Catholics, and to recognize religious liberty. Denmark is Lutheran, and forbids, under pain of perpetual exile and confiscation of goods, a member of the national church to become a Catholic. The Prussian government not long since imprisoned the archbishops of Cologne and Posen because they would not violate their Catholic consciences; Great Britain, since 1850, has passed the Ecclesiastical Titles Act, which declares, virtually, if not formally, the Catholic religion illegal, contrary to the civil law in the United Kingdom; and we have a dark-lantern movement in this country, supported, perhaps, more generally by the Methodists than by any other sect, expressly designed to deprive Catholics of their political and civil rights, unless they renounce their religion. Several of the state legislatures have proposed, and one state, I believe, has adopted, a law intended to disfranchise every Catholic, and to make them political pariahs in the very land of their birth. Nay, the whole spirit, tendency, and design of this very article on which we are commenting, is to rouse up the Protestant prejudices of the country and inaugurate a legal persecution of Catholics. With all these facts and many more like them before him, this Methodist reviewer does not blush to tell us that "the sacred right of individual free opinion in matters of conscience is the principle on which Luther fought the reformation!" Can it be possible that Protestants are so blind as really to believe that Protestant-

ism is the representative of freedom,—Protestantism which in its very essence is a persecutor, which was begotten in violence, born in robbery and massacre, and whose history is written in the blood of Catholics, and against which a whole army of martyrs in the Judgment Day will come to bear their testimony?

"The pope claimed absolute sovereignty in the world of opinion." This is untrue. The world of opinion is free, and the pope does not and never did claim any sovereignty at all in that world. Does the reviewer make no distinction between opinion and faith? Or is all faith with him simply opinion? The pope is the guardian and defender of the faith once delivered to the saints, but with opinions as long as they are confined to the world of opinion and are not put forth as faith or against faith he does not interfere. In the world of opinion you are as a Catholic free to hold what opinions you please, but no man can be so foolish as to claim the liberty of opinion in matters of faith, that is, in matters where he has not opinion but certainty, the objective truth. Who ever heard of liberty of opinion in regard to the proposition, the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles? Who demands liberty of opinion where he has the word of God? Is it a matter of opinion whether God's word is true or not?

"The temporal powers aimed also to control both the thought and action of the subject." And succeeded in those countries which threw off the papal authority, and embraced the reformation. "Conformity to the views of the monarch, not only in state policy but even in religion, was enforced upon the people as coming within the prerogatives of the *jus divinum*." After Luther, in countries that rejected the papacy, conceded; in those that remained Catholic, denied. Monarchs and their courtiers attempted to enforce the doctrine here justly objected to; but they were met by the popes, the Gregories, the Innocents, the Bonifaces, and other great pontiffs, the special objects of Protestant calumny and vituperation, and made aware that the crown has no competency in spirituals. It was not till Luther appeared, and invoked the princes against the pope, and prepared the way for national churches instead of one catholic church, that the monarchs and courtiers succeeded. Then religion fell indeed under the control of the state in every Protestant country. The German Protestant princes and the Scandinavian monarchs determined the faith and

worship of their subjects. Henry VIII. by an obsequious parliament is declared within the realm supreme in spirituals as well as in temporals, and the king or queen and parliament define the faith and regulate the worship of Englishmen,—yes, of Englishmen who boast of their freedom and manliness. The same was true in Holland, and the attempt to force the Belgian Catholics to conform in religion to the views of the Calvinistic monarch, lost in 1830 the crown of the Netherlands what is now the kingdom of Belgium. This same Methodist reviewer in the article before us is laboring, if he did but know it, to deprive religion of its freedom and independence, and to subject it to the political authority even in our own country, yet he would fain persuade the world that it is Protestantism that has emancipated religion from the despotism of the state! A more absurd or impudent pretence cannot be made. The champion of religious freedom against the state or the temporal power has in all times been the papacy, and this is in reality the standing charge of Protestants against the popes; for it is what is implied in that spiritual supremacy in regard to the temporal power, which has been the theme of so much sound Protestant declamation against them.

"But the successful assertion by Luther of the rights of conscience." The reviewer labors under a great mistake. Luther never asserted successfully, or unsuccessfully, the rights of conscience. "Broke not alone the religious thraldom of that age." All you can pretend is that for Protestant countries Luther's movement emancipated religion from the authority of the spiritual power, and subjected it to the temporal. "Both philosophy and science felt the liberating spell." Mere cant, and not a word of truth in it. That more attention has been paid to the physical sciences since the sixteenth century than was for some centuries before is possible, but that Luther's reformation has had any thing to do with it is not proved or provable. The principal contributions to modern science have been made in countries which did not accept Protestantism. Protestants have no philosophy, have done much to bring philosophical studies into disrepute, and few, if any, of them have been or are able to understand the great masters who philosophized before Luther. Germany is the only country in which Protestants have shown any philosophical aptitude, but even Germany has produced no philosophical system not already exploded, and no philosophers to compare with Vico, Galluppi, Rosmini, Gioberti, and Balmes.

"New ideas in faith, philosophy, popular rights, government, and progress in general, at once sprang forth." Were they true, those new ideas? and are any of them living now? I have observed that your new ideas of one age are usually exploded in the next; and those which possess you one day and which you call us narrow-minded and ignorant for not accepting, are most likely to be rejected the day after. What mean you, moreover, by "new ideas" in faith? I thought faith was revealed in the beginning and delivered to the saints once for all. I did not know that ideas excogitated by the human mind could become faith. The pretence of the reformers was not progress, not the discovery or development of new ideas in faith, but a return to the purity and simplicity of primitive Christianity, from which, it was alleged, that the church by her new ideas or inventions had departed. Your doctrine of progress is in direct contradiction to the ground they assumed. If they were right, you are wrong. After all, this talk about the emancipation of mind, and the progress of philosophy, science, government, &c., is mere rhetoric founded on the cant of the day. It is, moreover, with Protestants, of recent origin. Nothing was heard of it in my boyhood, and I believe no small share of the shame or the credit of introducing it to my countrymen belongs to my own labors in my Protestant nonage. I took this ground, not because I believed it the ground actually taken by the reformers, but because I saw no other ground on which their movement could be defended, and because I wished to establish a principle on which I could defend my own departures from so-called orthodox Protestantism. Yet the theory has no foundation in the facts of the case. What is new is not always true, and changes are not always improvements. There is not an idea, sound or unsound, put forth by the reformers or by Protestants since the reformation, that is really new, or that cannot be traced to individuals who lived long before Luther was born. Solomon said ages ago, "there is nothing new under the sun." Protestants have not done even so much as to invent a new error or a new blasphemy. The reformation has done nothing for progress, but to misdirect and retard it. The progress effected since the reformation bears no comparison with that effected from the sixth to the ninth, or from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries, when you consider the difference in the starting-point at the two epochs. From the state of Europe at the beginning of the barbarian era and

its state near the end of the reign of the Emperor Charlemagne, the progress of society was far greater and more difficult to effect than that which has been effected by European society since Luther. Take European society at as low a point in the sixteenth century as the reviewer can suppose, and that point was not so low as that at which the church took it at the commencement of any three hundred years previous, from the fall of the Western empire; and granting him all that he claims for his Protestantism, it will not have effected so much as the church effected in any previous period of three hundred years.

There is a gross fallacy in all the Protestant reasonings on this subject. They reason as if society had been constantly deteriorating from the sixth to the sixteenth century, that it was the influence of the church that caused it to deteriorate, that it has been constantly advancing since the reformation, and that its progress subsequently has been solely through the influence of Protestantism. Not one of these assumptions is true. In some respects civilization in what had been the Roman empire was in the sixteenth century below what it was in the third, and perhaps is so even yet; but the fall was not owing to the church, for Roman civilization actually advanced under her influence, as we may see by comparing the legislation of the Christian emperors with that of the pagan republic. In the imperial legislation there is embodied a sentiment of humanity, a respect for personal rights, and a tenderness for human life, of which you shall find no trace in the legislation of republican Rome. The fall, as everybody knows, was owing to the barbarian invasion and conquests, which placed on the ruins of the empire a comparatively uncivilized people. The true starting-point of modern Europe is, the date of the destruction of the Roman power by the Germanic conquerors, say at the beginning of the sixth century. Now if you take the sixth century for your starting-point, you will find that European society continued to advance, notwithstanding the Hunnic, Saracenic, and Norman invasions and devastations, not finally checked till the great wars of the crusades, and had at the opening of the sixteenth century attained on the whole, though not in every respect, to a better state than it could boast in the century before the irruption of the barbarians began. No man who knows the history of that long period of a thousand years can doubt for a moment that the grand agent of the progress effected was the Catholic Church. I do not

hold up those ages between the sixth and the sixteenth centuries as model ages; I do not place them above the present; I concede that they were often dark and barbarous; but it was not the church that made them so; it was, on the contrary, the church that gradually enlightened them, and rescued them, slowly if you will, from barbarism. Let this be remembered that Europe overrun by barbarians in the fifth century, and reduced to a barbarous state, was by the church rescued from that state, and under the paternal guidance of the popes enabled to advance to the comparatively enlightened and civilized state in which the reformers found it in the sixteenth century.

Now the reformers, it must be borne in mind, took European society at the highest point it had reached after the fall of the Western Roman Empire. The chief labor had already been done. Catholic faith, Catholic zeal, Catholic piety, and Catholic charity had covered Europe all over with churches, colleges, hospitals, and foundations for the poor. The church had diffused everywhere the Biblical spirit. She had to a great extent christianized philosophy, science, art, literature, and even politics. Into these labors of society under her inspiration the reformers entered, and Protestantism in the outset started with all the capital which Catholics had been patiently and laboriously accumulating for a thousand years. The venerable universities of Oxford and Cambridge were founded and endowed by Catholic zeal and charity, and the glorious old cathedrals which make the pride of England to-day, were erected by our Catholic ancestors. Take these facts into consideration and you will see that society ought not only to have advanced, but to have advanced much more rapidly after the sixteenth century than it had done before, for there was the accumulated force of a thousand years to push it onwards. But has such been the fact? I will not say that there has been no progress since the reformation, but I will say, and facts will bear me out in the assertion, that there has been far less than was to be expected, considering the vantage-ground already gained by European society. It is manifest to every one qualified by his genius and studies to form a judgment on such questions that there were causes in operation before the reformation, which, if not counteracted or impeded, would have ensured a far greater progress than has been realized, and that what real progress has been effected has been in spite of the reformation, rather than by it. Judging from what was done in any three hun-

dred years during the thousand years prior to Luther, it is impossible to doubt, that if religious unity had not been broken, the Protestant heresy and schism had not been introduced, involving one hundred years of fearful and destructive civil wars, from the sad effects of which Europe has not yet recovered, and the church had been permitted to continue to exert her directing power and her maternal influence in the whole of Europe, that the progress of the last three hundred years would have been far greater, and of a far higher order than it actually has been. In such case, moral and spiritual progress would have kept pace with material progress, and society would have reflected the lofty principles, the free spirit, and the sublime charity of our holy religion, instead of being as it is a pale reflex of Græco-Roman society.

It is only common justice to bear these facts in mind. Under the thousand years that Catholicity was the predominant religion of Europe, society advanced from the barbarism of the sixth century to the comparatively high civilization of the sixteenth. This proves that the church is not unfavorable to the progress of civilization, and that whatever defects there may have been in the civilization of the sixteenth century, she was not answerable for them. It was not the church that had reduced a civilized people to a barbarous people; it was not the church that seated the barbarians on the ruins of the ancient civilization; it was not the church that gave those barbarians their barbarous manners, their cruel, or their lawless dispositions, their savage customs, their impatience of restraint, and their contempt of the arts and refinements of civilized life. They had them all before her, and brought them with them or borrowed them from pagan Rome; and it was precisely against them that she had for one thousand years to struggle; and struggle she did with supernatural energy, and not without effect. Protestantism has had no such struggle. It has had no barbarous people to convert, at least it has converted and civilized none. It has taken no people from the depths of barbarism and brought them up even to a half-civilized state. It exterminates the savage or the barbarian when it comes in contact with him; it never civilizes or christianizes him. It has founded no state. The nations that are Protestant were old states, organized long before Luther, and as regularly organized as they are now. Protestantism commenced with powerful civilized states, and has, under the

temporal order, had nothing to do, but to suffer them to continue the direction they had previously received, and develop the principles and institutions already established. Yet the result obtained, rating it as high as any Protestant can have the conscience to rate it, falls far short of what the previous progress had given us the right to expect. Protestantism has lent those principles and institutions no force, and has really proved an obstacle to their natural development and growth.

"From that day, Protestant Christianity has been the representative of freedom, freedom first in the domain of conscience, and then consequently in philosophy, art, science, church, and state." Freedom of conscience in Protestant countries to reject the pope and councils, to form sects, and to persecute Catholics, conceded, but not in any other respect, for in no other respect do Protestants themselves, as a body, recognize freedom in the domain of conscience. "Freedom in philosophy." There is just as much freedom since Luther as before, and that is all. Men in the domain of philosophy, as long as they confined themselves within that domain, were always free. St. Anselm, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventura, philosophized as freely as Bacon or Leibnitz, Hobbes or Locke, Reid or Hegel, and far more profoundly and justly. Freedom in the "arts." We do not understand the claim put forth by the reviewer. Art is not Protestant, and while we do not pretend that all the great artists of the modern world have been exemplary Catholics, we deny that a great Protestant artist in any department of art can be named. Moreover the impulse to both art and science was given prior to Luther, and we believe Leo X. did not deny to art any reasonable freedom. Freedom in the "church." In the Catholic Church, there is about the same degree of freedom and restraint that there was before the reformation. In some respects, however, the abuses introduced and sustained by Protestantism, have led to the adoption of a more stringent discipline than was previously necessary. In the Protestant "church," the claim is absurd, for there was no Protestant church before, and there is none now. There are Protestant sects, establishments, conventicles, temples, but no Protestant church, except by courtesy. As for freedom in religion, we have seen what that is among Protestants; as for the internal discipline which the so-called Evangelical sects exercise over their members, it is far more stringent than any known amongst Catholics; and as for

arbitrary authority exercised without responsibility or control, you will find it in its perfection in the Methodist bishops and conferences. It is carrying the joke a little too far for a Methodist to talk of freedom in the church. Whoever knows the *Book of Discipline*, or the constitution John Wesley gave to the sect he founded, will listen with impatience to a Methodist claiming freedom in religious matters. Of all the Protestant sects I am acquainted with,—and, if what is the stock charge against me be true, I must be acquainted with a large portion of them,—the Methodists have the least freedom, and are subjected to the most stringent discipline. They are more enslaved than even the Presbyterians. Freedom in the "state." There is not a Protestant state in the world that has introduced into its constitution a principle of freedom not contained in it before the reformation. We in this country have done nothing but embody the great principles of natural right and justice, developed and defended by all the great Catholic doctors from St. Augustine down to the Spanish Jesuit, Suarez. So all this fanfaronade about freedom proves to be—fanfaronade.

"It reared the throne of reason on the broken power of bigotry and intolerance, and supported it by order, justice, and truth." Indeed! Where does that throne stand? Can you point me to its locality? "The ruins of bigotry and intolerance." Why, my dear brother, do you really fancy that Protestants are free from bigotry and intolerance? Pray, what meaning do you attach to these cabalistic terms? A Methodist talking against bigotry and intolerance! That is capital. It proves, what we began by intimating, that he has come to the conclusion that Baal is God, and the Lord is not God, and consequently reverses the ordinary signification of words,—fulfilling thus the prophecy that the time would come when the churl should be called liberal, bitter sweet, evil good; the liberal a churl, sweet bitter, and good evil. The reviewer's whole article is written in defiance of reason and common sense, of truth and justice, and is an open display of narrow-minded bigotry and intolerance. What is the dark-lantern movement in this country, but an outrageous exhibition of bigotry and intolerance, seeking to obtain the strong arm of power? Because you are blind, do you fancy nobody can see? What strange hallucination has seized our Protestant friends that they imagine that they respect the authority

of reason, and are liberal, free from bigotry and intolerance?

But think of a Methodist talking about erecting "the throne of reason." The Methodist is a descendant of the old Montanists, and places his religion in feeling, in sentiment, in the operation of the spirit, with which reason has nothing to do. The Methodist "Elder" does not, at least did not in my boyhood, address the reason, the understanding, the judgment. He appealed only to the feelings, the sensitive soul, the animal passions, and labored to magnetize his hearers, and throw them into convulsions. Ask a pious Methodist woman, why she believes, she answers, "I know." How do you know? "O I feel it here," putting her hand over where her heart ought to be. Everybody knows that Methodism is a species of wild fanaticism, without reason, method, or rule, in which mere animal feeling is dignified with the name of piety, religion. And yet here is a Methodist talking in grandiloquent terms about the emancipation of the mind, rearing the throne of reason, and freedom in philosophy, arts, science, &c. Does he forget that the founder of his sect eschewed art as profane, and forbade all ornaments even of the temple of worship as savoring of pride and vanity? Does he forget that the male and female attire he prescribed was the reverse of artistic? Does he forget that Wesley forbids the erecting of steeples to the meeting-house, prohibits church bells, and instrumental music, except that through the nose? He required his people to eschew every thing partaking of the arts or graces, and intended them to be a simple and plain people. The meeting-house was to be, as a wag once expressed it in my hearing, "not the Lord's house, but the Lord's barn." He somewhere tells us that though he could vie with the great orators of antiquity, he did not dare to adopt the arts of human eloquence, that he allowed himself to use only plain, simple speech, and not the enticing words of human wisdom. The last thing the Methodists would have done in my boyhood, when I knew them well, and went often to hear their ministers hold forth in school-houses, in barns, and in groves, would have been to praise Methodism because it favored human learning and human science, art and philosophy, and reared the throne of reason on the ruins of bigotry and intolerance. The Methodist ministers I knew in my younger days were more remarkable for their lungs and cavernous voices than for their learning or love of art, and for their

fat sleek horses than for their science or philosophy. They hardly knew the word reason; they spoke disparagingly of human science and learning, of art and culture, and depended solely on the gifts of the Spirit. It was a Methodist minister, I believe, who, when found not able to read, and being asked how he managed to preach, answered, "O, mother reads, and I 'spounds and 'splains." A change would seem to have come over the Methodists within the last twenty or thirty years, but if they are right now they were wrong then. I am willing to admit that they have latterly established three or four respectable academies and colleges, and in the older settled parts of the country are somewhat less uncivilized than they were, and shout, rant, and jump less, and split fewer pulpits. They have certainly made considerable progress, for which we give them all due credit. They are growing respectable, and losing many of the peculiarities of primitive Methodism; but they must not suppose that the Protestant world started in the sixteenth century from so low a point as they did in the eighteenth, or that the progress they have made since the last century is a fair measure of that made by the Protestant world. The man may know more than the child, and yet have little reason to boast of his progress. They are yet far below the level of the sixteenth century, and not quite up to the highest level reached by the more advanced Protestant sects.

In the statements which follow the Baalic character of the writer's views and assertions are so manifest, and the points raised have been so frequently and so recently discussed in these pages, that we must pass them over. In our review of Derby's Letters we reduced the boasted superiority of Protestant nations to its just dimensions, and showed that it lies in the natural order alone. We do not deny the material greatness of the British empire, but it is a greatness that requires only the natural virtues, and if it says nothing against, it says nothing for Christianity. With regard to this country we shall take an early occasion to compare the progress in civilization made here since the landing of the Pilgrims from the Mayflower, with the progress effected by Catholicity in Spanish America. It must be borne in mind that the immense majority of the population of all Spanish America are the descendants of the Indians who possessed it before the European colonization. We shall institute the inquiry, not whether the population of Spanish America as a whole is on a level with the population of the

United States, but whether the United States can show any work done for civilization, starting with the high civilization of our fathers, to compare with that of raising the Indian population from the point where Cortes and Pizarro found them, to that where they now are? This inquiry, if we mistake not, will put a quietus upon our boasts of Anglo-Saxon civilization. At any rate it will present a contrast between Catholicity and Protestantism, on the very points on which the former is condemned, and the latter eulogized, that will be by no means flattering to our anti-Catholic declaimers. We have multiplied and enlarged our borders, but it may be doubted whether in true civilization we have advanced on that of the original colonists; indeed I fear facts will compel us to acknowledge that we have even retrograded. We are richer, more numerous, more luxurious, but we are, I fear, less highly civilized, less thoroughly trained, less moral, less energetic, less manly, than our ancestors. We have exterminated the Indians or driven them beyond the frontier settlements; we have in no instance worth naming christianized or civilized them, and adopted them as an integral portion of our population. We can show nothing that we have done for them in the way of civilization. But the Spaniards did not exterminate the Indian population. The church by her missionaries went among them, christianized them, infused into them the elements of civilization, and elevated them not to the level of the European, for she has not yet done that, but to their present condition, which is far above that in which she found them. Now here is a positive work done by Catholicity on this continent; we demand what Protestantism, working not with savages, but with highly civilized Europeans or their descendants, has to show as an offset to this? We propose this question to our Methodist reviewer, and leave him for the present to ponder on it. Perhaps, when we meet him again, he will deal less in rhodomontade.

"Where are schools?" Schools are more numerous in France, Austria, and Rome, than in Great Britain, and also, we believe, in Turkey and China than in any Protestant country. The attention of Protestants has but recently been directed to education, only since the fright the Protestant governments got by the French revolution, and education is as general among Catholics as it is among Protestants. Where are "Bibles"? We answer, almost exclusively among Catholics. The book the Protestants call the

Bible is not the true Bible. "An unfettered press?" You will find it in England, the United States, and Belgium, one a Protestant country, one professing no religion, one a Catholic country, so far as the great majority of the people are concerned. You will find in France, which is not a Protestant country, a press free on all subjects, except the government. "The highest toned morality?" Certainly not in Protestant states. "The purest form of Christianity?" That involves the question whether Catholicity or Protestantism is Christianity. If Catholicity is Christianity, as we hold, the purest form, and the only form of Christianity is to be found in all countries where the church is, and nowhere else. If the writer had asked where are the foulest and impurest heresies to be found, we should answer at once, even taking him for judge,—in Protestant nations. "All these things,"—the reverse of what the reviewer means,—"are so patent to observation and of a kind so calculated to catch the attention, that sophistry must be artful, and judgment perverse, if the mind fails to be convinced." And yet we can hardly hope that the mind of the Methodist reviewer will not remain unconvinced, though we have shown that his statements are untrue and his reasoning inconclusive.

So much in regard to Protestantism, as the representative of the freedom, intelligence, and morality of the world, its philosophy, art, science, and progress in general. Turn we now from the bright picture of the Protestant system, which asserts Baal to be God, to the dark and gloomy picture of the Catholic world, which still persists in saying that the Lord is God, and as for me and my house we will serve him. "Opposed to this principle, is spiritual despotism in deadly hostility to Protestant freedom, and rallying for the most part under the standard of the pope." There is, then, some little spiritual despotism that does not rally "under the standard of the pope." That is some comfort. "Poorly disguised under the mask of Christianity the Roman Catholic hierarchy stands demonstrated by its history, its principles, and assumptions, to be a grand consolidated conspiracy against both religion and liberty." The writer concedes it to be *grand;* there is a drop of comfort in that too, for it at least is not a mean and petty conspiracy against religion and liberty like the Methodist hierarchy, and its pet, the Know-Nothing party. "It is worldly ambition." But you forget, my dear sir, that your standing

charge against our church is that she neglects the world, and that in the race for sensible goods she is far outstripped by Protestantism. "Ungodly ambition." Supposing Baal to be God, agreed. "With the mere *skin* of piety." In the Methodist sense, agreed again. The church does not confound piety with sensuality. "Defiant of God,"—that is, of Baal, quite true. "The most deadly enemy of man." In the sense of being his best and only real friend, true, nothing more true. One only needs to take the contrary of what you say, to have the truth.

"In the name of Christ it has remorselessly grasped power which Christ refused." How does the reviewer know that? "Claiming to be his vicegerent on earth, it has proclaimed doctrines which Christ never taught." Whence did you learn that? You assert it; she denies it, and wherein is your assertion better than her denial? You have for your assertion at best only your private judgment, and she at worst has her private judgment against you, and her private judgment, on any ground you choose to put it, is equal to yours. You are of yesterday. My grandfather was the contemporary of the founder of your sect, nay, even my mother might have known him. You are only the illegitimate offspring of the Anglican establishment, itself of illegitimate birth. Your sect is self-constituted, and nobody can be silly enough to suppose that either our Lord or his apostles founded the so-called "Methodist Episcopal Church." Whatever may be said of the Catholic Church, it is certain that yours is a man-made church, and that you have no authority to decide what our Lord did or did not teach. You have no divine commission, and in the church of God are simply nobody.

But see the admirable consistency of this man. He calls the church a usurper because she claims authority to decide what Christ did and did not teach; yet, in the very sentence quoted, he claims for himself and undertakes to exercise this very same authority. When he says the church has proclaimed doctrines Christ never taught, does he not assume the authority to decide what Christ did and did not teach? Who then is the usurper? If he says he has no authority, then his assertion is merely his opinion, and entitled to no consideration; if he says he has it, he must show us his commission. "Sanctioned enormities which drew forth his severest censures." Who made you a judge in the matter? Who authorized you to say what Christ did

or did not censure? "Sanctioned enormities." In the eyes of a worshipper of Baal, be it so; in the eyes of the Christian, the worshipper of the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, that is for you to prove. "Imposed burdens intolerable to be borne." Intolerable to those who say Baal is God, very likely; but at worst she imposes no burdens so heavy as those imposed by your sect on its members. "Instead of peace it has brought the sword." The very thing our Lord said he had come to do. "Think not," said he, "I am come to bring peace on earth, yea, a sword rather." "Instead of consolation, wretchedness and despair." To the enemies of Christ and worshippers of Baal, be it so; to others it is false. "And yet its pernicious errors are so interwoven with the truth, and the monstrous usurpations so covered with the sacred form of Christ, that the eyes of a large proportion of Christendom are still held that they see not its true character." How do you know, dear brother, that you yourself see its true character, and that what you call errors are not God's truths? Are you infallible? May it not be *your* eyes that "are held," and not ours?

"The battle between these two contending systems has hitherto been waged at a distance from us. Confidence in our own safety, and belief in the impossibility of disturbing the strong foundations on which our religious liberties rest, have made us in a measure indifferent to the struggles of liberty abroad. We have forgotten, too, what our fathers suffered." Your fathers, sir, if they suffered persecution at all, suffered it from the hands of Protestants alone. Neither they nor you have received wrong at our hands. But to hear this man talk one would think that Protestants have been the firm champions of religious liberty, and the sweet, innocent sufferers in its cause. Why, he really has the effrontery to appeal to history. Does the poor man in his self-delusion suppose we cannot read history as well as he? Does he suppose that we are ignorant of the persecutions and the inherent persecuting spirit of the party with which he identifies himself? Does he imagine that he is proving Protestantism to be the friend of religious liberty, by invoking its spirit in a war of extermination against Catholics? He is evidently aiming to arouse the Protestant feeling of this country against Catholics, and to deprive us of equal liberty with Protestants. Can he not understand that the religious liberty which he asserts is simply the

liberty of Protestantism to trample on the church? Because we resist being trampled on by Protestants, does he accuse us of persecuting them?

"So strong thus far has been the tide of papal immigration from the old world, that Rome has already commenced the work of recasting our institutions to suit her schemes of ecclesiastical aggression." Does the writer really believe this, or does he say it merely for effect? If the former, let him talk no more of Protestant intelligence; if the latter, let him be silent as to Protestant morality. The whole statement is nonsense. What does Rome want to recast our institutions for? "Her ecclesiastical aggressions,"—on what? Her ecclesiastical system is fixed, the power of her bishops defined, and there is here no motive for aggression, and nothing on which to make ecclesiastical aggression. What is there in our institutions Rome would wish to change? Use the power of the republic to put down Protestants, or to deprive them of their freedom to remain Protestants? Do you suppose she is so silly as to attempt any thing of that sort? Protestants have been here from the first settlement of the country, and have the full civil right to remain here as Protestants. It is not the principle or the practice of the church to enter a country where another religion has had before her entrance a legal right to exist, to gain by intrigue, or in any other way, the government, and then use it to suppress the old religion. That is the Protestant, not the Catholic method of proceeding.

"Free schools, free presses, free Bibles, free speech, and free thought, are the natural supports of the great principle of Protestantism; and these, therefore, in some way must be subject to her regulation." p. 36. If Almighty God has given her the power and made it her duty to regulate them, what have you to object? If she does what you allege, you must prove that she has no authority from God to do it, before you can prove any thing from it to her prejudice. "Free schools." Would you, a Methodist, send your children to a school taught by infidels, in which the books used were filled with slanders on Methodism, and in which your children would be trained up to despise the religion of their father and mother, to deny revelation, to deny God, and all moral distinctions? And what would you think of the man who should accuse you, because opposed to such schools, of being opposed to free schools, and to education? You would think of him just what we think of you. Nay,

would you send your children to Catholic schools, in which they would be likely to be trained up Catholics? Of course not. But you cannot hold Catholicity in greater horror than we hold your Methodism. It is not to free schools we object; it is not to education we object; but the sort of education you give in *your* free schools. You blame us for acting on the very principle on which you yourselves act. Why have the Methodists established schools, seminaries, colleges of their own, under the regulation of their own sect? Why do they not send their children to schools and colleges under the exclusive control of Episcopalians, Baptists, Presbyterians, Unitarians, Universalists, or Mormons?

"Free presses." Whether the church likes or dislikes them, it is certain the Methodists are opposed to them. The Methodists, as a sect, have their own Book Concern, and superintend their own publications. It is understood that the members of the sect are to restrict their purchases of books to the works issued by their own Book Concern, and that they are not to purchase even books approved by the sect if issued by other publishers; at least this was the case some time since. As to journalism, the Methodists allow it no freedom; all the journals of the denomination are under the control of the denomination. The *Methodist Quarterly Review* belongs to the Book Concern, and the editor is designated by the authority of the sect, and is simply its agent. He has nothing of the freedom we have as the editor of a Catholic Review. The only restraint we are under is the restraint of conscience itself; but he must conform to the will of his employers or be dismissed. As to the press itself, there is a question whether the censorship shall be exercised before or after publication, not yet settled; but there is none as to the propriety of the censorship itself. Great Britain, the United States, France, Spain, Belgium, Sardinia, and one or two German States, recognize the liberty of the press, but punish or profess to punish the misuse of its liberty. Other states continue to exercise a previous censorship; which is the better system I am not called upon to decide.

The reviewer is terribly scandalized at a recent publication of the patriarch of Venice.

"If any one supposes that Rome is more tolerant of the press now than formerly, let him read the 'Circular of Pietro Amerilo Matti, by the mercy of God, Patriarch of Venice, to his beloved sons, the book-

sellers, publishers, and true believers, residing in the city and diocese,' issued so recently as December 31, 1855. This fulmination follows directly in the wake of the Concordat just granted to the pope by the 'most pious' Emperor of Austria, and is the first signal gun to warn all impracticable sons of the Church, as well as heretics, of what they are now to expect. We extract a couple of paragraphs.

"'No one, be he priest or layman, will be allowed, without previously obtaining permission from our ecclesiastical "censure," to publish either as author, printer, or vender, any work either directly or indirectly touching on religion or morality, or specially treating of the Liturgy, or *of any other subject.* It is also forbidden to introduce *any book whatever* from other countries, without having applied for and obtained the approbation of the ecclesiastical "Censure Office," excepting in such cases where the book has been marked as being among the works which are permitted.

"'Should *any person dare publicly or privately* to sell books, prints, or paintings, which are prohibited by the Church, or could be prejudicial to religion or morality, be it known unto him, that we will not only suppress such illicit sale ourselves, but will also *call in the arm of the civil power*, which the monarch has placed at the disposal of the Church, to our assistance.'

"What this arm of the 'civil power' means, the unhappy victims of priestly despotism in Austria understand full well.

"It is not the sudden overthrow among us of the rights and immunities of Protestant liberty, that we fear; open and direct assault would defeat its own aim. Rome understands too well the laws of human nature. She saps and mines by slow approaches. What cannot be accomplished in a year may yield perhaps to a generation or a century. The ages are hers. Like the painter Zeuxis, she works 'for eternity.'" —pp. 36, 37.

The words "*of any other subject*," understood in the universal sense, and as indicating the extent of the ecclesiastical prohibition, could not have been in the original, for they transcend the canons of the church, and imply a power the canons do not confer on the patriarch. The rest of the prohibitory sentence is no more than is claimed by every Evangelical sect. The canons of the church prohibit, indeed, the publication of works touching faith, discipline, or worship, by a layman or simple priest, without the permission of the proper authority; but these canons are simply penal laws. I can publish what I please at my own risk. If what I publish contains nothing incompatible with faith, morals, discipline, or worship, I incur no censure; if I publish something against one or another of these I must submit to the penalty of having my publication

placed on the Index and being excommunicated if I refuse to correct or retract the erroneous matter. The same rule obtains substantially amongst the so-called Evangelical sects. The Methodists would excommunicate from their communion the layman or "elder" who should publish any thing against the Methodist *Book of Discipline* and refuse to retract it. The Presbyterians would excommunicate the minister or layman who should do the same with regard to their Confession of Faith. The previous censorship is chiefly a protection to the author, for it enables him to throw the responsibility, in great measure, from himself on to his censors. Thus for years, for my own protection, I submitted all my theological articles to the revision of authority before their publication; I do not do it now, because I choose to bear the responsibility myself alone.

The patriarch of Venice, in his ecclesiastical capacity, could not prohibit the introduction of foreign books; all he could do was to forbid Catholics within his jurisdiction to read them. The introduction or non-introduction is a matter that falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the civil power. What that power prohibits or does not prohibit in Venice or any other Catholic state, is nothing to me; for, as a Catholic, I am not bound to defend the legislation or administration of Catholic any more than of Protestant states. The principle involved in the patriarch's circular is wise and just. The church is bound to look after the faith and morals of her children, and if she allowed her children to buy and sell and read without restraint, bad books, books prejudicial to religion and morals, our Protestant saints would set up a universal clamor against her for her alleged profligacy and disregard of religion and morals. There are classes of books, prints, and paintings, as the reviewer well knows, which our laws forbid to be sold publicly or privately. Would the reviewer think it wrong even for a Methodist bishop to tell his people not to sell them, for he was determined to prosecute every man he found doing it? Protestants, when it concerns what a Protestant may do in the bosom of his sect, exercise as rigid a supervision over the reading of their members as the church does. The reviewer himself would not contend that all sorts of books, including irreligious, immoral, and infidel books, are proper even for Methodists. Would he recommend Methodists to read Tom Paine's *Age of Reason*, Volney's *Ruins*, Voltaire's *Philosophical Dictionary*, *Jacques et son Maitre*,

and *La Religieuse* of Diderot, Sterne's *Sentimental Journey*, or Moore's *Little's Poems*, to say nothing of the vile publications circulated secretly for the very purpose of corrupting the heart and inflaming the senses of our youth? Nay, would he not at least admonish them not to read even Catholic books, and to be on their guard against the seductions of Rome? Then what has he to complain of in the patriarch of Venice?

One almost loses his patience with these Protestant declaimers against the church. They cry out with all their force against the church, accuse her of usurpation, of tyranny, of spiritual despotism, whenever she takes any step for the maintenance of the religion and morality of her children, or seeks to secure the peace and order of the state. Yet they know well enough that without discipline, without wholesome laws, restraining licentiousness and punishing vice and crime, society cannot exist. If the church within her sphere, or a Catholic state within its sphere, attempts any thing of the sort, their love of liberty is outraged, and they call upon the whole Protestant world to come and put down these "Romanists." What is it they want? Of course, to prevent religion and morality from flourishing in Catholic states, to corrupt the morals of Catholics, to ripen the Catholic populations for sedition, rebellion, revolution, to render it impossible for Catholic governments to exercise their ordinary functions as governments, and to render the very existence of society in Catholic states impracticable. This is what English and American Protestantism is aiming at, and if it could only effect it, wouldn't it have a triumphant argument against the church? The real significance of all these charges against the church is that she pursues her own course without consulting the wishes or the interests of Protestantism, and has not the least disposition in the world to avoid doing her duty in order to give her enemies an advantage over her.

"What this arm of the civil power means, the unhappy victims of priestly despotism in Austria understand full well." Is there any priestly despotism in calling upon the government to prevent the sale of books that strike at the foundation of religion and morals? Is it priestly despotism to call upon the civil power to punish gambling, adultery, theft, robbery, murder? Victims of *priestly* despotism in Austria! Who are they? Name them. But you cannot. Austria is of all Catholic states precisely the one in which

the clergy have had the least power, and even the late concordat does not secure to the church in the Austrian empire the freedom and independence she has in these United States. Civil despotism there has been in Austria, and it has had its victims, but priestly despotism there has not been. The consorship has existed and exists still in Austria; yet its practical effect has been not to prevent the circulation of Protestant, infidel, or immoral publications, but the publication of Catholic works, and to discourage Catholic authors. Anti-Catholic books were connived at; Catholic books were prohibited, lest they should disturb the Protestant minority. Wherever the state has established a censorship Catholic thought and intelligence alone have suffered from it. What this wise and learned Methodist reviewer lays to the charge of the church belongs to the state. He is an unreasonable man, and blames the church for the very despotism of which she is the first victim, and pretends that the despotism which the state exercises over her, is a despotism which she exercises over the state. We wonder not that he should say, "Baal is God, and I will serve him."

"It is not the sudden overthrow of the rights and immunities of Protestant liberty, we fear." To hear this man talk, one would suppose that he really imagines that Catholics are engaged in a dangerous conspiracy against the liberty of Protestants. Nero set Rome on fire, fiddled while it was burning, and charged the crime upon the Christians.

> "Écoute : c'est Néron qui met le feu dans Rome
> Lui-même ! Il nous fallait des coupables : c'est vous
> Qu'on a choisis : Fuyez, ou vous périrez tous."

You are conspiring against the liberty of the country, and you would direct public vengeance against Catholics as Nero did. It is well; it shows who were *your* ancestors, and who were *ours*.

"The ages are hers. Like Zeuxis, she works 'for eternity.'" The first truth we have found in the article. The ages *are* hers, and she will live and bring forth children to her heavenly Spouse, long after the very name of Methodism shall be forgotten. She works for eternity, like her Master, not for time. Would our Methodist saint have her work for the temporal instead of the eternal? Like Balaam, the poor man opened his mouth to curse, but was forced by a higher Power to utter a blessing. What he intended for a cutting reproach proves to be the highest eulogy he

could pronounce. The church does work for eternity, and thus obeys him who commands us to "labor not for the meat that perisheth, but for that which endureth unto everlasting life."

"If *such* a church were the *true* representative of Christ on earth, then would infidelity have whereon to stand. Infidelity to Christ would be duty to God. The infidelity of the eighteenth century was the insurrection of reason, not against truth; not against Christianity; but against that mockery of it, which had stolen its name, that huge hypocrisy which, in the livery of Heaven, blasphemed the Almighty, trampled on his servants, and practically nullified every virtue which the Almighty has taught. The jeers of Voltaire, Diderot, and the Encyclopædists were a tribute to truth. The infinite scorn which in such terrible measure was heaped upon the pope and the whole papal system was a tribute to the truth. It sprang from a just conception of the holiness, wisdom, and justice of that God whose character was slandered and caricatured by the character and principles of the pretended successor of the chief of the apostles."—p. 41.

Another evidence that our reviewer insists that Baal is God. The infidelity of the eighteenth century attacked the Bible as well as the church; it made war avowedly on Christ himself, and its war-cry was, *Écrasez l' Infâme.* It denied all divine revelation, denied the whole supernatural order, the immortality of the soul, and moral accountability, and under the name of reason deified passion, fitly represented by a prostitute. "The jeers of Voltaire, Diderot, and the Encyclopædists were a tribute to truth." Does the writer really know what he says? Is he aware that those jeers were directed against every thing which even he, if he calls himself a Christian, and believes that Jesus Christ was the Son of God, the Redeemer of mankind, holds sacred? If our church be true, we grant infidelity has, as opposition to her, something to stand on; but if Protestantism, as this writer represents it, were true, it would have nothing to oppose and no motive to make war on Christianity, for in that case Christianity and infidelity would be one and the same thing. This converting Christianity to infidelity as the readiest way of converting infidels to Christianity, may do for a Methodist, but it will not do for a Catholic. The writer may persuade an intelligent unbeliever that Protestantism is infidelity, but he will never persuade him that it is Christianity. The common sense of the world has long since decided that Christianity and Catholicity are identical, and it is rare that a man who is really

in earnest to be a Christian, if possessed of ordinary means of intelligence, finds a resting place outside of the Catholic Church. Protestantism under a purely religious point of view, has no hold on the world, and it is supported mainly as a political and social system, and under a religious name, perhaps as a compromise between heaven and earth, eternity and time, God and the devil. Many worthy people, no doubt, think it will answer the purposes of religion, and that by it they may provide for future contingencies without that renunciation of this world and of sensual gratifications demanded by Catholicity. But the man who has no religion, who has no Protestant connections, who is convinced of the necessity of religion for his soul's sake, not merely to whitewash a damaged reputation or to give him respectability in the eyes of the world, and knowing the difference between Protestantism and Catholicity, will never think of embracing Protestantism. He will regard it as too much or too little. Being in earnest he must have reality instead of a sham. Gentiles, pagans, Jews, Mussulmans embrace Catholicity; very rarely Protestantism, and perhaps never except from a worldly motive. The notion of the writer that the unbeliever would be attracted by Protestantism rather than by Catholicity is true only on the supposition that the unbeliever wishes to gain the credit of being a Christian without giving up his unbelief. If he wishes to become really a Christian and to believe and practise in all things according to the word of God, he will turn from Protestantism with loathing and disgust.

"True religious faith cannot co-exist with this tyranny." A living faith, a faith that works by love, cannot co-exist in the same breast with this or any other tyranny, we agree, and therefore we never look for true religious faith among Methodists. "The essential element of faith is freedom of opinion." Is the writer aware that in this assertion he writes in blessed ignorance of the meaning of the words he uses? The school in which he was educated must have been a free and easy school. Faith is impossible as an act without free well, but it has nothing to do with opinion free or unfree. The essential element of faith on its natural side is reason, on its supernatural side, it is divine grace, the gift of God. Its essential character is certainty, a firm persuasion of mind that excludes doubt. The essential character of opinion is uncertainty, doubtfulness. Opinion may or may not be true, but which, there is no authority to decide.

To make freedom of opinion essential to faith is to make faith essentially freedom to be uncertain, to doubt, which is simple nonsense, since it is the essence of faith to exclude doubt and give certainty.

In matters of faith there is and can be no freedom to doubt, because no man is or can be free to doubt the word of God; in matters of opinion all men are free, and the church asserts full freedom for all her children. Protestants do not very well understand this, for Protestantism can draw no intelligible distinction between faith and opinion. The only alternatives for them are spiritual despotism and spiritual license. If they demand assent to creeds and confessions they practise spiritual despotism; if they reject all creeds and confessions, really, not merely in name, we mean,—they declare all doctrines indifferent, and assert spiritual license. They then place, as to faith, as to doctrine, the believer and the unbeliever, John Wesley and Thomas Paine, on the same footing. There is no help for them. They must do one or the other, although we are aware that they seek to do both, and both at once.

"In denying the rights of conscience, Rome arrays herself against the eternal principles of man's moral nature." But it is not yet proved that she denies the rights of conscience. We say she does not. She asserts them, and she alone asserts them. Her struggles with the temporal powers, which so scandalize our Protestant saints, have all been struggles on her part to maintain the freedom of conscience against the despotism of the state. Protestants rarely respect the rights of conscience in Catholics. The reviewer would surrender his own freedom of conscience to the mob to obtain the power to oppress the consciences of Catholics.

But we must stop. It is no pleasure to be forced to combat ignorance, imbecility, prejudice, conceit, pomposity, and recklessness. We wish we could find now and then in the list of our opponents, a man, a well developed man, able and not afraid to reason, who would do something more than make unwarrantable assertions, and repeat old worn out calumnies a thousand times proved to be calumnies. Have our Evangelicals never a man among them? Has Protestantism really destroyed intellect, intelligence, and candor, among them? Can they give us no opponents that it is not a discredit to notice? Must we fight the battle only against children, weak women, and weaker men? Have you no champions of metal? Where are your Chil-

lingworths, your Chemnitzes, your Bramhalls, and your Barrows? We are tired of the moral and intellectual troops you send against us, who appear in a plight worse than those whom the inimitable Falstaff so admirably describes, and with whom he was ashamed to walk through "Coventry." If you have any seriousness in you, do put forth some one, if you have him, who will discuss the great question between us seriously, and as a man who has confidence in his cause.

ROMANISM IN AMERICA.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1855.]

Who Rev. Rufus W. Clark is, we do not know, and have not thought it worth our while to endeavor to ascertain. We presume, however, that he is an Evangelical minister of some sort in this city, and perhaps of high standing in his own sect. His book does not present him in a very amiable light, and from its perusal we should judge him to be more remarkable for his zeal than his knowledge, and more accustomed to hate than to love. He is very ignorant, and even more untruthful. Candor and courtesy towards those from whom he differs are evidently qualities he has not yet acquired, and qualities which we fear he is utterly unable to appreciate. He is both credulous and unscrupulous, and though a Protestant minister, he is wanting in all those amenities and gentlemanly habits which are within the reach of a cultivated gentile. Yet we are obliged to confess that, however much his book may disgust the better sort of Protestants, it is a fair specimen of the works which issue from the American Protestant press against our church and the members of her communion. Its only merit is the satanic cunning with which it appeals to the low and worthy prejudices of the Protestant *plebs* against Catholicity. It is with great reluctance that we approach such a work, but as American Protestantism seems unable or unwilling to pro-

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**Romanism in America.* By Rev. Rufus W. Clark. Boston: 1855.

duce any thing more gentlemanly, more scholarlike, more worthy of the great question at issue, we suppose it would be undue fastidiousness to pass it by without some notice.

The work itself appears to consist of a course of Lectures delivered by Mr. Clark, the last season, in this city, and now published at the recommendation of some of the persons who listened to them. The subjects treated are,—1. The Origin and Progress of Romanism; 2. Fundamental Principles of Popery; 3. Antagonism between Popery and Civil Freedom; 4. The Order of the Jesuits; 5. The Paganism of Popery; 6. The Persecuting Spirit of Romanism; 7. The Inquisition; 8. The Bible in our Public Schools. These topics are selected with some skill, and give the lecturer an opportunity to repeat the greater part of the vulgar cant and stale charges which form the staple of the writings and lectures of men of his class. The slightest knowledge of history, coupled with a moderate share of good sense, is sufficient to demolish the whole fabric which the author erects, for it is less substantial than ordinary castles in the air. The author seems to have lost whatever original faculty he may have had of telling the truth. The truth itself, when by some rare accident he stumbles upon it, becomes falsehood in his manner of telling and applying it. His whole work is simply a tissue of false assertions, unfounded charges, gross perversions of facts, and unwarranted inductions. We cannot attempt a complete refutation of what he advances against our religion, for we have neither the space nor the patience to quote and reply separately to each separate sentence of his book. We can note only a few of the more glaring of his errors, misstatements, and false accusations. As a specimen of the whole work, we commend to our readers the following paragraphs from the opening Lecture.

"We would not exaggerate the evils or the strength of Romanism; neither would we utter a word to excite unnecessary alarm with regard to the prevalence of the system in our land. But we contend that a system in the very heart of our republic, deadly hostile to our churches, public schools, and free institutions, that numbers three millions of votaries, and is sustained by nearly sixteen hundred priests, thirty-two bishops, seven archbishops, more than one hundred colleges and seminaries, and seventeen hundred churches, is a system that should not be passed by with a sneer, or treated with cold indifference. The recent aggressions of this power, the arrogant assumptions of its prominent writers, the astounding insolence of such publications as the Freeman's

Journal, Shepherd of the Valley, and Brownson's Review, in asserting that heretics, that is, American Protestants, should be punished by the sword if they cannot be forced into the Catholic Church, should arouse the citizens of this nation, and prompt them to plant themselves at once in opposition to this power. We would deprecate all violence and unnecessarily harsh and denunciatory language; but we would use all the moral means that God has placed in our hands to break down a system that at every point is antagonistic to our dearest privileges and blessings.

"In seeking, however, the destruction of Romanism, we would do all in our power to save the Romanist, not, indeed, as a Romanist, but as a man, as a sinner like ourselves, for whom Christ died. In seeking the annihilation of Popery, we would save the Pope, as one who specially needs the benefits of the atoning sacrifice of Christ. We declare war, not against men, but against principles that are subversive of our liberties and religion. We declare war, and, God helping us, we will prosecute it, against that system which, in the Holy Scriptures, is denominated 'the man of sin and son of perdition,' 'the mystery of iniquity,' 'the mother of harlots and abominations.' And we would break it down that its victims themselves may be delivered from its grasp and saved from its pernicious influences; for a greater calamity could not befall the Roman Catholics than to have Romanism triumph in this nation. Such a conquest would be the destruction of the very privileges and advantages that they have come to our shores to enjoy."—pp. 7–9.

We hardly know how to deal with an author who writes in this way. There is not a word of truth in what he says of *The Freeman's Journal*, *The Shepherd of the Valley*, or *Brownson's Review*. These journals, one of them or all of them, have never, explicitly or implicitly, directly or indirectly, in form or substance, asserted that heretics, meaning thereby "American Protestants," or any other class of heretics, "should be punished by the sword," or in any other way, "if they cannot be forced into the church;" nor have they ever asserted that heretics ought even to be, or even may be, *forced* into the church at all.

The author says that, "in seeking the destruction of Romanism, he would do all in his power to save the Romanist." This distinction is intelligible, and every man who knows the difference between systems and persons makes it, or professes to make it. We ourselves say, and say truly, that, in seeking the destruction of Protestantism, we would save the Protestant. "In seeking the annihilation of Popery, we would save the Pope, as one who specially needs the benefits of the atoning sacrifice of Christ." This is well enough. So we, in seeking the annihilation of Protestant-

ism, would save Rev. Rufus W. Clark, "as one who specially needs the benefits of the atoning sacrifice of Christ," not less so, he must permit us to believe, than the pope. We may cheerfully say, also, with the author, that "we declare war, not against men, but against principles that are subversive of our religion and liberties. We declare war, and, God helping us, we will prosecute it, against that system which, in the Holy Scriptures, is denominated 'the man of sin and son of perdition,' 'the mystery of iniquity,' 'the mother of harlots and abominations,' and we would break it down that its victims may themselves be delivered from its grasp and pernicious influence." He calls that system "Romanism," we call it Protestantism, and are at least as anxious to deliver its victims as he is.

The author would save the Romanist, not as a Romanist, but, we suppose, by converting him from Catholicity to something else. Will he tell us to what he would convert him? To Protestantism? To what form or sort of Protestantism? To Protestantism in that sense in which it is accepted by all who call themselves Protestants? But in that sense it is simply the rejection of Catholicity, and not a religion, but the negation of the Catholic religion. To convert us to Protestantism in this sense would be merely inducing us to give up the religion we have, and to go without any religion,—to live without God in the world, and to die as the dog dieth. We cannot consent to that. We cannot live without religion, and if you ask us to give up Catholicity, you must offer us something better in its place, and something which we cannot have without ceasing to be Catholics.

Have you any thing of the sort to offer us? What is it? Reason? But that we already have, to say the least, as well as you. And we have no occasion to go out of the church in order to exercise it; for it leads us to submit to the church as divinely commissioned to keep and declare the law of God and dispense the mysteries of the Gospel. We came to her, and we submit to her in all she commands, by a free act of reason, and we could not renounce her without renouncing reason itself. Nothing strikes us as more reasonable than to believe God on his word, and to submit to him in all things; and therefore nothing seems to us more reasonable than to believe and obey the church authorized by him to teach and command us in his name, for it is his word we believe and his authority we obey. We

submit to the church, not blindly, but with our eyes open, and solely on the ground that our reason, freely exercised, is convinced that she is authorized by Almighty God himself to speak to us in his name, or rather that it is he, the indwelling Holy Ghost, that speaks to us in her voice, through her as his organ. Under the head of reason, then, you have nothing to give us.

What then have you to give us? The Bible? But we have that without you, and had it fifteen hundred years before Luther. In fact, you have the Bible only as you have got it from us, and you are obliged to take its canonicity and inspiration on the authority of the Catholic Church, or at least on Catholic tradition. Do you allege that we are not permitted to read it? Then you allege what is not true. We are not indeed allowed to regard your mutilated and corrupt version of the Scriptures as the genuine Bible, but we have as much liberty to read the Bible as you have. The free use of the Scriptures has always been permitted and encouraged by the church; the only thing she prohibits is their abuse. Do you add, that Protestants will allow us to interpret them for ourselves? That is true only in case we do not interpret them differently from the Protestant sect to which we happen to belong. But this is nothing. What is wanted is not the liberty to interpret the Scriptures for ourselves, and therefore to misinterpret them, and make God's word a lie, but the assistance necessary to enable us to arrive at their true meaning. Can you give us that assistance? No? Then in regard to the Bible you have nothing to give us which we have not already as Catholics. In regard to the Scriptures, then, we are at least as well off as you.

What, we ask again, will you give us in exchange for our Catholicity? "The benefits of the atoning sacrifice of Christ?" But how assure us that you have them to give? You probably mean, that you would teach us to rely solely on the merits of Christ for salvation, not on dead works. But this would give us nothing which, as Catholics, we have not already. The Catholic has always been taught to rely solely on the merits of Christ for salvation, for it is solely by virtue of his merits that we can perform the works to which heaven is promised as the reward. No works of our own, done by our natural strength, are of any avail for eternal salvation. Those works only are available that are done through grace, and the grace which renders

them available, or which merits, is a free gift to us, purchased for us by Christ our head, so that all the merits are due to Christ, and all the glory redounds to him alone. It is very considerate, and even kind, no doubt, to propose offering the pope "the benefits of the atoning sacrifice of Christ;" but it is possible that the pope can teach you more on that subject than you can the pope. The pope knows, without consulting Protestant ministers, that dead works avail nothing, and that we are saved by Christ alone, and that without his grace, purchased for us by his merits, operating within us, and freely concurred with by us, grace moving and strengthening us, we can do nothing in regard to salvation.

Once more, then, we ask, what has the Protestant to give us? The doctrine of justification by faith alone? But the doctrine that we are justified by faith is, and always has been, a Catholic doctrine, and therefore all that is affirmative in this doctrine is ours already. As Catholics, we hold that faith is the root and foundation of every Christian virtue; but we do not indeed hold that faith alone suffices, or that faith without charity can save us; for the devils believe and tremble, and yet continue to be devils. We believe, as St. James teaches, that faith without works is dead, being alone, and a dead faith cannot justify, for in that it is dead it is inoperative. Now what is peculiar to the Protestant, what is distinctively the Protestant doctrine, is expressed by the word *alone*, which is not in the sacred text, and was inserted by Luther in his version on his sole authority, as he himself avows; and it is a purely negative doctrine, merely denying the necessity of charity to justification. It gives us nothing which we have not, and merely takes away something which we have.

Do you tell us that by accepting the word *alone*, and saying that faith alone, that is, faith without love, faith without works, justifies, we should be relieved from the necessity of striving after inward holiness, and of performing acts of charity, as well as of fasts, penances, and works of mortification? This, if we could be assured of its truth, would no doubt save us some trouble, and bring some consolation to us, while living in a state of sin. But we know not the meaning of a justification without justice, and we are very much inclined to believe that, in order to be justified by a just God, we must be intrinsically just; and the works from which you would relieve us, after all, may be necessary to

make and to keep us inwardly just. A justification which leaves us all leprous with sin, and is based on no real justice in us, were a mere sham justification, and our God deals in realities, not shams. At best it would save us from the penalty of sin, without saving us from the sin itself; and with our hearts filled with sin we could have no spiritual life and no communion with God. It were simply a forensic justification, which would leave the intrinsic justification still to be acquired by works of charity, if we were ever to become meet companions for the saints in heaven; and therefore we should have, in order to be saved from sin, to perform all the works from which you propose to relieve us. Now, as we desire heaven more than we fear hell, and as it is from sin even more than from the punishment of sin that we would be saved, we can see no advantage in your doctrine of justification by faith alone, which remits the penalty and retains the sin, which saves from the external hell, but leaves all the inward aversion from God, which is the worst of all hells. Your doctrine is, no doubt, very convenient to those who would sin to their heart's content, and live as they list without fear of hell, without being troubled in their consciences, and with the comfortable assurance that they are saints; but as we do not wish to be of that number, as we wish to be saved from our sins, and to be conformed in our heart to God, and to bear his spiritual likeness that we may enjoy his communion, and hereafter be made partakers of his divine nature, the doctrine would be entirely useless to us, and perhaps even an inconvenience. We cannot, therefore, as at present advised, accept it in place of the Catholic doctrine.

On this as on all other points Protestants can offer us only their belief, whether negative or positive, in place of ours. But wherefore shall we give up our belief for theirs? Are they infallible? Certainly not, for they make it one of their greatest objections to the church, that she professes, by the assistance of the Holy Ghost, to teach infallibly what God has revealed to her. No, they answer, we are not infallible, but the Bible is. Conceded. But are you infallible in your understanding of what the Bible teaches? No? Then at the very best your belief is fallible, and may turn out to be false. Why then shall we give up ours for yours? At the worst ours is only fallible, and therefore no worse than yours at best.

We think, therefore, that this arrogant tone of the Prot-

estant minister, and his talk about saving the Romanist, and converting the pope, and all that, are quite out of place, and should not be indulged in till he has some positive doctrine, some affirmative truth, something more than a bare negation of Catholic doctrine, to offer us. We have a church professing to teach infallibly what God has revealed, and he proposes that we shall renounce her for no church at all, or at best for one that confesses herself to be fallible, and without authority to teach us either in faith or morals. Does it never occur to him that our church, while it is possible, as he must confess, that she may be infallible, and have from God the authority and assistance she professes to have, can at worst be only a fallible church, and therefore at worst as trustworthy as Protestantism at best? She would at worst only be worthless, and Protestantism, according to his concessions, can at best be no better than worthless. We have a church, a well-defined doctrine of faith and morals, which tells us distinctly what we must believe and what we must do in order to be saved,—to render ourselves acceptable to God and secure the eternal beatitude of heaven,—and you come to us and ask us to renounce her, to give up our clear, distinct, and well-defined faith, for what? For Protestantism, which, beyond the simple point of rejecting Catholicity, is a mass of crude and undigested opinions and speculations, varying with almost every individual Protestant, and ranging all the way from the high-churchism of Dr. Pusey down to the rank infidelity of Theodore Parker. First, dear brother, go and get Protestants to agree among themselves what Christianity is, and what it demands, and then show us your commission from Almighty God, made out in due form, to preach and administer it. Do that and we will hear you, but till then we must rank you with those prophets of whom the Lord by the mouth of Jeremy says, "I have not sent these prophets, and yet they run." "They are prophets of the delusions of their own hearts."

The simple fact is, Protestantism in its distinctive character is merely the denial of Catholicity, and on theological grounds cannot sustain itself for a moment. Protestants themselves feel this. They feel that it is incumbent on them, therefore, to bring something affirmative against us; and as they cannot find that in Protestantism as a religion, they would persuade us that they have it in Protestantism as a political and social system.

"I have often wondered why the Romanist did not, in moments of reflection, ask himself these simple questions: 'Why have I left the home of my fathers and the scenes of my childhood, and come to live in this Protestant land, and dwell among these heretics? How does it happen that I have here better food and clothing, higher wages, more constant employment, a more sure protection to my life and property, free education for my children, and far greater facilities for rising in the world than I had in my Catholic home. Whence this thrift, prosperity, and general happiness that I see around me?'

"It seems to us as though the man who could see the sunlight at noonday could see the answer to these inquiries, could see the world-wide difference between Popery and Protestantism, as elements of civilization and social happiness, to say nothing of the religious and spiritual bearings of the two systems. Yet we are presented with the strange spectacle of a large class of persons, who, after having experienced the miseries of the Papal system in their native country, are here, under the guidance of a corrupt and bigoted priesthood, laboring to break down the very government that affords them protection, destroy the sources of their daily comfort, sweep away the system of public education that seeks to elevate and enlighten them, and annihilate the Protestant faith, that has made America what it is,—the asylum of the oppressed, and the hope of all nations. That this state of things does not prevail universally among the Papal community in our own country, we are glad to allow. Some avalanches have slid away from this great Alps of iniquity, which in itself remains as cold and unmoved as ever. In some minds the light has broken, and revealed the error and corruption of the Romish apostasy. But over the mass of the people the cloud of ignorance and superstition is too dense to allow them to see what is so obvious to the enlightened observer."—pp. 9, 10.

The assumption of the author, that the evils of their own country which induce Catholics to emigrate are due to "the papal system," is unwarranted. Very few Catholics emigrate to this country from Catholic states, and the great body of them come from countries under Protestant governments. The most numerous body of emigrants are from Ireland, and Ireland is, and for three hundred years has been, a Protestant state, governed by Protestant England through an Irish Protestant faction, which has done all in its power to impoverish, degrade, and brutalize the Catholic Irish. It is not "the papal system," but the Protestant system of governing Ireland, as everybody knows, that has reduced them to that sad social and temporal condition which makes it desirable for them to emigrate. The next most numerous body of Catholic emigrants are from Germany, and to a great extent from German Protestant

states. That it is not "the papal system" that reduces the Germans to a condition which makes emigration desirable, is evident from the fact that the majority migrating from Germany to this country are non-Catholics.

The other assumption of the author, that the superior advantages enjoyed in this country are due to Protestantism, is equally unwarranted. Our national advantages we owe to the great extent of our country, the cheapness and fertility of our soil, and our vast natural resources. For these we are not indebted to Protestantism. Our political liberty we inherited, to a great extent, from our English ancestors, who themselves inherited it from Catholic England, and the rest we owe to local circumstances, and the long neglect of the colonies by the mother country, which enabled them to acquire habits of self-government. The religious liberty recognized by the constitution and laws we owe not to Protestantism, for it is repugnant to the very spirit of Protestantism, as the societies and movements of Protestants for the disfranchisement of Catholics, now in full blast, amply prove. There are no Protestant states in Europe that recognize and guaranty religious liberty in our sense of the term. Some of them *tolerate* different worships, but the European states that recognize and guaranty the *liberty* of different worships, such as France, Belgium, and Austria, are states in which the vast majority of the people are Catholics. Protestants rarely understand religious liberty in a sense broad enough to include the freedom of Catholicity, and the Protestant press of this country, the press which represents the genuine Protestant spirit, is urging upon the country to disfranchise Catholics, and even to expel them from the American territory. We must, therefore, tell our author, that, though religious liberty is recognized by our constitution and laws, it has been in spite of Protestantism, and not by it,—in fact, as a matter of state policy, or, if you will, of necessity, because no one Protestant sect was strong enough to make itself the state religion, and because at the time of our revolution very few persons thought it necessary to exclude Catholicity, which was supposed, if not dead, to be at least on its last legs. Both of the author's assumptions are therefore false, and his argument concludes nothing, or if any thing, it is against the Protestant states of Europe.

But even granting the author his assumptions, he could conclude nothing in favor of Protestantism or against Catholicity, as a religion. Religion is given us as the means of

securing eternal salvation, the beatitude of heaven, and we have never understood that to be granted as a reward of temporal prosperity, or to be purchased with worldly goods. The author, unconsciously perhaps, falls into carnal Judaism. He evidently makes the temporal prosperity of individuals and nations the touchstone of their religion. But this supposes that Christ came as a temporal Messiah, and rewards his followers with the goods of this life. This is precisely the error of the carnal Jews. They looked for a temporal prince, and interpreted the promises and prophecies of the Messiah and his kingdom in an earthly sense, and rejected our Lord because he came only as a spiritual prince, declaring that his kingdom was not of this world, and requiring his followers to labor not for the meat that perisheth, but for the meat that endureth unto everlasting life. The author agrees with them in principle, and differs from them only in this, that while they looked to him as a prince who was to restore the kingdom of Israel, and give to his chosen people all temporal power, grandeur, and happiness, he probably regards him as the temporal Messiah for the elect, whether Jews or gentiles. He is a little more liberal, perhaps, than they, but he does not differ essentially from them in principle.

This is a grave consideration, and we think we see evidence everywhere that Protestants to a fearful extent have lost sight of the spirituality of the Gospel, and in their own minds and hearts secularized and materialized Christianity. We know there are many hearts in the non-Catholic world who have high and noble aspirations, which the literature of the age calls "aspirations after the ideal"; but it is upon the whole low and utilitarian, and places its glory in the production and multiplication of material goods. It is a mercantile age, a shopkeeping world, which hardly recognizes a value which cannot be measured in good current coin. Intellect in that world, to a certain extent, no doubt, is cultivated, but as an instrument of the body, not of the spirit, or of the heart aspiring to the love and worship of "the First Good and the First Fair." Intellect is utilized, if we may use the term, and the heart is neglected, the soul is left to starve; wealth is made a god, industry a religion, commerce a worship, men and nations are measured by the material standard, and trade is regarded as the first of missionaries to the heathen. We do not exaggerate, we only state, or rather understate, the simple truth. In our own country thrift is the

first of virtues, and poverty is a crime, and everywhere punished as a crime; for your poorhouses are veritable prisons. In Catholic countries there are many people who are partially idle, poor people who are not struggling to become rich, and who take time to enjoy a holiday, to visit churches and say their prayers, or to go forth into the fields and enjoy innocent rural pleasures and tastes; there are quiet and repose; and there are beggars in the streets importuning you for an alms; and therefore our grave Protestants conclude that Catholicity is false, a blight upon the nations that embrace it. The people may, after all, be happy in their way, much happier than where the English and American system prevails; but how papacy must have degraded them before they could be contented to remain in their miserable condition, and find pleasure in such trifles as now charm them! Nobody is well employed, in the estimation of our Protestant age, unless employed in making revolutions, finding out new markets for trade, new articles of commerce, inventing new helps to industry, or opening or developing the resources of material wealth; that is, unless employed in making or helping others to make money. Such is that world in which Protestantism predominates. Now this materialism of the age has passed into the religion of Protestants. Protestantism—and this is its boast—is not a stationary religion, but a progressive religion, feeling always the impulse of the age, and yielding to its spirit. Just at present, two Protestant countries, Great Britain and the United States, represent the low utilitarian civilization now regarded as the most perfect civilization. They are at the head of the modern industrial and mercantile system, and in relation to this system are unquestionably the two most powerful states on the globe. Hence English and American Protestant authors conclude the truth and superiority of Protestantism. The most, however, that they could conclude from this would be the superiority of Protestantism in the material order. This superiority even we might dispute, but we let it pass for the present. Yet what must be the state of men's minds when they can allege it alone as an argument for or against a religion? The only principle on which they can do it is precisely that of carnal Judaism, and therefore only by directly opposing the essential nature of Christianity. Mr. Clark, no doubt, persuades himself that he is a Christian; and yet, if he understood one word of those Scriptures which he falsely alleges we are not per-

mitted to read, he would see that he proceeds on maxims which are the direct contradictories of those of our Lord and his apostles. Our Lord nowhere promises the kingdom of heaven to the rich and worldly prosperous. He says, "It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven." He teaches everywhere self-denial, detachment from the world, and commands us to lay up treasures in heaven, not on the earth; bids us set our affections not on things on the earth, but on things above; to be not solicitous as to what we shall eat, or what we shall drink, or wherewithal we shall be clothed, "for after all these things do the heathen seek." Evidently, to be solicitous for the wants of the body, and to seek after the good things of this life, are the characteristics of heathenism. How is it then that our author, when he takes worldly goods, sensible goods, goods that must perish with this life, as the criterion of our Christianity, does not see that he falls into the precise error that our Lord condemned in the heathen and the carnal Jews? How is it that he does not see that it is against Christianity itself that he is making war, and that he proves himself a worldly-minded man, a man of the earth, earthy, living after the flesh, not after Christ?

We think nothing is more certain than that the great practical objection to Catholicity, the objection that weighs most with our non-Catholic countrymen, is the supposed superiority in industry, thrift, and worldly prosperity of Protestant nations. Balmes has very well shown that this superiority is not a fact; but suppose that it is, it proves nothing for Protestantism as a religion, and commends it only in the minds of those who set their hearts on this world, and love the world more than they love God and heaven. This very worldly prosperity you boast, this modern system of trade and industry, which absorbs your minds and hearts, and directs all your energies to the *exploitation* of the material order, is itself the principal obstacle to the progress of Christianity, for Christianity lies in the spiritual order, another and an infinitely higher sphere. Mr. Clark himself, when he forgets controversy, and preaches on the practical requirements of the Gospel, will tell you as much, and contradict every principle he asserts in his reasoning against Catholics. Why then does he not see that perhaps the things he condemns in us are more praiseworthy than what he lauds in Protestants? How, if he commends this devo-

tion to the material order which he finds so much greater in Protestant nations than in Catholic nations, does he expect in his practical preaching to wean the affections of his people from the world, to make them despise its riches, to be content with poverty, and to bend all their energies, God helping them, to save their souls? How happens it that he does not see that the objection he urges against our religion is precisely the objection urged against our Lord himself, by those who crucified him between two thieves? The argument drawn from the unworldly and spiritual character of our religion, with which he would overwhelm us, is altogether in our favor, if Christianity be from God; and none but an infidel can with any propriety urge it as an objection. The obstacle Protestants find in the way of accepting our religion is really, if they consider it, that it is Christianity, that it makes little of this world, and renders us comparatively indifferent to worldly goods which perish, and solicitous only for those which endure unto everlasting life. It is an obstacle which exists in their own minds, in their own hearts, wedded to the world, not any thing wrong in the church, or that her defenders should seek to deny or explain away. Love not the world, but love God, and you will find that what now is a scandal to you will strike you as a proof that she is God's church.

The author's theory of the origin and progress of "Romanism," as he has the bad taste to call Catholicity, is an old acquaintance; but it is unhistorical, unphilosophical, and exceedingly superficial. We let the author state it in his own way.

"While surveying the movements and growth of the Papacy around us, we naturally inquire, in the first place, into the origin and history of this remarkable and mysterious power. A slight examination into the elements of Popery reveals the fact, that it has its source in the depravity of the human heart. It is virtually an embodiment of the evil principles and passions of the human soul. Selfishness, avarice, superstition, and despotism are among its constituent elements; and these, with others, are woven together with such skill, and form a combination of such prodigious strength, that Popery has been properly termed 'Satan's masterpiece.' It contains the principles of other false religions, of Paganism and a degenerate Judaism, all fused into one gigantic system. As an instrument for gaining temporal power and holding in subjection the thoughts and purposes as well as the conduct of men, it has no parallel in the history of religions. As a force destructive to vital piety and the pure doctrines of Christianity, it has no rival.

"During the first three centuries, when the opposition to the Church was from without, and the engines of Paganism were arrayed against her, she yet advanced with wonderful rapidity. With her doctrines pure and her advocates fired with a heavenly zeal, the principles of the Gospel spread throughout the Roman empire, and extended to regions which the sway of imperial Rome had not even reached. Churches arose in the capital of the empire; in the provinces of Asia Minor, and in Ethiopia; at Corinth, Phillippi, Thessalonica. The principles of the true faith were early introduced among the Gauls, Germans, Spaniards, and Britons. So rapid was the progress of the Gospel, and so complete its triumphs, in spite of the storms of persecution that raged against it, that, in the year 325, during the reign of Constantine the Great, the system of Paganism was demolished, and on the ruins was established the Christian faith. But Satan, unwilling to be baffled in his wicked designs, sought to plant within the Church itself the elements of destruction. Unable to check the tide of blessings that was flowing through the nations, he labored to poison the stream. And as the church gained in power and outward prosperity, she lost in spirituality, and in the graces of a sincere and ardent piety.

"The city of Rome, around which so many interesting and hallowed associations clustered, became the seat of authority. The bishop, by the strength which his position gave to him, and by being called upon to decide the disputes which arose in churches abroad, as well as at home, gradually gained supreme power. One nation after another submitted to his dictation. What he could not gain by persuasion he secured by the arts of diplomacy, or by the stern mandates of the sword. Over millions of consciences he held undisputed sway. All the avenues of influence centered at Rome, and thence emanated the laws that governed the civilized world.

"As early as during the first and second centuries we can trace the embryo developments of the Papal system. They appeared in many of the Christian churches, disturbing the faith and obstructing the spiritual growth of the members. St. Paul, in his letter to the Colossians, uses the following language: 'Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ.' And again: 'Let no man judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of an holy day, or of the new moon, or of the Sabbath days. . . . Let no man beguile you of your reward, in a voluntary humility and worshipping of angels.' Here we find these primitive disciples warned against the very errors which afterwards gained such prodigious power, and contributed so largely to the secularization and corruption of the Christian Church. The regard which was paid and continues to be paid to traditions; the influence of a vain and deceitful philosophy; the rules respecting meat, and fast and feast days; the worship paid to angels and saints, of which the Romish churches and the Pantheon at Rome bear abundant testimony,—all show

the importance of the Apostolic injunctions addressed to the Christians at Colossé.

"In the second century we discover in some minds a tendency towards monastic austerities. The doctrine was advanced, that the virtues of continence and chastity were specially pleasing to God, and that the marriage relation, under the most favorable circumstances, received but little Divine favor. In the extravagant and unscriptural views advanced upon this subject, we perceive the germ of that system of monasticism, which, with its inevitable perversions and corruptions, overspread in later years a large portion of the Christian Church.

"At this period, also, the vital interests of religion suffered from controversies which arose respecting minor observances, and the disposition which was manifested by some religious teachers to lay more stress upon the 'mint, anise, and cumin' of religion than upon the 'weightier matters of the law.'

"During this and the following century, several superstitious practices were introduced; such as the use of holy water, and regulations respecting the number of times that the eucharist should be celebrated. Traces of the doctrines of baptismal regeneration, and of purgatory, may be found in the works of some of the distinguished writers who belong to this period."—pp. 11–15.

We concede the disorders of human nature occasioned by the fall, but we do not concede the physical corruption of the soul. There are no evil principles in the soul physically considered. Sin is the result, not of an original evil principle, as the Manicheans held, but simply of the abuse or perversion of that which is good. False religions do not originate in what is evil in human nature, but in the perversion of that which is good, and constitutes its chief glory. This is what there is of true in the doctrine of those who contend that all religions are to some extent true and good. The false religion is a corruption or perversion of the true, and always presupposes true religion as the condition of its own existence. Now, if you maintain that Catholicity is a false religion, and contend that it originated in human nature, or in the human soul, you must show the true and good principles which it abuses, and a true religion of which it is a perversion. This will trouble you, for it and it alone of all pretended religions accords with the principles of human nature in their true normal development. And a keen examination of all other religions suffices to prove that they are departures from it, and corruptions or perversions of it. In like manner as all gentile religions are seen to be corruptions or travesties of the original patriarchial religion, so are all the forms of

Protestantism seen to be corruptions or travesties of Catholicity. There is not a single Protestant doctrine that does not presuppose the Catholic dogma, or that is intelligible without it. The man who, from the examination of Catholicity and any form of Protestantism, should pronounce the Protestant opinion to be prior to the Catholic dogma, and the dogma to be formed by a corruption or perversion of the opinion, would be looked upon by sensible men as a greater curiosity than Barnum has in his museum. From first to last, Protestantism leaves the marks of having originated subsequently to Catholicity, and of being derived from it by way of travesty, perversion, corruption, or denial. Every false doctrine originates in a true doctrine, which it falsifies. We demand, then, in every particular case in which the author alleges that Catholicity is false, that he should state the true doctrine of which it is a falsification. Till he complies with this demand, he has no right to offer us any speculations on the origin and progress of "Romanism." We commend this consideration to all Protestant controversialists. Truth is older than falsehood, which is the denial of truth, and older than error, which misapprehends, misapplies, misrepresents, or perverts it, sometimes innocently, sometimes culpably.

We always view with great distrust all theories which are founded on the supposed intrinsic corruption of the human soul. Nothing that exists is intrinsically evil. Protestants, when they do not deny the fall, are sure to exaggerate its effects on human nature. Man's nature has become disordered, his understanding darkened, and his will attenuated, by the loss of original justice, but it remains intrinsically good, physically what it was when it first came from the hands of the Creator. It is not totally depraved, it is not wholly corrupt; for if it were, it could not be redeemed and saved. Man's intellect is still adapted to truth, and cannot think without thinking truth on some side; his will still craves good, and cannot operate without on some side willing good. It is in the power of no man to think unmixed falsehood, or to will unmixed evil for the sake of evil. All thought is displayed on a substratum of truth, all will upon a substratum of good. In all error there is a truth misapprehended, misapplied, or perverted; in all evil there is a good misapprehended, misrepresented, misapplied, or abused. Here is the side of truth in your modern eclectic and humanitarian schools. All these ex-

aggerated views of the depravity of human nature should be avoided. The fathers did not find gentile philosophy all false and all evil. They studied it, and recommended its study, as containing much that is both true and good. Protestants even are to be judged with moderation and impartiality. It would be as false as illiberal to say that they have no truth. Not all their thoughts are false, not all their judgments are erroneous, not all their volitions are evil. They are men, men as richly endowed by nature as other men,—are not unfrequently able men, highly cultivated and learned men, as were many of the ancient gentiles. Not even in them has human nature lost all its dignity, or been shorn of all its glory. We should be able to recognize and vindicate, if need be, the dignity and nobility of human nature in the heretical as well as in the orthodox. We render no service to religion by decrying human nature. We are not to destroy nature, as attempted by Calvinists and Jansenists, to make way for grace. Grace does not supersede nature; it presupposes it, accepts it, comes to its aid, strengthens it, and lifts it into a higher sphere. It is what nature wants, what it cries out for, and without which it cannot attain to its supernatural destiny, its supernatural beatitude. That is what Tertullian meant when he pronounced the human heart "naturally Christian." But we shall have another occasion to develop this thought more at length, and to show that the modern idolatry of humanity which is the characteristic of socialism is only a travesty of Catholic teaching on the dignity of human nature and the solidarity of the race.

That Catholicity contains principles which may be found in Judaism,—even degenerate Judaism,—and in gentilism prior to the advent of our Lord, we are perfectly willing to concede. The Jews had the true religion, and the church is only the continuation of the synagogue under other conditions. Christianity did not come into the world as a new religion, or as a religion diverse from the Jewish. Christ came not to destroy the Law, but to fulfil it. The faith of the ancient Jews was, though less explicit, in substance the same as ours; only they believed in a Christ who was to come, and we in a Christ who has come. What was purely national in the synagogue, and what was purely typical in the Law, was abolished by the introduction of the Christian dispensation, but nothing more. It would therefore be an unanswerable objection to our religion if it

did not contain principles to be found in Judaism, and we are not to suppose that even degenerate Judaism has abandoned all those principles. Nor is it any objection, that our religion contains many principles in common with ancient gentilism. Ancient gentilism was not all false, and however it obscured, as does modern Protestantism, the great principles of the primitive revelation made to our first parents, it did not utterly reject them. It retained, as does Protestantism, and even more distinctly and in greater purity than do most Protestant sects, many true principles, —principles which must be recognized by every religion, in so far as it claims to be a religion at all. If Catholicity did not include what was true in gentilism as well as what was true in the synagogue, it would not be Catholicity, for it is essential to Catholicity that it include all truth in its unity and universality. The point for our author to make out is, not that "Romanism" includes principles found in other religions or in false and corrupt systems, but that it includes the falsity and corruption of those religions. If it includes only what they have that is true, only the principles which they corrupt and falsify, it is an argument altogether in its favor. It is necessary, then, in order to conclude against it, to show that it includes those religions in the sense of their errors, in the sense in which they were corrupt or false. This the author does not do, does not even attempt to do, and this, we venture to say, no man can do.

The author tells us, that, so "early as during the *first* and second centuries, we can trace the embryo developments of the papal system." Is not this a presumption against him? He must mean that he can trace them, not among the sects, cut off from the communion of the church, for that would be nothing to his purpose, but in the church herself. That is, the papacy, papal doctrines, and papal practices may be detected in the church during the very lifetime of the apostles and their immediate successors. The author cannot pretend that pure and genuine Christianity was found in any of the sects of the first and second centuries. Consequently, if it remained anywhere pure, unsullied, in its unity, integrity, and catholicity, it must have been during those centuries in the Catholic Church. Then either the papacy is not a corruption of Christianity, or there remained nowhere on earth a pure and uncorrupt Christianity at the close of the first century. Which are we to believe? Are

we expected to believe, amidst the light of this nineteenth century, so boasted by the friends of progress, that Almighty God, after having descended to the earth and established a religion designed for all men and nations, and intended to endure as the only way of salvation until the consummation of the world, took so little care of it, made such inadequate provision for its preservation, that it failed even in the lifetime of the apostles, or at furthest in that of their immediate successors?

We grant the errors against which St. Paul warns the Colossians did manifest themselves at that early day among individuals who called themselves Christians; but that is nothing to the author's purpose, for they were not "the embryo developments of the papal system," since they were not and never have been asserted by the church. The "embryo developments of the papal system" are not to be seen in the errors against which St. Paul warns the faithful, but in his assuming authority to admonish the faithful, and to condemn the things enumerated as errors in doctrine or practice; for the essence of the papal system is the claim of the pope to apostolic authority to teach and govern the faithful in all matters of salvation, and to define what is or is not Christian faith and morals,—that is, to do precisely what St. Paul himself did in his Epistle to the Colossians. The author is mistaken if he supposes the errors pointed out by St. Paul were the germs of the papal system, or of Romanism, for they have never been, in form or substance, doctrines or practices of the Roman Catholic Church, and are and always have been condemned by her precisely as they were by the apostle. She says with him to all the faithful, "Beware lest any man impose upon you by philosophy and vain fallacy, according to the tradition of men, according to the rudiments of the world, and not according to Christ." The apostle does not condemn tradition, and could not, for he elsewhere exhorts the faithful to hold fast the tradition they had received from him (2 Thess. ii. 15); he simply warns them against being deceived by the tradition of men, human tradition, and the rudiments of the world;—perhaps he means the false maxims of this world, or, as we say in our days, "the spirit of the age." The apostle bids us beware of being imposed upon by philosophy, and the fallacies of vain understandings,—that is, warns us against such writers as our author, and such books as *Romanism in America*,—and the church does the same.

She bids her children distrust the efforts of human reason to explain the mysteries of the Gospel, and condemns every attempt to substitute the speculations and subtilties of philosophy for the simplicity of faith. The apostle teaches that the distinction of clean and unclean meats, and that the festivals, new moon, and sabbaths of the Jewish law, are not obligatory on Christians. The church does the same. She bids us to call nothing common or unclean, and permits us the free use of all the good things of God, in so far as we use them as not abusing them. She does not prohibit all fasts, festivals, or observation of holidays; and if she did, we should never hear the last of it from our New England Puritans, who have their annual Fast, their annual Thanksgiving, and their weekly Sabbath, made holidays by the statute of the commonwealth. The apostle condemns the unauthorized and superstitious worship of angels or demons, whether good or bad, as practised by the philosophers and gentiles in ancient times, and by the spiritists among Protestants in modern times, and so does the church, and always has done it. These errors have never developed into Romanism, for Romanism has always excluded them, always set its face against them, and condemned them. It betrays on the part of the author either gross ignorance or gross unfairness, to represent as elements of "the papal system" what that system has never accepted, what it has always excluded and anathematized. We agree, of course, that "the embryo developments of the papal system, to use the author's very inaccurate language, can be traced in the first and second centuries, but not in the errors or sects condemned in those centuries. They can be traced only in the hierarchical organization of the church, and in the assumption by its pastors of authority from God to guard the primitive tradition, to teach "the faith once delivered to the saints," and to condemn as heresies whatever is opposed to it, and excommunicate from the society of the faithful all who embrace and persist in holding those heresies. It strikes us, therefore, that the fact that these "embryo developments" are found at so early a day in the Catholic Church of the time, should be regarded, to say the least, as a very strong presumption that what the author calls the papal system is of apostolic origin, and is to be accepted as the veritable Christian religion. If not, it is certain Christianity at that early day had failed, and its Author was an impostor, or deceiver, for he had

declared most solemnly that it should not fail. "Thou art Peter, and on this Rock will I build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." The author, it seems to us, in endeavoring to overthrow *Romanism*, overthrows, if any thing, Christianity itself; for if he proves any thing, he proves that Christ's promises have failed.

The author concedes the early development of the papacy, but attempts to explain its origin by the importance the pope derived from his position as bishop of Rome, and by his being "called upon to decide the disputes which arose in churches abroad and at home." Rome from the reign of Diocletian, in the third century, ceased to be the seat of the imperial authority, and the church in Rome during the first three centuries was far surpassed in numbers, wealth, and social importance by many of the Eastern churches. The patriarchate of Rome was during those centuries the feeblest of the four patriarchates into which the Christian world was divided. It was not the oldest church, and we cannot see what special strength the bishop of Rome could derive from his position. If there was nothing in the constitution of the church or in the primitive belief of the faithful that attached the primacy to the bishop of Rome as the successor of Peter, it seems to us that the primacy would much more likely have been attached to Jerusalem, as the oldest church, and as the city where our Lord preached, was betrayed and crucified; or to Antioch, where the disciples were first called Christians; or to Alexandria, the seat of the sciences, the erudition, and the philosophy of the empire. If the papacy is a usurpation, it is impossible to account for its usurpation by the bishop of Rome, or to explain how he came to be regarded by common consent as having the primacy. The first reason, therefore, assigned for the growth of the papacy in the bishop of Rome, we dismiss as unsatisfactory.

The second reason assigned seems to us to labor under the disadvantage of putting the effect for the cause. The author concedes the fact that the bishop of Rome in the first centuries was "called upon to decide the disputes that arose in churches abroad and at home," that is to say, in all the churches throughout the world. If, as the author evidently supposes, all the sees were equal in rank and dignity as Christian sees, and the bishop of Rome by divine constitution or apostolic tradition had no preëminence over his brethren in authority as well as order, how will he explain the rather remarkable fact, that he was thus called upon. The fact that

he was so called upon would seem to indicate that he was regarded as the proper and legitimate judge in the case of those disputes, and the conclusion should therefore be, not that he derived his power from being called upon, but that he was called upon because he had the power, or was regarded as the divinely appointed authority, to decide them.

The author's theory of the gradual development and formation of the papal power is not even plausible. It is as unhistorical as unphilosophical. From the very age of the apostles there has been recognized, whether rightly or wrongly is not now the question, a supreme teaching authority in the church, whose principle has uniformly been to prevent all novelty in doctrine, and to preserve the apostolic doctrine in its purity and integrity. Whenever any novelty of doctrine was broached, no matter by whom, it was met and marked with reprobation by the church; that is, either by the supreme pontiff, or by the pastors of the church in communion with him, assembled or dispersed. This in all ordinary cases, without any extraordinary assistance of the Holy Ghost, would suffice of itself to maintain purity and integrity of doctrine. Gradual and all but imperceptible changes of doctrine, we can easily conceive, may be introduced into the creed of a small sect, confined to a single district and subjected to the action of sects or associations with different beliefs; but it is impossible that such changes should be introduced into the creed of a church spread over the whole world, embracing persons of different races, languages, and nations, under different forms of government, different social institutions, and separated from one another by different manners and customs. How can you suppose the same causes would be operating at once on all points of the globe in precisely the same manner, and effecting precisely the same changes in all localities? How can this be, when with all, if there be a love of novelty, there is a still stronger aversion to change, and the conscientious conviction that no change is allowed, and no one is permitted to depart from the received dogma, but every one is bound to believe as the fathers believed, and to hold fast the tradition received from the apostles? The alleged corruptions or changes of doctrine are in no case historically verifiable, and the more common objection of Protestants against our church is that she does not change, that she is stationary, immovable in doctrine, and remains insensible to the spirit of the age, the progress of intelligence, and the changes time introduces into

human affairs. She is condemned as unprogressive, as being in the nineteenth century what she was in the twelfth, and as asking us to believe now as the faithful did eighteen hundred years ago. The more advanced Protestants are looking with some interest to ascertain whether the doctrine of development, or the one we have opposed to it, is the one the church approves, and they say there is hope for Catholicity if it turns out to be the doctrine of development. Then, as to the papal power, the author concedes that it can be traced in the first and second centuries. Its very character is such that it cannot be a gradual introduction. In human governments the monarchical element is never a gradual introduction, and in no instance has the state from a democracy or an aristocracy become a monarchy without a revolution more or less violent. Louis Napoleon did not become emperor without the employment of force. In the moral order no more than in the physical is there a real metagenesis, or do you find a passing of one species into another. Nobody has ever known the ox develop into a horse, or the hog into an elephant. The germ at least of the papal power must have been in the church from the first, or it could never have been introduced without a violent revolution, the traces of which would remain. The bishop of Rome could never have made himself acknowledged as supreme visible head and governor of the church, if he had not been from the beginning recognized as holding a primacy of jurisdiction; for otherwise there would have been no foundation on which he could erect his power, nothing of the same order from which his authority over the universal church could be developed. His authority, at least *in radice*, he must have held from the first, and therefore by divine institution. He could never, as temporal sovereigns may, extend his authority beyond what was fixed in the original constitution, for he has never had any means of doing it but appeals to the conscience of the faithful, which conscience must precede, not follow, the extension. Suppose him to have been ambitious and willing to usurp power, or to give his legitimate authority an illegitimate development, you must still remember that he must have been met by a resistance on the part of other bishops, as well as on the part of temporal sovereigns, too strong for him to overcome. The papal power has always been the first point of attack, for it is in some sense odious both to bishops and to temporal sovereigns; to the former because it subjects them to a superior

authority, to the latter because it gives unity, compactness, and efficiency to the spiritual power, which becomes formidable to them when they would be tyrants. Hence, when not under the influence of conscience, both have always shown a disposition not to extend, but even to restrict, the papal power. This is verified by all history, ecclesiastical and secular, from the first ages down to our own times. Pagan authors called upon the pagan emperors to put down Christianity as dangerous to their power, because Christians were organized under the supreme authority of one man, the bishop of Rome, in whom the emperor might find a formidable rival,—the very argument in substance used by the Know-Nothings of to-day. Temporal sovereigns, except when holy men and devout Catholics, which has seldom been the case, have in all times viewed the papal power with jealousy, and sought to restrict it. Courtly prelates and worldly-minded priests, especially when mixed up with the administration of the state, have always been ready to sustain them in so doing. How, then, we ask, could the bishop of Rome, having no material force, and on the author's hypothesis, no moral force, at his command, usurp the papal power, and get himself acknowledged by bishops and sovereigns as supreme ruler of the church? The thing is impossible, because it would require weakness to be able to overcome strength, nothing to produce something. We may therefore dismiss the author's theory of gradual corruption, and conclude that the church either was corrupt in the first and second centuries, or is not corrupt now.

We cannot follow the author through all his declamation. He finds that during the middle ages there was much corruption among Catholics, and that the bishops and priests did not always do their duty, and in some instances were no better in their morals than secular nobles and men of the world. But from whom does he learn this? He cites St. Bernard. But St. Bernard was a papist, what in our days we call an ultramontanist, a monk, an abbot, and has been canonized for his sanctity by the papal church. This must prove that those enormities of which he complains were not approved either by the church or by good Catholics, and also that they were not the necessary effects of Catholicity. The church is that Gospel net which, cast into the sea, gathered fishes of all sorts, both good and bad. All are not of the church that are in her external communion. Many of them will, no doubt, be damned, as bad

Catholics. The rule of judging is to judge by those who, like St. Bernard, conformed faithfully to what the church teaches and commands, not by those who disregard her requirements, and avail themselves of none of her helps to a holy life. What would the author say of us, should we rake through the scandalous history of our own state, and parade the number of Protestant ministers who, during the last twenty-five years, in this very neighborhood, have been proved guilty of adultery, and even of sodomy, and conclude from their corruption the falsity of Protestantism? Judas was a devil. Were the other eleven apostles therefore devils, and Christianity a satanic invention? "Scandals," says our Lord, "must needs come, but woe unto them by whom they come." But why, in view of these scandals, which we neither deny nor seek to disguise, and which you have learned only from their condemnation by Catholics, forget from what depths of vice and corruption the church has raised modern society? Why forget the example of heroic sanctity she has given to the world, the chaste sentiments she has inspired, the pure morality she has taught, the new dignity and nobility she has bid us honor in human nature? Why forget that, if you are yourselves this day in advance of your pagan and barbarous ancestors, who rushed down from the North to destroy civilization and brutalize Christian Europe, you owe it to her and the labors of her zealous and heroic missionaries? Why not ask yourselves, if there has been so much evil with the church and in spite of her, what would have been the condition of the world without her? Why, because you have put out your eyes or distorted your vision, seek you to extinguish the sun in the heavens, and wrap the world in darkness? Blind ye are, or you would see that these very scandals prove that the church is God's church, and under his supernatural protection; for if not, she would have been ruined by them, and ceased to exist long ages ago. Do, for the honor of our common humanity and of our common country, try to open your eyes, to elevate your thoughts, and to take broader and more comprehensive views of things. Do try to prove that you have not with Catholicity lost your five wits, and fallen below humanity.

We must pass over the author's two lectures on the "Fundamental Principles of Popery," a subject on which he is not very luminous, and simply delay our readers for a few moments on the "Antagonism between Popery and Civil Freedom."

"I propose, in this lecture, to discuss the bearing of Popery upon freedom, and social and national happiness.

"That we may not be charged with bringing against the Romish Church unfounded accusations, or with dealing with antiquated principles of government which have been abandoned or repudiated, we will quote the opinions which have recently been advanced by the advocates of Romanism in America. And it should be observed, that whatever is said against religious freedom bears with equal force against civil freedom, for the two are inseparably connected. One cannot exist without the other.

"'Hear, then, the language used by the 'Shepherd of the Valley:' 'The Church is of necessity intolerant. Heresy she endures when and where she must; but she hates it, and directs all her energies to its destruction. If Catholics ever gain an immense numerical majority, religious freedom in this country is at an end. So our enemies say. So we believe.'

"Another authority, high in the Church, has said: 'That popes and general councils have passed the most bloody and persecuting laws against all whom they were pleased to denominate as heretics, is now generally conceded by intelligent defenders of the Catholic faith, and it is maintained, as we have seen, that, if they should ever obtain a decided numerical majority in this country, they will be bound by the very nature of their religion to act on the same principles, and consequently religious liberty will thus be at an end. *"So our enemies say. So say we."*'

"'Listen to the words of Brownson's Review, which is the acknowledged organ of Romanism in this country, and is indorsed by nearly the whole Roman Catholic hierarchy in the United States. Indeed, Mr. Brownson has asserted that he writes nothing without the sanction of his bishop. On the subject of the Pope's authority, he says: 'We believe in the direct temporal authority of the Pope, as vicar of Jesus Christ on earth.' 'The Church (in the person of the Pope) bears, by divine right, both swords (temporal and spiritual). The temporal sovereign holds it [that is, the temporal sword], *to be exercised under her directions.*'

"And what, you may ask, is the authority of the Pope, according to the admissions of the Romish Church? The question is answered by the Council of Trent, in the following language: 'Sitting in the chair in which Peter, the prince of the Apostles, sat to the close of his life, the Church recognizes in his person the most *exalted degrees of dignity, and the full amplitude of jurisdiction,—a dignity and jurisdiction not based on synodal, or other human constitutions, but emanating from no less authority than God himself.*'

"Here we see the most absolute despotism conferred upon the head of the Papal Church, and conferred in the name of Almighty God. Powers the most unlimited, in civil, social, and religious matters, are committed to him, and all the forces and influences at the command of the Church are employed to sustain his supreme authority.

"The sentiments of Brownson, with regard to the Constitution of the United States, are thus responded to by one who signs himself *Apostolicus:* 'I say, with Brownson, that if the Church should declare *that the Constitution, and the very existence* of this or any other country, should be *extinguished*, it is a solemn ordinance of God himself, and *every good Catholic would be bound*, under the penalty of the terrible punishment pronounced against the disobedient, *to obey*.'

"Bishop O'Conner, of Pittsburg, says: 'Religious liberty is only endured till the opposite can be established with safety to the Catholic world.' The Bishop of St. Louis declares: 'America will soon be Catholic, and then religious liberty will cease to exist.'

"Such are the sentiments which are openly proclaimed in free America, not by men who have been wronged, or who have suffered under our institutions, but by those who have access to all the advantages which the nation affords, and whose lives, property, and right of speech are protected by the very government which they so bitterly and wantonly assail."—pp. 76–79.

The authorities which the author here cites to sustain his accusations against the church are all pure inventions, if not by him, by some of his friends. The pretended extract from *The Shepherd of the Valley* consists of certain sentences detached from their original connection, and so moulded together as to express a meaning never intended by the writer, and the reverse of the meaning he plainly expressed in the article from which they are culled. The passage ascribed to "another authority, high in the church," bears on its face the unmistakable evidence of having been written by an enemy of the church, most likely some pious Protestant. No Catholic ever did, or ever would or could have written it. The two quotations, professing, the one to be from the bishop of Pittsburg, the other from the bishop of St. Louis, are forgeries. They were never written by either of those distinguished prelates, and they are in contradiction to their well-known sentiments on the subject. We have looked till weary, and have found no such canon of the Council of Trent as is alleged, and it is well known that that council gave no definition of the papal power. The first passage from our *Review* is only a part of a sentence, and is made to convey a meaning which, in the very connection in which the words are found, we expressly deny. For the opinion we expressed, whatever it was, was expressed as our private opinion, not as a Catholic dogma, and whatever we meant by the *temporal* power of the pope, it is well known to our readers that we have asserted for him as

vicar of Jesus Christ no temporal or civil jurisdiction, outside of the Ecclesiastical States; that we fully recognize the distinction of the two powers, the autonomy of the state, and the independence and supremacy of the temporal authority in its own order. The second alleged quotation from us is a pure invention. We never said it, or anything like it. We do not allow ourselves to make impossible suppositions. We do not believe it possible for the pope to order the constitution of this country, far less the country itself, to be extinguished; therefore we could never have said what we should or should not be bound to do in case he should so order. The pope cannot dispense from the law of God or a divine command, and therefore cannot set aside a legitimate civil constitution, for such a constitution derives from God through the people, and exists by divine right. It is sacred and inviolable for conscience, and for the conscience of the pope as well as for the conscience of any other Catholic. It is ordained of God, and can no more be set aside than any other divine ordination. If any supposition of the sort alleged has ever appeared in our pages, it has been to show its absurdity, and to rebuke those writers and orators who are in the habit of making impossible suppositions, and showing their bravery in abusing the pope hypothetically. Every Catholic knows that the contingency supposed can never happen, any more than it can happen that God should command us to commit murder; and to believe that it could, would be to disbelieve Catholicity.

Undoubtedly we hold, and so does every good Catholic, that no contingency can happen in which resistance to the supreme pontiff, speaking and acting as chief of the church, can be lawful, for every Catholic believes him to be the vicar of Jesus Christ, and to resist him would be to resist Jesus Christ himself. Thus far, of course, Catholic obedience requires us to go, and if you dislike it, we cannot by denying our faith or by explaining it away relieve you, for "we must obey God rather then men." We do not expect it to please those who do not believe Catholicity, and it would by no means please us, if we did not believe the pope to be the vicar of Jesus Christ, teaching and governing by divine appointment. Prove to us that we are wrong in this belief, and we reject the papal supremacy at once, and refuse as stoutly as you to obey the pope in any thing whatever. But suppose him to be what we believe him to be, and Prot-

estants themselves must see that resistance to him in his official capacity can never be lawful; and they must be as much disgusted as we are with those Catholics who think to reassure them by their big words about what they would do to the pope in case he should do what they must deny Catholicity before they can believe it possible for him to do, and by asserting eloquently the brave resistance which they are well assured they will never be able to show, except hypothetically.

We cannot comment on all the author advances to prove that the papacy is incompatible with civil freedom. He is, as usual, false in his facts and illogical in his conclusions. The purport of what he would say is, Catholics hold the pope to be the supreme spiritual chief, and his authority is never to be resisted. Therefore Catholicity is antagonistic to *civil* freedom. We concede the premises, but deny the conclusion. Catholics love civil freedom as much as Protestants, and perhaps understand it somewhat better. If the pope had no divine commission, if he were not instituted by Jesus Christ as his supreme vicar on earth, undoubtedly the assertion of his supremacy would be antagonistic to both religious and civil freedom; but not by any means, if he is authorized to teach and govern in the name of Jesus Christ himself. The papal government, if not divinely authorized, is a despotism, because then it is not legitimate, is not founded in right; but if it is so authorized, it is no despotism, because despotism is power disjoined from right, from legality. If the pope governs as the divinely appointed vicar of Jesus Christ, it is God that governs through him, and his government is the government of Jesus Christ himself. To call his government, in that case, a despotism, would be tantamount to calling the divine government itself a despotism, which we think our author, with all his temerity, will not venture to do. Before, then, the author concludes that there is any thing in the papacy favorable to despotism, or antagonistic to freedom of any sort, he must prove that the pope governs by mere human authority, and not as the vicar of Jesus Christ. Till then he only begs the question.

The Protestant is fond of calling us slaves because we recognize the papal supremacy, and forgets that he, unless he is fibbing, is, to say the least, as great a slave as we. He is no more at liberty to believe or to do any thing contrary to the teachings and precepts of the Bible, than we are to believe or to do any thing contrary to the definitions and re-

scripts of the Holy Father. He is as much bound, according to his own confession, to conform in all things to the Bible, as we are to the church. He asserts for all men and nations, states and individuals, an authority as supreme and as inflexible as that which we assert. How, then, are we less free than he? The only difference between us in respect to authority is that he places it in the record of what God said by men in ancient times, and we in what he teaches and commands through the voice of a living pontiff. If the authority we assert is human because it comes to us through a human organ, then must the authority he asserts be human, for that comes to him only through a human organ. The prophets and apostles were men in the same sense that the pope is a man, and if God's voice through them is divine and authoritative, it may be equally divine and authoritative through him. If he holds that in believing and obeying the Bible he is believing and obeying God's word, so we hold that in believing and obeying the living pontiff we are believing and obeying God. He asserts an apostolic authority that was, and we an apostolic authority that was and is. If we hold a doctrine incompatible with freedom, he holds one equally so, and every argument he uses to prove that the papal supremacy is incompatible with freedom, civil or religious, and favorable to civil or spiritual despotism, may be urged to prove the same of the Scriptural supremacy which he asserts. He would do well to remember this.

Either our assertion of the papal authority, which is simply the continuation of the authority held by Peter on earth, that is, of the apostolic authority, is not, if it be such authority, antagonistic to civil freedom, or the authority which the Protestant asserts for the Bible is antagonistic to it. But he will not concede that the assertion of the Bible as the supreme and unalterable law for states and individuals is incompatible with the full freedom of either. Why should we, then, concede that the same authority, asserted on precisely the same grounds, for the vicar of Jesus Christ, denies all freedom, and reduces individuals and states to slavery? Civil freedom demands, on the side of the temporal authority, that it be independent and supreme in its own order, and on the side of the individual, that he be guarantied against being required by the civil authority to do or to suffer any thing repugnant to the law of God. The papal supremacy leaves the the state free, inasmuch as it leaves it independent and supreme, that is, without a superior, in its

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own order, and protects the freedom of the individual or subject by asserting the supremacy of the spiritual order, and forbidding the state to do or to require to be done any thing repugnant to the divine law. So far, then, from the papal supremacy being hostile to freedom, it is its indispensable condition. Civil freedom is and can be violated only by the encroachment of the temporal upon the spiritual, either by the subjects refusing to the state that obedience imposed by the law of God, or by the state commanding things to be done or suffered which that forbids. The essential condition of all civil freedom is, then, the assertion and maintenance of the independence and supremacy of the spiritual in face of the temporal. The Protestant, when he is not opposing us, asserts this supremacy as boldly as we do; for he then stoutly maintains that the word of God, as contained in the Scriptures, is the supreme law for both governments and subjects, and that neither have the right to do any thing which they forbid. In the Protestant mind, if sincere, a legislative enactment repugnant to the law of God as recorded in the Scriptures would be null and void from the beginning. If the state should command him to become a papist he would resist it, on the ground that it exceeded its competency. He asserts and must assert a higher law than the state, if he believes in God and the divine sovereignty. If he asserts no higher law than the state, he leaves the state supreme in spirituals as well as temporals, which is civil despotism; if he does assert it, and leaves it to each individual to determine for himself when the higher law applies, he denies the independence and supremacy of the civil power even in its own order, and falls into individualism, which is anarchy. Here is the inconvenience of Protestantism in relation to civil liberty. If the Protestant does not assert a higher law, he favors civil despotism; if he does, since the Bible does not explain itself, and he has no divinely constituted court for declaring that higher law, he must allow each individual to interpret it for himself, and thus favor anarchy, which is only another name for barbarism. Moreover, if there is no difficulty in ascertaining what the higher law forbids, that is, what the spiritual order forbids, the spiritual power under Protestantism, having no organization, no organs, and no representation, is and must be practically null, and hence it is that every Protestant community always vacillates between despotism and anarchy. The remedy is to be found only in the papal supremacy,

which embodies, so to speak, the divine authority, and represents God in the government of the world.

If we recur to history, we shall find civil society orderly and free just in proportion as the papal authority has been recognized and respected. Nations have always, since the origin of Christian nations, had to cast off or explain away the papacy before they could enslave their subjects. We have yet to find the first free state founded by Protestantism, for our country holds what freedom it has, not from Protestantism, but in spite of it, and Protestantism is doing its utmost to destroy the freedom we have, pushing us on the one hand to social despotism, and on the other to anarchy.

We do not pretend that Catholicity is republican in the American sense, for in fact she is neither republican nor monarchical, and commands us to obey the legally constituted government in all things not repugnant to the law of God, whatever its form. Within the limits of the law of God, the people are free, if they have no government existing, or if the actual rulers have forfeited their trusts, to institute government in such form and with such powers and limitations as seem to them good, whether republican or monarchical. She enjoins on us for conscience' sake to be loyal to the existing legal order, and commands the government, whatever its form, to govern justly, for the common good. She teaches the doctrine which forms the basis of the argument of the American Declaration of Independence, that the tyranny of the prince absolves the subject from his allegiance, and thus condemns tyranny and consecrates freedom. This is all that any friend of freedom can ask. Protestantism, having no loyalty or respect for law, and being in its very origin and nature a rebellion—justifiable or not is not now the question—against the established order, is unquestionably more deeply imbued with the revolutionary spirit than Catholicity, and no doubt will be more ready to overthrow an existing government for the sake of introducing a republican government, if you will; but for that very reason it must be less ready and able to sustain republican institutions where they already legally exist. This, if an advantage, we willingly concede to Protestantism. Catholicity is never good at making revolutions. That loyalty which under a monarchy is given to the prince, under a republic she tranfers to the constitution, and this, let us tell our republican friends, is a still greater advantage. Revo-

lutions are violent remedies, and are never proper in the normal state of things. Civil freedom by no means consists in the freedom to make revolutions when one pleases. Governments are not established to be overthrown, but to be preserved and administered for the good of the people. We have had our revolution, we have instituted our government, and our business is now to preserve it, and to secure its wholesome operation. Our republican friends must permit us to tell them that this can never be done by cherishing the revolutionary spirit, nor without that loyalty to the constitution which Protestantism cannot inspire, and which Catholicity enjoins as a religious duty. In vain will they seek support in selfishness, or in what the French call *l' intérêt bien entendu*, or enlightened self-interest; in vain will they seek it in constitutional checks and balances, or in attempting to play off conflicting interests and passions against each other. There is no firm basis for civil government outside of morality, and those lofty disinterested principles which are to be found only in religion. The constitution must be engraved on the heart of your people, and they must feel it a moral obligation, a religious duty, to love it, to live and die for it, or it will prove only so much useless parchment. The experience of our country is daily proving to all understandings, that, whatever may be the willingness and ability of Protestantism to make a revolution in favor of republicanism, it lacks the capacity to sustain republican government when introduced.

This is simple enough. The revolutionary spirit is the antagonist of the spirit that is required to sustain an established order. The former is the spirit of destruction, the latter the spirit of conservation. If the object of society were to be always making revolutions and trying experiments, Protestantism would be decidedly the best; but if the object is for society to preserve and develop itself in a fixed and stable order, according to a law of continuity, no man of ordinary capacity can for a moment doubt the superiority of Catholicity. Protestantism has no fixed point of departure, no uniform rule of procedure, and no determinate goal. It is hostile to whatever is fixed and immovable, and demands always freedom to make new experiments. It is always experimenting. It experiments on authority, on doctrine, on discipline, on the state, on society, and never arrives at any thing certain and durable. With this spirit, it can be relied on only where there is a work of

destruction to be done. It can make a revolution, but it cannot preserve the state. Catholicity, on the contrary, takes its point of departure in what is, and its fixed purpose is to preserve what is good, and secure an end which it foresees, and which for it is clear and determinate. It will amend what it finds that is faulty, but it will do it always in accordance with the principle and genius of the existing constitution, and always with a view to its preservation and freer and more healthy action. It cannot make a revolution for the sake of introducing a republican government, but it has precisely that conservative spirit and influence needed to save such a government and secure its beneficial operation wherever it exists.

But we own that Catholicity does not lay great stress on mere forms of any sort. She looks to realities, not empty forms. She teaches the great principles of civil liberty, and inspires her children with the wisdom, the courage, and the self-denial necessary to assert them. No Catholic people ever have or ever can be enslaved; they never are, and never can become, servile and sycophantic in their disposition or manners. They may be humble, free from pride, but true humility is compatible with the greatest magnanimity. No Catholic, if really such, can ever lose sight of the true dignity of human nature assumed by God himself, or of the true nobility of the human soul for which Christ has died. Hence under all forms of government true freedom is possible, and Catholicity therefore turns her attention, not to constitution-making, not to changing the form of the government, but to securing its wise and just administration. She weds herself to no form, makes all forms tolerable.

Protestantism, though dead, has for the moment by means of Know-Nothingism been galvanized into a sort of spasmodic life; but speaking in general terms it is dead, and only waits for its friends to give it a decent burial. The movements we witness really console us. They prove to us that the American mind is beginning to open to something better and nobler than it has hitherto had, and that the shrine-makers for the Ephesian goddess are beginning to be alarmed for their craft. Let none of our friends be disturbed by the crying from morning till night, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians!" More than one heathen god or goddess, more than one idolatry, more than one superstition, has fallen with a crash before the onward march of Catholic truth, and the day of deliverance for our countrymen, we firmly be-

lieve, is not far off. Do not let the clamors raised against us make us timid, or lead us to explain away the features of Catholicity most objected to by a Know-Nothing fanaticism. These are no times for trimming or time-serving. It is precisely in these times, when all the non-Catholic world is raising a hue-and-cry against the church for her alleged Mariolatry, that she defines the immaculate conception of Mary to be a Catholic dogma. It is when the mystery of the Incarnation is denied, that she renders new honors to the mother of God. Now, when the papal character of our church is so rudely assailed, let us hold fast to it, and forbear to abuse our Holy Father even hypothetically.

THE PAPAL CONSPIRACY EXPOSED.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1855.]

We assure the author, that it is very far from our intention to offer a formal reply to the false charges, calumnies, and illogical conclusions of his elaborate volume, which contains the quintessence of Evangelical acidity double distilled. He may have more natural ability, but he is, if possible, less truthful and amiable than the Rev. Rufus W. Clark, reviewed in the present number. We will, however, concede that, if his *Papal Conspiracy exposed* had been issued before that article was written, we should have selected it as the subject of our comments, instead of *Romanism in America*, for it was our wish to take the most malignant, the most bitter, and the least scrupulous Protestant production against Catholics that we could lay our hands on. In this point of view, Dr. Beecher's volume is superior to Mr. Clark's. It is even more savage in its spirit, more elaborate in its falsehoods, more vigorous in its sophistry, if less polished in its literary execution. Yet it must be admitted that both are admirable specimens of Evangelical literature, and, if they could be used, would be a very good substitute for vinegar.

**The Papal Conspiracy exposed, and Protestantism defended, in the Light of Reason, History, and Scripture.* By Edward Beecher, D. D. Boston: 1855.

Dr. Edward Beecher is a son of the renowned Dr. Lyman Beecher, and brother of the really able and independent Henry Ward Beecher, and of the world-famous or world-notorious Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. He is not naturally imbecile, or even destitute of logical power. We think nature has even been liberal to him, and that, placed in favorable circumstances and under genial influences, he would have proved himself worthy of esteem both as a thinker and as a writer. But he is a melancholy example of the influence of modern Evangelicalism to prevent all manly development of the intellect, and all generous and noble expansion of the heart. His puritanism, which he has never had the manliness to shake off, has kept him in a state of intellectual childhood, and prevented him from opening his heart to the genial rays of the sun of justice. He knows no freedom, and remains cramped, "cribbed, cabined, and confined," by his Protestantism, which cannot stand a moment before free thought and warm love, and can be defended only by falsehood, misrepresentation, calumny, vituperation, and chicane. If any thing could deepen our disgust at Evangelicalism, it would be the book before us, which proves its power to extinguish a naturally noble mind and a naturally generous heart. Dr. Beecher, we hesitate not to say, was born for better things; he might have been a man, and have done a man's work; but having early stuck in the mire of Calvinism, he can save his race only as a beacon, or as the drunken Helots served to teach temperance to the Spartan youth.

Dr. Beecher is haunted by strange visions of a papal conspiracy against American Protestantism and American liberty, and in his agitated dreams he calls out upon his countrymen to put an extinguisher upon Catholicity. The poor man is certainly dreaming. There is no conspiracy of the sort he imagines. We probably know as much of the subject as he does, and our word is as good as his; and we tell him and our countrymen that there is no papal conspiracy in the case, and the only conspiracy we know of is that of Protestantism in the Know-Nothing movement, to deprive Catholics of their political and civil rights, and perhaps to exterminate them, or to expel them from the country. "Even Mr. Brownson," the author says, "confesses that there is a system designed to exterminate Protestantism, not by force, but by argument and conviction." Suppose Mr. Brownson does so confess. What then? Sup-

pose that what he confesses, or rather asserts, is true, does it prove the reality of "a papal conspiracy"? Catholicity and Protestantism, as everybody knows, are mutually antagonistic. A man cannot be a Protestant without being opposed to Catholicity, or a Catholic without being opposed to Protestantism. The church labors to make all men Catholics, and Dr. Beecher labors, we suppose, to make all men Protestants. The success of either is, in the nature of the case, the extermination of the other. Even Dr. Beecher, we should suppose, could understand this much. The church, in fulfilling her divine mission, seeks to convert all the non-Catholic portion of the people of this country to Catholicity, to gather them within her communion, and to nourish them at her breast, that she may present them pure and holy to her heavenly Spouse. Should she succeed in doing this, she would, of course, exterminate Protestantism. But here is no conspiracy. All is open and avowed. It is precisely what, if the Christian Church, she must aim at, and what she has always and everywhere aimed at, and to prove that it is so is no proof or exposure of a papal or any other conspiracy. It is no wonderful discovery.

The church works in open day, and all her proceedings are public. She avows her object, and her means of attaining it. Her object is to convert the whole world in general, and, if you please, this country in particular, to Catholicity. But by what means? By force? No. But by "argument and conviction." That is, by convincing the reason and the will that she is God's church, out of which salvation is not possible. This supposes that she seeks only voluntary converts, and that she exterminates Protestantism only by convincing Protestants of its falsity, and inducing them voluntarily to abandon it. Now, does Dr. Beecher confess that, in an open field and fair play, Protestantism cannot stand before Catholicity? Does he call it a "conspiracy," to resolve to attack Protestantism by argument, by an appeal to the reason of Protestants? Would he maintain that a Protestant convinced of the falsity of Protestantism and the truth of Catholicity ought not to be allowed to profess himself a Catholic? Would he go so far as to deny to Catholicity the right to make converts if she can by "argument and conviction"? Does he feel that it is all over with Protestantism if Catholicity is free to combat it by argument? If so, how is it that he professes to defend it "in the light

of reason, history, and Scripture"? If reason, history, and Scripture are on the side of Protestantism, what has it to fear in argument with Catholicity? Why does it call in force to close the reason and shut the mouth of its opponent? No man is ever against reason, unless he feels or fears that reason is against him.

If Dr. Beecher had spoken of a Protestant conspiracy for the extermination of Catholicity, he would have spoken of what is not at all an imagination or a dream. Everybody knows that Protestants express their determination to exterminate Catholicity, not in our country only, but in all countries. To this end they have formed and sustained alliances and associations, in conjunction with acknowledged conspirators, for the purpose of revolutionizing every Catholic state in Europe, in the hope that, by revolutionizing the state in the sense of red republicanism, they will put an end to the papacy, and with the papacy to Catholicity. They have conspired, and still conspire, with Mazzini and other revolutionary leaders, against the church, the grand bulwark of social freedom and of social order. They have gone further; they have formed a real and undeniable conspiracy, —a secret society, a secret organization, sustained by the most rigid rules, and, if not belied, by the most fearful oaths.—whose express object is to deprive Catholics of all their political rights, to reduce them, if it suffers them to live, to the condition of slaves in their native land, and for no offence but that of worshipping God according to the dictates of their own conscience. They have succeeded in possessing themselves of the government of this ancient commonwealth, and they are laboring in secret conclave to get that of the Union, and to place the whole political power of this country in the hands of this secret society, governed by unknown and irresponsible chiefs, and substituting a secret and invisible despotism for the constitutional and public authority of the people. Now, with this well-known Protestant conspiracy against Catholics, with its ramifications throughout the Union, and perhaps throughout Christendom, what more shameless, what more satanic, than for a man like Dr. Beecher to turn round and accuse us of a "papal conspiracy" against Protestantism? We are exposed at any moment to the fury of a Protestant mob, inflamed by the passionate appeals of Protestant ministers; our churches are blown up, burnt down, or desecrated; the sanctuary of our private schools and colleges is invaded, or threatened to

be invaded, by illegal and unconstitutional legislative committees; our dead are all but denied a burial; our children are kidnapped and placed in Protestant families to be brought up in what we regard as a damnable heresy; legislatures are devising ways and means to confiscate the funds given by Catholic charity for the support of divine worship and feeding of the poor; our lives and property are insecure, and the authorities afford us hardly a shadow of protection; and our rights as Catholics, as citizens, or as men are every day trampled upon with impunity; and yet Protestants have the incredible impudence to accuse us of conspiracy, to represent themselves as the victims of our secret councils,—as in danger from us of losing their liberty, and may be their lives! This is adding mockery to injury, and, if it is a fair exhibition of Protestantism, as we have but too much evidence that it is, we and all Catholics cannot be too thankful to Almighty God, that we are not Protestants.

Quem Deus vult perdere, prius dementat. Nothing can more clearly prove that Protestants are demented than their present violence against Catholics. Never has Protestantism been willing to concede to Catholicity an open field and fair play. It boasts of religious liberty, but the only religious liberty it has ever recognized is its liberty by civil pains and penalties, or by material force, to shut the reason and close the mouth of Catholics. No country has ever become Protestant through the labors of peaceful Protestant missionaries, or by appeals to reason, history, and Scripture. Among whatever people Protestantism has gained an establishment, it has been by violence, by civil or physical force, and wherever it has sustained itself, it has been by falsehood, misrepresentation, calumny, and for the most part by civil laws disabling Catholics. It was not to be expected that it would change its nature on being transplanted to this New World. It indeed used fair words, and appeared gentle and tolerant when Catholicity was not here, or when it was so weak as to excite no fears; but the moment that Catholics became a little numerous, and seemed likely to gain a permanent foothold in the country, its tiger nature broke forth as of old. It could not be otherwise, for it is only a modern form of that old gentilism which in the martyr ages cried out so vehemently, *Christianos ad leones!* This is now seen, and save for the sake of Protestants we do not regret it. In fact, we rejoice to see Protestantism exposing itself, throwing off the mask, and confessing itself

to be able to sustain itself only by persecution. This book by Dr. Beecher justifies all that we have ever said against Protestantism, and the rage of the Evangelicals against unoffending Catholics now exhibited will disgust every intelligent and fair-minded man in the Protestant ranks with a pretended religion that can inspire it. These recent movements show Protestantism in its true light, in its inherent ugliness, and will drive from the Protestant ranks all who have the least love of justice and fair dealing in their hearts. For, after all, what have we as Catholics done to provoke them? Have we not always, in these United States, demeaned ourselves as good and loyal citizens? Have we ever resorted to unfair or underhanded methods in our dealings with Protestants? Have we ever denied or sought to deny them any of their rights? Have we ever burned down any of their meeting-houses or school-houses? Have we ever tarred and feathered any of their ministers? Have we kidnapped their orphan children, placed them with Catholics, and forced them to grow up in our religion? When have we set snares for unsuspecting Protestants? When have we attempted to convert them by any but fair, open, and honorable means? When have we tried to provoke them to riot and bloodshed? When have we mobbed them, and shot them down in the streets, or in their own houses? Or when have we without provocation stirred up a mob against them, killed and wounded large numbers of them, and then published in all the journals that it was they who mobbed us, and that we acted only in self-defence? Thank God! none of these things can be laid to our charge. There are men amongst Protestants who know this, and have the honesty and manliness to avow it. These see and feel Protestant injustice toward us, and we may be assured it will not deepen their attachment to Protestantism.

We are here what the Christians were under Diocletian, Galerius, and Maximian, and the Protestants represent the part of the persecuting pagans. We are the descendants of those Christians, holding their faith, and animated by the same spirit. They conquered, and so shall we; not in slaying, but in being slain. The old pagans were defeated in the very moment of their apparent triumph, not by being slain, but by slaying. Let our soil be saturated with the blood of Catholic martyrs, and it will no longer bear Protestantism. Protestantism will wither and die. How

little, then, have we to fear Protestant persecution! "It is sweet," sings the patriot, "to die for our country"; how much more sweet to die for our God, who has died for us, and to know that in dying for him we win the victory? How pants the true soldier of the cross for the glorious crown of martyrdom! Courage, dear brethren! perhaps that crown is reserved for some of us, and that we may not always have to envy those who fought the good fight under Nero, Decius, and Diocletian. Martyrdom is fearful only to those who inflict it, and persecution need alarm only persecutors. They, indeed, have reason to fear and tremble. We, for ourselves, can forgive them and pray for them, nay, thank them for the service they render us; but there is One above us and above them who will not forgive them unless they repent. God will avenge his spouse, and the blood of his saints. Let men like Dr. Beecher, Rufus W. Clark, and the host of puritanical ministers at the head of the violent movements against Catholics, reflect on the fate of the persecuting pagan emperors, and remember that they who are most responsible for them are they on whom the divine vengeance will fall swiftest and heaviest.

We have already said that we have no intention of offering a formal reply to Dr. Beecher's book. It is not worthy of an answer. There is nothing in it against the church that has not been answered over and over again. It may have weight with a few credulous and fanatical Protestants, who would read no answer to it were we to give one; it may be used as a pretext, by artful and unprincipled demagogues, for attacking the political and civil rights of Catholics; but to all intelligent, well-disposed, and fair-minded Protestants it carries with it its own refutation. The author has overshot his mark. He lies stoutly, but not adroitly. He betrays too openly his malignity, and the thoughtful and sober part of his readers will not believe that either we, or our church, are so black as he paints us. Then the motives which govern him and his brethren are too patent. The undeniable fact is, that Protestantism as a religion is in this country on its last legs, and is fast going the way of all the earth. Its ministers are losing their social position, their hold on the people, and their livelihood. They see and feel that their craft is in danger, and that their calling is no longer held in reverence or respect by the community at large. They are fast sinking into popular contempt, as were sunk, in the time of Diocletian,

the pagan priests. They must do something to recover their standing and influence, and they hope to be able to do so by getting up a violent persecution against Catholics. But we tell them it is too late. Their day is over, and these violent movements they are heading are only the violent throes of one in his agony. The people of this country are not yet Catholic, but they have lost their confidence in Protestant ministers, and hold them in about the esteem that the intelligent Romans, under the empire, held their priests. Whenever a party is obliged to resort to a secret organization in order to effect its purposes, it virtually confesses its weakness, and owns that the public is against it. If it has been in power, if it has once held the public, its resort to secret organization and to subterranean methods of operation is a proof that it has fallen, and that its doom is sealed. Its agony may be long and painful, but in its agony it is. Here is a fact that the Protestant leaders would do well to consider. Their secret organization, or their readiness to avail themselves of such organization, proves that they have no longer the mind or the heart of the American people on their side. This Know-Nothing movement is an humiliating confession of Protestant weakness; this book of Dr. Beecher is a cry of despair from the depths of the American Protestant heart.

No doubt expiring Protestantism may be revived to one last, vigorous, and desperate effort, as expiring paganism was under Diocletian and Galerius, and the persecution of God's people may be severe and terrible; but that effort will exhaust it. To whom the empire will descend, we say not; but the people will be found to have had enough of Protestantism. No heresy has ever retained its vigor for over three hundred years; those three hundred years for Protestantism have passed away, and it seems now to have the presentiment of its doom. The American people are not yet Catholic, they are not very generally disposed to become Catholic; but the day is near at hand when they must make their election between Catholicity and no religion. The half-and-half religion of Protestantism no longer satisfies their hearts, hardly blinds or confuses their intellectual vision. They are beginning to see that whoso holds that God has made a revelation of his will to man recognizes, in principle, an authority as universal, as positive, as inflexible, and as obligatory, as that which the Catholic claims for his church; that the Protestant, who asserts any supernatural

authority, can never make good his defence against the Catholic, is inconsistent in rejecting Catholicity, and either goes too far or not far enough; and that there is no alternative for a man, who can and who does reason, but to fall back either on the church or on unmitigated rationalism. He who questions this is ignorant of the state of the American mind. The fact is really undeniable, and therefore it is that we tell the Protestant ministers that their day is over, and that they will never recover their authority. Convinced of this, we see no use in spending time in replying to their tirades against Catholicity.

There are, however, one or two points raised by Dr. Beecher, on which we will offer a few remarks; not for his benefit, for he is past all human aid, but for the benefit of such honest-minded Protestants as are willing to know the truth, and to be just even to Catholics. Professor Park of Andover, some years since, asserted that the church teaches that "no faith is to be kept with heretics." This we, of course, denied.* Dr. Beecher cites certain documents, which he calls papal bulls, in which he maintains that the doctrine is taught. In this he does no great credit to his critical sagacity, or to his principles as a moralist. The documents assert no doctrine we denied. There is in them, even as given by the author, no such doctrine as that "no faith is to be kept with heretics." The only doctrine we find in them bearing on the point is, that men who enter into engagements with heretics, or anybody else, to do that which it is unlawful or wrong for them to do, are not permitted to keep those engagements, but are bound to break them off. Does Dr. Beecher maintain the contrary? Suppose he had entered into an engagement with John Smith to cut our throat, would he be bound to keep that engagement? Suppose we entered into an engagement with some of our associates to burn down his meeting-house, should we be bound to keep it? The doctrine of the church is, that our faith, lawfully pledged, is to be kept; unlawfully pledged, it is not to be kept. If we pledge ourselves to heretics to do that which we are free to do, which it is lawful and right for us to do, we are bound to fulfil our engagement; but if we pledge ourselves to them to do that which we are not free to do, which is not lawful and right, which it were a sin or crime in us to do, we are not to keep it. We sin in making the engagement, but not in breaking

* See Vol. VI., p. 419 and pp. 500–503.

it, because the engagement is itself sinful or criminal, and therefore null. The same principle governs the question of oaths. A lawful oath binds in conscience, and is to be kept, to whomsoever it is given; but not an unlawful oath. If we swear to do that which is wrong, we sin in so swearing, but should sin doubly if we kept the oath. Oaths such as are said to be taken by the Know-Nothings in their lodges are, by the laws of this state, unlawful and criminal. The Know-Nothing sins, and commits a crime, in taking them, but he does not sin, and is not a perjurer, in breaking them, because, being illegal and criminal, they were never obligatory. The principle is, that no man can bind himself to sin, or incur an obligation which it would be sinful to take, or sinful to keep. Man never is and never can be morally bound to do wrong, to sin, or to commit a crime. Now suppose Catholics, princes or subjects, contract obligations with heretics against the rights of the church, they would sin in contracting those obligations, but not in breaking them, for they could not be bound to fulfil them. Suppose Dr. Beecher should enter into an engagement with some of the followers of the late Abner Kneeland, to deprive, by violence, his church of their meeting-house, and to convert it into a dancing-hall, or an infidel conventicle, would he be bound to keep that engagement, or would he sin in breaking it? His sin would be in making such an engagement, and would be increased by keeping it. He would, even he will concede, be bound to break that engagement. What would he think of us, then, if we should say, Dr. Beecher teaches that no faith is to be kept with unbelievers, and that lying and perjury are no sin? Just what we think of him, when he says the same things of the church, and alleges that she teaches no faith is to be kept with heretics. No faith is to be kept with heretics, or with anybody else, when to keep it requires us to sin, or do wrong; but faith is to be kept with heretics, and with all others, when to keep it requires us to do nothing wrong or unlawful, although it may require us to do things against our own interest. Here is the whole doctrine of the church on this subject, and this doctrine makes no distinction between the obligation of faith pledged to a heretic, and of faith pledged to a Catholic. He who objects to this doctrine only proves, either that he does not understand it, or that he has made no great proficiency in moral theology.

The object of Protestants in bringing this charge against

Catholics is to make it appear that Catholics cannot be loyal to an heretical prince. Loyal to him in that he is a heretic, they cannot be; that is, they cannot obey, aid, or sustain him in his heresy; but as a prince, in all temporal matters, in the whole temporal order, if a legitimate prince, they can be, and are bound to be, loyal. If a prince, by the constitution of his state, holds his crown only on condition of being a Catholic, professing and protecting the Catholic religion, as was the case with the German emperors, and nearly all the Christian princes of Europe, down to the reformation, his lapse into heresy undoubtedly forfeits his crown, and absolves his subjects, not by a law of the church, but by the constitution of his realm. So, if the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland should become a Catholic, she would, according to the constitution, legally forfeit her crown, and her subjects would be absolved from their allegiance, for she holds it only on condition of being a Protestant. But even in Great Britain, as long as the queen holds her crown according to the constitution of the realm, Catholics owe her full and unreserved temporal allegiance, just as much as they would if she were a Catholic. In this country, the state, according to the constitution, is bound neither to be Catholic nor Protestant, and holds, therefore, under the law of nature alone. Catholics, therefore, owe it precisely the same allegiance that non-Catholics owe it. Grace does not supersede nature, and therefore all the rights a non-Catholic prince has, under the law of nature, over his infidel subjects, he has over his Catholic subjects. We are, in all temporal matters, just as much bound to be loyal to the state here, as we should be if it were professedly Catholic. We Catholics are neither Jansenists nor Calvinists, and therefore we admit the reality of the natural law; consequently, the rights of the state it confers, and the duties of subjects it imposes. This is sufficient as to our loyalty to an heretical or non-Catholic sovereign.

There is one other point, the relation of the papacy, on which we wish to make a remark or two in addition to what we have said in our review of Mr. Clark's *Romanism in America*. Dr. Beecher, and several others of his class, have cited our defence of the supremacy of the spiritual power, and the subordination of the temporal, and given it as their opinion, that we have the advantage as against those of our Catholic friends who take the ground of what is called Gallicanism. We understand and appreciate their

motives. They wish to promote divisions and get up angry controversies among Catholics themselves. In this they will signally fail, for we are none of us so foolish as to fight one another, when our citadel is besieged by the enemy. They think, also, that the papal power is more odious to the American people in the form in which we have presented it, than that in which some others present it. But even here they are probably mistaken, and there are not a few among Protestants, who, if they are to admit the papacy at all, would sooner accept it as defended by Bellarmine than as defended by Bossuet. Let us have it, they would say, in its plenitude, in its integrity, not mutilated and shorn of its strength. However this may be, the Protestant has the right to hold us to the defence of the papacy as defended by Bellarmine, because a Catholic *may* hold Bellarmine's doctrine without suspicion of heterodoxy, and no Catholic has the right to insist that Protestants shall take Bossuet's, or even Fénelon's, as the only approved Catholic doctrine. All a Catholic can say to a Protestant is, a man *may* be a Catholic without holding that the authority exercised by popes and councils over temporal sovereigns in the middle ages was an authority inherent in the papacy, but he cannot tell him, that to be a Catholic one *must* so hold. So, whether we are Gallicans or ultramontanists, Protestants have the right, if they choose, to hold us to the defence of the papacy on ultramontane principles, and we must be prepared always so to defend it, till we are able to declare by authority that those principles are heterodox.

The point made against us is, that, supposing the pope to have the supremacy alleged, Catholics owe him allegiance, and therefore cannot be loyal to the temporal government; or, in another form, the state is so subject to the pope, that it has, and can have, no temporal independence. If all civil government held from the church, or from God through the church, that is, under grace and not under nature, this objection would be plausible; but this is not the doctrine we defend. There have been three classes of governments. 1. Governments that are bound by their constitution to profess and defend the Catholic religion. Such was the Holy Roman Empire, revived by St. Leo III., and conferred on Charlemagne. 2. Governments held as fiefs of the Holy See, such as were England, Russia, Aragon, Sicily, Naples, and some others. 3. Governments holding simply under the law of nature, as was the case with pagan Rome, and as it is

with our republic, and most modern states. The relations which existed between the first two classes and the papacy, in so far as they were peculiar, do not concern us. For us, the question comes up simply as to the relations between the papacy and governments in so far as they hold under the law of nature, and have only obligations of the natural law to the spiritual. The question, moreover, does not relate to a non-Catholic people, for the church does not judge them who are without. It has practical importance for the American people only in so far as they are Catholics. Suppose the American people should become Catholic, what would be, on the principles we have defended, the authority of the pope in regard to their temporal government? Precisely his authority as the divinely appointed guardian and interpreter of the natural law. Supposing, what is true, that our civil constitution contains nothing repugnant to the law of nature, or natural justice, he would have no authority to alter or modify it, and none to require the people themselves to alter or modify it. Being the legitimate constitution, it would be binding on the Catholic conscience, and the law for the pope in his intercourse with the American state, no less than for the citizens themselves. He could not absolve us from our allegiance to it, because that allegiance is due under the law of nature, is a precept of the natural as well as the revealed law, and the pope can grant a dispensation from no precept of either law. We must understand that the pope has no arbitrary power in the case, and has, and claims, as we learn from Boniface VIII., no authority to dispose of temporal kingdoms, or to depose temporal princes at his own will and pleasure. Such an authority Bellarmine is as far from asserting as is Bossuet himself. The pope does not make the law under which the prince holds, and can declare him deposed only in case he has forfeited his power by the law under which he holds. Unless the prince has forfeited his power by that law, the pope cannot absolve his subjects from their oath of allegiance, for he cannot absolve any one from an oath which, in the particular case, has not in justice ceased to bind. The real nature of the absolution is the judicial declaration, that in the particular case, under the particular circumstances, the law does not require it to be kept, and therefore that the subject is free. The act of deposition is judicial, not legislative. It does not make or annul the law, but declares and applies it. The prince can be deposed only in case he is a tyrant, abuses and forfeits his trusts, and his

subjects can be absolved only in case they are really so in natural justice. Here is nothing incompatible with the just freedom and independence of states, and the papal authority is and can be terrible only to tyrants. The pope is made by it, practically, a simple arbitrator, and exercises by divine right, and with the weight of his spiritual authority, the functions which our peace-men would have exercised by a congress of nations, or which are attempted, with indifferent success, to be exercised by modern diplomacy. It makes him the divinely appointed court of appeal, in matters of difference between sovereign and sovereign, and between a sovereign and his subjects. The utility of such a court, and its necessity to the internal tranquility of states and the peace of Christendom, all good men feel, and not a few even among non-Catholics acknowledge. Without it, there is or can be no Christendom; there is and can be, in the political order, only gentilism, only a heathendom.

Protestants make singular blunders whenever they speak of Catholicity. Assuming that the church is not from God, that she is at best a mere human institution, they are forced to attempt to explain what they witness amongst us on natural, evil, or satanic principles. They travesty our holiest doctrines, and see only craft and wickedness, a secret and satanic meaning, in our most innocent expressions, and our most innocent, nay, our most praiseworthy, proceedings. Nothing can be more edifying than the conduct of our Catholic population under the present Know-Nothing provocations. Every one must be struck by their singularly calm and collected deportment. They manifest, as a body, no excitement, apparently feel no alarm, show no disposition to retaliate on their enemies, and quietly and peaceably pursue their ordinary avocations. How explain this? The Protestant cannot explain it in a good sense, and supposes that it is policy, that it is all owing to the influence of the priests. The priests have given the order, and the poor, superstitious, priest-ridden laity dare not disobey. Assuming this to be the fact, Protestants even find in it an argument against our religion itself. Can it be safe, they argue, to tolerate in a republic a religion whose priests have such power over their flocks? To-day, indeed, they exert their power to keep their people quiet; but who can say that they may not to-morrow use it to stir them up to murder and massacre poor defenceless Protestants, or to take away our liberties? But priests are men as well as the laity, and have like feelings and pas-

sions. How happens it, then, that the priests themselves are so calm and collected? Whence comes it that they can not only restrain their people, but themselves also? They are, it is answered, ordered to do so by the pope. The pope, having certain designs on this country, has given his orders, and they must be executed. But by what magic does the pope, more than three thousand miles off, secure such unlimited obedience to his orders? How is the pope able, at this distance, to make men put a curb on their natural tempers, and the natural passions of the human heart, and rise so much above themselves, overcome their natural powers and their physical timidity, and stand unmoved, calm and collected, before a whole people in wrath against them, insulting them, and reviling all they hold sacred? Here is something which our Protestant philosophers cannot explain, on their theory of Catholicity.

Protestants observe in the Catholic community certain remarkable phenomena, which they observe amongst no other people. Precluded by their Protestantism from explaining them by the operations of divine grace, they undertake to explain them as the result of satanic influence, or of the most consummate human policy. They suppose that the clergy are full of all craft and subtlety, and that the pope is constantly interfering, directly or indirectly, most despotically, with every thought and every action of the individual Catholic. They assume that we have no freedom, no spontaneity; that we are automatons in the hands of the priests, mere puppets, moving only as we are moved by secret wires, adroitly pulled by the bishops and clergy, at the command of the pope. But in this they forget that we are Catholics, and reason as if we were Calvinists, with John Calvin, John Knox, or Cotton Mather for pope. A system of policy, craft, fraud, and tyranny, like that which Protestants imagine to explain what they observe amongst us, would itself be supernatural, and its maintenance for eighteen hundred, or even for twelve hundred years, in the most civilized nations of the earth, would itself be the most stupendous miracle recorded in history. Nothing is philosophically or historically falser than this Protestant theory of the church. There is nothing of this astuteness, of this consummate policy, in her history. Trace her through eighteen hundred years, and you will find, according to our human modes of judging, that her clergy, from the pope downwards, have been far more successful in attaining to the simplicity of the dove.

than to the prudence of the serpent. Strange as it may sound to Protestants, the thing which most strikes a convert from Protestantism, especially a convert from Evangelical Protestantism, on entering the church, is the freedom and naturalness he finds amongst his new associates, and the total absence of that officiousness on the part of the clergy which he had been accustomed to in Evangelical ministers. Every thing is free, natural, spontaneous. The bandage is stripped from his eyes and his limbs. He is no longer in swaddling-clothes; no longer swathed and lashed to a board, like the Indian infant, to be thrown over the back of its mother, set up against a tree, or hung on a branch. He feels a strange sensation of relief, and a life, a buoyancy, that is as new as delightful. He feels that he has suddenly burst from darkness into light, from the most galling slavery into the glorious liberty of the children of God. He feels that he is in very deed a freeman.

This notion of Protestants that we are under an iron despotism is purely imaginary, and Catholics, if the matter were not so grave, would be much amused at their talk about papal orders, rigidly enforced by the popes on the bishops, by the bishops on their clergy, and by their clergy on the faithful. It would seem that they really believe that we are in all matters, temporal and spiritual, subject to arbitrary will or caprice, and that the pope rules us as despotically as some of our old puritan ministers did their respective congregations. But the government of the church is, from first to last, a government of law, not of mere will. Amongst Protestants, authority is for the most part personal, and depends on the personal character of the minister, and with them an organization as complete as that of the church would be an unmitigated despotism, and an ambitious man at the head of it could use it to gratify his lust for dominion. But with us he cannot, because with us authority is not personal, attaches not to the person, but to the office, and is determined by law. We may esteem one priest as a man higher than another, but this personal esteem does not mingle with our obedience to the priest as a priest. We reverence his office, and we obey him for the sake of the office, not for the sake of the man. Now the office is fixed in the original constitution of the church, and its rights and duties are defined by an unalterable law. This law enters into Catholic instruction, and forms the Catholic conscience. Hence the clergy could not, if disposed, exert an illegiti-

mate influence over the laity, because, the moment they attempted it, they would find not only the law, but the Catholic conscience itself, against them.

Catholic conscience is formed by Catholic faith, by Catholic teaching, which must be uniform throughout the world, and the same in every age. Hence it is not in the power of the popes and clergy combined to change the Catholic conscience, or to pervert it to any purpose of personal or selfish ambition, even if they would. They have no influence, except through Catholic faith and conscience, neither of which is under their personal control. The pope himself cannot create a new dogma, or change the law of conscience. The Protestant overlooks this fact, and supposes that with us, as with him, faith and conscience are variable, or changeable at will. This is a mistake. Catholic doctrine, which forms the Catholic conscience, is invariable, and not alterable at the will of its ministers. It is open, public, and taught to children before even any ill-disposed priest can think of availing himself of his office of teacher to mould the young mind to his selfish or ambitious purposes. The influence which the clergy are able through their office to exert could become dangerous only on condition that they could control the faith they teach, and form the Catholic conscience at their will, as is, to a great extent, the case with Protestant ministers. If, *per impossibile*, all Protestant sects could unite in one body, in a single organization, the world would see a despotism far more rigid and oppressive than was exercised even by the old heathen sacerdocies, for these ministers would be restrained by no Protestant conscience, and would have the sole control over their own teaching. The principles applicable to such an organization cannot, even humanly, apply to the church, because her pastors can only teach what they and the laity also have been taught from the beginning, and are bound by the same law that binds the body of the faithful.

This reasoning applies to the question before us. The rights and duties of sovereigns and subjects are in Catholic teaching clearly defined. Nothing in regard to either is left to arbitrary will or caprice. Those rights and duties as the church in her public teaching has always defined them are sacred and inviolable for all Catholics, for the pope and clergy no less than for the laity. Whatever power of intervention the pope may be assumed to have, he can intervene in no case not foreseen, and in no respect except in

accordance with the principles always publicly recognized and always publicly taught. He cannot impose a new political duty on sovereign or subject, or exact from either what has not always been exacted by the law under which the authority holds. What will sustain his intervention? What can he rely on to give his intervention success? Catholic faith and conscience. Nothing else. But these he does not and cannot form, and these he does not control, for they were formed before he was pope, and therefore could not be relied on in case of the contravention of either. Suppose the pope, as we and many Catholics hold, has power to depose a temporal sovereign, or to declare him fallen from his dignity, and his subjects absolved from their oath of fidelity to him, he can do so only in case such sovereign has, according to Catholic morality, publicly taught and presumed to be well known by everybody, abused and forfeited his trusts, and has already ceased *de jure* to reign. Now that morality, which no pope makes or can alter, and which binds the pope as well as the prince, teaches that power is amissible indeed, but that no temporal sovereign forfeits his trusts, committed to him by God through the people, except by abusing them, by using his power iniquitously, contrary to the common good, and in grievous oppression of his subjects. And what man, worthy to be a freeman, and not imbued with the spirit of an oriental slave, will not acknowledge, nay, will not maintain, that, when a prince so abuses his powers, he ought to be deposed? The old Puritans of England, under Cromwell, went further, and not only deposed their sovereign, but beheaded him; and the doctrine of those at the present day who are most inveterate in their hostility to the papacy is, that it is lawful to depose a sovereign even because he is a sovereign, and solely for the sake of changing the form of government. Ultramontanism, in what its enemies may regard as its most odious form, goes by no means so far, and they who take the highest views of the papal prerogative hold that the pope can depose a temporal prince, holding under the law of nature, only in case he so abuses his power as to forfeit his right to reign. He is deposed for his crimes, his iniquity, his tyranny, his oppression of his subjects, for nothing else.

The difficulties which honest and fair-minded non-Catholics feel on the subject arise from supposing that, because we admit the plenary authority of the pope as vicar of Jesus Christ on earth, we necessarily admit that he has the sov-

ereign authority over our faith and morals, and can make them what he pleases. They do not see how it is that we can recognize such an authority without subjecting ourselves to the will or caprice of him who holds it. They do not see this, because they do not understand that Catholic faith and morals are in themselves entirely independent of the papal will, and that the pope has no more power to impose an article of faith or a precept of morality than the humblest layman. He as head of the church is the guardian and interpreter of the faith once delivered to the saints, and he can define what is of faith and morals, what has been delivered, what the law of which he is the guardian enjoins; but he cannot, even if we could conceive him to wish to do so, mould either faith or morality to suit any passion or selfish purpose of his own. In this sense he has no power over our faith or conscience. There is not a Protestant minister in the land that has not in this respect more power over the faith and conscience of his congregation, providing he gains their confidence, than the pope has over the faith and conscience of Catholics. The minister to a great extent forms the doctrine he teaches out of his own brain, and imposes upon his followers his own private opinions; he can insist on a new and peculiar morality, and impose on the Protestant conscience a law of his own enacting, as we every day witness. The pope cannot. By the nature of the case, as well as by divine grace, he is restricted in his teaching to what he has received, and in his government of the church to the law imposed from the first. His legislative authority is limited to matters of discipline and administration, and in these is bound by the fundamental law. He can introduce no new principle, or change or reject no principle hitherto recognized and acted upon. This, if considered, would satisfy, we should think, any honest and serious mind, that the pope really has no power of his own over faith and conscience, and that in regard to them he is the simple organ of the law, or of the authority that originally enacted it. The law for the Catholic conscience is not that we shall believe and do whatever the pope commands us, but that we shall believe and do whatever God commands us through the pope, or in the law of which the pope is the divinely instituted guardian and interpreter. The divine command or this law binds the pope as much as it does us, and he cannot give it an arbitrary interpretation, because its interpreta-

tion—an interpretation that is fixed and unalterable—has been given and known to the church from the first, and is not left to be discovered or invented by any individual pope. New questions come up indeed for decision, but these are not decided by a new and previously unknown interpretation of the law, but by the application of the law as always interpreted, or in the sense in which the church has always understood it. We as individual Catholics may not know in this or that case what God commands, or what is the true sense of the law, and we apply to the Holy Father to be informed. He answers us, not by a new command or a new interpretation, but by telling us what in the sense of the church has always been the law or the divine command on the subject. He enlightens our conscience, but he does not form it. The law which he proclaims as the law of our conscience is equally the law of his, and he can no more make it what he will than we can what we will. We are as free, therefore, in our faith and conscience as he is in his. The Protestant notion, that the Catholic has no faith or conscience but what the pope wills, is wholly unfounded.

We insist so strenuously on this point, because we are confident that it is the point on which Protestants most frequently and most seriously misunderstand Catholicity. They really think that we are deprived of all freedom, and are mere slaves to our priests, or if not the priests, at least to the pope. Nothing is further from the truth. Priests are the ministers of the law to us, not the law itself. Catholic faith and morals are not private or arbitrary things. They are *catholic*, public, and taught openly to all the faithful. We have them all in our catechism, and we know there can be no departure from them,—nothing varied in them, nothing added to them, nothing taken from them. The church knew her work in the beginning, and sprung into life with the full possession of all her faculties. She had her *credo* to start with; she had her doctrines fully formed, in the outset; and there were for her no new discoveries to make, no new interpretations to give. These doctrines may not be equally well known by all the faithful, but the church has always equally possessed and known them, and they have always and everywhere been taught to her children, and in their substance known and believed by them all. Having been so known and believed, they have formed alike in the church teaching and in the church believing the law of the Catholic conscience, to which the

pastors are as subject as their flocks, and which teachers no more than believers can alter, for teachers must be believers before being teachers. For Catholics there is and can be no slavery to persons, whatever their rank or dignity. There is no power in pope or bishop to enslave our consciences, or to reduce us to that spiritual thraldom Protestants in their folly speak of; for neither, if they would, could make us believe that we are bound in good conscience to do what is repugnant to the faith and morals they have uniformly taught us, and which they have assured us had been taught them also. All you can say against us is that in your opinion the faith and morals taught us are false and mischievous, but you cannot call us spiritual slaves because we believe them, and feel ourselves bound in conscience to conform to them. We believe them because we believe that God has taught them and commands us to conform to them, and it is not slavery to be bound to believe and obey God. The most you can say is that we labor under a mistake, but in so saying you are at least as liable to labor under a mistake as we. At the worst we can judge of that question as well as you, fallible as you certainly are and confess yourselves.

If Protestants would bear in mind that Catholic faith and morality are always the same, and are taught to all Catholics, and form for all the law of conscience, the spring of action, and the guide of the understanding, they would be able to explain, in a much more simple way than is usual with them, many things they observe among Catholics, and see that they can interpret them more rationally in a good than a bad sense. They would see that much of that which they attribute to the direct and positive orders of the clergy, or to a secret and well-concerted scheme of action, is the spontaneous expression of our Catholic life. Unity of life begets unity of action. Uniform faith and morals produce uniform private and public effects. We act freely as Catholics from the faith we have received and the life that is in us, and the conduct which is often supposed to result from papal orders, clerical influence, or subtle policy is nothing but the open and frank expression of the interior life common to all the faithful. The papal orders are much rarer than is commonly supposed; and much less is to be attributed to the personal influence of the clergy than is commonly imagined. There is a Catholic common sense, that counts for something, and Prot-

estants would be surprised to know how much of that which they charge to conspiracy is perfectly free and spontaneous with us.

Resolved to understand every thing among us in a bad sense, Protestants attribute the introduction and spread of Catholicity in this country to a papal conspiracy. They sometimes go so far as to attribute the Irish migration hither to the pope and cardinals. We have not learned whether they attribute to the pope and cardinals, or not, the Irish famine of 1846. We should not, however, be surprised to find that they do. They regard every Catholic Irish servant-girl in a Protestant family as an emissary of the pope, initiated more or less into the secret of the papal conspiracy. Every Irish maid-servant and man-servant is supposed to have no faith, no conscience, but to do the will of the priest, and to be ready to obey his order, whether it be to poison the Protestant master, or to burn down his house. Verily, one is not surprised at Barnum's success. Now the pope and cardinals had no more to do with the Irish migration than they had with the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth. The Irish were forced to emigrate by the misgovernment of their country by Protestant England, and came here because we promised them liberty of conscience, civil and political equality, after a short probation, with natural-born citizens, and good wages and plenty of employment. They came here Catholics, and they choose to remain so. They are so far from being engaged in a conspiracy to deliver over this country to the pope, that, if we were to reproach them at all, it would be for their want of zeal for the conversion of our non-Catholic countrymen. They have suffered so long and so much from the Anglo-Saxon, that they can hardly persuade themselves that his conversion enters into the designs of Providence. They know their faith, and love it; they know the rights it gives them, and the duties it imposes, and there is not one among them who, if ordered by a priest to do any thing contrary to Catholic morality, would not say to him, "Get behind me, Satan." If there could be found a priest base enough to give the order supposed, there is no Catholic servant that is so ignorant as to believe it obligatory. He, the priest, would, were he to give it, lose all his influence, and be looked upon, not as a priest, but as a moral monster. To poison one's master or to burn down his house, Catholic morality, as taught to all, condemns, and every Catholic

knows that whosoever should advise or order it denies Catholic teaching, and therefore is to be held as separated from the faithful. If an angel from heaven, says St. Paul, should preach to you any other Gospel than that which we have preached, let him be anathema. No conspiracy by the pope and clergy to do what is contrary to the faith and morals publicly taught, and which are held by all Catholics, could possibly be formed, and to do what is required by Catholic faith and morals no conspiracy is needed, and no additional power could possibly be derived from it.

There are no doubt among Catholics the silent operations of divine grace, and the secret or invisible influences of faith and charity; but the Protestant notion that the church is a huge secret society, somewhat like that of the Know-Nothings, is as far from the truth as was the notion of the old heathens, that Christians worshipped an ass's head, and killed and eat an infant in their assemblies. The church is open and frank, and what she does she does in the light, not in the dark. She has no secrets but those of the interior life, and she condemns all secret societies. Her faith is proclaimed on the house-tops, before all the world; her dogmas and morals are not concealed; all may know them who will; and she calls upon all by her missionaries, not emissaries, to make themselves acquainted with them. Her emissaries, you say, are secretly at work to bring this great, free, and glorious republic under the dominion of Popery. Translate this into civil and gentlemanly language, and it means that Catholic missionaries are at work to convert the people of this country, as of all others, to Catholicity. And what is there so very objectionable in this? If they can, by appeals to reason, history, and Scripture, convince the American people that Catholicity is from God, who has the right to complain? Reason, history, and Scripture are open to you to use against them, if you choose. They are willing to meet you on fair and equal terms before the American public, and if you are unwilling to meet them on the same terms, or, so meeting them, are worsted, is this their fault?

But Dr. Beecher would persuade us that Popery is itself a grand conspiracy against the Gospel and the liberties of mankind; but Dr. Beecher is not very high authority, nor very persuasive in his speech. He deals too much in filth to have much influence with men of a tolerable stomach. The pretence is absurd. You may say Catholicity in your judgment is not true Christianity, and is unfavorable to true

freedom, but you cannot say it is a *conspiracy*. A conspiracy is a combination of men for an evil purpose, more especially an unlawful plot to overthrow a government. In neither sense can you call the church a conspiracy. It is not a conspiracy against governments in general, or any particular government, certainly not against ours, which it is our sacred duty as Catholics to sustain. It is not a combination for an evil purpose, for the purpose of the church is to convert the world to Jesus Christ, and to establish on earth the reign of peace. This is a good purpose, and even if the church could be mistaken, as she uses and suffers to be used none but lawful means to accomplish it, she is and can be no combination of men for an evil purpose. To talk of exposing the papal conspiracy, is only to expose your own looseness of language, or something still more reprehensible.

But enough. We have wished in what we have said to address ourselves to that class of Protestants—large, we would fain hope—who love fair play, and who, however they may dislike Catholicity, would deal justly and honorably with Catholics. We have wished to offer some suggestions which may, if taken up and pursued by their own thought and reflection, satisfy them that Catholics, even if ultramontanists, may be as free and act as spontaneously, to say the least, as their Evangelical opponents. In general, however, we are unwilling to assume even the appearance of an apologist. Works like Dr. Beecher's can do us, in the long run, no harm. They can make no lasting impression on the American people, and in the end will operate greatly to the damage of Protestantism. Sensible people will be led by them to ask, Whence is it that Protestantism shows itself so weak and malignant, so untruthful in its statements, so unphilosophical in its reasoning? Can it make no better defence? Has it no more refinement, no more honesty, no more virtue? Protestantism cannot long survive the asking of such questions.

THE DECLINE OF PROTESTANTISM.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1851.]

These remarkable pamphlets indicate the commencement of a new era in the controversy between Catholics and Protestants in Great Britain and this country. Hitherto, in both countries, Catholics have been accustomed to apologize for their religion, and explain away its offensive points, appearing to be content with repelling the calumnies invented against it, and showing that, upon the whole, it can compare advantageously with the best form of Protestantism. These pamphlets, as well as several other recent publications, prove that the day for this is passing away, and that Catholics are beginning to shake off their timidity, to assume in controversy their legitimate position, and to speak in the bold and energetic tones which become them; that, instead of stopping to refute anew objections which have been refuted a thousand times, and to repel calumnies which will be repeated as often as repelled, they are carrying the war into the enemy's country, and compelling Protestantism to defend itself. This is a great and important change of tactics. So long as Protestantism is suffered to act on the offensive, to vent all manner of calumnies, and to urge all manner of objections, and we, simple souls, confine ourselves to the task of merely refuting them, it can maintain the appearance of a formidable opponent, and throw a cloud of dust in the eyes of the ignorant and prejudiced multitude; for it never heeds our refutations of its calumnies and objections, but continues always to repeat them as if we had said and could say nothing against them. But the moment we turn our arms against it, and force it to give an account of itself, its weakness is at once apparent to all the world. It has no ground on which to intrench, and no arms with which to defend itself, except those of the state.

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*1. *The Decline of Protestantism and its Cause. A Lecture, delivered in St. Patrick's Cathedral, on the Evening of November* 10, 1850. By the Most Rev. John Hughes, D. D., Archbishop of New York. New York: 1850.

2. *Developments of Protestantism, and other Fragments.* Reprinted from the "Dublin Review" and "Tablet." London: 1849.

The simple announcement, by such a man as the Archbishop of New York, of a Lecture on the *Decline of Protestantism*, together with the cause of that decline, is a pregnant event in the modern religious world, and must strike on the ears of Protestants as the trump of doom, filling their hearts with fear and perplexity. He is not a rash man, disposed hastily to commit himself. No man feels more delicately the pulse of his age and country, or marks more accurately their various tendencies. When such a man, occupying so high a rank in the church and in society, proclaims in his own cathedral, and before the world, that Protestantism has declined, is declining, and must continue to decline, we may rest assured that such is the fact, the certain and undeniable fact. But he not only proclaims it; he triumphantly proves it, and, if any one wishes for more detailed evidence than he gives, it may be found in the second publication on our list, a work of rare sagacity and intelligence.

The views, facts, and reasonings of these remarkable publications are not precisely new to the readers of this journal, for we have often set them forth, in our humble way; but we are not a little gratified to find them so much more clearly, eloquently, and learnedly expressed than it was in our power to express them, and confirmed by authority so high as that of the Archbishop of New York, and so respectable as that of the learned and philosophical author of the essay on the *Developments of Protestantism*. Our own position, prior to our conversion, in the more advanced ranks of the Protestant community, gave us facilities for judging of the real character, tendencies, and prospects of Protestantism not possessed by every one, and it was only after having proved, philosophically and historically, that it must, in so far as left to follow its own nature, decline into infidelity, heathenism, and absolute nullism, that we ever consented to abandon it. We saw that it had done the best that it could do, that it was incapable of amendment, and that, whatever else might be true or salutary, it in all its forms was false and of evil tendency, good neither for this world nor for that which is to come. We saw that, as a matter of fact, whatever it was in its origin, it had now ceased to bear a religious character; that as a theology it was absurd, as a philosophy ridiculous, as politics, either anarchy and unbridled license or absolute civil despotism; in a word, in so far as it pretended to be any thing more than a low form of heathenism, it was simply what that

genuine Protestant Carlyle calls a *sham*. We saw that *Protestant* Christianity was a contradiction in terms, and that we had no alternative, unless we could content ourselves with saying two and two are five, but absolute infidelity or Catholicity. But when we have said so, many have been disposed to discredit us, and to set down our conclusion to our alleged ultraism, or tendency to run to extremes. The publications before us, from men who cannot be accused of the tendencies always falsely laid to our charge, abundantly confirm and triumphantly establish, in a manner at once popular and profound, all that we have contended for, as the archbishop's Lecture fully shows.

Protestantism reached its limits in 1567, or by the close of the first fifty years of its existence, and it has not enlarged its territory one inch since, except by colonization in countries then unknown to the civilized world, or but recently discovered. No nation is Protestant now that was not Protestant then, and large districts in Europe, especially in Savoy and Germany, then Protestant, are now Catholic. Even in France, the Protestants and unbelievers combined are not today so large a proportion of the French people as were the Huguenots in the reigns of Henry II. and Charles IX. Protestantism has never made a single conquest from the gentile world, and for over two hundred and eighty years, that is, for nearly the whole period of its existence, it has made no conquest from Catholic nations. Its expansive power was almost instantly exhausted, and it has been gradually losing the ground it originally occupied. This is a remarkable fact, well worthy of the serious meditation of every Protestant. It proves that Protestantism is struck with sterility; that it is destitute of true reproductive energy, and is destined at no distant day to dwindle into an insignificant sect, or finally to disappear from the earth it has not blessed. Another fact equally remarkable, and which no Protestant can have the hardihood to deny, is the entire falsification, by the event, of all the predictions and promises of the pretended reformers. Nothing has been realized of what was promised. In no country, in no respect whatever, has Protestantism proved to be what we were told in the beginning it would be. It promised to restore the Gospel, from which it dared to say the church had apostatized, and for the Gospel it gives us mere rationalism, transcendentalism, and heathenism, and it has made the Bible, as somebody has said, a fiddle, on which a skilful performer may play any tune he pleases. In the

United States, according to the American Almanac,—Protestant authority,—over one half of the adult population belong to no religious society whatever, and are really heathen. The majority of the American people are what are waggishly, but expressively, called Nothingarians, although good Protestants in their hostility to the Catholic Church. In all Protestant nations faith is gone, morality is gone, and principle is gone. The least depraved among them may vie not unsuccessfully in immorality and unnatural crimes with the more depraved nations of heathen antiquity. The sin of Sodom is far from being unknown, and infanticide is quite too common even in our own country to permit us to reproach the modern Chinese with the exposure of infants.

These results should not surprise us. Human nature is, since the fall, depraved, rotten, and there are no vices too filthy or crimes too foul for it to fall into when left to itself, without being elevated, strengthened, and sustained by the sacraments which Protestantism rejects. Even in Catholic countries, where faith still survives, and the graces of the sacraments are insisted upon and within reach, the depravities of human nature manifest themselves, and multitudes roll sin as a sweet morsel under their tongue. How much more so in Protestant countries, where there is no faith, no adequate moral instruction, no sacraments, and nothing but pride and a mere regard to public decorum to aid and protect virtue! The only solid foundation of virtue, private or public, is Christian faith, and its only safeguards are the Christian sacraments. Where these are wanting, you may indeed have for a time polished manners and kindly sentiments, but no genuine virtue, for men cannot without grace fulfil even the law of nature. It is nothing surprising, then, that nations under Protestantism should lapse into all the vices, immoralities, and unnatural crimes of heathenism.

The decline of Protestantism in regard to Christian doctrine was in the natural course of things, and the infidelity and heathenism in which it everywhere results are only its legitimate development, the realization of what it originally *meant*. From the first, Protestantism contained the seeds of its own destruction.

Protestantism could not, if left to the free action of the human mind, but develop itself, and in accordance with its own essential nature. In the bosom of the Catholic Church there is development of life in obedience to the truth, but

no development of doctrine, save such successive explications and definitions as are necessary to preserve the splendor, purity, and integrity of the original deposit of faith against the novel heresies and errors which, in consequence of men's perversity and subtle curiosity, from time to time arise to obscure, controvert, or deny it; because in matters of faith the church teaches from the first the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and thus leaves no room for development or variation of doctrine without lapsing into error. Development of doctrine, as distinguished from development of practice, is predicable only where the truth is but partially communicated to the mind, or communicated mixed with falsehood, for it proceeds always from the effort of the mind to eliminate what it regards as the false element, and to complete, or realize the potentiality of what it regards as the true element. Protestantism had originally at best only a partial truth, and this truth it held mingled with falsehood. Even by its own confession, it was not the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Truth and falsehood are necessarily repugnant to each other. There was originally an innate repugnance between their several elements of doctrine professed by Protestants, and they had at best only a few fragments of the truth. Hence Protestantism could not remain fixed and invariable. Wherever the mind was free, it must struggle to get rid of this innate repugnance or contradiction, and to complete its view of truth.

Development must follow the inherent law or essential nature of its subject. Development in the vegetable must follow the inherent law of the vegetable world; in the animal, the inherent law of the animal world; in doctrine, the inherent law or essential principle of the doctrine, as Mr. Newman has satisfactorily proved in his theory of development,—a theory as profound and true when applied to heretical sects and doctrines as it is false and dangerous when applied in the bosom of the church to Christian doctrine, that is, the Catholic faith, objectively considered. Protestantism, then, if not prevented by external causes, must not only develop, but it must develop according to its own inherent law, or essential nature, and this it must do by eliminating whatever is repugnant to it, assimilating whatever is in accordance with it, and realizing its potentiality, or pushing its essential principle to its last logical consequences.

The inherent law or essential principle of Protestantism is denial, or negation. Protestants, when they went forth from the church, professed, it is true, to retain a certain number of Christian doctrines, and Protestantism taken as originally professed consisted of these doctrines and the principles it asserted in protesting against the church, or in denying its authority. But these Christian doctrines, so far as it held them at all, it held in common with the church, and therefore they did not and could not constitute its essential nature, its distinguishing characteristic, as Protestantism. If it had taken them for its point of departure, and eliminated what it held incompatible, and assimilated what was in accordance with them, that is, purified and completed them by development, it would have been obliged to abrogate itself, and return to the church against which it protested. Its inherent law, its essential principle, its distinguishing characteristic, could not lie in what it held in common with the church, but must necessarily lie in what it opposed to the church, as the ground of its rejection of her authority. It must reject the Catholic Church, be a protest against her, let it be whatever else it might. The concession of the church, or the recognition of her authority, in any sense or degree conceivable, was fatal to itself, the total destruction of its own being. It could be only by being Protestantism, and it could be Protestantism only by being opposed to Catholicity; and hence we find, historically, that Protestants, though differing among themselves in all else, agree to a man in protesting against the church, and denying her authority. The principle of this denial of the authority of the church, then, must be the essential principle, the distinctive nature, of Protestantism.

The principle of this denial is what is termed the right of private judgment. But the assertion of the right of private judgment is at bottom only the denial of the right of any authority to control the judgment, that is, the simple denial of authority itself. In denying the authority of the church on the strength of private judgment, the pretended reformers did not deny it on the strength, or in obedience to the commands, of another authority opposed to hers, but on no authority at all. Their denial of her authority was then a simple negation, in which nothing was affirmed, and therefore the essential principle of Protestantism is denial, or negation. We grant that the pretended reformers did not formally assert the right of private judgment, but they im-

plied it, since in denying the authority of the church they asserted no authority to justify their denial. It is true, they alleged the written word, but this amounted to nothing; because in alleging it they alleged nothing peculiar to themselves, no *authority* opposed to the church. The church asserted the authority of the written word as well as they, and their distinguishing mark was not in asserting the authority of the written word, for that authority no Catholic denies, but in asserting the written word as privately interpreted, that is, in denying all authoritative interpreters, and therefore all authoritative interpretation of it; which was, in effect, not the assertion, but the denial, of the authority of the written word, as the subsequent developments of Protestantism have amply proved. The written word is authoritative only in its sense, and its sense can be authoritative only in so far as authoritatively determined and applied. It is true also, that the pretended reformers alleged the written word interpreted by the private illumination of the Holy Ghost; but this was only their private allegation, made on the strength of their private judgment, and therefore on no authority at all. Their peculiarity here was not in asserting the interior illumination of the Holy Ghost, for that every Catholic asserts, but in asserting their right of determining by their own private judgment whether the spirit by which they were moved was or was not the spirit of God; and hence the distinguishing trait of the allegation as a Protestant principle was the assertion of private judgment against the authority of the church, that is, the denial of her authority on no authority. Hence, notwithstanding these two allegations, our assertion remains true and undeniable, that the essential principle of Protestantism is denial, or negation.

It follows from this, that the development of Protestantism must necessarily consist in the development of the principle, if we may so speak, of denial or negation, in eliminating whatever it originally held along with it repugnant to that principle, and in carrying it out to its last logical consequences. But, from the nature of the case, this must be a successive throwing off of truth, and a gradual denial of all things. The elimination of every positive element, and the pushing of denial to its last logical consequences, is universal negation, the denial of God and the universe,—absolute nullism, which is absolute falsehood! This is the final term of Protestantism, what it originally

meant, or was, potentially, from the first, in so far as Protestantism. Hegel and several others, in their speculative theories, have reached this final term, but the great body of the Protestant people draw up a little this side, though without any good reason in their own system for doing so, except that universal negation is necessarily the negation of itself, and pure falsehood, being a nonentity, is absolutely unintelligible; for, as we have often occasion to say, what is not, is not intelligible. Men may invent theories which imply absolute nullism, but all such theories are self-destructive, and can never be practically carried out; for negation is intelligible only by virtue of some affirmative principle, and falsehood only by virtue of the truth it denies. Hence, if there were no Catholic Church, Protestantism would be absolutely inconceivable, and if it could succeed in denying her and getting actually rid of her, it would itself become absolutely extinct, or at best only an unmeaning word. In consequence of the purely negative character of Protestantism, the number of pure and consistent Protestants must always be small, because common sense will always in most men be stronger than theory. Nevertheless, by the invariable law of development, the whole Protestant body must be always tending to be more and more thoroughly Protestant, and therefore be always struggling to throw off more and more of what little of truth they may have held in solution, and to approach nearer and nearer to pure unmixed falsehood. This is clear *a priori*; and it is proved by the whole history of Protestantism during the last three hundred years. The decline of Protestantism, under a doctrinal point of view, lay, as we have said, in the ordinary course of things, for the development of negation, that is, growth of negation is necessarily a decline, an approach towards ceasing to be, that is, to nonentity.

It should then excite no surprise, that Protestantism has successively eliminated the Christian doctrines which the pretended reformers originally retained from the church. These doctrines were affirmative, and necessarily foreign and repugnant to its essential principle, which it must preserve or cease to be Protestantism. It was doomed to eliminate them, and lapse into pure rationalism, transcendentalism, heathenism. It has done so, and it cannot help itself. All its attempts to retrace its steps, whether in England, Germany, or this country, and to take its stand nearer to Christian truth, are in vain, and only accelerate its general

decline. It has no remedy, for it has no recuperative energy, no living principle. Its being is non-being, its life is the negation of life, and its movement is the movement of dissolution, of the body after life has departed, subjected to the operation of the natural chemical agents. It is strange that Protestant nations, not lacking in the cultivation of letters and affairs, should not have sooner discovered that the body they clasp to their bosoms, and on which they lavish their caresses, is a lifeless corpse, a mass of putrefaction, soon to be a ghastly and grinning skeleton. It is strange that they have been so slow in discovering the imposition which has been practised upon them, and that they should continue to glory in the pretended reformation, even after having learned by their own bitter experience that of all the fine things it promised them it has given them none. Are they fools? In the one thing needful, must assuredly. They are among those of whom the apostle speaks, who, "esteeming themselves wise, become fools," who, "ever learning, are never able to come to the knowledge of the truth." So it is. When men yield to their own fancy and follow the suggestions of their own pride, they lose their powers of discernment, and become the prey of every false illusion. Good seems to them evil, and evil seems to them good; truth wears to them the garb of falsehood, and falsehood the garb of truth; light is to them darkness, and darkness, light. Following their own foolish hearts, their minds become darkened, and God gives them up to a reprobate sense, and premits them to be carried away by strong delusions in punishment for their rejection of the truth and consent to iniquity. They have, like the old carnal Jews, eyes, but they see not, ears, but they hear not, hearts, but they understand not. Yet, singularly enough, they imagine themselves enlightened, fancy themselves learned and wise, and use great, swelling words, as if they really knew and were saying something. Alas! how little do they suspect the ridiculous figure they cut in the eyes of Catholics, and how we should laugh at them, did not our charity subdue our risibility, and lead us to compassionate them. Alas! we cannot laugh at them; we can only weep for them. They have souls, souls for whom Christ shed his precious blood on the cross,—souls, capable of endless happiness through the grace of our Lord, or of the eternal tortures of hell. Why should they be lost? Dear Catholic friends, pray for them; besiege Heaven, day and night, with prayers for

their conversion. O Mary, Refuge of sinners, pray for them, and present our prayers to thy divine Son, that he may open their eyes, save them from themselves, and enable them to love him with their whole hearts, and thee as their sweet mother.

The archbishop might have enumerated among the causes, no less than among the effects, of the decline of Protestantism, the partial relaxation in most Protestant countries of the barbarous penal codes enacted, and for a long time rigidly enforced, against the profession and practice of the Catholic religion. Protestantism was favored in its origin by the civil authorities, anxious to get rid of the restraints always imposed on their despotism by the papacy; and it is a well-known fact, that the pretended reform was never able to establish itself in any country, except by the strong arm of the secular power. To this not a single exception can be named. Protestantism never spread, became predominant, and sustained itself by the peaceable study of the Sacred Scriptures, free discussion, and moral suasion, but it owes its success to confiscations, fines, dungeons, scaffolds, and wholesale massacres, authorized by the civil authority. Its infancy, indeed, was baptized in blood, as its youth and manhood were nourished by it, but it was the blood of persecuted Catholics, not of its own martyrs. Unlike the early Catholics, under pagan Rome, who conquered the world not by slaying but by being slain, Protestants have made all their conquests by killing, and attempted to secure their conquests by penal codes against Catholics, which would have afforded many valuable hints to a Nero, a Decius, or a Diocletian, and this, too, while they openly acknowledged that salvation was attainable in the Catholic communion!

The relaxation of these codes, either by a formal repeal or by suffering them to fall into desuetude, and the consequent partial toleration of the Catholic worship in Protestant countries, have operated seriously to the disadvantage of Protestantism; which could never stand a moment before its Catholic opponent, when it had not taken the precaution to dig out that opponent's tongue, and to bind him hand and foot. In an open field, with fair play, it never gained, and never could gain, any thing, but a shameful defeat, and Great Britain, while we are writing, confirms it, by proposing to re-enforce, or to re-enact, her old penal code against Catholics. In itself, Protestantism never had any strength, and it is never able in a fair argument to make

even a show of defending itself. Hence everywhere it shrinks from argument, if there is any prospect of a reply. It cannot be coaxed or shamed into a discussion with Catholicity on equal terms, and now that it has no longer the strong arm of the civil law to fell its opponent, it resorts solely to petty squibs, to gross calumnies, or coarse vituperations, and the exhibition of obscene Leahys and Maria Monks. But these things after a while lose their savor, and its resources fail. What shall 'it do? Its sole strength—after the ignorance of the multitude, the gullibility inherent in all genuine Protestants, the pride of the human heart, and the depraved tastes, instincts, and passions of human nature—is and always has been in the civil government, and just in proportion as that abandons it, it dwindles into an insignificant sect, or lapses into the lowest form of sadduceeism and gentilism. So true is this, and so rapid have been the decline of Protestantism and the growth of Catholicity under the relaxation of the old penal codes, that we expect to see efforts speedily made in all Protestant nations to revive them.

In point of fact, in those Protestant nations which profess to tolerate Catholicity, as well as in this country, which professes to recognize its equal rights, the state is constantly exerting its force in favor of Protestants, and against Catholics. It is still the state that supports Protestantism, and its whole political and social action is directed against the church. It liberally endows Protestant institutions of learning, taxes Catholics to support schools, to which in comparatively few instances can Catholics with a good conscience send their children, and even in liberal Massachusetts refuses to grant a simple charter of incorporation to a Catholic college. The whole system of state education, now so earnestly insisted on, and which no one can oppose without being charged with opposing education itself, is only insisted on because it is believed to favor infidelity, that is, Protestantism, and check the growth of Catholicity. The various philanthropic institutions, Farm Schools, Houses of Reformation, Normal Schools, and the like, are protected and favored by the state, solely with a view to the suppression of Popery and the preservation of Protestantism. But bad as these all are, and as much as the state may do through them, Catholicity, if tolerated at all, spreads and will spread. The knowing amongst Protestants see it, and, as they have relaxed nothing in their hatred of the church, we may ex-

pect them ere long to demand more efficient and stringent measures against us. But we are pretty sure that it is too late for them, even if they obtain such measures, to succeed.

Our reason for thinking it too late for the revival or enforcement of the old penal codes with success, is not only in the actual decline of Protestantism, but in the new and imposing attitude assumed by Catholicity. Two years ago we were told from Protestant pulpit and press that it was all over with Popery. The Holy Father was in exile, and the capital of the Catholic world was in the hands of a ruthless demagogy, of infidel ruffians, paid by Protestant contributions, and sworn to overthrow the Catholic Church. All Europe was in commotion, social order was broken up, and it seemed that the civilized world was abandoned to the red republicans and socialists, the emissaries of hell, and the determined enemies of God and man, of the church and of the state. Two years have passed, and the Holy Father is restored to his temporal possessions, the chains with which civil despotism in France and Austria, Spain and Portugal, had bound the spiritual power are nearly all broken, and the church, arising from the servile posture in which she had been bound, resumes her pristine energy, and addresses the nations in her free, bold, and commanding tone, which the world has not heard before during these last three hundred years. England, out of hatred to Catholicity, fostered the conspiracy of Mazzini, and sent a cabinet minister to excite rebellion in all Italy, and the church answers to her insolence by the National Council of Thurles, and the re-establishment of the English Catholic hierarchy, with Cardinal Wiseman at its head. In France, we have, after so many years' silence, once more the free voice of the church, and we see the state kneeling at her feet and imploring her to save French society from anarchy and total destruction. "The Gallican liberties" have become only a faint reminiscence, and the Gallican Church feels that her only safety is in filial submission to the chair of Peter. In Austria, the noble and pious young emperor has given the death-blow to Josephism, and restored to religion her freedom. Spain recalls her exiled prelates, and Portugal yields to the wishes of the Holy See. Catholic nations awake from their slumbers, shake off the timidity which had for centuries paralyzed their efforts, and on all sides Protestantism is assailed as it never has been before. It had brought all Europe to the verge of ruin; it had well-

nigh precipitated the whole civilized world into barbarism, and the stern voice of indignant nations is heard calling it to stand forth and show cause why judgment shall not be executed against it. And it has no answer to give. Here is what encourages us. Catholics are becoming Catholics, are beginning to feel, as amid the disasters of so many centuries they had not dared feel, that God is for them, and no enemy can prevail against them. This is all that was ever wanting to make an end of Protestantism, or at least to compel it to retire into some dark corners, to be forgotten save by the antiquarian, or the curious traveller delighting to detect the remains of lost tribes.

Undoubtedly the church in this world must always be the church militant, and we are never to expect her to be entirely free from either internal or external enemies. Her life through the ages is and must be the life of the individual believer, that of constant vigilance and unremitted warfare. Perfect peace and security are not to be attained to in this world; the victory is fully gained only at the end, and the triumph is reserved for heaven. Nevertheless, as her heavenly Spouse visits from time to time the faithful soul with sweet and ineffable consolations, so does he visit and console his church; and it is not too much to believe, that he is about to visit and reward her fidelity with new consolations. We do not expect Protestantism, now mere carnal Judaism and heathenism, will wholly disappear from the face of the earth, but we do believe that its power is broken, and that it should no longer be regarded as a formidable opponent. The woman has bruised its head, and the good God is about to visit the nations more in mercy than in judgment. We Catholics, while we watch and pray, may take hope, that we have seen the darkest days, and that Christ, who loves his church and gave his life for her, descends to console her for her past sufferings, and for the insults she has recently received from her enemies. While we humble ourselves in the dust for our sins and short-comings, we may take new courage, and press forward with renewed ardor to the charge against the enraged but disheartened enemies of the Lord and of his immaculate spouse. Especially may we do so in this country, where we need nothing but courage, fidelity, and perseverance.

THE BIBLE AGAINST PROTESTANTS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1860.]

If we take into consideration the age or its dominant spirit and tendency, the controversy between Catholics and Protestants has ceased to be dogmatic, or to turn on particular theological doctrines; but we concede, at the same time, that there is a large class of Protestants with whom the controversy must still be theological. This class is large, and on its old ground relatively larger in some countries, and relatively smaller in others. In France and Germany, in Holland, Sweden, and Denmark it hardly exists; in Scotland, Ireland, England, the British colonies, and in the United States it is large, though relatively much smaller in the latter country than in Great Britain or Ireland, for the American mind is more logical, more courageous than the British mind, is less restrained by conventionalisms, old institutions, and traditions; and is more prompt to draw from its premises their last consequences. Still, in the American Protestant ranks there are, no doubt, large numbers who really have, or intend to have, some respect for Christianity as a supernatural order of life and immortality, and who are really disposed to accept Christian doctrine when made clear to their apprehension, and proved to them from the Holy Scriptures to have been taught by our Lord and his apostles.

To this class of Protestants the work before us, written some years ago by an Irish prelate, not now living, and of whose life and character we are ignorant, is adapted, and well adapted. It is clear and straightforward in its statements, courteous and liberal in its tone, sound and just in its views, strong and conclusive in its arguments. Dr. Shiel proves very clearly, to every Catholic mind at least, that the Bible is *against* Protestantism, and *for* Catholicity,

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* *The Bible against Protestantism and for Catholicity; evinced in a Conference between a Catholic, a Protestant (Episcopalian), and a Presbyterian.* By the Rt. Rev. Dr. Shiel, Roman Catholic Bishop. *To which is annexed an Appendix, proving that the "Reformed" Churches are destitute of any lawful Ministry.* Fifth edition, revised, corrected, and enlarged. Boston: 1859.

and establishes unanswerably, it seems to us, that if we accept the Bible as the revealed word of God, or as written by divine inspiration, we must accept the Catholic as the true, and the only true religion. But we are inclined to the opinion, that comparatively few Protestants of any denomination have sufficient confidence in the divine inspiration of the Scriptures to accept the Catholic Church on their authority. The great majority of them, we have no doubt, would sooner deny the divine authority of the Bible than embrace the Catholic religion, especially as they understand it. No doubt a great many Protestants have a really high esteem, perhaps a deep reverence, for the Holy Scriptures; but he knows little of them who believes that their loud professions of love and veneration of the sacred Book, are, in a vast majority of cases, any thing more than policy or affectation. The Protestant must have some idol to adore, and when he does not adore himself, he makes an idol of the Bible. He also wants something to keep him in countenance before the Catholic, as well as something to substitute for the church which he rejects and protests against. The Bible answers both of these purposes better than any thing else he has or can get. The Catholic, holding that the Bible is given by divine inspiration, cannot accuse him of having only human reason as long as he has the written word of God, or, if he acknowledges the Bible, of having no divine authority for his faith, at least theoretically. It serves him an admirable purpose in combating the Catholic. No Catholic can deny that the Bible contains the written word of God, or that we are all bound to believe whatever it teaches. Once get the notion afloat, that the church makes void the written word of God through her traditions, assumed to be only the traditions of men, and studiously keep the Bible concealed from Catholics, lest they discover the cheat, and he has us, in the estimation of the ignorant multitude, on the hip. It is, therefore, his policy to extol the Bible, to profess the profoundest reverence for it, and the firmest belief in it, and to represent us as having no respect for it, and a great dread of its circulation. Hence his charges against us of substituting the church for the Bible, human authority for divine authority, and the traditions of men for the word of God; and hence his eulogiums on the Bible, his Bible societies, and extraordinary efforts to multiply and circulate copies of the Bible in both Christian and un-Christian

lands. He makes in this a capital point, as he persuades himself, against us, and as he really would do, were the facts in the case precisely as he represents them. As it is, it is the best point the old-fashioned Protestant does or can make against the church. But, save as it can be used with effect against Catholics, we must not suppose that, in general, he really cares any more for the Bible itself, than he does for a last year's almanac.

The Protestant professing to own allegiance to the Bible only considers himself in our days a freeman, and counts us who recognize the authority of the church, miserable and abject slaves. The reason for this is, that he holds that he has in the Bible the words and the authority of God, while we in the church have only the words and authority of men, and sometimes of men remarkable neither for their intelligence nor their virtue. He, however, in this concedes, by implication at least, a very true and just principle, that subjection to God or divine authority is freedom, and subjection to mere human authority is slavery. This is much, and we should be happy to find Protestants always and everywhere recognizing and insisting on it. We concede very willingly, that, if in the church we have only the words and authority of men, we are, in being subjected to her, only miserable slaves, and that the Protestant, in laboring to emancipate us from our spiritual thraldom, deserves our gratitude. But suppose, that in the teachings of the church we really have, as every Catholic believes, the words and the authority of God, we, in being subjected to her, are as much freemen as Protestants in being subjected to the written word, if subjected to it they really are. If the Protestant answers that God cannot give us his word and his authority through men, we ask him how he can say he has the words and the authority of God in the Bible, since the Bible itself was given us only through men, men, if you will, who spake only as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. If he has the words and authority of God in the Bible, nothing renders it impossible for us to have them in the teachings of the church.

The Protestant, also, makes in his own mind perhaps, and in the minds of the unreflecting, a point against us in assuming that he is free in his belief, while we, being bound to believe whatever authority commands us to believe, are slaves in ours. But can he believe the Bible is the word of God, and yet hold that he is free to disbelieve it, or to be-

lieve any thing contrary to what it teaches? If not, how can he be more free in his belief, or in his faith, than we? Is the authority of the Bible, in his opinion, less authority, or less stringent, than the authority of the church? If he believes that in the Bible he has the word of God, he has no more right or liberty to contradict it, than we have to contradict the church. Supposing, then, that he really believes the Bible to be what he alleges, he believes in principle on authority just as much as we do. No doubt, he fancies that in rejecting the authority of the church, he is rejecting all authority in matters of faith, and is free to follow his private judgment,—at least the Protestant of to-day so fancies, though Luther, Calvin, and their associates never pretended to any thing of the sort. The so-called reformers were as far removed as possible from avowing in principle the modern Protestant doctrine of private judgment. They never asserted the principles of free examination, and never objected to the authority of the church because it was authority, and in matters of faith there should be no authority. They claimed to set the authority of the church aside, by what they alleged is a higher authority,—to wit, the authority of the written word. In the written word we have, said they, the authority of God himself,—the supreme authority, which you and we are alike bound to obey. The definitions of popes and councils have in themselves no authority, and must be brought to the test of Scripture. The teachings of popes and councils, especially in later times, cannot abide that test, and therefore we reject them. In practice they may have asserted private judgment, because they decided on their own private authority, that popes and councils have contradicted the teachings of the Scriptures; but in theory they maintained simply the authority of the written word in opposition to that of the church, and they no more permitted any one to dissent from the Bible, than Catholics admit the right of dissent from the church. Calvin caused Michael Servetus to be burnt over a fire made of green wood, for heresy, and wrote and published a pamphlet in defence of the right of the magistrate to burn heretics. Just as much authority is asserted by Protestants, that is, by those Protestants who profess to regard the Bible as the word of God, as is asserted by Catholics. And the Protestant, if he really holds himself bound to believe what the Bible teaches, because it teaches it, has, in rejecting the church, by no means emancipated himself from authority in matters of faith.

The gain of the Protestant in regard to free faith, in his sense of the term, is not in the theoretical assertion of private judgment, or in the theoretical denial of authority, but in the fact that if he transfers the authority from the church to the Bible, he is bound to no particular interpretation of the written word. The Bible, as a matter of fact, lends itself to a variety of interpretations; and as these interpretations are the work of human reason, the Protestant has the right to follow the one he prefers. This is the theory. But the practice is different, for in practice each sect claims and exercises over its members as much authority as the church claims and exercises over her members; and the most the dissenting member can do, is to change his sect, or create a new sect. This authority exercised by the sect, is on Protestant principles purely human, and therefore the Protestants subjected to it are really slaves in their faith or opinion. Hence we find in the Protestant world, those who are determined to be subjected in matters of faith to no human authority, join no sect or denomination, and remain, as the term goes, "Nothingarians," sometimes called the "Big Church," and in our country including by far the larger number of the population. But waiving this, it is evident, since the Protestant confesses himself bound by the authority of the Bible, if the Bible were as clear, as express, and as definite in the statement of what is or is not to be believed, as is the church in her teaching and definitions, that the Protestant rule would give no more scope for private judgment, and secure no more liberty of belief than the Catholic rule.

No man believes the Bible, or takes it for authority in matters of faith, who believes that he is at liberty to reject any thing it really teaches. If he can ascertain exactly and precisely what it teaches, he must accept its doctrine, let it be what it may. He has no freedom, no option, no choice in the case. The Protestant, then, in case he can come at the true meaning of the Scriptures, has no more latitude of interpretation than the Catholic. What, then, in the way of freedom does he gain? He gains simply freedom from being tied down to the word of God in the exact sense intended by the Holy Ghost, or of escaping real submission to the word of God, through the vagueness or uncertainty of the letter, or while he admits the authority of God in general, of denying it in particular, recognizing no divine authority in matters of faith but the written word, and the

written word privately interpreted, binding him to no particular dogmas, he is free to dwell in vague generalities, and to appear to hold the Christian faith while he rejects every particular, definite Christian dogma. He gains the privilege of self-delusion, and, to some extent, of misleading others; practically, his rule binds him to believe the Christian religion in general, but nothing of Christianity in particular. His rule tells him where the revelation of God is deposited, but does not tell him what it is. His advantage over us is, that while our faith is and must be precise, exact, definite, his is and must be loose, vague, and indeterminate. This is the chief ground, we apprehend, of the attachment of the Protestant in our day to what he calls the Bible rule. If he really wished to know and believe the word of God in its true and exact sense, he would feel that his rule is defective and wholly inadequate; but, wishing to believe the word of God without believing any thing particular, that is, to believe and not to believe it at the same time, he finds it exactly to his purpose, and is able to make out some semblance of a case in his own favor when arguing against us before an ignorant or a prejudiced audience—a very great advantage certainly!

The Catholic, no doubt, holds the Bible to be the written word of God, and he is ready to concede at once, that if the church were to contradict it, her teaching would be false. But before one can establish the fact of the contradiction, he must know exactly what is the true sense of Scripture, and what it is the church really teaches. What is the true sense of Scripture the Protestant has no infallible means of knowing, and of what the church really teaches, he is, in our days, for the most part ignorant. How is he, then, to establish the fact that the church in her teaching contradicts the written word? "She contradicts the meaning he gives to the written word." Be it so. But how does the Protestant know that the meaning he gives is the true meaning? Or how does he know that if he rightly understood the written word, there would not be a perfect coincidence of doctrine between it and the teaching of the church? He says there is not, she says there is, and why, at the very lowest, is not her assertion as good as his? One thing is certain, that no instance, in the course of three hundred years,—we might say in the course of eighteen hundred years,—of a contradiction between her teaching and that of the written word has been adduced, and all the

pretended instances amount to nothing, because they all depend on interpretation. The Scriptures bid us beware of the traditions of men; no doubt of it: the church commands us to hold fast the traditions of faith, whether they have come down to us in the written or unwritten word; therefore she contradicts the Scriptures. Not at all. She does not command us to hold fast the traditions of *men*, but the traditions of *faith*,—divine and apostolic traditions; which may be done without accepting the sort of traditions censured by the written word. Our Lord speaks of those who "through their traditions make void the law;" but it does not follow, therefore, that the traditions the church requires us to hold fast are contrary to the written word. Throughout, the Protestant argument to prove the contradiction is a mere sophism, and for the most part a very shallow sophism into the bargain.

The Protestant always assumes that, in submitting to the authority of the church, we submit to a purely human authority. Can he tell us why the authority of the church is any more human than that of the Bible? In either case the divine reaches us only through the medium of the human, and if the human medium, through which the teachings of the church reach us, makes them human, the same must be said of the Holy Scriptures, for they come to us only through a human medium. If you say that the Bible is the word of God, notwithstanding the human medium through which it comes to us, then why not the teachings of the church? The same facts and arguments that establish the authority of the men who wrote the Bible to speak in the name of God, establish the authority of the church to speak in his name. Before you can claim the Bible as the word of God, you must prove that God revealed its contents to its writers, and assisted them to write without error or mistake what he revealed to them. This at the most is all that we have to prove in regard to the church. If he deposited the faith revealed with the church, and assists her to teach it, without error or mistake, then we can conclude, as the Protestant does in the case of the Bible, that what she teaches is the word of God. He, before he can conclude that the Bible is the word of God, must establish the inspiration and authority of the apostles, and that is all we need to establish in order to prove the authority of the church to keep, teach, and declare the divine word. He cannot take it for granted, then, that our church has only human authority.

He must prove it,—a thing he cannot do; for what is false can never be proved.

On this question of authority there is much misapprehension. The authority of the church is twofold: her authority as teacher of the word, and her authority as spiritual governor of the faithful and administrator of ecclesiastical affairs. Nobody pretends that, in this latter capacity, she is infallible, or that her prelates are necessarily always wise, or even just. In matters of administration, subjected to human prudence, we obey the ecclesiastical authority, as the legitimate authority, for God's sake; but we are not obliged to believe *ex animo* that all its acts are the wisest and best possible. We do not hold ourselves bound to believe that no bishop ever commits a mistake in the administration of his diocese, or that no pope even has ever fallen into an error of policy in his various and numerous relations with temporal powers, or that no pope has ever been unhappy in his selection of a man to be bishop, or to be made a prince of the church. We are not bound to believe that no prelate has ever misused his power, or that no pope has ever made a mistake in applying the "power of the keys." It is not ours to judge our ecclesiastical superiors; it is ours to obey them, to submit to them as legitimate authorities, unless they command us to do wrong, to do what the law of God forbids. Then, indeed, we are not bound to obedience, and we may always know infallibly whether what is commanded is or is not contrary to the law of God, for the church, in her capacity of witness, teacher, and judge of the faith, is infallible in declaring what the law of God does and what it does not forbid. In case what is commanded only requires us to suffer wrong, we are to obey for God's sake, and trust to him to redress our grievances; because it is more for the interest of religion that we should suffer injustice, than that we should endeavor to right ourselves by rebelling against the established order; and because to suffer wrong for Christ's sake is never an evil but a great good to him who suffers it. The evil is in *doing*, not in *receiving* wrong.

But, in the sense of teacher, the church is infallible, and is never permitted by Almighty God to commit the slightest error or mistake. Yet, even here, Protestants rarely do us justice. It is no part of the Catholic faith that the church is inspired to reveal truth, or that, in regard to faith and morals, she has in herself any legislative authority. She

can only declare the will of her Lord, and make only that to be of faith which he has revealed and committed to her keeping. The pope has recently declared the Immaculate Conception of Mary to be a Catholic dogma, but only on the ground that it is a doctrine of divine revelation, contained in the original deposit of faith. She has no arbitrary authority in the case, and is herself as much bound by the law of God as the lowliest of her children. What was not revealed by our Lord, and committed to her by the apostles, she cannot make an article or a dogma of faith. She cannot make faith. She can only witness the revelation, interpret it, promulgate it, as teacher, and define or declare and apply it as judge. In doing this, she is, according to Catholic faith, infallible. We believe, on her authority, that this or that has been divinely revealed, but we do not believe, on her authority, that it is true. We believe that on the veracity of God himself, and know by reason that God is true, truth itself, and can neither deceive nor be deceived, and therefore whatever he says cannot but be true. Hence, in his act of faith, the Catholic says: "O, my God, I firmly believe all the sacred truths the Holy Catholic Church believes and teaches, *because thou hast revealed them*, who canst neither deceive, nor be deceived." The ground of our faith is not the teaching of the church, but the revelation of God, and therefore in the last analysis we believe on the authority of God alone, not on the authority of the church. The Protestant professes to believe the Bible because it is the word of God, and he believes it is the word of God on the authority of its authors, who he believes were inspired to reveal the word of God, and bear witness to it; and the Catholic believes the teachings of the church because the church says so, and believes what in this respect she says, because he believes her divinely appointed, and supernaturally assisted by the Holy Ghost to bear witness to and declare what God has revealed. The authority of the church to teach is authority to teach what God has revealed. All we want to enable us to make an act of faith is the certain testimony to the fact of revelation, and this must be supernaturally furnished, and can at least be as well furnished by a divinely protected and assisted teaching church, always and everywhere present and living, as by a book written in a language unknown to the mass of the faithful, and of the fidelity of its translation into the vernacular of any people, few are or can be in a condition to

judge. Suppose, then, the Catholic to be right, since subjection to God abridges no one's natural liberty, there is and can be no incompatibility between the authority asserted by Catholics for the church in faith and morals, and the most perfect moral and intellectual freedom. We have all the freedom a Protestant, who really holds himself bound to believe the Bible, can pretend to have; and the authority we assert for the church, tends, to say the least, no more to enslave the mind than that which the Protestant asserts for the written word.

The pretence of the Protestant that the church seeks to prevent the free circulation of the Holy Scriptures, or to conceal them from the faithful lest they should discover the discrepancy between them and her teaching, we think is a very silly pretence, and certainly does not argue that extraordinary human wisdom and sagacity on her part that Protestant writers usually give her credit for. Certainly the church, if she believed there is a real discrepancy between their teaching and hers, would never claim both as the revelation of God. Nothing is more certain than that the church holds the Scriptures to be divinely inspired and that they are the written word of God. It is, however, equally certain that she holds that what she teaches and requires her children to believe, is also the word of God, and it is only on the condition that it is the word of God, what God himself has revealed and commanded, that she requires her children to believe and obey it. She of course knows enough to know that the word of God cannot contradict the word of God. How, then, if she believes that what she teaches is contrary to what the Bible teaches, or the reverse, explain the fact that she teaches that both are the word of God? There would be little human wisdom or even human cunning in that. The fact that she presents both as the word of God, is ample proof that in her belief they do not contradict each other. She can then have no motive, like that alleged, for keeping, as it is pretended, the Bible from the people. Believing in no discrepancy between the two, she cannot fear any discrepancy will be detected. If, then, she places any restriction on the free circulation of the Scriptures, it must be for some other reason than any fear of that sort, and that reason may possibly be to her credit, not to her discredit. It may be a well-founded fear that, aided by Protestant glosses and ingenuity, the ignorant, the speculative, and the unstable may wrest the Scriptures to

their own destruction. We do not find, however, that any restriction is, or ever has been, placed on the free circulation or the reading of the Scriptures in the original languages, or in the Latin Vulgate. The restriction applies, we believe, only to unauthorized versions in Latin and to translations in the modern languages; and in these cases mainly because these versions are either unfaithful, or made from a corrupt text, because they do not represent the written word truly, and because they may be hurtful to the faith or conscience of their readers. There is no restriction on reading the Scriptures in an approved version, unless in the case of those who give indications to the pastor, director, or confessor, that they will abuse them, and pervert their sense to their own grave injury. Whatever restriction is placed on the reading of them, is placed to bring it within the rule of discipline, subject to the wisdom and discretion of those charged with the cure of souls. Yet even this restriction is practically little more than nominal. The version approved by our prelates, circulates as freely among Catholics in this country, as the version authorized by King James of England and Scotland does among English-speaking Protestants.

The notion that all that is needed to make Catholics turn their backs on their spiritual mother, and embrace the Protestant movement, is the free reading of the Holy Scriptures, is not worthy of any serious refutation. Catholics had, and freely read, the Scriptures for fourteen hundred years before Protestantism was born, and read far more devoutly than Protestants now read them, without finding in them any thing repugnant to their Catholic faith. And while we can name several instances, within our own knowledge, in which by reading the Scriptures, even in the Protestant version, Protestants have arrived at a belief in the Catholic Church, we have yet to learn the first well-authenticated instance of a Catholic becoming a Protestant by reading the Bible alone. The story told of Luther and the Bible he one day came across in the convent library is too incredible and absurd for any sensible person really to believe. Men never leave the church and embrace Protestantism from simple love of truth, or respect for the written word of God. There is always some other motive operating. One man has got offended at his bishop, believes, justly or unjustly, that great wrong has been done him, and in his anger becomes blinded to the truth, loses his judgment, charges upon the church

what is due only to the individual, or perhaps to his own morbid fancy, takes for the use what is only an abuse of power in a single prelate, and thinks it will be a capital revenge to renounce the church, without stopping to reflect that all he makes sure of, by so doing, is his own damnation. Another finds that he cannot, without more violence to the flesh than he has courage to practise, preserve the chastity he has pledged, and so becomes a Protestant, and takes unto himself a wife. Another finds that the church imposes too much restraint on his licentious thoughts; and, with a heart hardened and intellect darkened by his passions, abandons his Mother, and gives himself up to "strange women." Others find the church in the way of their worldly schemes, their ambitious projects, or their desire for power and distinction, and they cast her aside as the "Mystery of Iniquity." Some are simply seduced into error by artful and designing associates, who take advantage of their ignorance and simplicity. Others, for the lack of moral courage to see their children drop dead from starvation before their eyes, yield to the hot soup held out to tempt them. We believe it is true that the Bible-readers have made a few perverts in Ireland and elsewhere, but the proffered soup has had more to do with it than any thing read from the Bible. The attempt of apostates to justify their apostasy by appeals to the Holy Scriptures is usually an afterthought. They first fall away, and then try to find in the Bible something which they can, with a little ingenuity, explain into a justification of what they have already done, at least done in spirit and in intention.

The illustrious author of the book before us clearly proves that the Bible, honestly interpreted, is against Protestantism and for Catholicity. The multiplicity of Protestant sects, all appealing alike to the Bible, and lustily crying out, "the Bible, the Bible alone is the religion of Protestants," proves conclusively, that it is impossible to interpret the Bible throughout in accordance with any scheme of Protestantism. The Calvinists have succeeded, in our judgment, better than most others, in wresting the Bible in accordance with their views, and they probably have more vitality, such as it is, than any other Protestant sect. Of all Protestant theories, Calvinism, though the most revolting, is the least inconsistent with itself. The real intellect of the Protestant world has been, and is on the Calvinistic side. Luther is more amiable, more of a free, bold, dashing nature than John Calvin, but he never was his intellectual peer, never had any

thing of Calvin's clearness of mind, concentrated thought, vast constructive genius, or rigid logic. Calvinism is, at times, terribly consistent, and is able to pervert a considerable portion of Scripture in its favor; but it has never been able to make the Scriptures teach that God is the author of sin, that Christ died for the elect only, that man by the fall lost his free will, that a man has free will though he has no freedom of choice, or that he chooses freely when he has no power to choose the contrary, that justification is purely forensic, and by faith alone, without works, that grace is irresistible and inamissible, that God causes men to sin necessarily, that he may damn them justly, and various kindred doctrines. If the Calvinists fail, which among the Protestant sects can hope to succeed? The fact is, no Protestant sect can find any more than certain detached passages of Scripture in its favor. How, then, pretend that the Bible is in favor of Protestantism? On the other hand, the right reverend author shows that the Bible, interpreted by the light of Catholic tradition, harmonizes throughout with the teaching of the church. The Catholic student may find texts that are obscure to him, the full meaning of which he does not comprehend, but he never finds a passage that contradicts his Catholic faith, or that he cannot without violence harmonize with it. This, the weakest light in which we can view the question, the light the least favorable to Catholics, is sufficient of itself to show that the Bible is *against* Protestantism, and *for* Catholicity.

Dr. Shiel has proved, as clearly as any thing can be proved from Scripture, all the principal doctrines of the Catholic Church; but we think his work would have proved them more satisfactorily to the minds of non-Catholic readers, if, instead of proving each doctrine as a separate and independent doctrine, he had presented the several doctrines in their proper theological relations one to another. Few Protestants have belief enough in the holy Scriptures to accept an isolated doctrine on the authority of single texts, however numerous and express they may be, or sufficient philosophical culture and theological knowledge to detect under an analytic statement of Catholic doctrines and dogmas the real Catholic synthesis. The analytical method of the schools, however convenient to the professor, while it renders the mind acute, and is well fitted to silence an opponent, is but ill fitted to give one a comprehensive view of Catholicity as a living whole, or to convince an unbeliever of its truth. All

the parts of Catholicity have a mutual relation, and so grow out of and fit into each other, and lend each other such mutual support, that when they are presented in their real synthesis, they carry conviction of themselves, and little proof is required beyond what the schools call *ratio theologica*, or theological reason. We may cite as many authorities and proof texts as we please for the worship of Mary and the saints, but if we fail to show its reason in the mystery of the Incarnation, we shall fail to convince a Protestant of its justice and propriety. We may prove conclusively from the holy Scriptures, from the fathers, and from universal tradition, the authority of the church to teach, but unless we show the relation of the church to the Incarnation, and her place in the economy of salvation, as an essential part of one grand *scheme*, if we may use the word, of mediatorial grace, of one grand whole, of which the Incarnation is the principle, and the glory of the God-man, the end, the central life, from which life flows out and animates the whole as a living organism, we shall produce hardly a perceptible effect on a non-Catholic mind. So of any other Catholic doctrine. All belong to and grow out of one grand principle of mediation. Accept what St. Paul says: "There is one mediator between God and men, the MAN Christ Jesus," and you have bound yourself logically to accept every thing in Catholicity, even the holy water and the veneration of relics. Christ had a human body—the Word was made *flesh*,—and his body has, by virtue of its union with his soul and divinity, a part or office in the grand work of Christian mediation. Man's body is a *résumé* of the whole material world. Man, as the ancients maintained, is a microcosm, a world in miniature. A rational animal, he has at once the nature of angels and the nature of animals; and by the union of soul and body, he contains in himself the elements of the whole vegetable and mineral worlds, and hence it is that he is declared to be the lord of the lower creation. All material nature was assumed by our Lord when he assumed a human body, and therefore it is, that in its sphere and degree, all matter may participate in the work of the Mediator. Hence the apostle tells us, "Every creature of God may be blessed by prayer." Present Catholicity as a whole, and explain it from its central principle, and show the relation and dependencies of its parts, and their mutual consistency, and there will be little more to be done, for then whatever proves one point proves the whole, and a single

Scriptural hint or allusion becomes sufficient to establish any particular doctrine.

There is a wide difference between the Catholic fundamental conception and the Protestant fundamental conception of Christianity. Catholics and Protestants do not start from the same point, run along together for a certain distance, and then diverge in opposite directions. Their starting-point is not one and the same. One class of Protestants see in Christianity only certain gracious helps to man in his work of self-culture, or in attaining the highest moral, intellectual, and social development of his nature. To this class belonged the late Dr. Channing of Boston, and virtually to the same belong the adherents of what is called the New Theology, in Germany, only these run a little further into natural mysticism. The other principal class of Protestants admit, in words, at least, the Incarnation, but in their scheme, as we have elsewhere said, it serves only one single purpose, that of making an atonement for sin. At most, God becomes incarnate in order to expiate man's transgression, and to repair the damage done by sin. All in the Gospel is directed to this one end. Man has sinned; God looks at him as a sinner, as having forfeited life, and incurred death, spiritual and physical, temporal and eternal, and would forgive him, and receive him to his favor, but he cannot, because his justice forbids it, and cries out, Die he or justice must! Terrible dilemma! If man dies, mercy is sacrificed; if he is saved, justice is sacrificed. What shall be done? The Son answers: "I will assume man's nature and die on the cross, and satisfy the demands of justice. Those demands satisfied, Thou, O Father, mayst forgive him, and receive him to thy favor." Well pleased, the Father accepts the sacrifice of his Son, in whose blood he quenches the fiery darts of his wrath, and now giving full flow to his mercy, pardons the sinner for Christ's sake. Beyond this, the Protestant theology, as far as we have ever learned it, recognizes nothing for the Son of Man to do, and nothing that man receives from the Incarnation.

This is not Catholic doctrine. Catholic theologians may, indeed, differ on the question: Whether if man had not sinned God would have become incarnate? But the very fact that such a question can be debated among them, proves that their theology differs widely from the Protestant. The Protestant can ask no such question, for if men had not sinned there could have been on his theology no motive or

reason for the Incarnation. The tendency at present among our theologians, is to defend the opinion that, if man had not sinned God would still have become incarnate, though he would not have suffered on the cross, as there would have been no expiation needed. The other opinion, perhaps the more common one, is, that if man had not sinned, God would not have become incarnate, and so far coincides with the Protestant view; but they who hold this opinion hold, what Protestants do not, that the Incarnation was not designed simply as the condition of making satisfaction for sin, and rendering it consistent with divine justice for God to pardon the sinner, but that its principal design was to elevate human nature to be the nature of God, and to make sin the occasion to the believer of a superabounding good. Hence the church breaks out in her ecstasy on Holy Saturday: *O felix culpa, quæ talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptorem.* Man having sinned, God not only provides through the Incarnation for the complete satisfaction of divine justice, but also, through the assumption of human nature, makes man's sin the occasion of ennobling man and elevating him to an intimate union even by nature with himself, so that where sin abounded grace superabounded, and the gain, through the obedience of Christ, the second Adam, might infinitely exceed the loss through the disobedience of the first Adam. Sin is thus overruled, and made the occasion, through the power, the wisdom, and the love of God, of supernatural beatitude.

But whichever of the two views we adopt, the end and effect of the Incarnation are the same, and both agree in this, that the satisfaction for man's transgression and the reparation of the damages of sin, are not the only nor even the principal end of the Incarnation. Certainly, without the Incarnation, complete satisfaction to divine justice for man's sin could not have been made; but God, without such satisfaction, could, had he so chosen, have pardoned man's sin, on simple repentance and reformation of life; but he did not choose to do so, for he would do something infinitely better for man. The sin is blotted out by our Lord's cross and passion, but to blot out the sin was not the principal end of the Incarnation. The principal end of the Incarnation was in satisfying for sin, if we take one opinion, the elevation of human nature to union with God, to create in men a new and higher order of life, and to secure the believer, persevering to the end, supernatural beatitude, or a participation in the nature and beatitude of God,

or, according to the other opinioin, the principal end of the Incarnation is this same elevation and beatitude, but in securing this end it makes by the way satisfaction to divine justice, and blots out man's transgression, by infusing into his heart supernatural grace and enabling him to merit a supernatural reward. In either case sin is condoned and atoned for, but the mind is not fixed exclusively nor primarily on this fact, but on the unbounded love of God, which not only loves us while we are yet sinners, and procures us satisfaction and pardon for our sins, but elevates us to a higher order of life, and an intimate blissful union with God himself. The believer bewails and detests his sin which is so offensive to God, and which has caused our Lord such bitter agony, but he is still more affected by the infinite love and goodness of God, and his joy in the divine mercy overcomes even his sorrow for sin.

Now, take this Catholic view, and consider that the end of the Incarnation is the glory of the God-man in the new creation, or as the principle and end of a new and supernatural order of life and immortality, through the mediation of the human nature, hypostatically united to the divine, and you will see that it is not only very different from the Protestant view, but that all Catholic doctrine and practice centres in it, grows out of it, is presupposed or authorized by it. The whole is coherent and self-consistent, and nothing can be added to it or taken from it, without marring its beauty and destroying its symmetry. Few minds can take it in as a whole, without being convinced that man himself could never have invented it, that priests and monks could never have forged it, even little by little, for human reason, normally or abnormally exercised, never could, without supernatural revelation, have conceived its central or generative principle. Show the Protestant, as you may, that all Catholic doctrine and discipline forms only a complete and symmetrical whole, and grows, legitimately, out of the central fact of Christianity, and you remove his objections, and compel his intellectual assent to its truth and sanctity. So presenting Catholicity, is what we mean by presenting it in its synthesis, in its genetic, not merely in its analytic character.

The Christian order, though it presupposes the natural, is itself supernatural, and natural reason could never of itself have attained to a conception of it. But although supernatural, it is an order created by infinite wisdom and intelligence,

as well as byinfinite love, and therefore is infinitely logical in all its relations within itself. Our reason, as a copy or imitation of the divine reason, placed by revelation on its plane, can, by its own light and strength, discover and respond, at least to some extent, to its interior logic. We cannot comprehend the whole, but we can apprehend the relation of article with article, or dogma with dogma, and the relation of practical with speculative, or moral with dogmatic theology. Hence we are capable of constructing, with revealed *data*, the science of theology, in which all in faith and morals is co-ordinated and placed in its real relation to the fundamental principle of the new creation. All Catholic theologians recognize the unity of all Catholic faith, but their analytical method of teaching it does not always enable the learner to perceive it, and very few of our popular controversial works enable non-Catholics to catch even a glimpse of it. To them these works show no intrinsic reason why the church should be papal, and they seem to offer them only an extrinsic authority for any article of our faith. We think we should be more successful if we changed somewhat our method, and instead of relying solely on extrinsic authority, we endeavored to exhibit, more clearly and distinctly, the reasons that are in the Catholic system itself for Catholic dogma and Catholic morals.

END OF VOLUME VII.

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